Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Dynamic Predicate Logic.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (1):39-100.
    This paper is devoted to the formulation and investigation of a dynamic semantic interpretation of the language of first-order predicate logic. The resulting system, which will be referred to as ‘dynamic predicate logic’, is intended as a first step towards a compositional, non-representational theory of discourse semantics. In the last decade, various theories of discourse semantics have emerged within the paradigm of model-theoretic semantics. A common feature of these theories is a tendency to do away with the principle of compositionality, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   226 citations  
  • The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases.Irene Heim - 1982 - Dissertation, UMass Amherst
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   400 citations  
  • Modal Subordination and Pronominal Anaphora in Discourse.Craige Roberts - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (6):683 - 721.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  • Judge Dependence, Epistemic Modals, and Predicates of Personal Taste.Tamina Stephenson - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (4):487--525.
    Predicates of personal taste (fun, tasty) and epistemic modals (might, must) share a similar analytical difficulty in determining whose taste or knowledge is being expressed. Accordingly, they have parallel behavior in attitude reports and in a certain kind of disagreement. On the other hand, they differ in how freely they can be linked to a contextually salient individual, with epistemic modals being much more restricted in this respect. I propose an account of both classes using Lasersohn’s (Linguistics and Philosophy 28: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   146 citations  
  • A New Solution to Moore's Paradox.Anthony S. Gillies - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (3):237-250.
    Moore's paradox pits our intuitions about semantic oddnessagainst the concept of truth-functional consistency. Most solutions tothe problem proceed by explaining away our intuitions. But``consistency'' is a theory-laden concept, having different contours indifferent semantic theories. Truth-functional consistency is appropriateonly if the semantic theory we are using identifies meaning withtruth-conditions. I argue that such a framework is not appropriate whenit comes to analzying epistemic modality. I show that a theory whichaccounts for a wide variety of semantic data about epistemic modals(Update Semantics) buys (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • What Might Be the Case After a Change in View.Anthony S. Gillies - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (2):117-145.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Context Probabilism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - In M. Aloni, Maria Aloni, Vadim Kimmelmann, Floris Roelofson, Galit W. Sassoon, Katrin Schulz & Matthijs Westera (eds.), Logic, Language, and Meaning: 18th Amsterdam Colloquium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 19-21, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Berlin: Springer. pp. 12-21.
    We investigate a basic probabilistic dynamic semantics for a fragment containing conditionals, probability operators, modals, and attitude verbs, with the aim of shedding light on the prospects for adding probabilistic structure to models of the conversational common ground.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.
    Seth Yalcin has pointed out some puzzling facts about the behaviour of epistemic modals in certain embedded contexts. For example, conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and it might not be raining, … ’ sound unacceptable, unlike conditionals that begin ‘If it is raining and I don’t know it, … ’. These facts pose a prima facie problem for an orthodox treatment of epistemic modals as expressing propositions about the knowledge of some contextually specified individual or group. This paper (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Inquiry.R. Stalnaker - 1984 - Mind 94 (376):627-630.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   215 citations  
  • Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics.David I. Beaver - 2001 - CSLI Publications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
    Epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's paradox. I set out the puzzling phenomena, explain why a standard relational semantics for these operators cannot handle them, and recommend an alternative semantics. A pragmatics appropriate to the semantics is developed and interactions between the semantics, the pragmatics, and the definition of consequence are investigated. The semantics is then extended to probability operators. Some problems and prospects for probabilistic representations of content and context are explored.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   224 citations  
  • Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
    David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, "modal realism." He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   704 citations  
  • Epistemic Modals in Context.Andy Egan, John Hawthorne & Brian Weatherson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 131-170.
    A very simple contextualist treatment of a sentence containing an epistemic modal, e.g. a might be F, is that it is true iff for all the contextually salient community knows, a is F. It is widely agreed that the simple theory will not work in some cases, but the counterexamples produced so far seem amenable to a more complicated contextualist theory. We argue, however, that no contextualist theory can capture the evaluations speakers naturally make of sentences containing epistemic modals. If (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • CIA Leaks.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.
    Epistemic modals are standardly taken to be context-dependent quantifiers over possibilities. Thus sentences containing them get truth-values with respect to both a context and an index. But some insist that this relativization is not relative enough: `might'-claims, they say, only get truth-values with respect to contexts, indices, and—the new wrinkle—points of assessment (hence, CIA). Here we argue against such "relativist" semantics. We begin with a sketch of the motivation for such theories and a generic formulation of them. Then we catalogue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • Must . . . Stay . . . Strong!Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2010 - Natural Language Semantics 18 (4):351-383.
    It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is therefore quite (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • The Interpretation of Questions in Dialogue.Alex Lascarides & Nicholas Asher - unknown
    A semantic framework for interpreting dialogue should provide an account of the content that is mutually accepted by its participants. The acceptance by one agent of another’s contribution crucially involves the theory of what that contribution means; A’s acceptance of B’s contribution means that the content of B’s contribution must be integrated into A’s extant commitments.1 For assertions, traditionally assumed to express a proposition formalised as a set of possible worlds, it was clear how the integration should go: acceptance meant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Defaults in Update Semantics.Frank Veltman - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):221 - 261.
    The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   214 citations  
  • V—Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
    After presenting a simple expressivist account of reports of probabilistic judgements, I explore a classic problem for it, namely the Frege‐Geach problem. I argue that it is a problem not just for expressivism but for any reasonable account of ascriptions of graded judgements. I suggest that the problem can be resolved by appropriately modelling imprecise credences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   255 citations  
  • A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - In William Harper, Robert C. Stalnaker & Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs. Reidel. pp. 87-104.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Knowledge in Flux. Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Gärdenfors - 1988 - Studia Logica 49 (3):421-424.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   103 citations  
  • Epistemic Conditionals and Conditional Epistemics.Anthony S. Gillies - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):585–616.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   58 citations  
  • Meta-Agnosticism: Higher Order Epistemic Possibility.Roy Sorensen - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):777-784.
    In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (which relied on the implausible KK (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Knowledge in Flux.Henry E. Kyburg & Peter Gardenfors - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):519-521.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   88 citations  
  • An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 32-62.
    way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Nonindexical Contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
    Philosophers on all sides of the contextualism debates have had an overly narrow conception of what semantic context sensitivity could be. They have conflated context sensitivity (dependence of truth or extension on features of context) with indexicality (dependence of content on features of context). As a result of this conflation, proponents of contextualism have taken arguments that establish only context sensitivity to establish indexicality, while opponents of contextualism have taken arguments against indexicality to be arguments against context sensitivity. Once these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   156 citations  
  • On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If ).Anthony S. Gillies - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (3):325-349.
    What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs.Irene Heim - 1992 - Journal of Semantics 9 (3):183-221.
    Karttunen observed that, if the complement of an attitude sentence presupposes p, then that sentence as a whole presupposes that the attitude–holder believes p. I attempt to derive some representative instances of this generalization from suitable assumptions about the lexical semantics of attitude predicates. The enterprise is carried out in a framework of context change semantics, which incorporates Stalnaker's suggestion that presupposition projection results from the stepwise fashion in which information is updated in response to complex utterances. The empirical focus (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   141 citations  
  • The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.Fred Dretske - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363--378.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • More on Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):785-793.
    I respond to comments by David Barnett and Roy Sorensen on my paper ‘Epistemic Modals’.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Pragmatics.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):272--289.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   144 citations  
  • New Age Relativism and Epistemic Possibility: The Question of Evidence.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):262--283.
    What I am calling New Age Relativism is usually proposed as a thesis about the truth-conditions of utterances, where an utterance is an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type. Roughly, it is the view that, for certain discourses, whether an utterance is true depends not just on the context of its making—when, where, to whom, by whom, in what language, and so on—and the “circumstances of evaluation”—the state of the world in relevant respects—but also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Were, Would, Might and a Compositional Account of Counterfactuals.N. Asher & E. McCready - 2007 - Journal of Semantics 24 (2):93-129.
    This paper has two purposes. We first give a new dynamic account of epistemic modal operators that account for both their test-like behaviour with respect to whole information states and their capacity to induce quantificational dependencies across worlds (modal subordination). We then use this theory, together with an analysis of conditionals and irrealis moods, to give a fully compositional semantics of indicative and counterfactual conditionals. In our analysis, the distinction between counterfactual and indicative conditionals follows directly from the interaction between (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Epistemic Possibility.Paul Teller - 1972 - Philosophia 2 (4):303-320.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Vagueness, Truth and Logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   395 citations  
  • Presupposition and Accommodation in Update Semantics.Henk Zeevat - 1992 - Journal of Semantics 9 (4):379-412.
    A reconstruction is presented of van der Sandt's theory of presupposition in the framework of update semantics and extended to belief sentences. The resulting view is confronted with earlier approaches to presupposition (especially Heim's) in update semantics, concentrating on the approach to accommodation. It is shown in some detail that the anaphoric view of presupposition can be maintained for only a subclass of presuppositional triggers and must be given up for another class. The paper shows that the treatment of presuppositional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion.Andy Egan - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):1--22.
    I think that there are good reasons to adopt a relativist semantics for epistemic modal claims such as ``the treasure might be under the palm tree'', according to which such utterances determine a truth value relative to something finer-grained than just a world (or a <world, time> pair). Anyone who is inclined to relativise truth to more than just worlds and times faces a problem about assertion. It's easy to be puzzled about just what purpose would be served by assertions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   148 citations  
  • What 'Must' and 'Can' Must and Can Mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.
    In this paper I offer an account of the meaning of must and can within the framework of possible worlds semantics. The paper consists of two parts: the first argues for a relative concept of modality underlying modal words like must and can in natural language. I give preliminary definitions of the meaning of these words which are formulated in terms of logical consequence and compatibility, respectively. The second part discusses one kind of insufficiency in the meaning definitions given in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   235 citations  
  • Does 'Probably' Modify Sense?Huw Price - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):396 – 408.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Epistemic Possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   154 citations  
  • For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Isaac Levi - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Possibility.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (2):143-168.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   463 citations  
  • Kritik der reinen Vernunft.Immanuel Kant & Raymund Schmidt - 1924 - Annalen der Philosophie Und Philosophischen Kritik 4 (3):30-31.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Nonfactualism About Epistemic Modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something whose truth turns on how things are with the weather in the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with the weatherman’s state of mind in the world. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Epistemic Modals Are Assessment-Sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    By “epistemic modals,” I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like “necessarily,” “possibly,” and “probably,” adjectives like “necessary,” “possible,” and “probable,” and auxiliaries like “might,” “may,” “must,” and “could.” It is hard to say exactly what makes a word modal, or what makes a use of a modal epistemic, without begging the questions that will be our concern below, but some examples should get the idea across. If I say “Goldbach’s conjecture might be true, and it might be false,” (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   111 citations  
  • A Flexible Contextualist Account of Epistemic Modals.Janice Dowell, J. L. - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-25.
    On Kratzer’s canonical account, modal expressions (like “might” and “must”) are represented semantically as quantifiers over possibilities. Such expressions are themselves neutral; they make a single contribution to determining the propositions expressed across a wide range of uses. What modulates the modality of the proposition expressed—as bouletic, epistemic, deontic, etc.—is context.2 This ain’t the canon for nothing. Its power lies in its ability to figure in a simple and highly unified explanation of a fairly wide range of language use. Recently, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • .A. Russo - 1988 - Rivista di Studi Corporativi:296--299.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps.Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   154 citations