- Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion.Martijn Blaauw - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):105-108.details
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Two more for the knowledge account of assertion.Matthew Benton - 2011 - Analysis 71 (4):684-687.details
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The Case for Closure.John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 26-43.details
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(1 other version)Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.details
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The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.details
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Metaethical Contextualism Defended.Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Ethics 121 (1):7-36.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertion.Jim Stone - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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Flexible Contextualism about Deontic Modals: A Puzzle about Information-Sensitivity.J. L. Dowell - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (2-3):149-178.details
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Knowledge and its Limits. [REVIEW]L. Horsten - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(1 other version)Ignorance : a case for scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (3):371-372.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Possibly false knowledge.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (5):225-246.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.details
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Must we act only on what we know?Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (8):463-473.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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Adapt or die: The death of invariantism&quest.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263-285.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge in the image of assertion.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):1-19.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Warrant and action.Mikkel Gerken - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):529-547.details
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Two Kinds of Stakes.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):307-324.details
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