In this manuscript, published here for the first time, Tarski explores the concept of logical notion. He draws on Klein's Erlanger Programm to locate the logical notions of ordinary geometry as those invariant under all transformations of space. Generalizing, he explicates the concept of logical notion of an arbitrary discipline.

Wilfrid Hodges; VIII*—Truth in a Structure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 135–152, https://doi.org/10.1093/ari.

Alternative readings of quantification are considered. The absence of an unequivocal translation into ordinary speech is noted. Some examples are cited which, in the opinion of the author, are a result of equivocal readings of quantification, or unnecessarily restrictive readings which obscure its primary function.

Vann McGee; XIII*—Two Problems with Tarski's Theory of Consequence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 273–292, htt.

In this paper I develop a new conception of Tarskian logic based on Tarski’s intuitive characterization of logical consequence as formal and necessary in his 1936 paper. Special emphasis is placed on the role of logic in our system of knowledge, the origins of semantics, the semantic definition of logical consequence, and the role of logical and non-logical terms in a logical system. The paper offers a new definition of logical terms based on the question: what division of terms into (...) logical and extra-logical would yield a logical system that satisfies Tarski’s intuitive characterization of logical consequence in complete generality? I discuss the consequences of the new conception for revision in logic, the logicist thesis, and the relation between logic and mathematics. I offer a proof-theoretic perspective on the semantic conception delineated in this paper. And I conclude with a postscript on Tarski’s lecture, “What are Logical Notions?”, which was published shortly after the present conception of logic was developed. (shrink)