Vulnerability is a notion discussed in feminist philosophy as a basis for a morality that widens our sense of those whose deaths are grievable. Vulnerability and grievability also factor in reproductive ethics. This essay employs recognition theory to analyze critically how these notions are mobilized in conservative Christian anti-abortion writings and in feminist philosophy. This analysis exposes weaknesses and misrecognition in both sets of discourses. In response, I offer theological arguments for recognizing fetal value without implying a right (...) to life and for acknowledging how human finitude and the precarity of pregnancy render gestational hospitality a discretionary, not obligatory, moral act. (shrink)

The High Court continues to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about interventions into the lives of situationally vulnerable adults with mental capacity. In light of protective responses of health care providers and the courts to decision-making situations involving capacitous vulnerable adults, this paper has two aims. The first is diagnostic. The second is normative. The first aim is to identify the harms to a capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy that arise on the basis of the characterisation of situational (...) class='Hi'>vulnerability and autonomy as fundamentally opposed concepts or the failure to adequately acknowledge the conceptual relationship between them at common law. The second part of this aim is to draw upon developments in analytic feminist philosophy to illustrate how standard approaches to autonomy are ill-equipped to capture the autonomy issues of capacitous vulnerable adults when their decisions regarding care and treatment are at stake. The second (normative) aim is to develop an account of self-authorised, intersubjective autonomy on the basis of analytic feminist insights into the relational practices of recognition. This account not only attempts to capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults and account for the necessary harms to their autonomy that arise from standard common law responses to their situational vulnerability, it is also predicated on the distinctions between mental capacity, the satisfaction of conditions for informed consent and the exercise of autonomy, meaning that it is better placed to fulfil the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction – to facilitate the autonomy of vulnerable adults with capacity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper examines the question of whether recognition relations are based on trust. Theorists of recognition have acknowledged the ways in which recognition relations make us vulnerable to others but have largely neglected the underlying ‘webs of trust’ in which such relations are embedded. In this paper, I consider the ways in which the theories of recognition developed by Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth, not only point to our mutual vulnerability but also implicitly rely upon mutual relations of (...) trust. The paper first offers a novel examination of the relation between recognition, vulnerability and trust in Habermas’ account of communicative action with the aim of arguing that such a consideration helps to elucidate important features of recognition. My claim is that a consideration of the dynamics of recognition and vulnerability in language-use, leads to an acknowledgment of the forms of trust that not only underpin communicative action, but recognition more generally. I conclude by considering the elements that are underplayed in Habermas’ account by turning to an examination of Axel Honneth’s alternative affective theory of recognition, specifically considering the interrelation between vulnerability and recognition. In doing so, I also turn to a consideration of the kind of trust that must be assumed in Honneth’s account of mutual recognition and point to a recognitive notion of trust. (shrink)

(Conference proceedings 2014) This presentation (International Development Ethics Association, July 2014) considers economic vulnerability, exploring the risk of deprivation of necessary resources due to a complex and rarely discussed vulnerability that arises from hope. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological account of French petit-bourgeois aspiration in The Social Structures of the Economy has recently inspired Wendy Olsen to introduce the term “aspiration paradox” to characterize cases wherein “a borrower's status aspirations may contribute to a situation in which their borrowings exceed their (...) capacity to repay,” leaving the individual much the worse, due to an aspiration to betterment. If such financial opportunities were not made available to these people – if some were denied loans due to a careful assessment of their vulnerability – would they be better off? We should seriously consider that they might be. I will hazard the straightforwardly paternalistic suggestion that limiting access to lending to those who are vulnerable to their aspirations can be a just policy. Because aspiration paradox is a cross-cultural phenomenon, and because lending frequently involves asymmetries in mathematical education between borrowers and lenders, I hope to elude at least some of the charges of colonialism that have gained a stronger purchase on adaptive preference arguments. (shrink)

While some trust theorists have adverted to the vulnerabilities involved in trust, especially vulnerability to betrayal, the literature on trust has not engaged with recent work on the ethics of vulnerability. This paper initiates a dialogue between these literatures, and in doing so begins to explore the complex interrelations between vulnerability and trust. More specifically, it aims to show how trust can both mitigate and compound vulnerability. Through a discussion of two examples drawn from literary sources, (...) the paper also investigates the effects of pathogenic vulnerability on the psychic economies of trust and distrust. (shrink)

Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...) we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks. (shrink)

Vulnerability and politics are among the relevant and key topics of discussion in the Ethiopian healthcare context. Attempts by the formal bioethics structure in Ethiopia to deliberate on ethical issues relating to vulnerability and politics in healthcare have been limited, even though the informal analysis of bioethical issues has been present in traditional Ethiopian communities. This is reflected in religion, social values, and local moral underpinnings. Thus, the aim of this paper is to discuss the bioethical implications of (...) vulnerability and politics for healthcare in Ethiopia and to suggest possible ways forward. First, we will briefly introduce what has been done to develop bioethics as a field in Ethiopia and what gaps remain concerning its implementation in healthcare practice. This will give a context for our second and main task – analyzing the healthcare challenges in relation to vulnerability and politics and discussing their bioethical implications. In doing so, and since these two concepts are intrinsically broad, we demarcate their scope by focusing on specific issues such as poverty, gender, health governance, and armed conflicts. Lastly, we provide suggestions for the ways forward. (shrink)

Does the fact that humans are vulnerable, needy and dependent beings play an important role in Kantian ethics? It is sometimes claimed that it cannot and does not. I argue that it can and does. I distinguish between broad (all persons are vulnerable) and narrow (only some persons are vulnerable) senses of vulnerability, and explain the role of vulnerability in both senses in Kantian ethics. The basis of this argument is to show that the core normative focus of (...) Kantian ethics is on the dignity that human beings have in virtue of their capacity for rational agency. This implies that the empirical conditions under which human beings can acquire, sustain, exercise, and develop their rational capacities are of core moral importance in Kantian ethics. This explains why human vulnerabilities, including the vulnerability of human bodies, are important in Kantian ethics, since rational capacities in human agents (and the bodies those rational capacities depend upon) are highly vulnerable in all persons (vulnerability in the broad sense) and especially vulnerable in some sub-groups of persons (vulnerability in the narrow sense). (shrink)

Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their caregivers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. (...) My interest is in the so-far little-discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical pursuits and experimentation with one's self. I call these ‘special goods of childhood’ because individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a distinctive and weighty contribution to wellbeing. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice towards children. The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part of every child's upbringing. (shrink)

The question of church-state separation has haunted America since her founding. James Madison and select founding fathers suggest that religions and states are better off when they minimize (or altogether eliminate) their interactions. Many Muslims in Iran, for instance, believe the opposite – aligning state functions with religious motives results in the most effective state. In this paper, I propose a model of thinking about church-state separation in which states and religions must maintain epistemic vulnerability to allow legal, political, (...) and socio-religious change. Simply put, epistemic vulnerability is an attitude of susceptibility to new sources and instances of knowledge. I present institutions as sets of constraints which interact with shared mental models. In this way, I explain how cultural institutions limit and shape individuals’ susceptibility to new knowledge. The more accommodating a religion is to self-assessment when confronted with new knowledge aids in forming institutions that are reliable, efficient, and robust for groups to grow and adopt new ideas. This results in a model of state-religion that highlights the impact on epistemic vulnerability when either religious organizations or state governance expand their responsibilities outside of their proper functions. (shrink)

This paper challenges the prevailing notion in vulnerability theory that only relational vulnerability holds moral significance for aiding the vulnerable. Contrary to this stance, I contend that ontological vulnerability carries moral relevance, and thus grounds a consequentialist duty to mitigate potential harm. This duty constitutes the core ethical principle of transhumanism. My aim will therefore be to defend transhumanism’s central moral tenet from within the framework of vulnerability theory, by showing that ontological vulnerability has moral (...) significance. Section 1 will introduce transhumanism’s moral objective, emphasizing the role of ontological vulnerability. Section 2 will analyze the relational and dispositional accounts of vulnerability, emphasizing the reasons why such kinds of vulnerabilities ground duties to help the vulnerable. Section 3 argues that these same reasons also ground moral obligations to remedy ontological vulnerability, therefore committing us to endorse transhumanism’s moral endeavor highlighted in section 1. (shrink)

In society, human vulnerability is associated with multiple causes such as poverty, injustice, discrimination and illnesses, among others. In the midst of this panorama of external agents that lead human beings to situations of vulnerability, some clearly see – although others not so much – a vulnerability proper to the human person, simply because they exist. This approach to vulnerability is considered to be a conditio humana that affects everyone. Precisely because it is a conditio humana, (...) vulnerability is closely related to autonomy. For this reason, in this article we have attempted to deepen in the interrelationship between autonomy and vulnerability, focusing on an anthropological vulnerability, and determining whether vulnerability constitutes an impediment for autonomy, as vulnerability and autonomy seem to be the representatives of polar opposites: one that is limited and can do nothing or very little, and the other that can do everything and has no limits. -/- La vulnerabilidad humana está asociada en la sociedad a múltiples causas, tales como la pobreza, la injusticia, la discriminación, las enfermedades, entre otras. En medio de este panorama de agentes externos que lleven a los seres humanos a situaciones vulnerables, se deja ver, para unos claramente, para otros no tanto, una vulnerabilidad propia a la persona humana por el simple hecho de existir. Uno de los enfoques de la vulnerabilidad es considerarla como una conditio humana que nos afecta a todos, asunto que ha sido insistentemente ratificado por el pensamiento contemporáneo. Justamente, por ser una conditio humana, la vulnerabilidad se encuentra en estrecha relación con la autonomía. Es así que en este trabajo nos hemos propuesto ahondar en ese entramado de autonomía y vulnerabilidad, tomando el enfoque de la vulnerabilidad antropológica con el fin de describir la interrelación entre dichos principios y determinando si la vulnerabilidad constituye un “freno” o no para la autonomía, pues vulnerabilidad y autonomía parecen ser los representantes de dos polos opuestos, el del que se encuentra limitado y no puede hacer nada o hace poco, y el del que puede hacerlo todo sin ningún límite. (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas’s work seemingly places a great emphasis on language leading some commentators towards a Kantian reading of him where moral consideration would be based on the moral patient’s capacity for reason with language functioning as a proxy for this. Although this reading is possible, a closer look at Levinas’s descriptions of language reveal that its defining characteristic is not reason but the capacity to express beyond any thematized contents we would give to the Other. This expressivity (which Levinas calls (...) face) would confront me with their singularity, infinity, and interiority tying me to them in a relation of responsibility. And the “content” of such an expression is a vulnerability and exposure tied to their mortality which continually entreats me though I cannot take it away. It is by means of this bare expression of an exposure to death as the core of language that it will become possible for non-human mortal beings to have what Levinas calls language. This possibility, although not explicitly addressed by Levinas, is at least left open by his account of Bobby the dog as well as his agnosticism over a snake’s face. (shrink)

Shame is frequently viewed as a destructive emotion; but it can also be understood in terms of change and growth. This essay highlights the problematic values that cause pervasive and frequent shame and the importance of resisting and changing these values. Using Confucian insights, I situate shame in an interactive process between the individual's values and that of their society, thus, being vulnerable to shame represents both one's connection to a community and an openness to others’ negative feedback. This process (...) provides an important arena where personal values interact with communal ones. The Confucian tradition, I argue, affords individuals a degree of autonomy in internalization through urging them to cultivate and maintain a keen sense of shame. My discussion also offers resources for understanding the various aspects of this interactive process—how individuals with similar experiences of shame may, through channeling their experiences, influence social values and propel moral progress. (shrink)

Transhumanism is a challenging movement that invites us to rethink what defines humanity, including what we value and regret the most about our existence. Vulnerability is a key concept that require thorough philosophical scrutiny concerning transhumanist proposals. Vulnerability can refer to a universal condition of human life or, rather, to the specific exposure to certain harms due to particular situations. Even if we are all vulnerable in the first sense, there are also different sources and levels of (...) class='Hi'>vulnerability depending on concrete social circumstances. Recently, Michael Hauskeller argued about a fundamental incompatibility between transhumanism and vulnerability. He understands vulnerability as an existential category, linked to woundability and mortality. This idea is akin to ontological vulnerability, but it does not notice some important features of social vulnerability. On the other side, transhumanism is a complex and non-homogeneous movement. Here we distinguish between a strong and a weak version of transhumanism. We will propose that the salience of vulnerability is only diminished in the radical one, while a moderate version can reconcile vulnerability with human enhancement. Thus, vulnerability, a concept that has recently gained much importance as an anthropological category in contemporary ethics, is not necessarily at odds with any transhumanist project. (shrink)

The outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 has exposed a shared condition of vulnerability on a global scale. How can we use vulnerability as an effective paradigm in order to foster collective political initiatives? This essay claims that the idea of care is key to understand the vulnerability framework as being both an epistemic and a political resource to address ethical issues. The first half of the essay recollects several arguments in Adriana Cavarero’s and Judith Butler’s most recent works, insofar (...) as both theorists have insisted on the notion of vulnerability in order to interpret contemporary political mobilizations. The second part of the essay retraces a constellation of practices of care in the works of several Black and decolonial feminist thinkers situated in different socio-political contexts. Whereas for Christina Sharpe and Saidiya Hartman the focus is on the matter of Blackness and Black lives in their constitutive vulnerability, both Cristina Rivera Garza’s and Sayak Valencia’s works remarkably insist on the specific socio-political context of today’s Mexico. These authors urge the readers to adopt a critical posture when encountering official narratives, also because in their texts they exhibit their own vulnerability. For them, writing, their writing is an ethical demand to imagine alternatives and to foster new entanglements between bodies persisting on the margins, at the limits of the norms that regulate legibility. (shrink)

Mercenaries are the target of moral condemnation far more often than they are subject of moral concern. One attempt at morally condemning mercenaries proceeds by analogy with prostitutes; mercenaries are ?the whores of war?. This analogy is unconvincing as a way of condemning mercenaries. However, careful comparison of mercenarism and prostitution suggests that, like many prostitutes, some mercenaries may be vulnerable individuals. If apt, this comparison imposes a consistency requirement: if one thinks certain prostitutes are appropriate subjects of moral concern (...) in light of their vulnerability, then one must think that mercenaries who are likewise vulnerable are also appropriate subjects of moral concern. In this paper I elucidate the relevant, morally significant sense of ?vulnerability?, and present evidence suggesting that at least some mercenaries are vulnerable in this sense. (shrink)

Bribing doctors for preferential treatment is rampant in the healthcare system of developing countries like Vietnam. Although bribery raises the out-of-pocket expenditures of patients, it is so common to be deemed an “envelope culture.” Given the little understanding of the underlying mechanism of the culture, this study employed the mindsponge theory for reasoning the mental processes of both patients and doctors for why they embrace the “envelope culture” and used the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics to validate our reasoning. Analyzing (...) responses from 1042 Vietnamese patients, we discovered that bribing doctors can help patients reduce the destitution risk induced by treatment. Such effect of doctor bribery remains consistent among patients that have to pay high daily costs (e.g., accommodation and subsistence fees) regardless of their employment status. Nevertheless, for patients with no or unstable jobs, their risks of destitution increase if they have to pay more thank-you money. These findings suggest that doctor bribery is an adaptive strategy for patients in an environment where the healthcare supply cannot meet the actual demand. Moreover, healthcare equity is greatly exacerbated due to the envelope culture, as vulnerable individuals are exposed to a greater threat of poverty. At the same time, those with good economic conditions get preferential treatment by paying a higher amount of thank-you money. Healthcare workers’ ethics must be the top priority for an equitable and proper healthcare system. (shrink)

Unethical behavior among university students such as cheating and plagiarism has weakened the character of honesty in education. This fact has challenged those who perceived education as a holistic process of internalizing values and norms that lead to the formation of students’ moral principles and moral behavior. Educators have played the role of ensuring the students to internalize and realized moral values and norms. A study of 360 students of the second semester who enrolled at the course of “ethical and (...) personal development” at Atma Jaya Catholic University in Indonesia showed that unethical behavior such as cheating and plagiarism were rarely done. However, a deep look at the reason the students did academic dishonesty has prompted the permissiveness of student’s moral life. This study proves that academic integrity among university students is worrisome, and it is worsened by the fact that they were enrolled in the course of “ethical and personal development”. Seriously taking into consideration the strong desire of students to change the culture of academic misconduct, the authors argue that an educational model which is not oriented excessively to cognitive performance is needed. The authors argue that this position has to be practiced in line with the involvement of “clean” students who are involved as role models in influencing the formation of student awareness and ethical behavior. (shrink)

In this interview, Estelle Ferrarese elaborates on her account of vulnerability and care to highlight its political and social, as opposed to its ethical, dimensions. Drawing on, amongst others, Adorno, Tronto, Castell, and Laugier, she argues that vulnerability and care should not be understood ontologically, as an antropological exposure of the body, but rather socially, as the normative expectations and material conditions under which care work takes place. Situating her approach in anglophone and francophone discussions on vulnerability (...) and precarity, she discusses her approach to normative expectations and how it informs her account of vulnerability of living at the mercy of someone else's agency, as well as the politicization of vulnerability. She also discusses the political implications of her account of vulnerability and care with regard to a range of contemporary issues, such as the Men's Right Movement, the posthuman turn and the Antropocene, and mutual aid and the neoliberalization of the welfare state. (shrink)

In a series of reflections published in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, Giorgio Agamben expresses a number of concerns related to the way the pandemic has altered the very fabric of our societies, potentially changing it forever. While maintaining a certain scepticism towards the threat represented by the virus itself, Agamben claims that the response to the contagion shows how easy it is for authorities to limit individual freedoms in the name of public health, and how readily they are (...) willing to put such limitations in place. At the same time, the pandemic shows how easy it is for individuals to accept this situation as the new normal, and how readily they are willing to give up their freedoms and relationships. In this paper I offer a brief overview of Agamben’s worries, focussing on two issues in particular: the loss of individual freedom of movement and association, and the moral and political implications of social distancing. I then approach these issues from a different angle, making use of relational theory to propose an alternative framework which relies on the notion of vulnerability. While agreeing with Agamben that there is reason to worry about the state seizing the opportunity to exercise unchecked power over its citizens, I argue that we should pay attention to the ways in which social distancing measures can be grounded in solidarity and respect for the autonomy of vulnerable individuals. (shrink)

An orthodox view in marketing ethics is that it is morally impermissible to market goods to specially vulnerable populations in ways that take advantage of their vulnerabilities. In his signature article “Marketing and the Vulnerable,” Brenkert (Bus Ethics Q Ruffin Ser 1:7–20, 1998) provided the first substantive defense of this position, one which has become a well-established view in marketing ethics. In what follows, we throw new light on marketing to the vulnerable by critically evaluating key components of Brenkert’s general (...) arguments. Specifically, we contend that Brenkert has failed to offer us any persuasive reasons to think that it is immoral to market to the vulnerable in ways that take advantage of their vulnerability. Although Brenkert does highlight the fact that the specially vulnerable are at greater risk of being harmed by already immoral marketing practices (e.g., deception, manipulation), he fails to establish that the specially vulnerable are a unique moral category of market clients or that there are special moral standards that apply to them. Moreover, even if Brenkert’s position were theoretically defensible, the practical implications of his position are far less tenable than he suggests. If our criticisms are sound, then Brenkert and others who endorse his position are seriously mistaken regarding how one can permissibly market products to vulnerable populations, and, in addition, they have improperly categorized certain morally permissible marketing practices as being immoral. (shrink)

Political theory and philosophy need to widen their view of the space in which what matters politically takes place, and I suggest that integrating the conditions of sustainability of all affected—that is, all participants in nature's relations—is a necessary first step in this direction. New materialists and posthumanists have challenged how nature and politics have traditionally been construed. While acknowledging the significance of their contributions, I critically examine the ethical and political implications of their ontological project. I focus particularly on (...) how the decentering of human agency that they advocate for raises a set of concerns that need to be addressed in developing an appropriate ecological ethics. I argue that the latter must be attuned to the vulnerability of living beings who participate in relationships that sustain life on earth. This brings me to conclude that qualitative distinctions between the worlds ofbiosandtechneare necessary. This is because we need to think critically about ways of evaluating types of relationships so that we can assess them and establish which are worth nurturing and protecting and which are not. (shrink)

Wounds teach us what we were vulnerable to and what vulnerabilities we may yet bear. But wounds are often met with doubt and disbelief, suggesting that their lessons may be hard to learn. Through an analysis of advocacy movements to believe victims of sexual assault set in conversation with Caravaggio’s Incredulity of Thomas, this paper argues for an understanding of vulnerability as part of a process of learning from wounds that is sometimes marked by emotional incredulity, an expression of (...) doubt or denial of what one knows to be true because of the way its realization feels. Emotional incredulity in these circumstances is not a denial of vulnerability that pretends to mastery, but one that expresses the challenge of learning, together, how much we do not know of ourselves. (shrink)

Introduction: This paper explores the vulnerability of practice-like activities to institutional domination. Methods: This paper oers an ethnographic case study of a UK-based engineering company in the aftermath of its acquisition, focusing in particular on its R&D unit. Results: The Lab struggled to maintain its practice-based work in an institutional environment that emphasized the pursuit of external goods. Discussion: We use this case to develop two arguments. Firstly, we illustrate the concept of “practice-like” activities and explore their vulnerability (...) to institutional domination. Secondly, in light of the style of management on display after the takeover, we oer further support to MacIntyre’s critique of management. Finally, based on the empirical data we reflect on the importance of organizational culture, as well as friendship and the achievement of a common good in business organizations for these kinds of activities. (shrink)

In this paper I engage with the notion that Covid-19 can be seen as the ‘great equalizer’, in virtue of the widespread sense of uncertainty it has caused and the fact that it has forced us to recognize our shared human fragility. Against the view that Covid-19 is the ‘great equalizer’, I argue that, on the contrary, the pandemic reflects existing vulnerabilities and, in many cases, exacerbates them. I do so by offering first a definition of both ontological and relational (...) vulnerability and discussing some important ethical and political dimensions of vulnerability in conditions of uncertainty. I then claim that understanding vulnerability in both ontological and relational terms allows us to see the differential impact of the pandemic on differently situated individuals. More specifically, I argue that vulnerability in conditions of uncertainty can threaten individuals’ sense of self, and thus their autonomy – both understood in relational terms. I consider what kind of response human vulnerability in times of crisis calls for. In particular, I maintain that a promising way to counteract uncertainty would be to adopt a solidaristic approach to public health, based on an understanding of solidarity as a relational concept. In other words, I argue that it is through solidarity that individuals’ vulnerabilities can be mitigated, and their autonomy promoted, even during the most uncertain times. I finally discuss two objections that could be raised against the solidaristic approach defended in my paper. First, the approach may fail to find the support of individuals who are unwilling to care for others when their own interests are under threat. Second, there might be those who deny that the virus constitutes a serious enough threat to warrant or justify the restrictions on individual freedoms imposed by governments in the name of solidarity. I conclude by arguing that while a commitment to solidarity can be easily undermined by scepticism towards political and other authorities, and by the failures of those authorities themselves, it is paramount that societies strive for it as the best means to preserve individuals’ health, autonomy, and well-being. (shrink)

ICTs, personal data, digital rights, the GDPR, data privacy, online security… these terms, and the concepts behind them, are increasingly common in our lives. Some of us may be familiar with them, but others are less aware of the growing role of ICTs and data in our lives - and the potential risks this creates. These risks are even more pronounced for vulnerable groups in society. People can be vulnerable in different, often overlapping, ways, which place them at a disadvantage (...) to the majority of citizens; Table 3 in this guide presents some of the many forms and causes of vulnerability. As a result, vulnerable people need greater support to navigate the digital world, and to ensure that they are able to exercise their rights. This guide explains where such support can be found, and also answers the following questions: - What are the main ethical and legal issues around ICTs for vulnerable citizens? - Who is vulnerable in Europe? - How do issues around ICTs affect vulnerable people in particular? This guide is a resource for members of vulnerable groups, people who work with vulnerable groups, and citizens more broadly. It is also useful for data controllers1 who collect data about vulnerable citizens. While focused on citizens in Europe, it may be of interest to people in other parts of the world. It forms part of the Citizens’ Information Pack produced by the PANELFIT project, and is available in English, French, German, Italian and Spanish. You are welcome to translate this guide into other languages. Please send us a link to online versions in other languages, so that we can add them to the project website. (shrink)

The rapid adoption of cloud computing has revolutionized the way organizations operate, offering unparalleled flexibility, scalability, and efficiency. However, it also introduces a new set of vulnerabilities and security challenges. This manuscript explores the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity solutions to address these cloud vulnerabilities. By examining the current landscape, AI methodologies, and practical implementation strategies, we aim to provide a roadmap for enhancing cloud security through AI-powered solutions. -/- .

In this paper, I challenge the argument that if we take health to be a meta-capability, we will be able to address the vulnerabilities that characterize human life. Instead, I argue that some vulnerabilities, like that attached to being a patient, can not be successfully addressed.

In this paper, I would argue for a mindful sports philosophy that stresses that wisdom does not emerge from abstract thinking; instead, it requires that we become attentive to what is concrete: our everyday life and how we spend it. Do we spend our life wisely or not? Answering this question requires that we know ourselves sufficiently — that is to say, have we explored and examined our own life by paying attention to it while we are living it? Am (...) I aware of how my life constantly intervenes with life in general and vice versa? To exemplify this philosophical approach, I will refer to examples from mod- ern football coaching that illustrate how they play themselves and their team into certain thoughts, not the other way around. However, a crucialю part of coaching and leading in sports relies on self-knowledge, not as something that only emerges from the inside out but equally from how the outside affects us. In this paper, I will argue how a mindful sports philosophy understands self-knowl- edge as both an introspection and “interiosation” of the outside with the quest of becoming worthy of what happens. (shrink)

Judith Butler argues for collective liberatory action grounded in ontological vulnerability. Yet descriptive social ontology alone provides neither normative ethical prescriptions nor direction for political action. I believe Butler tries to overcome this gap by appealing to equality as an ethical ideal. In this article, I reconstruct how equality operates in her transition from ontological vulnerability to prescriptive commitments. Then, turning to Sylvia Wynter, I argue Butler's uncritical use of equality constrains the radical direction of her liberatory goals—firstly (...) because it cannot mitigate the coloniality of Being, and secondly because she figures the locus of critique as an anonymous and equally vulnerable body at the limits of the recognizably human. I conclude with Wynter's demand for liberatory critique to arise out of specific decolonial locations of rupture from our historically situated, oppressive, and overrepresented genre of being human. (shrink)

Technological developments involving robotics and artificial intelligence devices are being employed evermore in elderly care and the healthcare sector more generally, raising ethical issues and practical questions warranting closer considerations of what we mean by “care” and, subsequently, how to design such software coherently with the chosen definition. This paper starts by critically examining the existing approaches to the ethical design of care robots provided by Aimee van Wynsberghe, who relies on the work on the ethics of care by Joan (...) Tronto. In doing so, it suggests an alternative to their non-principled approach, an alternative suited to tackling some of the issues raised by Tronto and van Wynsberghe, while allowing for the inclusion of two orientative principles. Our proposal centres on the principles of autonomy and vulnerability, whose joint adoption we deem able to constitute an original revision of a bottom-up approach in care ethics. Conclusively, the ethical framework introduced here integrates more traditional approaches in care ethics in view of enhancing the debate regarding the ethical design of care robots under a new lens. (shrink)

It might become possible to build artificial minds with the capacity for experience. This raises a plethora of ethical issues, explored, among others, in the context of whole brain emulations (WBE). In this paper, I will take up the problem of vulnerability – given, for various reasons, less attention in the literature – that the conscious emulations will likely exhibit. Specifically, I will examine the role that vulnerability plays in generating ethical issues that may arise when dealing with (...) WBEs. I will argue that concerns about vulnerability are more matters of institutional design than individual ethics, both when it comes to creating humanlike brain emulations, and when animal-like emulations are concerned. Consequently, the article contains reflection on some institutional measures that can be taken to protect the sims' interests. It concludes that an institutional framework more likely to succeed in this task is competitive and poly-centric, rather than monopolistic and centralized. (shrink)

An issue about the privacy of the clustered groups designed by algorithms arises when attempts are made to access certain pieces of information about those groups that would likely be used to harm them. Therefore, limitations must be imposed regarding accessing such information about clustered groups. In the discourse on group privacy, it is argued that the right to privacy of such groups should be recognised to respect group privacy, protecting clustered groups against discrimination. According to this viewpoint, this right (...) places a duty on others, for example, private companies, institutions, and governments, to refrain from accessing such information. To defend the idea that the right to privacy should be recognised for clustered groups, at least two requirements must be satisfied. First, clustered group privacy must be conceived of as either a collective good or a participatory good. Since these forms of good are of the type from which no member of a group can be excluded from benefiting, the right to them is defined as a group right. Second, there must be group interests on which to base a group right. Group interests can be either the interests of those members that are a result of their being in the group or the interests of the group as a whole that transcend the interests of its members. However, this paper argues that clustered group privacy cannot be conceived of as either a collective or a participatory good because it is possible for some individuals to be excluded from benefiting from it. Furthermore, due to the lack of awareness among individuals that they are members of a clustered group and the nature of a clustered group itself, such groups cannot have the group interests necessary to establish a group right. Hence, the group right to privacy cannot be recognised for these groups, implying that the group right cannot be considered a means to protect clustered groups against discrimination. Instead, this paper suggests that moral principles need to be articulated within an ethics of vulnerability to identify the moral obligations of protecting vulnerable clustered groups. The duty owed to the vulnerable should involve refraining from accessing certain information about clustered groups in specific contexts. This duty is not engendered by the right to privacy of such groups; it is the duty owed to the vulnerable. The findings highlight the need to articulate moral principles regarding privacy and data protection to protect clustered groups in contexts in which accessing information about them could constitute a reason for discriminatory targeting. (shrink)

Presently, there is a lack of psychological and quantitative studies in Singapore about discriminatory attitudes. This paper aimed to contribute to this aspect. However, to examine actual behavior can be difficult due to the sensitive nature of the needed data. Hence, this study approached discrimination at an attitudinal level. Six vulnerable groups were examined in this study. They consisted of people of a different race, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, people living with HIV/AIDS, people of a different religion, and unmarried (...) couples living together. Two research questions were posed: 1) What is the prevalence of having discriminatory attitude toward vulnerable groups? and 2) What are the predictors of these discriminatory attitudes? Using a sample population of 1,972 Singaporeans, descriptive analysis and binomial logistic regression analysis were conducted. Firstly, based on the results, the prevalence ranged between 10.76% to 42.46%. Singaporeans have discriminatory attitude toward vulnerable groups who can be categorized into two: the least discriminated (three groups ranging between 10.76% to 15.48%) and the highly discriminated (three groups ranging between 30.86% to 42.46%). Secondly, binomial logistic regression showed support for several significant predictors such as emphasis on the importance of religion and tradition, and employment status, depending on the model assessed. However, one pattern was observed in all the models, that a person who discriminates one group is more likely to discriminate another group. The findings were then discussed and explained within the context of Singapore. (shrink)

Is it possible to justify requiring that I respond adequately to the other’s vulnerability? I contend that insofar as I value my own personal identity it is consistent to respond adequately to the vulnerability of the other. Part one provides a break down of vulnerability in terms of its fundamental indeterminacy. Part two illustrates how the ability to respond either adequately or inadequately to the other’s vulnerability is implied by the fundamental co-constitution of personal identity. I (...) understand myself as a self only insofar as I stand in relation to other selves that see me as a self. If the relationship between recognition and identity also holds for the other, my response to her vulnerability founds her identity as well. In part three the relationship developed in part two is employed to justify the obligation to respond adequately to the vulnerable other. If I value my own personal identity, then I require an adequate response from others, because that response plays an integral role in the foundation of my personal identity. The other cannot respond adequately to my vulnerability unless her own identity is assured. Only if I respond adequately to the vulnerability of the other will she be in a position to assure my identity. Therefore, I ought to respond adequately to the vulnerability of others if for no other reason than it puts the other in a position where she can assure the personal identity that I value. (shrink)

In this book chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Food Ethics, I examine the moral responsibility that agents have for hunger resulting from climate change. I introduce the problem of global changes in food production and distribution due to climate change, explore how philosophical conceptions of vulnerability can help us to make sense of what happens to people who are or will be hungry because of climate change, and establish some obligations regarding vulnerability to hunger.

Debates in feminist political philosophy often focus on what problematic(s) to use in order to understand normative ideals, gendered differences, and their histories. For the purposes of this chapter, I will contrast two important problematics in these debates, the procedural/deliberative politics in the tradition of Critical Theory, represented here by Seyla Benhabib, and the poststructuralist or postmodern politics, represented here by Judith Butler. The goal of the contrast will be to set up the contribution that Gadamer’s work can make to (...) contemporary feminist philosophy. (shrink)

According to the High Court in England and Wales, the primary purpose of legal interventions into the lives of vulnerable adults with mental capacity should be to allow the individuals concerned to regain their autonomy of decision making. However, recent cases of clinical decision making involving capacitous vulnerable adults have shown that, when it comes to medical law, medical ethics and clinical practice, vulnerability is typically conceived as opposed to autonomy. The first aim of this paper is to detail (...) the problems that arise when the courts and health care practitioners respond to the vulnerability of capacitous adults on the basis of such an opposition. It will be shown that not only does the common law approach to vulnerability fail to adequately capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults, the conception of vulnerability and autonomy in oppositional terms leads to objectionably paternalistic health care responses that undermine the autonomy of vulnerable patients as well as clinical and legal interventions that violate their autonomy. In response, the second aim of this paper is to show that the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability are necessarily entwined and, on that basis, the focus should be on promoting the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults where possible. In order to make this case, the paper explains the limitations of standard approaches to the autonomy of vulnerable adults and, in their place, offers a conception of legitimate, self-authorised autonomy that is fundamentally dependent on intersubjective practices of recognition. (shrink)

Book review of Rozmarin's Vulnerable Futures, Transformative Pasts (2017).

At the heart of Levinas’s work is the apparently simple idea that through the encounter with another person, we are forced to give up our self-concern and take heed of the ethical relation between us. But, while simple on the surface, when one tries to characterize it in more detail, it can be hard to fit together the various ways in which Levinas talks about this relation and to identify precisely what he took its normative structure to be, as this (...) is described in a number of apparently different ways, that are not obviously compatible or equivalent, such as “command,” “call,” “summons,” “demand,” and so on. In this chapter, we intend to focus on these different characterizations and show what makes them different while also endeavoring to find a way in which Levinas’s conception may nonetheless be fitted together into a coherent account of the face-to-face encounter that is at the heart of his ethics. We will begin by considering the different normative terms used to characterize the encounter in that text and show how they are conceptually distinct from one another; we will then offer a way to read Levinas’s position to nonetheless show how these different normative relations can be fitted together into a stable position. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s texts contain a puzzle about the role of vulnerability in the creation of intimacy and its function on behalf of human flourishing. I describe the interpretive puzzle and its prima facie paradoxical aspects. On the one hand, there are texts in which Nietzsche expresses a longing for intimacy and other texts where he furnishes details about the possibility of intimacy between equals. On the other hand, Nietzsche is severely critical of certain types of intimacy and advocates for a (...) pathos of distance in human relationships. I claim that Nietzschean intimacy is not an inherently paradoxical concept. A proper understanding of Nietzsche’s anti-humanism provides the resources to resolve the paradox and to use the solution of the puzzle to illuminate Nietzsche’s insights about human psychology. (shrink)

Drawing upon Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory, the paper argues that the legal claims of homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate our universal vulnerability which stems from the essential, life-sustaining activities flowing from the ontological status of the human body. By recognizing that housing availability has constitutional significance because it provides for life-sustaining activities such as sleeping, eating and lying down, I argue that the legal rationale reviewed in the paper underscores the empirical, ontological reality of (...) the body as the basis for a jurisprudence of universal vulnerability. By tracing the constitutional basis of this jurisprudence from Right to Travel to Eighth Amendment grounds during COVID-19, the paper outlines a distinct legal paradigm for understanding vulnerability in its universal, constant and essential form – one of the central premises of vulnerability theory. (shrink)

Smajdor argues that “recognition” is the solution to the “reifying attitude” that results from “the urge to protect ‘vulnerable’ people through exclusion from research”. Drawing on theories of reification, we argue that it is the concepts of autonomy and vulnerability themselves that have been reified, resulting in the impoverishment of approaches to autonomy at law and in research ethics. Overcoming such reification demands a deeper consideration of the grounds on which vulnerable individuals are owed recognition and thereby the forms (...) such recognition should take. Smajdor argues for a recognition that appeals to autonomy and that manifests in providing vulnerable individuals with the opportunity to assent. The problem is that this kind of recognition is dependent on a more fundamental kind. It is this second form of recognition that would need to do the heavy lifting for assent-based frameworks to avoid the same problems we find with consent. (shrink)

This essay compares Maurice Merleau-Ponty's notion of the flesh with Judith Butler's concept of primary vulnerability in terms of their helpfulness for developing an intersubjective ontology. It compares the flesh with Butler's more recent concept of primary vulnerability insofar as she sees both as useful for intersubjective ontology. The hiatus of the flesh is that which spans between self and world and opens Merleau-Ponty's thought onto an intersubjective ontology. While Butler's discussion of vulnerability as a primary condition (...) of human existence also makes this concept intersubjective, her understanding of violence as articulated through vulnerability makes this a more helpful concept for intersubjective ontology than the flesh. While many discussions of an intersubjective way of life focus almost exclusively on its positive possibilities, almost to the exclusion of violence altogether, the understanding of violence Butler presents through primary vulnerability helps us to discern whether a violation is benign or malign. In turn, this fuller understanding of violence lets primary vulnerability open onto an ethical imperative of reconciliation, but a reconciliation of what is never whole. (shrink)