Social epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...) we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks. (shrink)

In this paper, we explain and showcase the promising methodology of testimonial network analysis and visualization for experimental epistemology, arguing that it can be used to gain insights and answer philosophical questions in social epistemology. Our use case is the epistemic community that discusses vaccine safety primarily in English on Twitter. In two studies, we show, using both statistical analysis and exploratory data visualization, that there is almost no neutral or ambivalent discussion of vaccine safety on Twitter. Roughly half the (...) accounts engaging with this topic are pro-vaccine, while the other half are con-vaccine. We also show that these two camps rarely engage with one another, and that the con-vaccine camp has greater epistemic reach and receptivity than the pro-vaccine camp. In light of these findings, we question whether testimonial networks as they are currently constituted on popular fora such as Twitter are living up to their promise of delivering the wisdom of crowds. We conclude by pointing to directions for further research in digital social epistemology. (shrink)

No debemos olvidar que existe una relación dialéctica entre libertad y justicia. Cuanto mayor es la justicia, más necesario es limitar la libertad; cuanto mayor es la libertad que se disfruta, más se amenaza la justicia, porque los más fuertes, los más inteligentes, los más hábiles acaban oprimiendo a los demás. Esta antítesis de libertad y justicia debe estar siempre presente en nuestra conciencia, incluso cuando pensamos en la sociedad del futuro.

Advocates of conceptual engineering as a method of philosophy face a dilemma: either they are ignorant of how conceptual engineering can be implemented, or else it is trivial to implement but of very little value, representing no new or especially fruitful method of philosophizing. Two key distinctions frame this dilemma and explain its two horns. First, the distinction between speaker’s meaning and reference and semantic meaning and reference reveals a severe implementation problem for one construal of conceptual engineering. Second, the (...) distinction between stipulating meanings and conceptually analyzing allows us to see why, on another construal of what conceptual engineering involves, the practice is neither a new nor neglected philosophical methodology. The article also argues that semantic externalism is not the root of the implementation problem for conceptual engineering, and that the usual rationale for adopting the practice, one that ties its value to the amelioration of “conceptual defects”, is unsound. (shrink)

Max Weber, who was a well-known sociologist both of his own time and of today, has been one of the most influential names – besides, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, and Friedrich Nietzsche - for Karl Jaspers, who is one of the original names that come into minds when the 20th-century existential philosophy is mentioned. In fact, it can easily be asserted that Weber had a huge personal role in Jaspers’ carrier as a philosopher. Karl Jaspers is known for his uniquely (...) discussed concepts such as freedom (Freiheit), communication (Kommunikation), Existenz, limit situations (Grenzsituationen), the encompassing (das Umgreifende), guilt (Schuld), and responsibility (Verantwortung). And it is obvious that Jaspers was affected by Weber considering his two specific concepts: guilt and responsibility. This is the case because Jaspers himself explains how and in what ways he was influenced by Weber. In this article, we will discuss Weber from the perspective of Jaspers. This discussion will be held in two aspects: i) personal features of Weber given by Jaspers, and ii) Weber’s effects on Jaspers from the viewpoint of Jaspers and what they share considering politics and ethics at the theoretical level. (shrink)

Recent discussions on the explanation of action are permeated with two divergent models of explanation, namely causal model and non- causal model. For causalists the notion of explanation is intimately related to that of causation. As Davidson contends, any rudimentary explanation of an event gives its cause. More sophisticated explanations may cite a relevant law in support of a singular causal claim. The non-causalists, on the other hand, hold that when we explain an action we do not ask for the (...) cause, rather we try to understand the action in terms of its meaning. Moreover, they argue that the causal model fails to account for the conceptual priority of human agency. The aim of this paper is to show how Max Weber attempted a synthesis of the two divergent models of explanation in the realm of human actions. The first section of this paper gives an expository account of Weber’s theory of explanation. In the second section an attempt is made to interpret Weber’s thesis so as to assimilate the two divergent models of explanation. (shrink)

Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...) data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairments is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur. A second cognitive impairment, one which impairs the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Thirdly (and this is the main thrust of our chapter) we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief. (shrink)

Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he explicitly argues that perceptions and (...) hallucinations differ in nature. Second, his version of the position is philosophically interesting in its own right. This is so primarily, though not exclusively, in virtue of the positive story he tells us about perceptual content. Third, Scheler’s case proves particularly instructive to the question of whether intentionalism and disjunctivism constitute a fundamental, unbridgeable divide. (shrink)

These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Max Horkheimer is well known as the director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and as a sometime collaborator with Theodor Adorno, especially on their classic Dialectic of Enlightenment. These essays reveal another side of Horkheimer, focusing on his remarkable contributions to critical theory in the 1930s. Included are Horkheimer's inaugural address as director of the Institute, in which he outlines the (...) interdisciplinary research program that would dominate the initial phase of the Frankfurt School, his first full monograph, and a number of other pieces published in the 1930s. The essays, most of which have not appeared in English before, are surprisingly relevant to current post-philosophy debates, notably "On the Problem of Truth," with its focus on pragmatism, and "The Rationalism Debate in Current Philosophy," a sustained critique of the post-Cartesian philosophy of consciousness. Horkheimer's 1933 critique of Kantian ethics, "Materialism and Morality," is of particular interest given the current reaction to the neo-Kantian aspect of Habermas's work. There are also essays relevant to the current foundations debate within Continental philosophy, and the rationality/relativism question is sustained throughout the volume. (shrink)

What did Max Gluckman actually say about apparently structureless societies? I introduce a fictional example to make sense of what he says regarding the Tonga.

Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable to conditionalise all our moral commitments on the question of whether there are non-natural facts. Non-natural facts are causally inefficacious, and so make no difference to the world of our experience. And to be a realist about such facts is to hold that they are mind-independent. It is compatible with our experiences that there are (...) no non-natural facts, or that they are very different from what we think. As Nagel says, realism makes scepticism intelligible. So the non-naturalist must hold that you might be wrong that your partner matters, even if you are correct about every natural, causal fact about your history and relationship. But to hold that conditional attitude to your partner would be a moral betrayal. So believing non-naturalist realism involves doing something immoral. (shrink)

Was ist Wert? Des Öfteren hat man bei der Beantwortung dieser Frage den Wert als etwas einer Qualität oder einem Attribut Ähnliches konzipiert. Meines Erachtens muss die Antwort hingegen in der Verbindung des Wertes mit der Erfahrung gesucht werden. Der Wert ist nichts, was dem Phänomen von außen zugeschrieben würde, sondern etwas, was dem Phänomen die Möglichkeit gibt, sich zu offenbaren und sich zu konstituieren. In dieser Richtung behauptet Scheler, dass der Wert keine „Eigenschaft“ eines Dinges neben seinen anderen Eigenschaften (...) sei. Der Wert gehört demnach einem Teilbereich der Erfahrung an, jedoch nicht als einfaches Phänomen, sondern vielmehr als Urphänomen. Daraus folgt, dass der Wert nicht – wie eine Wertqualität oder ein Attribut – auf die Gegebenheit eines Phänomens zurückgeführt werden kann, da er der Erscheinung des Phänomens selbst vorangeht. Als Urphänomen ist der Wert Element der Vorgegebenheit, nicht der faktischen Gegebenheit. (shrink)

Many theorists have defended the claim that collective entities can attain genuine agential status. If collectives can be agents, this opens up a further question: can they be conscious? That is, is there something that it is like to be them? Eric Schwitzgebel argues that yes, collective entities, may well be significantly conscious. Others, including Kammerer, Tononi and Koch, and List reject the claim. List does so on the basis of Tononi’s Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. I argue here that (...) List’s rejection is too quick, and that groups can, at least in principle, display the kind of informational integration we might think is necessary for consciousness. However, group consciousness will likely differ substantially from the individual experiences that give rise to it. This requires the defender of group consciousness to face up to a similar combination problem as the panpsychist. (shrink)

(Runner-up, Royal Institute of Philosophy 2020 Philosophy Essay Prize) Technological developments have led to the digitization of certain sectors of the economy, and this has many authors looking ahead to the prospects of a post-work society. While it is valuable to theorize about this possibility, it is also important to take note of the present state of work. For better or worse, it is what we are currently stuck with, and as the COVID-19 pandemic has ensured, much of that work (...) is now taking place online. Though a ‘return to normalcy’ is on the horizon, part of that normalcy involves online work, which is itself a significant change in the lives of many workers. Here I develop an account of work on which work is teleologically structured. This gives the result that working is something we can fail at doing, even when we try, and we can also be unsure of whether we’ve succeeded or failed. The shift of certain work from in-person to online modes generates a persistent uncertainty for workers in affected professions. Because our ability to work is something we typically value, this uncertainty has significant negative consequences for a worker’s self-conception. Indeed, it is analogous to disorders of agency and generates a kind of alienation. (shrink)

A comemoração dos 150 anos de nascimento de Max Weber foi considerada uma data promissora para novos debates sobre o pensamento deste intelectual, cuja obra representa um dos fundamentos do pensamento social contemporâneo. Com a realização do Colóquio Max Weber: 150 anos, foi possível reunir diferentes pesquisadores que têm estudado o seu pensamento ou investigado temas weberianos no Brasil. Uma das características marcantes do evento é que ele foi multidisciplinar e teria de sê-lo, uma vez que a obra de Max (...) Weber percorre diferentes áreas do saber. Por isso participaram do colóquio filósofos, historiadores, sociólogos, cientistas políticos e antropólogos. Este livro é resultado das contribuições de diferentes especialistas que participaram daquele encontro, e tem por escopo apresentar as pesquisas recentes no campo da crítica weberiana. (shrink)

«The world is about to get rid of morality, becoming total organization that is total destruction. Progress tends to culminate in a catastrophe». This few words sum up the fears of the late Horkheimer, who is increasingly worried about the effects of the dialectic of enlightenment. The fatal outcome of such dialectic has led the world to the brink of annihilation. According to Horkheimer, the root of the dialectic of enlightenment is an instrumental reason tending to the dominion (the dominion (...) of man over nature and the dominion of man over man). With his theoretical production, Horkheimer has tried to prevent the disastrous effects of this instrumental reason, ending up framing the longing for the Totally Other. In our opinion, the Totally Other plays an anti-dialectic function over enlightenment, having the triple meaning of transcendence as other than immanence; of utopia as an other society than the present one; and of an other reason than the instrumental reason, as a promise of a thought that is not anymore allied to the dominion. A new interpretation of the Totally Other would free its critical power, and it would be a “negative” attempt (in the sense of negative theology) to prevent the catastrophe towards which we all are pushed by what Horkheimer calls the immanent logic of history. (shrink)

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...) loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

This is a fine book. In what has become a crowded field, it stands out as direct, deep, and daring. It should place Max Velmans amongst the stars in the field like Chalmers, Dennett, Searle, and Churchland who are most commonly referenced in consciousness studies books and articles. It is direct in that the de rigueur history and review of the body-mind problem is illuminating and concise. It is deep in that Velmans deconstructs the usual idea of an objective world (...) as distinct from our experienced world. It is daring in that in his last chapter he comes out on the side of consciousness co-evolving with the universe rather than arising at some point within it (though he insists that such speculation is beyond the more empirical intent of his earlier chapters). (shrink)

In the pair of articles of which this is the second, I present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. These problems are related to the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness should be thought (...) of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In the first article, “Relativism 1: Representational Content”, I discussed the general issue of relativism about representational content. I argued for the conciliatory view that both relativist and absoutist conceptions of representational content can be legitimate. In the present continuation, I look in more detail at a special case of the general issue, namely the question of whether semantic contents, i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language, should be construed in an absolutist or in a relativist way. (shrink)

Metaphysics should follow science in postulating laws alongside properties. I defend this claim against the claim that natural properties conceived as powers make laws of nature redundant. Natural properties can be construed in a “thin” or a “thick” way. If one attributes a property in the thin sense to an object, this attribution does not conceptually determine which other properties the object possesses. The thin construal is underlying the scientific strategy for understanding nature piecemeal. Science explains phenomena by cutting reality (...) conceptually in properties attributed to space-time points, where these properties are conceived of independently of each other, to explore then, in a separate step, how the properties are related to each other; those determination relations between properties are laws. This is compatible with the thesis that laws are metaphysically necessary. According to the thick conception, a property contains all its dependency relations to other properties. The dependency relationships between properties (which appear as laws in the thin conception) are parts of the properties they relate. There are several reasons to resist the thick conception of properties. It makes simple properties “holistic”, in the sense that each property contains many other properties as parts. It cannot account for the fact that properties constrain each other’s identity; it can neither explain why natural properties are linked to a unique set of dispositions, nor why and how this set is structured nor why the truth-maker of many disposition attributions is relational although the disposition is grounded on a monadic property. (shrink)

Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399 -/- Max Weber: Ação Social e Tipos Ideais Nascido na Alemanha, em 1864. Os trabalhos de Weber estão condensados entre as duas primeiras décadas do século XX e estipulam uma nova estruturação para as Ciências Sociais. Weber, assim como outros cientistas sociais, dedicou-se a metodizar a Sociologia, não obstante, sua perspectiva sociológica diverge do pensamento de Durkheim, particularmente no que tange à transcendência do sujeito e de sua ação social. (...) Divergente de Émile Durkheim, o autor em questão, não considerava o corpo social como algo externo e eminente aos sujeitos. Para Weber, o corpo social careceria ser ponderado sobre o alicerce do conjunto das ações individuais. Todavia, o que seria o supracitado? Para o autor, qualquer ação individual é norteada por outras ações, isto é, quando procedemos, levamos em consideração e nos norteamos pela ação de outrem. Alicerçados na expectação de como nossa ação será vista, procedemos de uma ou outra maneira, sempre com base no olhar de outrem. Logo, nossa ação individual é acatada por Weber como sendo social, uma vez que ela está inserida em um contexto histórico e social que caracteriza todas as ações individuais. Com isso, os acontecimentos sociais são resultados diretos de ações individuais, o que nos dá ideia de que não há objeção entre o sujeito e o corpo social, visto que, para o autor, somente é possível captar o corpo social no momento em que a ação individual a divulga. Logo, o sujeito não é visto como um produto de um todo coercitivo. O sujeito é, antagonicamente, consciente pelos seus atos. O corpo social não tem uma essência própria, mas é reproduzido pelos sujeitos que o conformam, que mediante suas ações lhe conferem essa essência que o falta. Por conseguinte, os estudos de Weber tem como fundamental âmago a indicação de que o entendimento de acontecimentos sociais organizacionais (como o capitalismo, as formas de poder, as formas de dominação, os Estados, os regimes políticos e as religiões) situa-se na observação e no entendimento das ações individuais ou de um agrupamento dessas ações. Mediante tais análises supracitadas, Weber explana: [a sociologia é a] ciência que tem como meta a compreensão interpretativa da ação social de maneira a obter uma explicação de suas causas, de seu curso e de seus efeitos. Por “ação” se designará toda a conduta humana, cujos sujeitos vinculem a esta ação um sentido subjetivo. Tal comportamento pode ser mental ou exterior; poderá consistir de ação ou de omissão no agir. O termo “ação social” será reservado à ação cuja intenção fomentada pelos indivíduos envolvidos se refere à conduta de outros, orientando-se de acordo com ela. Para o autor, o sujeito é singular, e que essa singularidade é um alusivo cêntrico, tanto para si próprio quanto para o corpo social. Logo, significa dizer que a análise weberiana parte do sujeito e de sua ação individual para elucidar os acontecimentos ou fenômenos sociais que se decorrera. Como exemplo pragmático do texto supra, não seria exequível elucidar o ascendente número de suicídios provenientes da crise econômica em certo país. Contrariamente, seria imprescindível partir da observação e entendimento empírico das ações solitárias que serviram como motivação para essa ascensão e suicídios. Logo, somos capazes de compreender que a ação social é o agente de investigação cêntrica da sociologia de Max Weber. Todavia, o que é uma ação social? Para o autor em questão, a ação social nada mais é do que quaisquer ação de um sujeito que é norteada pela a ação de outrem. Como exemplo pragmático do antes citado, temos as eleições. O sujeito vota, tendo como norte os comentários, pelas intenções, pelas pesquisas realizadas por instituições como Ibope, Datafolha, etc. e até mesmo pelo votos de outros votantes. Isto é, a ação de votar em urna eletrônica é individual, mas só se torna cognoscível sociologicamente ao passo em que a escolha de estipulado candidato tem como norte o conjunto dos demais votantes. A seguir, imagens que representam uma eleitora exercendo seu papel democrático na urna eletrônica no Rio de Janeiro, outubro de 2010 e, logo depois uma charge de 2010. As observações e as compreensões de Weber ante os corpos sociais e de seus acontecimentos peculiares tem como centralidade o referencial da ação do agente individual. Com isso, a protestação histórica de determinados acontecimentos devem ser entendidos mediante o agrupamento das ações individuais. Tendo como estopim as ações individuais, o autor objetiva entender problemas sociais genéricos. Destarte, para analisar problemas que afetam e caracterizam o corpo social como um todo, é preciso partir da investigação de ações individuais intrínsecas. Para Weber, o conhecimento sociológico, só pode ter finalidade se tiver como alicerce o estudo dessas ações individuais supracitadas. Não obstante, o que deve ser posto em análise? Segundo Weber, a realidade é desmesurável e, com isso, deverá ser fragmentada para que se possa compreendê-la. O instrumento de investigação é, assim, criado pelo sociólogo. O especialista social faz uma escolha dos fatos que vai investigar: sua escolha é intrínseca. É o sociólogo que decide o que estudar e analisar alicerçado em julgamentos que se fundamentam de acordo com seus valores pessoais. Mediante essa escolha do que analisar, que é peculiarmente intrínseca, Max Weber constrói um método de investigação para alcançar a imparcialidade científica. Os resultados são considerados objetivos, ao passo em que os procedimentos de investigação da ação social são aplicados na prática efetiva. Quanto mais longe da finalidade da investigação o sociólogo se coloca, mais concretos e objetivos serão os resultados de sua análise. As metodologias de investigação, que asseguram a imparcialidade dos resultados, estão diretamente relacionadas à construção de tipos ideais ou tipos puros. O alcunhado tipo ideal é um “instrumento” que o analista e pesquisador utiliza para se aproximar da realidade subjetiva. Cotejando com a Física, digamos que o tipo ideal é uma régua que serve para medição de determinado elemento. Nada mais é do que um artífice para medir a realidade, bem como para tentar compreender o conteúdo dessa realidade em questão. Todavia, como a realidade é plural e múltipla e impossível de ser elucidada em toda sua totalidade, o autor elabora tipos ideais para se apropinquar o máximo possível da realidade pragmática e subjetiva em análise. Tais tipos ideais são obrados mediante as regularidades sociais que ele observou. Frisando que a edificação de um tipo ideal, apesar de se espelhar na realidade pragmática, nada mais é do que um artífice teórico do pesquisador. Algo como escolher certas características regulares de determinada sociedade e construir um tipo ideal de pai de família . Quando o pesquisador for investigar um corpo social especifico, esse tipo ideal antes citado, ainda que não insira-se exatamente na realidade, servirá de alicerce para compreender como, citando caso análogo, alguns pais estipulam relações com suas famílias em certas comunidades. Como conclusão, Weber edificou quatro tipos ideais de ação social, são elas: 1. A ação social com relação a fins; 2. A ação social com base na relação de valores; 3. A ação tradicional e, por fim, 4. A ação afetiva. Por se tratar de tipos ideais, essas ações não são formalmente reconhecíveis na realidade. Todavia, alicerçados pela construção teórica de weber, podemos analisar a realidade e a verificar algumas ações individuais definidas por um único ou mais tipos ideais de ação social. A essência aqui é enxergar e entender que esse artífice favorece o entendimento do corpo social ao passo em que apropinqua o pesquisador da realidade estudada. -/- AVALIAÇÃO DE FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO: MAX WEBER: AÇÃO SOCIAL E TIPOS IDEAIS PROF. Lic. EMANUEL ISAQUE CORDEIRO DA SILVA SOCIOLOGIA GERAL II – 24 de Maio de 2019 TURMA: 2° __ -/- Estudante: __________________________________________________________ N°: ___ -/- 1 Amparados pelas aulas ministradas, aclare a suma importância dos estudos de Weber para a estruturação do novo estágio das Ciências Sociais do século XX. 2 A sociologia de Weber diverge da de Durkheim. Aponte as principais divergências entre o pensamento dos autores sobre o indivíduo e sobre a sociedade. 3 Para Weber, quaisquer ação individual é orientada por ações de outros sujeitos. Aclare a ideia, antes citada, alicerçados por fundamentos de sua vida pragmática em sodalício. 4 Segundo Weber, só é possível compreender a sociedade mediante a manifestação da ação individual do sujeito. Elucide a ideia defendida pelo estudioso e, embasados pelas aulas em sala de aula, cite exemplos de manifestações contemporâneas no nosso país que servem de alicerce para entender a realidade social do Brasil. 5 Elucide a teoria de que a compreensão dos fenômenos sociais estruturais estão alicerçados na análise e entendimento das ações individuais ou de um conjunto dessas ações. 6 Debruçados a citação do livro Conceitos básicos de Sociologia, elucide por quê a meta da Sociologia, como ciência, é a compreensão interpretativa das ações dos indivíduos. 7 Amparados pela citação do livro de Weber, supracitada no texto, defina o que seria “ação” e “ação social” para o autor, posteriormente, use tais alcunhas weberianas e dê uma nova definição para os termos, embasados pela sua observação quanto a sociedade contemporânea. 8 Ao votar, o eleitor pratica uma ação individual que é orientada pela ação dos outros indivíduos. Explique por quê. 9 Para Weber, a realidade é infinita e deve ser recortada para ser compreendida. Aclare a ideia. 10 Elucide por quê a escolha do pesquisador sobre o que vai se analisar deverá ser subjetiva. 11 Elucide o que seria um tipo ideal weberiano. 12 Elucide por quê é fundamental o conceito de tipo ideal para que o pesquisador se apropinquar da realidade subjetiva. 13 O tipo ideal, comparando com a Física, é uma régua que serve para medir um elemento. Aclare a ideia weberiana. 14 Defina os tipos ideias de ação social construídos por Weber e, posteriormente, cite exemplos de ambos os tipos na sociedade atual em que vivemos. a) Ação Tradicional; b) Ação Afetiva; c) Ação Racional orientada a valores, e d) Ação Racional orientada a fins. 15 Como conclusão, debruçados sobre o texto introdutório, leio atentamente após todas as questões resolvidas, para um melhor entendimento profundo, e disserte sobre todas as ideias explanadas, expondo seu ponto de vista sobre o tema, isto é, se concorda ou não, sempre usando uma fundamentação que alicerce seu ponto de vista. (Mínimo – 35 linhas/Máximo – 65 linhas). -/- De coração, boa sorte! (shrink)

In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness (...) should be thought of as varying with some (more or less surprising) factor. In this, first, article, I shall discuss the general issue of relativism about representational content. I shall claim that there are legitimate ways of attributing contents that are absolute truth-bearers, and there are also equally legitimate ways of attributing relativistic representational contents. In the companion piece “Relativism 2: Semantic Content”, I look in more detail at the more specific question whether semantic contents (i.e. the contents assigned to linguistic utterances in the semantics of natural language) should be construed in an absolutist or a relativist way. (shrink)

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection (...) selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all. (shrink)

This article investigates how Max Weber’s theory of value conflict is connected to his realist understanding of politics and how he conceives the relation of politics and ethics. This investigation also covers Weber’s views on the argumentative limits of the social sciences and ethics. The center of Weber’s philosophy of science is constituted by his methodological thoughts on “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit) of the social sciences. The first thesis of this paper contends that Weber’s theory of a clash of irreconcilable values (...) and ideals goes back to Nietzsche. According to the second thesis of the article, the general claim of Weber’s philosophy of science is that there is no possibility of an ultimate rational, philosophical, or scientific grounding of values and normative theories. Weber’s endorsement of an ethics of responsibility in the field of politics led to the criticism that he contradicts his postulate of the “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit) of the scientist. The third thesis of the paper claims that Weber’s arguments for a political ethics of responsibility are compatible with his methodological postulate. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...) different possible worlds. In the second part, I give a positive argument for the necessity of at least some laws of nature, by showing with the example of a paradigmatic law of association that it consists in an internal relation between two universals which are determinables of the same class of determinates, where this relation is essential to both. Furthermore, I show that the necessity of laws of association could be accommodated within David Lewis' Humean metaphysics, but that it is incompatible with David Armstrong's combinatorialism. (shrink)

Arendt is a philosopher despite herself, and this paper uses the resources of her <<The Life of the Mind>> to develop her comparison of thinking as a 'departure' from the world with the fore-doomed attempt by Orpheus to bring from underground into the light of day. The paper investigates how thinking, though we 'lose' it in the speech and writing that makes it public, still can have the delicate power that Arendt attributes to it.

What exactly does conceptual analysis consist in? Is it empirical or a priori? How does it support philosophical theses? and What kinds of thesis are these? There is no consensus on these questions in contemporary philosophy. This study aims to defend conceptual analysis by showing that it comprises a number of different methods and by explaining their importance in philosophy. After setting out an initial dilemma for conceptual analysis, the study outlines a minimal ecumenical account of concepts, as well as (...) an account of concept possession and concept employment. On the basis of these accounts, the study then argues that there are both empirical and a priori forms of conceptual analysis, and that each can be defended as legitimate methods. The philosophical interest of conceptual analysis, however, resides in relying on all three types of method in the service of answering philosophical concerns. This is illustrated by three sample cases. (shrink)

This is a one page handout presenting objections from Gluckman's book Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society.

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematical impact on the concept of logic. My paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the “Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) in general. Kant’s fundamental (...) question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. In a first part, I shall demonstrate the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. A brief outline of Kant’s answer to this question, with special emphasis on his revolutionary new comprehension of logical form, will be given as well. A second part shall open up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. I will answer the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? I will argue that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application. (shrink)

La lógica formal no es una ciencia que se encuentre libre de presupuestos. Más bien, su representación de la forma lógica se basa en presupuestos a los cuales la lógica misma no llega. Este artículo se propone aclararlos. Para ello, en un primer momento, consideraremos las determinaciones fundamentales de la forma lógica. En un segundo paso, esta consideración será profundizada a partir del análisis del concepto lógico-formal de “concepto”. Con él se plantean problemas que hacen necesario avanzar en la reflexión (...) sobre la forma lógica. Ese avance necesario es la lógica trascendental en el sentido en el que la entiende Kant. /// Formal logic cannot claim to represent a presuppositionless science. In fact, its account of logical form rests upon a set of presuppositions, which is not justified within logic itself. This article shall elaborate on this in two steps. First, we shall highlight the primal determinations in formal logic’s account of logical form. Second, we shall deepen this with regard to the account of the concept. In doing so, we will encounter systematic problems, the resolution of which necessarily gives rise to a genuine self-reflection of logical form, which is transcendental logic in terms of Kant. /// Formale Logik ist keine voraussetzungsfreie Wissenschaft, sondern ihre Darstellung der logischen Form beruht auf Voraussetzungen, die sie selbst nicht einholt. Der Aufsatz soll dies verdeutlichen. Dazu werden in einem ersten Schritt die grundlegendsten Bestimmungen in der Fassung der logischen Form vergegenwärtigt. In einem zweiten Schritt wird dies mit Blick auf den formallogischen Begriff des Begriffs vertieft. Dabei treten systematische Probleme auf, deren Auflösung einen Fortschritt in der Selbstreflexion der logischen Form nötig macht: die transzendentale Logik im Sinne Kants. (shrink)

Max Weber e o problema da evidência e da validade nas ciências empíricas da ação.

In Max Scheler il concetto di spirito (Geist) è particolarmente instabile: come il pennino di un sismografo è capace di registrare ogni minimo mutamento del suo pensiero. L'oscillazione più spettacolare avviene nel 1923. Il problema è che invece le diverse interpretazioni su Scheler, ancora oggi, procedono come se avessero a che fare con un termine univocamente definito. Ancora nel 1922, nella seconda edizione di Vom Ewigen, Scheler esprimeva la tesi che «lo spirito è infinitamente più potente (mächtiger) di tutta la (...) natura insieme», già nel 1924, in Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens, scrive esattamente il contrario: «originariamente lo spirito non ha in sé una qualsiasi traccia di forza o di efficacia». Inoltre mentre nel periodo intermedio i termini "persona" e "spirito" risultano rigorosamente correlati-nel Formalismus si arriverà a sostenere che «l'idea di uno spirito impersonale è insensata» - dopo il 1923 il concetto di "spirito" viene gradualmente riferito a tutta la natura, per cui la persona diventa una delle tante espressioni dello spirito. Che cosa succede nel 1923 per spiegare un rovesciamento di posizioni di tale portata? (shrink)

Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida’s allusion, in the first part of Of (...) Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”. (shrink)

Fine (2007) argues that Frege’s puzzle and its relatives demonstrate a need for a basic reorientation of the field of semantics. According to this reorientation, the domain of semantic facts would be closed not under the classical consequence relation but only under a stronger relation Fine calls “manifest consequence.” I examine Fine’s informally sketched analyses of manifest consequence, showing that each can be amended to determine a class of strong consequence relations. A best candidate relation emerges from each of the (...) two classes, and I prove that the two candidates extensionally coincide. The resulting consequence relation is of independent interest, for it might be held to constitute a cogent standard of reasoning that proceeds under a deficient grasp on the identity of objects. (shrink)

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief (...) in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met. (shrink)

I present a reconstruction of the logical system of the Tractatus, which differs from classical logic in two ways. It includes an account of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” device, which suffices to express some effectively generated countably infinite disjunctions. And its attendant notion of structure is relativized to the fixed underlying universe of what is named. -/- There follow three results. First, the class of concepts definable in the system is closed under finitary induction. Second, if the universe of objects is countably (...) infinite, then the property of being a tautology is \Pi^1_1-complete. But third, it is only granted the assumption of countability that the class of tautologies is \Sigma_1-definable in set theory. -/- Wittgenstein famously urges that logical relationships must show themselves in the structure of signs. He also urges that the size of the universe cannot be prejudged. The results of this paper indicate that there is no single way in which logical relationships could be held to make themselves manifest in signs, which does not prejudge the number of objects. (shrink)

To understand consciousness we must first describe what we experience accurately. But oddly, current dualist vs reductionist debates characterise experience in ways which do not correspond to ordinary experience. Indeed, there is no other area of enquiry where the phenomenon to be studied has been so systematically misdescribed. Given this, it is hardly surprising that progress towards understanding the nature of consciousness has been limited. This chapter argues that dualist vs. reductionist debates adopt an implicit description of consciousness that does (...) not resemble ordinary experience. If one adopts an accurate description of conscious phenomenology along with an understanding of the fundamental differences between correlation, causation and ontological identity, reductionism cannot succeed. However the alternative is not a dualism that places consciousness beyond science. Rather, it is a nonreductionist science of consciousness. (shrink)

In their article “Out of nowhere: thought insertion, ownership and context-integration”, Jean-Remy Martin & Elisabeth Pacherie criticize the standard approach to thought insertion. However, their criticism is based on a misunderstanding of what the standard approach actually claims. By clarifying the notions ‘sense of ownership’ and ‘sense of agency’, I show that Martin & Pacherie’s own approach can be construed as a refined version of the standard approach.

This paper examines the position in moral philosophy that Harry Frankfurt calls the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). The paper first describes the principle as articulated by A.J. Ayer. Subsequently, the paper examines Frankfurt’s critique and proposed revision of the principle and argues that Frankfurt’s proposal relies on an excessively simplistic account of practical reasoning, which fails to account for the possibility of moral dilemmas. In response, the paper offers a further revision of PAP, which accounts for Frankfurt’s critique, moral (...) dilemmas, and the challenge of causal determinism. (shrink)

Seguendo l’esposizione data in (Orsi 2012), riguardante una comparazione fra alcuni aspetti dell’opera di Carl Schmitt e di Jürgen Habermas in filosofia politica, centrata sulla nozione di ordine ed inquadrata, nelle sue basi, entro la sociologia delle religioni di Max Weber, sarà possibile, oltre l’individuazione in essa di un comune punto di convergenza fra il pensiero dei questi autori nella nozione di ordine, portare avanti, su un piano teoretico di livello superiore, un ulteriore raffronto più orientato verso la metodologia della (...) ricerca filosofica così come intesa da Martin Heidegger, la quale permetterà tra l’altro di vedere sia Schmitt che Habermas da un altro possibile punto di vista prospettico. (shrink)

In recent metaethics, moral realists have advanced a companions-in-guilt argument against moral nihilism. Proponents of this argument hold that the conclusion that there are no categorical normative reasons implies that there are no epistemic reasons. However, if there are no epistemic reasons, there are no epistemic reasons to believe nihilism. Therefore, nihilism is false or no one has epistemic reasons to believe it. While this argument is normally presented as a reply to Mackie, who introduced the term “companions-in-guilt” in his (...) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong of 1977, Herbert J. Phillips presented a form of this argument in Ethics in 1940. In this paper, I will discuss Phillips’ version of the companions-in-guilt argument, demonstrate how recent epistemology bears out an important premise of the argument, and compare Phillips’ argument to Derek Parfit’s recent work. (shrink)

This paper examines a paradigm case of allegedly successful reductive explanation, viz. the explanation of the fact that water boils at 100°C based on facts about H2O. The case figures prominently in Joseph Levine’s explanatory gap argument against physicalism. The paper studies the way the argument evolved in the writings of Levine, focusing especially on the question how the reductive explanation of boiling water figures in the argument. It will turn out that there are two versions of the explanatory gap (...) argument to be found in Levine’s writings. The earlier version relies heavily on conceptual analysis and construes reductive explanation as a process of deduction. The later version makes do without conceptual analysis and understands reductive explanations as based on theoretic reductions that are justified by explanatory power. Along the way will be shown that the bridge principles — which are being neglected in the explanatory gap literature — play a crucial role in the explanatory gap argument. (shrink)

Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...) imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content, while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content : More of P!Less of U! If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me! (shrink)