This dissertation investigates Plato’s prohibition on suicide at Phaedo 62b2-c9. I first lift two descriptions of death early in the text. At Phaedo 64c, Plato offers a description of physical death. A person dies physically when their body falls away from their soul. Plato goes on to offer a description of psychological death at 67c-d. A person dies psychologically when their soul has unencumbered itself from the body as much as is possible. Generally, I conclude, death is the separation of (...) the soul and body from one another. Having determined what death is for Plato, I turn to the central topic of the dissertation, Plato’s prohibition on suicide. I suggest that the suicide prohibition consists of two parts. The Enclosure Argument indicates the body is an enclosure from which we should not seek freedom so as not to defy the gods. The Guardian Argument indicates that we humans should not kill ourselves because we are enslaved to the gods. In all, the two arguments cohere insofar as they both tell against abandoning right rule. (shrink)

I show that the common reading of Thomson, that she argues by analogy for the conclusion that abortion is permissible, is mistaken. The correct reading of Thomson is that she argues by counterexample, showing that arguments against abortion are unsound. The remainder of the paper highlights the lessons learned from Thomson once we read her aright.

Provides an account of how necessary subjective syntactic investments on the part of speakers affect the semantic contents of their words and the possibilities for their thought-contents.

Some students who possess the same cognitive skill set as their counterparts but who neither speak nor write English fluently have to contend with an unnecessary barrier to academic success. While an administrative top-down approach has been in progress for many years to address this issue, enhancement of student performance begins in the classroom. Thus, we argue that instructors ought to implement a more organic bottom-up approach. If it is possible for instructors to make class content available in other languages, (...) such as Spanish, without thereby compromising something of comparable pedagogical value, then they ought to do so. In fact, we provide here Anselm’s Ontological Argument rendered in Spanish to show how, when translated, it provides native Spanish speakers with greater accessibility to difficult material. Then, we consider the possible beneficial implications of doing so for university students. (shrink)

In both scientific and popular circles it is often said that we are in the midst of a sixth mass extinction. Although the urgency of our present environmental crises is not in doubt, such claims of a present mass extinction are highly controversial scientifically. Our aims are, first, to get to the bottom of this scientific debate by shedding philosophical light on the many conceptual and methodological challenges involved in answering this scientific question, and, second, to offer new philosophical perspectives (...) on what the value of asking this question has been — and whether that value persists today. We show that the conceptual challenges in defining ‘mass extinction’, uncertainties in past and present diversity assessments, and data incommensurabilities undermine a straightforward answer to the question of whether we are in, or entering, a sixth mass extinction today. More broadly we argue that an excessive focus on the mass extinction framing can be misleading for present conservation efforts and may lead us to miss out on the many other valuable insights that Earth’s deep time can offer in guiding our future. (shrink)

Michel Serres's relation to ecocriticism is complex. On the one hand, he is a pioneer in the area, anticipating the current fashion for ecological thought by over a decade. On the other hand, 'ecology' and 'eco-criticism' are singularly infelicitous terms to describe Serres's thinking if they are taken to indicate that attention should be paid to particular 'environmental' concerns. For Serres, such local, circumscribed ideas as 'ecology' or 'eco-philosophy' are one of the causes of our ecological crisis, and no progress (...) can be made while such narrow concerns govern our thinking. This chapter intervenes in the ongoing discussion about the relation of Serres to ecology by drawing on some of Serres's more recent texts on pollution and dwelling, and this fresh material leads us to modulate existing treatments of Serres and ecology. I insist on the inextricability of two senses of ecology in Serres's approach: a broader meaning that refers to the interconnectedness and inextricability of all entities (natural and cultural, material and ideal), and a narrower sense that evokes classically 'environmental' concerns. Serres's recent work leads us to challenge some of the vectors and assumptions of the debate by radicalising the continuity between 'natural' and 'cultural' phenomena, questioning some of the commonplaces that structure almost all ecological thinking, and arguing that the entire paradigm of ecology as 'conservation' and 'protection' is bankrupt and self-undermining. After outlining the shape of Serres's 'general ecology' and its opposition to ecology as conservation, this chapter asks what sorts of practices and values a Serresian general ecology can engender when it considers birdsong, advertising, industrial pollution and money to be manifestations of the same drive for appropriation through pollution. A response is given in terms of three key Serresian motifs: the world as fetish, parasitic symbiosis, and global cosmocracy. (shrink)

Phylogenetic models traditionally represent the history of life as having a strictly-branching tree structure. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that the history of life is often not strictly-branching; lateral gene transfer, endosymbiosis, and hybridization, for example, can all produce lateral branching events. There is thus motivation to allow phylogenetic models to have a reticulate structure. One proposal involves the reconciliation of genealogical discordance. Briefly, this method uses patterns of disagreement – discordance – between trees of different genes to add (...) lateral branching events to phylogenetic trees of taxa, and to estimate the most likely cause of these events. I use this practice to argue for: (1) a need for expanded accounts of multiple-models idealization, (2) a distinction between automatic and manual de-idealization, and (3) recognition that idealization may serve the meso-level aims of science in a different way than hitherto acknowledged. (shrink)

Much French philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been marked by the positive valorization of alterity, an ethical position that has recently received a vigorous assault from Alain Badiou’s privilege of sameness. This article argues that Badiou shares a great deal in common with the philosophies of alterity from which he seeks to distance himself, and that Michel Serres’s little-known account of alterity offers a much more radical alternative to the ethics of difference. Drawing on both (...) translated and as yet untranslated works, I argue that the Serresian ontology of inclination, along with his conceptual personae of the hermaphrodite and the parasite, informs ethical and political positions that offer a distinctive ethics and politics that present fresh insights about the relation between the singular and the universal, the contingency of market exchange, and the nature of violence. (shrink)

Juha Raikka argues against disassociation from collective responsibility based on a premise of logical inconsistency insofar as the conclusion ‘one is not guilty’ does not necessarily follow from the premise that ‘everyone is guilty.’ Raikka builds his case on a fictionalized national, ethnic, or cultural group that participates in human sacrifices for the sake of ‘medical reasons’ or human health. He concedes that this fictionalized group bears an uncanny resemblance to Western society and their proposed collective responsibility for practices ranging (...) from (A) foreign conflicts to (B) Environmental pollution and (C) overconsumption of “third world” foreign natural resources. Arguably, these practices could be parsed as exercises conducive or equal to ‘human sacrifices’. Our discussion here will be all but entirely subsumed by (C). (shrink)

This edited collection began as an international symposium on Kant and biology held at the University of Tübingen in 2010 and the now-published volume offers us new ways of thinking about Kant’s theory of biology with respect to not only his own work but to contemporary discussions regarding biological function and form. With a consistently high level of scholarship and a set of internationally renowned contributors, Kant’s Theory of Biology thus offers us an important contribution to the field’s rapidly growing (...) interest in the history of the life sciences, and the book’s discussions devoted to the Critique of Judgement, in particular, will no doubt shape the course of subsequent investigations in the years to come. The anthology contains fifteen essays divided into three parts, with a focus on the development of the philosophy of biology in Kant’s early writings, the theory of organisms in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, and current perspectives on the teleology of nature. The quality of the editing on this book is excellent, far superior to that of a typical anthology, and what is to be especially appreciated is the helpful cross-referencing being done by the majority of the papers in so far as this lends the collection an organic, as opposed to a merely aggregative, feel. (shrink)

An interview exploring the complexity of contemporary French philosophical atheism, in the light of Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Badiou, Nancy and Meillassoux (Edinburgh UP, 2011).

Eric Watkins argues that according to Kant, causation is not a relation between two events, but a relation between the “causality” of a substance and an event. It is shown that his arguments are partly based on a confusion between causation and interaction. Further, Watkins claims that for Kant, causes cannot be temporally determined. If this were true, it would follow that there can be no causal chains, and that all factors that determine the time when an effect (...) occurs do not belong to its cause. However, it is not true. In order to understand Kant, one must distinguish between causation, action, and interaction. When two substances interact, each of them does something (an event), which causes something to happen to the other one. (shrink)

Eric Watkins has argued on philosophical, textual, and historical grounds that Kant’s account of causation in the first Critique should not be read as an attempt to refute Hume’s account of causation. In this paper, I challenge the arguments for Watkins’ claim. Specifically, I argue (1) that Kant’s philosophical commitments, even on Watkins’ reading, are not obvious obstacles to refuting Hume, (2) that textual evidence from the “Disciple of Pure Reason” suggests Kant conceived of his account of (...) causation as such a refutation, and (3) that none of Hume’s early German critics provided responses to this account that would have satisfied Kant. Watkins’ reading of Kant’s account of causation is thus more compatible with traditional views about Kant’s relationship to Hume than Watkins believes. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of speculative anticipation in ethics during the COVID-19 pandemic and provides a structure to think about ethical decision-making in times of extreme uncertainty. We identify three different but interwoven domains within which speculative anticipation can be found: global, local, and projective anticipation. Our analysis aims to open possibilities of seeing the situatedness of others both locally and globally in order to address larger social issues that have been laid bare by the presence of SARS-CoV-2. Our (...) account of speculative anticipation builds on the analyses of the gendered impact of anticipation in technoscience by Vincanne Adams, Michelle Murphy and Adele Clarke; studies in cultural anthropology by Ann Laura Stoler; and the recent research on speculative fiction by Esther Jones. Like theirs, ours is intended to be useful. We offer it as a tool to recast questions and revisit assumptions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is hoped that by using the frame of the ethics of speculative anticipation, one might be able to consider how to avoid those futures that reproduce inequity, and instead actively and responsibly envision those futures that are informed by equity and sustainability. (shrink)

Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such as: “For every (...) metal there is a melting point.” All-and-some statements are both universally and existentially quantified in that order. Watkins argued that AS should be regarded as both nonfalsifiable and nonverifiable, for they partake in the logical fate of both universal and existential statements. This claim is subject to the proviso that the bound variables are “uncircumscribed” ; i.e., that the universe of discourse is infinite. (shrink)

Bu makalede, bilim felsefecisi kimliğiyle tanınan Thomas Kuhn’un eğitim ve özellikle fen eğitimi alanındaki görüşlerine değinilmektedir. Fen eğitimi, bilim, bilimin doğası ve bilim uygulamaları hakkında düşünceler geliştirmeye odaklanarak fen öğrenimi için gerekli olan beceri ve anlayışın geliştirilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Fen eğitiminin temel amaçlarından biri bilimin gerçek doğasının tespit edilmesi ve bu doğrultuda bir eğitim modelinin belirlenmesidir. Bu çerçevede Kuhn’un bilim tarihine yönelik incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü paradigma kavramı bilimin doğası ve fen eğitimi konusundaki görüşlerin değişimine yol açmıştır. Kuhn açısından fen eğitimi (...) yürürlükteki bilim yapma tarzının temelinde yatan paradigma ve öğretilerinin bilim insanlarına ve öğrencilere aktarılması sürecidir, bu nedenle fen eğitimi yalnızca olağan bilim döneminde mümkündür. Kuhn’un eğitim modeli, mevcut paradigmayla ilişkili olarak karşılaşılan bulmaca ya da sorunları çeşitli örneklerden hareketle tekrar tekrar çözmeye çalışan öğrenciler aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilir. Kuhn’un olağan bilimin sınırları içerisinde kalarak değerlendirdiği fen eğitimi anlayışı eleştirel düşünceyi engellediği iddiasıyla Karl Popper, John Watkins ve Richard Bailey tarafından katı, tutucu, dogmatik ve endoktrinasyonu vurgulayan bir eğitim anlayışı olarak görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede makalede, öncelikli olarak Kuhn’un bilimin doğası ve bilimin gelişim tarzına yönelik belirlemeleri doğrultusunda fen eğitimine yönelik düşünceleri ve bu düşüncelerin eğitim alanındaki yansımaları incelenmektedir. Ardından, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi üzerine görüşlerinin iddia edildiği gibi dogmatik bir yapıda olmadığı, endoktrinasyonu ya da zorla öğretimi vurgulamadığı, bu tür yorumların radikal bir yaklaşımdan öteye gidemediği ileri sürülmektedir. Son olarak makalede, Kuhn’un fen eğitimi anlayışının yalnızca bir durum tespiti ya da bir fen eğitimi tasviri olarak değerlendirilmesi gerektiği düşüncesi ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. -/- In this article, Thomas Kuhn’s impact, who is known as a philosopher of science, on science education are mentioned. Science education aims to develop the skills and understanding necessary for science learning, with a focus on developing ideas about science and the nature of science. One of the main purposes of science education is to determine the true nature of science and to determine an education model in this direction. In this context, the concept of paradigm, which Kuhn put forward as a result of his studies on the history of science, has led to a change in views on the nature of science and science education. For Kuhn, science education is the process of conveying the paradigm underlying the current way of doing science to scientists and students because science education is possible only in the normal science period. Kuhn’s educational model is carried out through students who repeatedly try to solve puzzles or problems encountered in relation to the current paradigm. Kuhn’s understanding of science education is seen by Karl Popper, John Watkins and Richard Bailey as a rigid, conservative, dogmatic and indoctrinational education approach with the claim that it prevents critical thinking. In this context, the article primarily examines Kuhn’s thoughts on science education and the reflections of these thoughts in the field of education. Then, it is argued that Kuhn’s views on science education are not dogmatic as claimed, he does not emphasize indoctrination, and that such interpretations cannot go beyond a radical approach. Finally, in the article, it is emphasized that Kuhn’s understanding of science education should be evaluated only as a description of science education. (shrink)

In this eleventh book of scilogs – called in-turns and out-turns –, one may find new and old questions and solutions, referring mostly to topics on Neutrosophy, but also Multispace, with miscellaneous addition of topics on Physics, Mathematics, or Sociology – email messages to research colleagues, or replies, notes about authors, articles, or books, spontaneous ideas, and so on. -/- Exchanging ideas with Prem Kumar Singh, Feng Liu, Nicolae Bălașa, Jimmy Quellet, Minodora Rușchița, Frank Gelli, A. R. Vătuiu, Victor Christianto, (...) Vladimir I. Rogozhin, Robert Neil Boyd, Akira Kanda, Stefan Spaarmann, Oliver Consa, Yabin Shao, Junle Zhuo, Nivetha Martin, Said Broumi, Jean Dezert, Erick González, Tomasz Witczak, B. De Baets, I. Couso, D. Dubois, L. Good, Mihaela Colhon, Atiqe Ur Rahman, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Ihsan, Edeline Nancy, Shawkat Alkhazaleh, Shazia Rana, Vasantha Kandasamy, Santanu Acharjee, Mohamed Al-Shmrani, Parimala Manie, Mehmet Unver, Murat Olgun, Adel Aleidhri, Akira Kanda, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, Mircea Zărnescu, R. Tayebi Khorami, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Maisam Jdid, M. Abobala, Riad Hamido, Rafael Rojas, Esmaeil Zarei, Faisal Khan, Rouzbeh Abbassi, Adel Al-Odhari, Henry Garrett, Ackbar Rezaei, Saeid Jafari, Karthika Muthusamy, Harish Garg, Huda E. Khalid, Gonca D. Güngör, Muslim A. Noah Zainal, Fakhry Asad Agusfrianto, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Mariam Hariri, Yudi Mahatma, Masoud Ghods, Marco Brigliadori, Luis Enrique Aponte Pérez, Amr Mohammed, M. Aslam (in order of reference in the book). (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem Begriff "Männlichkeit". Die Klärung des Begriffes soll mithilfe dreier philosophischer Strategien unternommen werden. Erstens werde ich zwei philosophische Modelle von Männlichkeit einander gegenüberstellen. Harvey C. Mansfields Theorie soll mithilfe von Pierre Bourdieus Konzept der männlichen Herrschaft kritisiert werden. Während Mansfield eine verbreitete Auffassung von Männlichkeit vertritt, die diese mit Assertivität, Mut und Adel verbindet, bietet Bourdieu uns ein gutes Instrumentarium dafür, versteckte Strukturen der männlichen Ordnung hinter diesem Bild zu entdecken. Zweitens wird diese Kritik mit (...) Bourdieu durch einen phänomenologischen Hintergrund motiviert. Dabei werde ich sowohl die phänomenologischen Wurzeln von Bourdieus Denken als auch die Möglichkeit der phänomenologischen Weiterführung seiner Ideen berücksichtigen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird den Übereinstimmungen von Bourdieu und Max Scheler gewidmet. Schließlich werde ich den Vorschlag machen, „Männlichkeit“ als einen offenen Begriff zu verstehen, der historisch, sozial und kulturell wandelbar ist. Die Idee des offenen Begriffs bietet eine Alternative zu essenzialistischen Definitionen anhand notwendiger und hinreichenden Kriterien, lässt genügend Freiraum, um die Interdependenz zwischen gesellschaftlichem Wandel und un-seren Männlichkeitskonstruktionen zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

I emphasize two merits of Eric Watkins’ account in "Kant on Laws": the strong evidential support it has, and the central place it gives to Kant’s laws of mechanics. Then, I raise two questions for further research. 1. What kind of evidential reasoning confirms a Kantian law? 2. Do natures explain Kantian laws? If so, how?

Kant’s Antinomy of Teleological Judgment is unique in offering two pairs of oppositions, one of regulative maxims, and the other of constitutive principles. Here I defend a traditional interpretation of the antinomy— as proposed, for example, by Stadler (1874), Adickes (1925), and Cassirer (1921)—that the antinomy consists in an opposition between constitutive principles, and is resolved by pointing out their legitimate status as merely regulative maxims. I argue against recent interpretations—for example, in McLaughlin (1990), Allison (1991), and Watkins (2009)—which (...) treat the regulative pair as itself antinomial. I then address several textual worries having to do with reconciling the traditional interpretation within the overall structure of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment that have led these scholars to espouse the new view. Throughout the paper, I emphasize hitherto neglected parallels with Kant’s treatment of the antinomy of taste, which sheds light on understanding the antinomy of teleology. (shrink)

It is claimed that the English genitive marker 's' suprisingly mirrors- at least in some dialects of English - the three main different usage of the mono-morphemic reflexives such as 'se' in French. A solution to this paradox already noted by Jespersen (1918) is proposed drawing on Watkins paradox according to which the study of what looks like 'social' parameters might be relevant for linguistics.

This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. The (...) ontological interpretation allows Kant to be an incompatibilist because the ontological priority of agents qua noumena "ontologically undermines" the significance of phenomenal determinism for agents' free will. That is, since agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena, the fact that agents qua noumena are not subject to determinism is more fundamental than the fact that agents qua phenomena are subject to determinism, and it is the more fundamental fact that we should be concerned with in the metaphysical foundations of moral responsibility. Recent (independent) work by myself, Eric Watkins, and Robert Hanna is drawn on to demonstrate that the ontological interpretation can mount a better defense against some traditional objections than has often been thought. -/- According to the two-aspect interpretation, the transcendental distinction between agents qua noumena and qua phenomena is a semantic and epistemological distinction. Since it rejects the ontological priority of noumena, it has no way to assert that the non-determinism of agents qua noumena is more metaphysically fundamental than the determinism of agents qua phenomena. For the two-aspect interpretation, the truth of determinism must remain just as fundamental as the truth of any other characterization of agents. This means that, on the two-aspect interpretation, there is no better reason to call Kant an incompatibilist than there is to call him a compatibilist. Since Henry Allison has presented the most detailed two-aspect interpretation of the agential transcendental distinction, the arguments against the two-aspect distinction address his interpretation. Part of Allison's strategy is to argue that phenomenal determinism poses less of a problem for free will if we accept his accounts of the Second Analogy and empirical psychology. I point our problems in these accounts and argue that this strategy cannot be accepted. -/- . (shrink)