One of the key insights of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is the idea that gender-based subordination is not just something done to women, but also something women do to themselves. This raises a question about ethical responsibility: if women are complicit, or actively implicated in their own oppression, are they at fault? Recent Beauvoir scholarship remains divided on this point. Here, I argue that Beauvoir did, in fact, ethically criticize many women for their complicity, as a sign of (...) what she called “bad faith”. I challenge recent accounts by Nancy Bauer and Manon Garcia, who both read Beauvoir as exonerating complicit women. According to this reading, women emerge as human “freedoms” within a social world where a “destiny” of inferiority is already prepared for them. Their self-subordination is then an inevitable product of acting in a patriarchal world. I argue, however, that this interpretation generates a crucial tension, leading Bauer and Garcia to call on women to stop being complicit, while also claiming they cannot avoid complicity. I propose instead a different interpretation, on which feminine complicity is often fueled by criticizable ethical attitudes that are far from inevitable. By revisiting Beauvoir’s notion of “bad faith”, I show that this account is compatible with recognizing the limitations imposed on women’s agency and I show that this feminist ethical criticism is itself an important part of a collective project of social transformation. (shrink)

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a 'typical' dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light --a different light-- on philosophical debates on the laws of (...) nature. In the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...) many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws. (shrink)

In situations where we ignore everything but the space of possibilities, we ought to suspend judgment—that is, remain agnostic—about which of these possibilities is the case. This means that we cannot sum our degrees of belief in different possibilities, something that has been formalized as an axiom of non-additivity. Consistent with this way of representing our ignorance, I defend a doxastic norm that recommends that we should nevertheless follow a certain additivity of possibilities: even if we cannot sum degrees of (...) belief in different possibilities, we should be more confident in larger groups of possibilities. It is thus shown that, in the type of situation considered (in so-called ‘classical ignorance’, i.e. “behind a thin veil of ignorance”), it is epistemically rational for advocates of suspending judgment to endorse this comparative confidence; while on the other hand it is shown that, even in classical ignorance, no stronger belief—such as a precise uniform probability distribution—is warranted. (shrink)

I summarize, in this informal interview, the main approaches to the ‘Past Hypothesis’, the postulation of a low-entropy initial state of the universe. I’ve chosen this as an open problem in the philosophical foundations of physics. I hope that this brief overview helps readers in gaining perspective and in appreciating the diverse range of approaches in this fascinating unresolved debate.

Il concetto di relazione è colto come concetto antinomico e il valore è la coscienza di questa antinomia.

Como introducción al monográfico sobre reduccionismo y emergencia brindamos aquí un contexto teórico al debate contemporáneo. Hablaremos primero del acercamiento naturalista en filosofía (§2), así como de dos de las características más importantes de la emergencia: autonomía y universalidad (§3). Finalmente, basándonos en la literatura contemporánea (principalmente en Patricia Palacios y Jessica Wilson, además de Mario Bunge y Alicia Juarrero) presentamos algunas de las definiciones y distinciones más importantes para entender mejor el debate sobre la emergencia (§4).

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a ‘Humean system’—a generic dynamical system without guiding laws—and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens [2003], which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since (...) this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random—that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity. (shrink)

The common account of the analog vs digital distinction is based on features of physical systems, being related to the usage of continuous vs discrete supports respectively. It is proposed here to alternatively characterize the concepts of analog and digital as related to coding systems, of which a formal definition is given, by suggesting that the distinction refers to the strategy adopted to define the coding function: extensional in digital systems, isomorphic intensional in analog systems. This thesis is supported by (...) examples, in particular of analog systems exploiting discrete supports, and is discussed to explain why digital coding is currently so widespread in technological and social practice. (shrink)

This paper compares Nietzsche ́s views on the relationship between philosophical reflection and empirical sciences against the background of some of the debates in the so-called transcendental tradition, in order to characterize his position in terms of a liberal kind of methodological naturalism. Initially, it will be shown that there are some similarities between the debates in the German academic philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century and the Postquinean contemporary debates on naturalism. I discuss subsequently F. A. (...) Lange ́s historical views concerning the emergence of methodical discipline within the materialistic tradition, as well as Nietzsche ́s reception of them. Next, I present Spir ́s arguments against the naturalizing programs of his time, as well as Nietzsche ́s response to him. In the last section, I discuss the meaning of Nietzsche ́s orientation to a speculative philosophy of the will to power in his late works and whether it is compatible or not with his more liberal conception of naturalism mainly supported in his middle period works. (shrink)

Nietzsche mobiliza recursos retóricos de natureza heterogênea em sua obra, que podem ser distribuídos em pelo menos quatro grandes rubricas: elementos que (1) incidem sobre a materialidade sonora e rítmica da linguagem (dimensão expressiva associada à prova ética); (2) orientam a adoção de um conjunto de estratégias argumentativas que variam conforme as necessidades filosóficas do momento (dimensão argumentativa ou dialética); (3) dizem respeito a escolhas relativas à forma de apresentação dos argumentos, ou à sua inserção no interior de diferentes gêneros (...) literários (aqui vale a tese do pluralismo defendida por Nehamas, pois Nietzsche explora as potencialidades de diferentes formas de apresentação para as suas ideias, sendo a principal delas um gênero híbrido que incorpora elementos do aforismo e do ensaio); finalmente, (4) retomam aspectos relativos à invenção (dimensão heurística do paradigma indiciário, com a valorização da inferência abdutiva). Neste artigo pretendo mostrar, através de uma caracterização sumária da prática discursiva de Nietzsche, assim como de uma rápida retomada de sua tematização da retórica, como essas diversas dimensões (expressiva, inventiva, argumentativa e expositiva) se integram em seu projeto filosófico, tornando-se uma parte constitutiva do mesmo. Essa leitura se contrapõe a uma tradição que nega relevância filosófica à dimensão retórica da obra de Nietzsche, relegando-a a uma suposta dimensão exotérica de seus escritos. Há formas implícitas e explícitas pelas quais um intérprete pode chegar a esse resultado. Dentre as formas implícitas de contornar o desafio retórico posto pela filosofia de Nietzsche, a mais célebre é a de Heidegger. Ela se funda em sua decisão filologicamente controversa, no limite indefensável, de conferir primazia aos póstumos em detrimento dos livros publicados pelo filósofo, que deveriam, segundo ele, ser tomados como fachada. Paul de Man representa a forma explícita dessa recusa, mas com resultados curiosamente próximos aos de Heidegger, ainda que movido por intenções filosóficas distintas. No presente ensaio recuso ambas as estratégias de evasão e procuro mostrar que os diversos aspectos retóricos presentes na obra de Nietzsche se integram de forma relativamente harmônica ao seu projeto filosófico de cunho perfeccionista. (shrink)

The idea that women qua women can be dehumanized has been dismissed by feminist philosophers, like Kate Manne, and by philosophers of dehumanization, like David Livingstone Smith. Against these skeptics, I argue that we can and should use dehumanization to explain an important strand of misogyny. When they are dehumanized, women are represented simultaneously as human and as inhuman embodiments of the natural world. They therefore appear as magical, contaminating, sexualized threats towards whom violence is acceptable or even necessary. Misogynistic (...) dehumanization is important to understanding atrocities like the early modern European witch-hunts, but also contemporary phenomena like incel violence. (shrink)

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a ‘typical’ dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light—a different light—on philosophical debates on the laws of nature. In (...) the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The constraints required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such constraints might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

Aesthetic hedonism is the view that to be aesthetically good is to please. For most aesthetic hedonists, aesthetic normativity is hedonic normativity. This paper argues that Kant’s third Critique contains resources for a nonhedonic account of aesthetic normativity as sourced in autonomy as self-legislation. A case is made that the account is also Kant’s because it ties his aesthetics into a key theme of his larger philosophy.

This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields (...) that have not been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws. Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behavior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields. According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal becomes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable regularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project, if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) intermediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency. Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of pre-existent governing laws. Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II develops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from a more complex underlying level. (shrink)

Aesthetic preferences and practices vary widely between individuals and between cultures. How should aesthetics proceed if we take this fact of aesthetic diversity, rather than the presumption of aesthetic universality, as our starting point? How should we theorize the cultural origins and cultural basis of aesthetic diversity? How should we think about the value and normativity of aesthetic diversity? In an effort to model what the turn toward diversity might look like in aesthetic inquiry, each author defends a different account (...) of aesthetic diversity, and they engage in a collective dialogue about these issues. (shrink)

Yoshimi has attempted to defuse my argument concerning the identification of network abstraction with empiricist abstraction - thus entailing psychologism - by claiming that the argument does not generalize from the example of simple feed-forward networks. I show that the particular details of networks are logically irrelevant to the nature of the abstractive process they employ. This is ultimately because deep artificial neural networks (ANNs) and dynamical systems theory applied to the mind (DST) are both associationisms - that is, empiricist (...) theories that derive the principles of thought from the causal history of the organism/system. On this basis, I put forward a new aspect of the old argument by noting that ANNs & DST are the causal bases of the phenomena of passive synthesis, whereas the language of thought hypothesis (LOT) and the symbolic computational theory of mind (CTM) are the causal bases of the phenomena of active synthesis. If the phenomena of active synthesis are not distinct in kind from and are thus reducible to those of passive synthesis, psychologism results. Yoshimi’s program, insofar as it denies this fundamental phenomenological distinction, is revealed to be the true anti-pluralist program, by essentially denying the causal efficacy of the mechanistic foundations of active synthesis by referring phenomenology exclusively to associationism for its causal foundation. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance for the (...) Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

Os projetos de psicologia científica enfrentam pelo menos duas ameaças. A primeira delas surge quando uma proposta de psicologia tenta seguir os cânones da ciência moderna. Nesse caso, torna-se necessário "objetivar o fenômeno psicológico", o que, geralmente, é feito por meio da sua tradução em termos fisiológicos. Mas, nesse ponto, a especificidade da psicologia é ameaçada pelo reducionismo fisiológico. A segunda ameaça aparece quando um projeto de psicologia tenta evitar o reducionismo fisiológico defendendo a natureza subjetiva irredutível do fenômeno psicológico. (...) No entanto, isso coloca uma série de dificuldades metodológicas. Dessa maneira, a segunda ameaça às propostas de psicologia científica é o mentalismo, que impõe limitações ao emprego do método científico. O presente ensaio tem o objetivo de mostrar como o projeto de psicologia científica de Tolman pode ser visto como uma alternativa a essas duas ameaças. Em primeiro lugar, examinamos em que medida a concepção de comportamento como fenômeno molar afasta Tolman do reducionismo fisiológico. Em seguida, analisamos algumas dificuldades decorrentes dessa proposta, em especial, as limitações inerentes à epistemologia realista - adotada inicialmente por Tolman. Por fim, apresentamos a proposta tolmaniana de superação dessas dificuldades: trata-se da analogia entre teorias científicas e mapas, que revela a adoção de uma epistemologia instrumentalista por Tolman. (shrink)

The notion of Providence is born with the Greek word prόnoia which, however, originally meant "premeditation" (of a crime) or "design" of an artefact, and had nothing to do with religion. It was Plato in the Timaeus who adopted the word from the common language to indicate the rational and benevolent principle that inspired the anonymous God, which he defined as dēmiourgόs (also this word originally meant a professional technician, for example, a doctor or an architect) in his work of (...) shaping the cosmos. The doctrine of divine Providence was taken up by Middle Platonism, and with it the need to "justify" the divinity for the presence of evil in the world, what Leibniz will call "theodicy". Stoicism also supported Providence, but here there is no "theodicy" because in Stoic philosophy rationality and beneficial purpose are intrinsic to the cosmic process and therefore there is no external architect to be charged and absolved. Christian authors of the first centuries recycled the arguments of the Platonists in support of Providence, despite the fact that the word prόnoia never appears in the New Testament, nor is there any Hebrew equivalent in the Tanak. Perhaps there is some compatibility problem between the philosophical theory of Providence and the biblical-Christian view of God. (shrink)

It is not uncommon in the history of science and philosophy to encounter crucial experiments or crucial objections the truth-value of which we are ignorant, that is, about which we suspend judgment. Should we ignore such objections? Contrary to widespread practice, I show that in and only in some circumstances they should not be ignored, for the epistemically rational doxastic attitude is to suspend judgment also about the hypothesis that the objection targets. In other words, suspension of judgment “propagates” from (...) the crucial objection to the hypothesis. In this paper I study under which conditions this phenomenon occurs, and discuss its significance for the topics of skepticism, scientific realism, and peer disagreement. (shrink)

Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, die Frage zu stellen, ob die Art und Weise, wie Nietzsche sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft bezieht, mithilfe des zeitgenössischen methodologischen Naturalismus beschrieben werden kann. Leiter (2009) hat diese Frage mit einem entschiedenen Ja beantwortet, ohne jedoch die Spannungen, die eine solche Antwort mit sich bringen, ausführlich zu diskutieren. Zumindest aus zwei Gründen scheint die Philosophie Nietzsches sich mit der stärkeren Version des methodologischen Naturalismus nicht so leicht in Einklang bringen zu lassen: (...) Erstens aufgrund des Prinzips des Willens zur Macht, das die These impliziert, dass das Intentionalitätsvokabular primitiver bzw. gründlicher als das physikalistische Vokabular sei, als einer Konsequenz aus der Verwendung des pragmatischen Prinzips der Sparsamkeit auf die ontologische Debatte (JGB 36, KSA 5, 54 f.); zweitens aufgrund Nietzsches Auffassung der spezifischen Aufgabe der Philosophie als einer normativen Aufgabe (JGB 211, KSA 5, 144 f.; GM I Anmerkung, KSA 5, 289). Gegen die starke Interpretation Leiters werden hier die folgenden Thesen vertreten: Nietzsche kann nur insofern als ein Vertreter des methodologischen Naturalismus betrachtet werden, als er der Auffassung ist, dass der Philosoph epistemische Tugenden erst dann gewinnt, wenn er sich mit einer wissenschaftlichen Methode vertraut macht (MA I 256, KSA 2, 212). Das bedeutet, dass er sich zumindest vorläufig den Regeln unterwirft, die innerhalb einer bestimmten wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft gelten (MA I 635, KSA 2, 360 f.; JGB 188, KSA 5, 108 ff.). Der Philosoph soll dies tun, um die epistemischen Tugenden zu erlangen, die für die normative Aufgabe der Philosophie unentbehrlich sind. Diese epistemischen Tugenden sind wesentlich skeptischer Natur. Sie zu kultivieren, bedeutet sicherlich, epistemische Werte zu fördern, nicht aber unbedingt für sie (AC 54, KSA 6, 236 f.), geschweige denn für ein kausales, bzw. monokausales Erklärungsmodell Exklusivität beanspruchen zu müssen (JGB 21, KSA 5, 35 f.). (shrink)

How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only (...) about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world. (shrink)

The present thesis intends the reconstruction of Nietzsche’s dialogue with the history of scepticism through the identification of his main sources. Such dialogue is constantly mediated by texts from authors contemporary to Nietzsche, therefore the reconstruction of the sources could not remain exclusively inside the sceptical tradition, but included frequently some post-Kantian authors. The fundamental claims of the present thesis are: Nietzsche was deeply acquainted with the history of scepticism; his work assumes this tradition in a very innovative manner; Nietzsche (...) not only associated himself instrumentally to scepticism, but tried to incorporate some of the essential commitments of the sceptical life to his understanding of philosophical life. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

Hume once argued the basic science to be not physics but “the science of man” and the foundation of this science to be the empiricist mechanism of association governed by the law of similarity in appearance—now more popular than ever in the form of artificial neural networks. I update Hume’s picture by showing phenomenology to be centrally concerned with providing a unifying basis for all the sciences (including physics) by going beyond the psychology of associationism (passive synthesis) to reveal phenomena (...) that are irreducibly syntactic (not associative) in structure. I therefore argue that the language of thought (LOT) is the necessary mechanism at the basis of these descriptive phenomena. I conclude by sketching a new picture of all the sciences unified by LOT based on Husserl’s opposition to Galilean “physicomathematical” science vis-à-vis the life-world (Lebenswelt). (shrink)

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present some reasons why source criticism is a particularly promising methodological approach when applied to Nietzsche’s work. Starting from a first taxonomy, devoted to the various methodological approaches in the history of philosophy, I argue that source criticism is particularly well suited to dealing with Nietzsche’s work, due to the enthymematic nature of the ways he presents his arguments as well as to the nature of some of his substantive philosophical commitments (such (...) as ethical perfectionism and descriptive fictionalism). Next, I propose a second taxonomy, which classifies the variety of connections Nietzsche establishes with his philosophical sources: spiritual affinity, programmatic commitment and instrumental appropriation. (shrink)

Much recent philosophy of physics has investigated the process of symmetry breaking. Here, I critically assess the alleged symmetry restoration at the fundamental scale. I draw attention to the contingency that gauge symmetries exhibit, that is, the fact that they have been chosen from an infinite space of possibilities. I appeal to this feature of group theory to argue that any metaphysical account of fundamental laws that expects symmetry restoration up to the fundamental level is not fully satisfactory. This is (...) a symmetry argument in line with Curie’s first principle. Further, I argue that this same feature of group theory helps to explain the ‘unreasonable’ effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and that it reduces the philosophical significance that has been attributed to the objectivity of gauge symmetries. (shrink)

One question that leads us into aesthetics is: why does beauty matter? Or, what do aesthetic goods bring to my life, to make it a life that goes well? Or, how does beauty deserve the place we have evidently made for it in our lives? A theory of aesthetic value states what beauty is so as to equip us to answer this question. According to aesthetic hedonism, aesthetic values are properties of items that stand in constitutive relation to pleasure. Contemporary (...) versions of aesthetic hedonism don’t explain what makes aesthetic values aesthetic, but they do explain what makes them normative, stating what makes it the case that aesthetic value facts lend weight to what an agent should do, for the fact that acting yields pleasure is always a reason to act. This book introduces and defends an alternative to aesthetic hedonism. According to the network theory, aesthetic value facts lend weight to its being an achievement for an agent to act. Since agents achieve by acting in coordination with one another, the theory takes seriously the sociality of aesthetic activity. The main argument for the network theory is that it better explains six facts about aesthetic activity than does aesthetic hedonism. The book also discusses the relationship between aesthetic value and pleasure, the point and distinctive character of aesthetic discourse, and the metaphysics of aesthetic value. Two final chapters use the network theory to shed light on how aesthetic value matters to us as individuals and as members of collectives. (shrink)

This essay examines the possibility that phenomenological laws might be implemented by a computational mechanism by carefully analyzing key passages from the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Part I examines the famous Denkmaschine passage as evidence for the view that intuitions of evidence are causally produced by computational means. Part II connects the less famous criticism of Avenarius & Mach on thought-economy with Husserl's 1891 essay 'On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).' Husserl is shown to reaffirm his earlier opposition to associationist (...) (Humean) and adaptationist (Darwinian) explanations of our thought-machine on the ground that they cannot reconstruct the notion of truth and its syntactic mental preservation in symbolic thought-trains. Part III reveals Husserl's interesting commitment to the idea that descriptive sciences necessarily transform into explanatory sciences on pain of contradicting the essence of science as a rational ideal. Since explanation in relation to phenomenology means causal explanation, and causal explanation in the form of the Denkmaschine accounts for phenomenological intuition, it is inferred that the rationally compelling ideal of explanatory science requires a computationalist reading of the subsequent logical investigations. (shrink)

This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (2017), whoargue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean metaphysics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Supervenience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism. This undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion that Humean Supervenience and the Growing-Block theory are (...) incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maximalism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. Finally, I point out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is disputable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion and supporting the moral that metaphysical theories—or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little constrained by truthmaking commitments. (shrink)

En esta entrada se mencionan las principales cuestiones en los fundamentos de la mecánica estadı́stica y la termodinámica, y las cuestiones filosóficas en las que repercuten estas áreas de la fı́sica. Al final se añaden lecturas recomendadas, enfatizando las traducidas al español.

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, the theory of (...) Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

The representations of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are formed from generalizing similarities and abstracting from differences in the manner of the empiricist theory of abstraction (Buckner, Synthese 195:5339–5372, 2018). The empiricist theory of abstraction is well understood to entail infinite regress and circularity in content constitution (Husserl, Logical Investigations. Routledge, 2001). This paper argues these entailments hold a fortiori for deep CNNs. Two theses result: deep CNNs require supplementation by Quine’s “apparatus of identity and quantification” in order to (1) (...) achieve concepts, and (2) represent objects, as opposed to “half-entities” corresponding to similarity amalgams (Quine, Quintessence, Cambridge, 2004, p. 107). Similarity amalgams are also called “approximate meaning[s]” (Marcus & Davis, Rebooting AI, Pantheon, 2019, p. 132). Although Husserl inferred the “complete abandonment of the empiricist theory of abstraction” (a fortiori deep CNNs) due to the infinite regress and circularity arguments examined in this paper, I argue that the statistical learning of deep CNNs may be incorporated into a Fodorian hybrid account that supports Quine’s “sortal predicates, negation, plurals, identity, pronouns, and quantifiers” which are representationally necessary to overcome the regress/circularity in content constitution and achieve objective (as opposed to similarity-subjective) representation (Burge, Origins of Objectivity. Oxford, 2010, p. 238). I base myself initially on Yoshimi’s (New Frontiers in Psychology, 2011) attempt to explain Husserlian phenomenology with neural networks but depart from him due to the arguments and consequently propose a two-system view which converges with Weiskopf’s proposal (“Observational Concepts.” The Conceptual Mind. MIT, 2015. 223–248). (shrink)

Embora não o desenvolva na exposição que se segue, o argumento subjacente à minha contribuição para este volume é bastante simples: há duas vias pelas quais a filosofia de Nietzsche pode contribuir positivamente para uma revisão do modo como os seres humanos no ocidente definiram sua relação com o não humano: (1) a primeira via é a agonística – a tese agonística pode ser mobilizada para combater o viés especista que caracteriza boa parte da reflexão normativa do ocidente sem que (...) isso nos comprometa com a suposição de que é possível abandonar o perspectivismo em sua versão forte (a tese segundo a qual nossos esquemas conceituais e perceptuais, ou o fato de pertencermos a uma mesma história natural, nos aprisionam na perspectiva da espécie humana). O agonismo é uma posição filosófica que recusa a supremacia absoluta de uma formação de domínio como um arranjo prejudicial à própria formação de domínio; (2) a segunda via é a da filosofia da afirmação incondicional do acaso ou da necessidade, como Nietzsche se expressa alternativamente. Esta via comporta uma dimensão religiosa, por mais chocante que isso possa parecer a ouvidos nietzschianos. Nesta perspectiva da afirmação incondicional, todas as forças atuantes são igualmente afirmadas e a perspectiva normativa preservada minimamente na abordagem agonística é como que suprimida e toda tensão dissolvida. Segundo minha interpretação, a filosofia afirmativa defendida por Nietzsche exige uma política da reconciliação que vai além da perspectiva agonística. Ela representa a superação da visão moral de mundo na sua forma mais drástica: com um dizer sim até mesmo à perspectiva do último homem. Mas é justamente aí que as coisas começam a assumir ares dramáticos, pois Nietzsche reconhece que esta perspectiva não pode ser facilmente aceita em suas diversas implicações. Embora as duas vias que acabamos de mencionar possam inspirar legitimamente o projeto de uma revisão do antropocentrismo que caracterizou a reflexão normativa no ocidente, é necessário reconhecer que alguns traços do pensamento nietzschiano tornam esta tarefa de revisão altamente improvável. Uma vez assumida, a segunda via exigiria, por exemplo, a supressão de um dos traços centrais da personalidade filosófica de Nietzsche. Refiro-me a seu incansável ativismo em prol da autossuperação dos tipos mais elevados da humanidade. Esta dificuldade revela uma das facetas mais importantes da filosofia de Nietzsche, que consiste em seu compromisso com uma forma depurada de humanismo; um compromisso radical, que não pode ser ignorado por seus leitores. Esta forma depurada de humanismo fornece a autorização teórica para o lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana: seu flerte com a noção de uma história planificada e de uma administração global da terra, como forma de promover o cultivo dos homens de exceção. Este lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana pode ser descrito como um desdobramento consequencialista de sua ética perfeccionista, e está na origem das derivações políticas que o filósofo alemão extrai deste compromisso ético. Penso que isso justifique a expressão hiperbólica utilizada no título de minha contribuição: “A catástrofe do humanismo”. Sempre que esta modalidade de humanismo depurado prevalece na reflexão de Nietzsche, a única voz perceptível nesta que é a mais polifônica das escritas filosóficas é a voz do ativista militando em prol dos homens de exceção. Quando esse tipo de engajamento prevalece, não é possível discernir nenhuma contribuição especificamente nietzschiana ao tema em torno do qual nos propusemos a refletir nesta coletânea: nestas ocasiões Nietzsche permanece indubitavelmente no interior de uma tradição que confere exclusividade ao humano em sua reflexão normativa. (shrink)

O artigo parte do consenso sobre a facto de que a arte tem valor para a exploração dos vários problemas sobre esse valor cujas soluções dividem os filósofos da arte. O enfoque é especialmente sobre a dimensão mais actual do debate em torno do tema, que se debruça não tanto sobre questões como o realismo quanto aos valores estéticos e a objectividade e justificação dos juízos de valor estético, mas acima de tudo sobre a natureza do valor artístico – que (...) tipo de valor é e em que propriedades da arte (se nalguma) reside. (shrink)

A detailed discussion of Corbanezi's book, entitled "Perspectivismo e Relativismo na Filosofia de Nietzsc he," published in 2021 by the Collection Sendas & Veredas [Ensaios] in a partnership between the Unifesp Publisher and GEN (Grup de Estudos Nietzsche). The book aims to answer a very specific question: to what extent does Nietzsche's perspectivism incur in relativism? To answer this main question, Corbanezi mobilizes some of the main concepts of Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy, competently displaying their internal articulations (world conception, will to (...) power, forces, perspective, interpretation, relation, impulses, values). In making this choice, he goes against a certain current preference for exploring more peripheral themes of the German philosopher's work. The main and extended argument of the book consists in showing, against the hegemonic reading in the secondary literature, that the question does not bear a univocal negative answer, and this means: if on the one hand, Nietzsche's perspectivism refuses and combats relativism, on the other hand, he actually admits it and even radicalizes it. How is it possible to defend such a conclusion? To some extent, we can say that Corbanezi arrives at this seemingly counterintuitive result by mobilising the resources of Nietzschean philosophy itself, that is, by perspectivising the question. The present discussion reconstructs the author's main arguments in defence of his nuanced position and assesses to what extent such arguments are convincing and supported by defensible methodological choices. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate the extent to which Abel’s insertion in the debate on scepticism and naturalism in the Anglophone philosophical tradition, especially in the historical Strawson-Stroud debate on the success of transcendental arguments in response to the sceptical challenge, allows the creation of a conceptual scheme which refuses both the conventionalist and the naturalist position in regard to our conceptual schemas, while at the same time seeking to differentiate itself from the apriorism of the Kantian tradition. Although I (...) acknowledge that interpretationism offers a new solution to the issues involved in this debate, I argue that this solution is unable to deliver everything it promises. This new conceptual space is not determined enough to pacify scepticism. I conclude by suggesting that the attempt to reconcile Nietzsche and Wittgenstein introduces instability in Abel’s interpretation. The reformist impulse of Nietzsche’s philosophy rests on the results of a preliminary naturalistic stage (genealogical inquiry) which neither Wittgenstein nor Abel seems willing to incorporate into their philosophies. (shrink)

Todd and Rabern (2021) have argued that if we assume that future contingents are untrue and if we accept the Retro-closure principle (???? → PF(????)), then the existence of a temporal omniscient entity becomes metaphysically impossible. Since the truth of a metaphysical and theological theory should not be dependent on questions of temporal semantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain that future contingents are untrue, one must abandon the Retro-closure principle. The aim of this paper is (...) to propose a temporal semantics system in which future contingents are untrue, the Retro-closure principle is valid, and the possibility of the existence of an omniscient and temporal being is guaranteed. (shrink)

Ziel meines Beitrages ist die These zu vertreten, dass das Triebmodell Nietzsches durch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem schopenhauerianischen Prinzip des Willens zum Leben entwickelt wurde. Dieses Modell lässt sich als einen durchgehenden Versuch interpretieren, mit den begrifflichen Schwierigkeiten der Willensmetaphysik Schopenhauers umzugehen, die Nietzsche bereits im Jahre 1868 in der Leipziger Aufzeichnungen identifiziert hat. Was Nietzsche für besonderes verwerflich an dem Projekt Schopenhauers einer post-Kantischen Metaphysik hält, das ist im Wesentliche die Tatsache, dass er bei Durchführung dieses Projektes den alten (...) Dualismus von Leib und Seele durch einen neuen Dualismus, der Dualismus von Willen und Vorstellung, bzw. Willen und Verstand ersetzt hat. Der neue Dualismus Schopenhauers resultiert aus einer Reform unseres vorreflexiven Willensbegriffes. Bei dieser Reform habe Schopenhauer, so Nietzsche, die intentionale Qualität des Wollens „heraus subtrahirt“, so dass was „er ‚Wille‘ nennt“ „ein blosses leeres Wort“ sei (KSA, 13, 14[121], S. 301). Noch wichtiger als die Pluralität ist in Nietzsches Augen die Intentionalität, die als ein wesentliches Merkmal des Willensbegriffes gilt. Wollen und Vorstellen sind nicht ‚losgetrennt zu denken‘; von Wollen zu reden „ohne von vornherein einen Intellekt anzunehmen, der sich vorstellen konnte was man will“ macht keinen Sinn, weil „einen solchen Willen in’s Blaue (oder in’s Dasein!) giebt es nicht“ (KSA, 9, 4[310], S. 178). Das Triebmodell Nietzsches ist eine begriffliche Entfaltung dieser prinzipiellen Nicht-Übereinstimmung. Während Schopenhauer seine Willensmetaphysik aus dem Modell des Begehrens konzipiert, dem zufolge „wir werden durch unsere Begierden gelenkt: nicht durch unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, geschweige durch unsere Tugend und Weisheit“ (KSA, 9, 5[27], S. 187), hat Nietzsche sich entschieden, „sich der Analogie des Menschen zu Ende [zu] bedienen“ (KSA, 11, 36[31], S. 563), d. h., bei seiner theoretischen Philosophie eine Anthropomorphisierungsstrategie zu verfolgen. Diese Strategie kann insoweit legitimiert werden, als man fähig ist, unser menschliches Bild von moralischen Vorstellungen und Gefühle zu befreien und „den Menschen nämlich zurück[zu]übersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr [zu]werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen Grundtext homo natura gekritzelt und gemalt wurden [...]“ (JGB, 230). Ein realistisch konzipiertes politisches Modell, wobei die Macht als Hauptbegriff auftritt, erlaubt Nietzsche unser triebhaftes Leben zu beschreiben, ohne unsere nützlichen und vernünftigen Interessen, unsere Tugend, Weisheit und Dummheit, unsere kompromiss- und vertragsfähige Natur ausklammern zu müssen. Zum Schluss unseres Beitrages wird die Frage gestellt, inwieweit das aus dem politischen Bereich konzipierte Triebmodell zu dem sogenannten Homunkulus-Fehlschluss führt und inwieweit diese Art von Fehlschluss zu vermeiden ist. (shrink)

A hipótese que procuro defender neste ensaio é a seguinte: a famosa expressão " Am Leitfaden des Leibes", que surge nos póstumos de 1884 e desaparece um ano depois, contabilizando pouco mais de dez ocorrências no conjunto dos fragmentos póstumos e nenhuma na obra publicada, é uma expressão cujo sentido e intenção devem ser desvendados tendo como pano de fundo o crescente interesse de Nietzsche, na virada da primeira para a segunda metade dos anos oitenta, na reabilitação da atividade especulativa. (...) Minha segunda hipótese é que, ao cunhar esta expressão, Nietzsche se inspira na reivindicação metodológica de Schopenhauer, segundo a qual o corpo é o único fio condutor que nos resta se queremos nos mover com alguma segurança pelo labirinto da especulação. Por "corpo próprio‘" (Leib), Schopenhauer designa um tipo específico de experiência intuitiva que teria sido negligenciada por Kant: a experiência do conjunto de nossa vida afetiva. Segundo a minha hipótese, a partir da segunda metade dos anos oitenta Nietzsche estaria disposto a reconhecer que a intuição metodológica de Schopenhauer estava correta. O erro de Schopenhauer teria consistido simplesmente em partir de uma concepção equivocada do corpo e do tipo de acesso que temos a ele. A divergência, portanto, não incidiria sobre o método próprio à especulação, mas sobre o conteúdo ao qual o método se aplicaria, ou seja, sobre a representação do corpo próprio e dos traços que lhe seriam essenciais. Persistem as divergências quanto ao que implica seguir este preceito metódico (por exemplo, sobre o que deve e o que não deve ser evitado no antropomorfismo subjacente ao método de projeção analógica), ou quanto ao meio mais apropriado de se obter uma representação do corpo próprio. Segundo Schopenhauer, nós teríamos uma intuição do que é essencial no corpo mediante a experiência imediata do querer. Segundo Nietzsche, somente após um longo e penoso processo que envolve tanto a investigação empírica quanto a reflexão conceitual chegamos a alguns resultados tímidos. Portanto, mesmo a especulação que se serve do corpo como fio condutor representa uma extrapolação em relação ao que estaríamos autorizados a inferir em um ambiente epistemicamente mais rigoroso. E isso não apenas pela razão de que a inferência analógica é por si mesma uma inferência logicamente abusiva (mas tolerável, na ausência de outro recurso), mas também pelo fato de que aquilo que serve de base para a inferência analógica é uma imagem seletiva e arbitrariamente construída, cuja legitimidade epistêmica, mesmo quando restrita ao domínio da fisiologia humana, é apenas relativa. Estas considerações fornecem parte das razões (as de ordem epistêmica) de porque Nietzsche nunca conseguiu se persuadir inteiramente de que o seu projeto de reabilitação da filosofia especulativa era legítimo. Esta indecisão o levou a postergar e, segundo alguns intérpretes, a finalmente abandonar a sua execução, ou pelo menos a sua tradução em uma obra literária sistemática. (shrink)