What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...) rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid. (shrink)

It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely (...) available to human agents. After exploring the limitations of existing formal algorithmic fairness strategies, the article argues that procedural justice requires that human agents relying wholly or in part on algorithmic systems proceed with caution: by avoiding doxastic negligence about algorithmic outputs, by exercising deliberative capacities when making similarity judgments, and by suspending belief and gathering additional information in light of higher-order uncertainty. (shrink)

A lot has been said about how the notion of reference relates to the notion of knowledge; not much has been said, however, on how the notion of referencerelates to our ability to become aware of what we do not know that allows us to be curious. In this essay I attempt to spell out a certain type of reference I call ‘inostensible’ that I claim to be a fundamental linguistic tool which allows us to become curious of what we (...) do not know. In the first part, I try to explicate the notion of inostensible reference, both for singular and for general terms, as well as full declarative sentences, and in the second part, I argue that our capacity to enjoy conceptual curiosity is essentially based upon our aptitude for inostensible reference. (shrink)

In this paper, I identify a theoretical and political role for ‘white ignorance’, present three alternative accounts of white ignorance, and assess how well each fulfils this role. On the Willful Ignorance View, white ignorance refers to white individuals’ willful ignorance about racial injustice. On the Cognitivist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance resulting from social practices that distribute faulty cognitive resources. On the Structuralist View, white ignorance refers to ignorance that (1) results as part of a social process that (...) systematically gives rise to racial injustice, and (2) is an active player in the process. I argue that, because of its greater power and flexibility, the Structuralist View better explains the patterns of ignorance that we observe, better illuminates the connection to white racial domination, and is overall better suited to the project of ameliorating racial injustice. As such, the Structuralist View should be preferred. (shrink)

Despite the recent increase in interest in philosophy about ignorance, little attention has been paid to the question of what makes it possible for a being to become aware of their own ignorance. In this paper, I try to provide such an account by arguing that, for a being to become aware of their own ignorance, they must have the mental capacity to represent something as being unknown to them. For normal adult humans who have mastered a language, mental representation (...) of an unknown is enabled by forming linguistic expressions whose content is grasped, but whose referent is unknown. I provide a neo-Fregean, a neo-Russellian, and then a unified account of this. On that basis, I then argue further that the content of ignorance can always be captured by a question. I then distinguish between propositional ignorance and non-propositional ignorance and argue that propositional ignorance attributions can be of three types, that-ignorance, whether-ignorance, and fact-ignorance. I conclude by arguing that the acquisition of truths, even when it yields knowledge that is certain, does not always eliminate one’s ignorance and that there is a degree of ignorance in almost everything we claim to know. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Kresimir Agbaba 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's gen- eralized accounts|an attributive use of a denite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon.

In this paper I respond to and elaborate on some of the ideas put forth on my book The Philosophy of Curiosity (2012) as well as its follow-up “Curiosity and Ignorance” (2016) by Nenad Miščević, Erhan Demircioğlu, Mirela Fuš, Safi ye Yiğit, Danilo Šuster, Irem Günhan Altıparmak, and Aran Arslan.

I argue that Millianism has the very odd consequence that there are simple direct questions that Millians can grasp, but they cannot answer them in the positive or the negative, or in some other way, nor could they say that they do not know the answer.

There are two sorts of singular terms for which we have difficulty applying Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction: complex definite descriptions, and proper names. With respect to the uses of such terms in certain contexts we seem to have conflicting intuitions as to whether they should be classified as referential or attributive. The problem concerning how to apply Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of certain complex definite descriptions has never been debated in the literature. On the other hand there have been attempts (...) to extend Donnellan’s distinction to the uses of proper names, the most popular one being due to Kripke. However the argument Kripke gives to this end in his ‘Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference’ seems to be inconsistent with the position he takes in Naming and Necessity. I suggest that the reason we seem to have conflicting intuitions with respect to the uses of such terms, is because there is not one but two separate distinctions inherent in Donnellan’s examples; a pragmatic distinction based on the speaker’s intentions in using a term , and an epistemic one based on the notion of having an object in mind. In the light of this, I argue that the issue of whether there are attributive uses of proper names, in the latter sense, relates to the epistemic problem of whether a speaker can have de re attitudes toward an object that he does not have in mind. On this epistemic issue Kripke and Donnellan are on opposite sides as revealed by their debate over the issue of whether there are contingent a priori propositions. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use (...) is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive. (shrink)

Objective: During the pandemic, elective cases other than those requiring emergency thoracic surgery were postponed. Depending on the magnitude of the impact the pandemic posed on hospitals and clinics, there have been changes in the number and variety of cases of thoracic surgery. The intention behind conducting this study was to share the experiences gained by a thoracic surgery clinic during the pandemic period. Methods: Altogether, 214 patients were included in the study. Patient data that were recorded included those on (...) age, gender, lung pathology, duration of hospital stay, positivity for COVID-19, survival, and causes of death. Results: Of the 214 patients operated on, 12 died during the postoperative period. Eight of these patients died due to their primary disease and one died due to gastrointestinal bleeding, whereas the remaining three patients died due to COVID-19 infection. Conclusions: If opportunities and facilities favorable for the administration of surgical treatment are made available, surgical treatment services can be offered safely to all patients. (shrink)

Contract cheating, or students outsourcing their assignments to be completed by others, has emerged as a significant threat to academic integrity in higher education institutions around the world. During the COVID-19, when traditional face-to-face instruction became unsustainable, the number of contract cheating students increased dramatically. Through focus group interviews, this study sought the perspectives of 25 students enrolled in first year writing in a private higher education institution in Kuwait during the pandemic in 2020–2021, on their attitudes towards contract cheating. (...) MAXQDA 2020 was used to examine the data. The participants believe that the primary motivations for engaging in contract cheating are mainly the opportunities presented by online learning and the psychological and physical challenges they experienced during online learning. Those who did not cheat had some shared traits, such as a competitive spirit, confidence in their talents, and a strong desire to learn. Additionally, those with high moral values avoided cheating. To combat contract cheating, students believe that teaching and evaluation techniques should be drastically altered and that students should be educated about plagiarism, while institutions should impose tougher sanctions on repeat offenders. (shrink)

The paper investigates whether it is plausible to hold the late stage demented criminally responsible for past actions. The concern is based on the fact that policy makers in the United States and in Britain are starting to wonder what to do with prison inmates in the later stages of dementia who do not remember their crimes anymore. The problem has to be expected to become more urgent as the population ages and the number of dementia patients increases. This paper (...) argues that the late-stage demented should not be punished for past crimes. Applicable theories of punishment, especially theories with an appropriate expressivist, or communicative element, fail to justify the imprisonment of the late-stage demented. Further imprisonment would require a capacity for comprehension on the part of the punished, and, under certain narrowly specified conditions, even a capacity to be at least in principle capable of recalling the crime again. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag befasst sich mit der Befürchtung, dass eine Erweiterung der DNA-Analyse von Tatortspuren für Zwecke der Polizeiarbeit zu Diskriminierungen führen wird. Diese Erwartung bezieht sich insbesondere auf die Ermittlung der sogenannten biogeografischen Abstammung und der Hautschattierung. In dieser Untersuchung werden einige Stellen im Ermittlungsprozess, an denen auf Grundlage solcher Analysen Diskriminierungspotential auftreten könnte, zunächst gesammelt und dargelegt. Im zweiten Teil wird dann der Diskriminierungsbegriff genauer beleuchtet. Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass verschiedene Positionen zu der Frage, was genau eine Diskriminierung (...) moralisch problematisch macht, zu unterschiedlichen Einschätzungen der DNA-Phänotypisierung in der Polizeiarbeit führen. / There is a concern according to which analyzing crime scene DNA to determine biogeographic origin and skin color of suspects can lead to discrimination against minority populations. This article summarizes and explains some of those parts of the investigation process that can give rise to discrimination. The second part of the paper offers an analysis of the notion of discrimination and presents different accounts of the exact ground of its moral wrongness. As it will emerge, these different accounts lead to different assessments of the use of DNA phenotype analyses in police investigations. (shrink)

This paper addresses the so-called Taurek debate on whether or not to save the greater number of victims in rescue conflicts. In this controversy we take a consequentialist and aggregationist pro-numbers position and defend it against various objections. In particular, we consider it to be compatible with the principle of equal concern. Given that the pro-numbers position hinges to a significant extent on the acceptance of the person-neutral value of personal well-being, we offer a coherentist justification for this value claim. (...) Systematically though, we argue that neither pure welfare aggregationism nor its strict rejection are convincing. Rather, rejoining the two ethical dimensions of individual claims and collective well-being requires a hybrid position. Identifying three possible ways of constructing such a position, we briefly defend them against a recent version of the charge that they cannot be coherently expressed in a rational choice framework. -/- / Zusammenfassung: Im Rahmen der sogenannten Taurek-Debatte wird die Frage diskutiert, ob in Rettungskonflikten die größere Anzahl an Opfern gerettet werden sollte oder nicht. Wir beziehen in dieser Kontroverse eine konsequentialistische und aggregationistische Pro-Anzahl-Position und verteidigen diese gegen verschiedene Einwände. Insbesondere halten wir die Position für kompatibel mit dem Prinzip gleicher Achtung. Angesichts des Umstandes, dass die Pro-Anzahl-Position in maßgeblicher Weise von der Annahme eines personenneutralen Wertes persönlichen Wohlergehens abhängt, bieten wir eine kohärentistische Rechtfertigung für diese Wertbehauptung. Systematisch argumentieren wir, dass weder ein reiner Wohlergehensaggregationismus noch seine komplette Zurückweisung überzeugend sein können. Die Vereinigung der beiden ethischen Dimensionen individueller Ansprüche und kollektiven Wohlergehens erfordert stattdessen eine hybride Position. Wir identifizieren drei mögliche Wege für die Konstruktion einer solchen Hybridposition und verteidigen diese abschließend kurz gegen einen aktuellen Vorwurf, demzufolge diese nicht auf kohärente Weise im Rahmen der rationalen Entscheidungstheorie abgebildet werden können. (shrink)

The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle, according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself (...) to AAP, one must also commit oneself to the view that political participation rights are not necessarily the only, and not necessarily the best, way to protect morally weighty interests. I also argue that economic participation rights raise important worries about democratic accountability, which is why their exercise must be constrained by a number of moral duties. (shrink)

Bettina Schöne-Seifert and Marco Stier present a host of detailed and intriguing arguments to the effect that potentiality arguments have to be viewed as outdated due to developments in stem cell research, in particular the possibility of re-setting the development potential of differentiated cells, such as skin cells. However, their argument leaves them without an explanation of the intuitive difference between skin cells and human beings, which seems to be based on the assumption that a skin cell is merely part (...) of a human organism, while an embryo is at some point a human organism. An appropriately designed concept of the human organism can explain the difference, but also has the potential of re-dividing the argumentative landscape along familiar lines. (shrink)

Michael Quante’s book Person offers a systematic and argumentative assessment of the question what a person is and accounts for the multiple aspects that play a role in our everyday understanding of the term. Quante is skeptical about the possibility of constructing a purely psychological account of the person and proposes to base the diachronic unity conditions of persons on the human organism. At the same time he acknowledges that psychological considerations, including the notion of a person’s personality, are important (...) for practical purposes. However, one may wonder why he proposes the human organism as the remedy for the alleged shortcomings of the psychological approach, rather than introducing an additional physical continuity requirement of the cerebrum or other parts of the brain. (shrink)

The increasing number of dementia cases has led to renewed interest in philosophical theories of personal identity, because these patients seem to “drop out” of their own identities in some ways. Philosophical positions that try to account for the phenomenon of identity loss include numerical theories of identity which argue for a psychological or a biological continuity criterion, narrative theories of identity, as well as reflections about different forms of memory, some of which have had influence in modern psychology and (...) in the neurosciences. This special issue brings together current articles by experts in these areas. / Die zunehmende Verbreitung von Demenzerkrankungen hat zu einem erhöhten Interesse an philosophischen Theorien der personalen Identität geführt, da diese Patienten in manchen Hinsichten aus ihrer eigenen Identität „herauszufallen“ scheinen. Zu den philosophischen Ansätzen, die sich hiermit beschäftigen, gehören Theorien der numerischen Identität, wie etwa das psychologische oder das biologische Kontinuitätskriterium, narrative Theorien der Identität, aber auch Refl exionen über verschiedene Formen des Erinnerns, die sich zum Teil in der modernen Psychologie und in den Neurowissenschaften niederschlagen. Dieses Schwerpunktheft enthält aktuelle Beiträge von Experten aus den genannten Bereichen. ​The increasing number of dementia cases has led to renewed interest in philosophical theories of personal identity, because these patients seem to “drop out” of their own identities in some ways. Philosophical positions that try to account for the phenomenon of identity loss include numerical theories of identity which argue for a psychological or a biological continuity criterion, narrative theories of identity, as well as reflections about different forms of memory, some of which have had influence in modern psychology and in the neurosciences. This special issue brings together current articles by experts in these areas. (shrink)

Many countries have adopted new triage recommendations for use in the event that intensive care beds become scarce during the COVID‐19 pandemic. In addition to establishing the exact criteria regarding whether treatment for a newly arriving patient shows a sufficient likelihood of success, it is also necessary to ask whether patients already undergoing treatment whose prospects are low should be moved into palliative care if new patients with better prospects arrive. This question has led to divergent ethical guidelines. This paper (...) explores the distinction between withholding and withdrawing medical treatment during times of scarcity. As a first central point, the paper argues that a revival of the ethical distinction between doing and allowing would have a revisionary impact on cases of voluntary treatment withdrawal. A second systematic focus lies in the concern that withdrawal due to scarcity might be considered a physical transgression and therefore more problematic than not treating someone in the first place. In light of the persistent disagreement, especially concerning the second issue, the paper concludes with two pragmatic proposals for how to handle the ethical uncertainty: (1) triage protocols should explicitly require that intensive care attempts are designed as time‐limited trials based on specified treatment goals, and this intent should be documented very clearly at the beginning of each treatment; and (2) lower survival prospects can be accepted for treatments that have already begun, compared with the respective triage rules for the initial access of patients to intensive care. (shrink)

Zihin felsefesinin varlığı felsefenin ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemden günümüz felsefesine kadar geniş bir zaman dilimine sahiptir. Zihin felsefesi akademik bir disiplin olarak adından 17. Yüzyıldan itibaren söz ettirmiş olmasına rağmen, bu alanda ele alınan konular Antik Yunan’dan beri tartışılagelmiştir. İnsan kendisi ve çevresindeki dünyanın gerçekliğini sorgulamaya başladığında zihin, bu gerçekliğe anlam kazandırmıştır. Özne ve nesnenin birbirine zıt ve ancak bir o kadar da birbiri için oluşu zihin-beden olgusu içinde düalist ve monist anlam barındırmaktadır. Monist düşüncede kendi içinde önemli görülen, eleyici (...) materyalizm öne çıkmaktadır. Zihnin bileşenlerinin, zihinsel yapının algı, duygu ve düşüncenin var olmadığını savunmaktadırlar. D. (shrink)

The most well-known goal of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is still to determine whether or not a fetus has trisomy 21. Since women often terminate the pregnancy upon a positive result, there is concern that the use of NIPT contributes to discrimination against persons with disabilities. If this concern is justified, it could have an impact on the wider social acceptability of existing testing practices and their potential further expansion. This paper demonstrates four different versions of the discrimination worry, indicates (...) how international policy papers have reacted to them, and identifies the ethically most relevant feature of the concern. (shrink)

There is a widespread consensus that a commodification of body parts is to be prevented. Numerous policy papers by international organizations extend this view to the blood supply and recommend a system of uncompensated volunteers in this area—often, however, without making the arguments for this view explicit. This situation seems to indicate that a relevant source of justified worry or unease about the blood supply system has to do with the issue of commodification. As a result, the current health minister (...) of Ontario is proposing a ban on compensation even for blood plasma—despite the fact that Canada can only generate 30 % of the plasma needed for fractionation into important plasma protein products and has to purchase the rest abroad. In the following, I am going to suggest a number of alternative perspectives on the debate in order to facilitate a less dogmatic and more differentiated debate about the matter. Especially in light of the often over-simplified notions of altruism and commodification, I conclude that the debate has not conclusively established that it would be morally objectionable to provide blood plasma donors with monetary compensation or with other forms of explicit social recognition as an incentive. This is especially true of donations for fractionation into medicinal products by profit-oriented pharmaceutical companies. (shrink)

This paper argues that Henry Sidgwick's theory of the good is a form of enlightened preference hedonism. In order to support this conclusion, the paper argues that the correct interpretation of his notorious passage about the 'ideal element' of the good should get tied to his views about weakness of the will. Sidgwick believes that reaching your own good requires overcoming weakness of the will. An applied section illustrates the practical significance of this finding. In cases in which shooting down (...) a passenger plane can save a greater number of people on the ground, and no other relevant considerations apply, the passengers should desire their own destruction-not only to promote the general good, but also in order to reach the only good they can still secure for themselves: giving their inevitable deaths a positive meaning. This utilitarian position regarding some one-versusthe-many cases has been overlooked in the German Supreme Court ruling on the destruction of 9/11 airplanes in 2006. (shrink)

Complex problem solving (CPS) and related topics such as dynamic decision-making (DDM) and complex dynamic control (CDC) represent multifaceted psychological phenomena. In a broad sense, CPS encompasses learning, decision-making, and acting in complex and dynamic situations. Moreover, solutions to problems that people face in such situations are often generated in teams or groups. In turn, this adds another layer of complexity to the situation itself because of the emerging issues that arise from the social dynamics of group interactions. This framing (...) of CPS means that it is not a single construct that can be measured by using a particular type of CPS task (e.g. minimal complex system tests), which is a view taken by the psychometric community. The proposed approach taken here is that because CPS is multifaceted, multiple approaches need to be taken to fully capture and understand what it is and how the different cognitive processes associated with it complement each other. (shrink)

The current ethical and regulatory framework for research is often charged with burdening investigators and impeding socially valuable research. To address these concerns, a growing number of research ethicists argue that informed consent should be adapted to the risks of research participation. This would require less rigorous consent standards in low-risk research than in high-risk research. However, the current discussion is restricted to cases of research in which the risks of research participation are outweighed by the potential clinical benefits for (...) the individual research participant. Furthermore, current proposals do not address the worry that risk-adapted informed consent may result in enrolling participants into research without their autonomous authorization. In this paper, we show how the standard view of informed consent – consent as autonomous authorization – can be adapted to risk even when the research does not have a favourable risk-benefit profile for the participant. Our argument has two important implications: first, it implies that current and proposed consent standards are not adequately calibrated to risk and, second, that consent standards also need to be adapted to factors other than risk. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a framework for fostering argumentative skills in a systematic way in Philosophy and Ethics classes. We start with a review of curricula and teaching materials from the German-speaking world to show that there is an urgent need for standards for the teaching and learning of argumentation. Against this backdrop, we present a framework for such standards that is intended to tackle these difficulties. The spiral-curricular model of argumentative competences we sketch helps teachers introduce the relevant (...) concepts and skills to students early on in their school career. The focus is on secondary schools, but the proposal can also be of use for learning and teaching in universities, especially in introductory classes. (shrink)

Although other animals can make simple tools, the expanded and complex material culture of humans is unprecedented in the animal kingdom. Tool making is a slow and late-developing ability in humans, and preschool children find making tools to solve problems very challenging. This difficulty in tool making might be related to the lack of familiarity with the tools and may be overcome by children's long term perceptual-motor knowledge. Thus, in this study, the effect of tool familiarity on tool making was (...) investigated with a task in which 5-to-6-year-old children (n = 75) were asked to remove a small bucket from a vertical tube. The results show that children are better at tool making if the tool and its relation to the task are familiar to them (e.g., soda straw). Moreover, we also replicated the finding that hierarchical complexity and tool making were significantly related. Results are discussed in light of the ideomotor approach. (shrink)

Das deutsche Gesundheitswesen steht durch die schnell steigende Anzahl an CO- VID-19-Erkrankten vor erheblichen Herausforderungen. In dieser Krisensituation sind alle Beteiligten mit ethischen Fragen konfrontiert, beispielsweise nach gerech- ten Verteilungskriterien bei begrenzten Ressourcen und dem gesundheitlichen Schutz des Personals angesichts einer bisher nicht therapierbaren Erkrankung. Daher werden schon jetzt klinische und ambulante Ethikberatungsangebote verstärkt mit Anfragen nach Unterstützung konfrontiert. Wie können Ethikberater*innen Entscheidungen in der Krankenversorgung im Rahmen der COVID-19-Pandemie unterstützen? Welche Grenzen von Ethikberatung sind zu beachten? Bislang liegen hierzu (...) noch wenige praktische Erfahrungen vor. Angesichts der dynamischen Entwicklung erscheint es der Akademie für Ethik in der Medizin (AEM) wichtig, einen Diskurs über die angemessene Rolle der Ethikberatung bei der Bewältigung der vielfachen Heraus- forderungen durch die COVID-19-Pandemie zu führen und professionelle Hinweise zu geben. Mit dem vorliegenden Diskussionspapier möchte die AEM einen Beitrag zur Beantwortung wesentlicher Fragen leisten, die sich für die Ethikberatung in den verschiedenen Bereichen des Gesundheitswesens stellen. Sie regt an, diesen Dis- kurs weiter zu führen und hat ein Online-Forum (s. unten) eingerichtet, in dem Ethikberater*innen ihre Erfahrungen teilen und die professionelle Selbstreflexion der Ethikberatung in Pandemiezeiten mit Anregungen fördern können. (shrink)

Clinical researchers should help respect the autonomy and promote the well-being of prospective study participants by helping them make voluntary, informed decisions about enrollment. However, participants often exhibit poor understanding of important information about clinical research. Bioethicists have given special attention to “misconceptions” about clinical research that can compromise participants’ decision-making, most notably the “therapeutic misconception.” These misconceptions typically involve false beliefs about a study’s purpose, or risks or potential benefits for participants. In this article, we describe a misconception involving (...) false beliefs about a study’s potential benefits for non-participants, or its expected social value. This social value misconception can compromise altruistically motivated participants’ decision-making, potentially threatening their autonomy and well-being. We show how the social value misconception raises ethical concerns for inherently low-value research, hyped research, and even ordinary research, and advocate for empirical and normative work to help understand and counteract this misconception’s potential negative impacts on participants. (shrink)

Bu araştırmanın ilk amacı, sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının tartışmaya yönelik özyeterlikleri, bilimin doğası inanışları ve eleştirel düşünmeleri arasında sınıf düzeyine göre anlamlı bir fark olup olmadığını incelemektir. İkinci amacı ise, sınıf öğretmeni adaylarının tartışmaya yönelik öz-yeterlikleri, bilimin doğası inanışları ve eleştirel düşünmeleri arasındaki ilişkilerin yapısal eşitlik modeli ile incelenmesidir. Araştırmanın modeli ilişkisel tarama çalışmasıdır. Araştırmanın örneklemini Aydın Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Pamukkale Üniversitesi, Muğla Sıtkı Koçman Üniversitesi ve Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Temel Eğitim Bölümü Sınıf Öğretmenliği programının birinci, ikinci, üçüncü (...) ve dördüncü sınıflarında öğrenim gören 858 öğretmen adayı oluşturmaktadır. Araştırmanın örneklemi seçilirken uygun örnekleme tekniği tercih edilmiştir. Veriler “Tartışmaya Yönelik Öz-yeterlik Ölçeği”, “Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği” ve “Eleştirel Düşünme Standartları Ölçeği ile toplanmıştır. Verilerinin analizinde SPSS 18, LISREL 8.80 ve MPLUS 7 programlarından faydalanılmıştır. Tartışmaya Yönelik Öz-Yeterlik Ölçeği, Bilimin Doğası İnanışları Ölçeği ve Eleştirel Düşünme Standartları Ölçeği puanlarının anlamlı bir farklılık gösterip göstermediğini belirlemek için tek yönlü varyans analizi (ANOVA) kullanılmıştır. Argümantasyona dayalı öz-yeterliğin, bilimin doğasına yönelik inançları ve eleştirel düşünmeyi yordayıp yordamadığını belirlemek amacıyla kurulan model, yapısal eşitlik modeli ile test edilmiştir. (shrink)

"A Progress of Sentiments is a pleasure to read in every way. The book itself is attractively printed and produced. (It includes, for example, some well reproduced and unusual portraits of Hume, a useful chronology of Hume's life, and a carefully organized and comprehensive index.) Baier writes in a lively, smooth, and clear manner. She entirely avoids jargon and needless technicalities. The commentary and discussion is full of insight and interesting observations on the details of Hume's philosophy. The general interpretation (...) that is argued for presents the substance of the Treatise in a rather new light. Baier's theses and claims concerning Hume's thought are effectively defended and well supported. This is a study which can be recommended both to students who are coining to Hume's work with little background knowledge, and also to the established Hume scholar who is thoroughly familiar with the territory that Baier is covering. Anyone who reads this book with the care that it deserves will learn a great deal from it.". (shrink)

In this book, Ilhan Inan questions the classical definition of curiosity as _a desire to know._ Working in an area where epistemology and philosophy of language overlap, Inan forges a link between our ability to become aware of our ignorance and our linguistic aptitude to construct terms referring to things unknown. The book introduces the notion of inostensible reference. Ilhan connects this notion to related concepts in philosophy of language: knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description; the referential (...) and the attributive uses of definite descriptions; the _de re/de dicto_ distinction; and Kripke’s distinction between rigid and accidental designators. Continuing with a discussion of the conditions for curiosity and its satisfaction, Inan argues that the learning process—starting in curiosity and ending in knowledge—is always an effort to transform our inostensible terms into ostensible ones. A contextual account is adopted for the satisfaction of curiosity. It then discusses the conditions of successful reference to the object of curiosity and its presuppositions. The book concludes with a discussion on the limits of curiosity and its satisfaction. (shrink)

If Annette Baier is right that ‘some degree of trust is … the very basis of morality” (Baier 2004, 180) , it is surprising that a philosopher so interested in moral psychology and interpersonal relationships such as Iris Murdoch does not explicitly discuss trust in her work. However, on closer inspection, Murdoch’s proposal of an ethics focused on realism, unselfing and attention crucially depends upon the possibility of trust – trust in reality, and in one’s own capacity for moral (...) vision. Connecting Murdoch's project with feminist philosophy and especially feminist epistemology, and drawing on the philosophy of trust developed by C. Thi Nguyen and Karen Jones, this chapter argues for a vision of 'trust in the world' implicit in Murdoch's work, where trust emerges not in the domain of personal relationships, but in our attitude towards reality, including moral reality, that is not perceived by us as merely something inert. (shrink)

This essay addresses the attitude of some leading Neo-Kantian philosophers toward scientific psychology and psychophysics. Early influential figures like Friedrich A. Lange counted Gustav T. Fechner’s psychophysical law among their allies in the rehabilitation of the Kantian standpoint. Later on, however, Neo-Kantian philosophers firmly rejected psychological measurement as a whole and harshly criticized the methods adopted by several psychologists of their time. For example, the Marburg mathematician and philosopher August Stadler reduced the validity of Fechner’s law to the mere physiological (...) sphere, and Hermann Cohen conceived the application of mathematical integration to human sensations as an inane enterprise. (shrink)

Dini çoğulculuk, dini dışlayıcılık ve kapsayıcılıktan farklı olarak, her dinsel inanış taraftarlarının kendi dinleri içinde kalarak ilahi selamete erişeceğini söyler. Temelde, teolojik ve felsefi boyutları olan dini çoğulculuk tartışmasının siyasete bakan bir yönü de vardır. İslam tarihinde Meşşâî felsefenin kurucusu ve mutluluk filozofu olarak bilinen Farabi, bir taraftan hakikate nasıl ulaşılacağı diğer taraftan ise “âlem” adını verdiği kozmopolitanizm nasıl inşa edileceği ile ilgilenmektedir. Siyasal toplumun amacının, insanların uygun ölçekte, en yüce iyi için yardımlaşmalarını sağlamak olduğunu savunan Farabi’ye göre, erdemli bir (...) yaşam kurulmasına imkan sağlayan üç örgütlenme biçimi vardır: Şehir, millet ve âlem. Platon ve Aristoteles gibi Antik düşünürlerden farklı olarak erdemli bir yaşamın sadece sitede kurulacağı düşüncesine karşı çıkan Farabi, sitenin yetkin bir yaşamın ilk basamağı olduğunu savunur. Ancak, erdemli yaşamı site ile sınırlamaz. Farabi’nin teorisinde, Antik düşünceyi aşan bir kozmopolitanizm söz konusudur. Bundan dolayı Farabi, farklı dinlerin varlığını, kendi siyasal düşüncesine uygun olarak meşru kabul eder. Eğer mutluluk için yardımlaşacaklarsa, insanların dinlerinin farklı olmasında bir beis görmez. Bu dini çoğulculuğun siyasal temelidir. Diğer taraftan Farabi, dinleri hakikatle eşitleyen anlayışa karşı çıkarak, farklı dinlerin hakikatin çeşitli imajlar, örnekler ve taklitler yolu ile halka benimsetilmesi olarak görülmesi gerektiğini savunur. Diğer bir ifade ile dinler, hakikatin kendisi değil, farklı tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlarda oluşmuş sembolik ifadesidir. Bu bakımdan bütün dinler ile hakikat arasında bir mesafe bulunmaktadır ve hiçbir din hakikatin kendisi değildir. Buradan Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dinsel çoğulculuğunun sınırı olmadığı çıkmamalıdır. Farabi’ye göre din, felsefe yolu ile bulunan hakikatin ikna etme veya hayal ettirme yoluyla ya da her ikisiyle birden halka kabul ettirilmesidir. Ancak Farabi, hakiki felsefe ile sahte felsefe arasında bir ayrım yapar ve ancak hakiki felsefeyi takip eden dinlerin bir hakikat değeri olduğunu savunur. Hakiki felsefe ise evrenin bir ilk nedeni olduğunu ve ilk nedenin de nedensiz olduğunu söyler. Bu, evrenin tek bir yaratıcısı olduğu anlamına gelir ve çok tanrıcılığı dışlar. Bu bakımdan Farabi, sadece tek tanrılı dinleri çoğulculuk kapsamına alır. Bunun nedeni, tek tanrılı dinlerin hakikatle özdeş olmaları değil, hakiki felsefeyi takip etmeleridir. Çünkü felsefe dinden öncedir. Bu, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde çoğulculuğun sınırlarına işaret etmektedir. Farabi, dinleri hakikatle özdeş görmeyerek ve aynı hakikatin sembolik ifadeleri olduğunu söyleyerek çoğulculuğun yolunu açar. Buna karşın sahte felsefeyi takip eden dinler olduğu gerekçesiyle çok tanrılı dinleri dışarıda bırakarak sınırlarını çizer. Bu çalışma, Farabi’nin düşüncesinde dini çoğulculuğun siyasal ve epistemolojik temellerini ve çoğulculuğun sınırlarını konu almaktadır. (shrink)

In this paper, I dwell on a particular distinction introduced by Ilhan Inan—the distinction between ostensible and inostensible use of our language. The distinction applies to singular terms, such as proper names and definite descriptions, or to general terms like concepts and to the ways in which we refer to objects in the world by using such terms. Inan introduces the distinction primarily as an epistemic one but in his earlier writings (1997: 49) he leaves some room for (...) it to have some semantic significance i.e., the view that in certain intensional de re contexts whether a term occurring in a sentence is ostensible or inostensible may have a bearing on the semantic content of the sentence. However, in his later writings e.g., The Philosophy of Curiosity, he appears to abandon his earlier thoughts regarding the semantic significance of his distinction. He says: “the ostensible/inostensible distinction is basically an epistemic one.... It is an epistemic distinction that has no semantic significance” (2012: 65). I argue that there are indeed such intensional contexts in which the distinction has some semantic significance, i.e., whether a term is ostensible or inostensible has in fact a bearing on what proposition is expressed by the sentence in which the term occurs. (shrink)

In her provocative discussion of the challenge posed to the traditional impartialist, justice-focused conception of morality by the new-wave care perspective in ethics, Annette Baier calls for ‘a “marriage” of the old male and newly articulated female... moral wisdom,’ to produce a new ‘cooperative’ moral theory that ‘harmonize[s] justice and care.’ I want in this paper to play matchmaker, proposing one possible conjugal bonding: a union of two apparently dissimilar modes of what Nel Noddings calls ‘meeting the other morally,’ (...) a wedding of respect and care. (shrink)

Erarbeitet von Dominik Balg, Anne Burkard, Henning Franzen, Aenna Frottier, David Lanius, David Löwenstein, Hanna Lucks, Kirsten Meyer, Donata Romizi, Katharina Schulz, Stefanie Thiele und Annett Wienmeister. -/- Die Entwicklung argumentativer Fähigkeiten ist ein zentrales Ziel des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts, ja überhaupt ein zentrales Bildungsziel. Wie aber kann das gelingen? In vielen verfügbaren Unterrichtsmaterialien werden argumentative Fähigkeiten eher vorausgesetzt als systematisch gefördert. Auch curriculare Vorgaben bleiben zumeist sehr unspezifisch. Lehrpersonen werden so weitgehend allein gelassen mit der Aufgabe, Lernende beim Erwerb (...) argumentativer Fähigkeiten zu fördern. Die vorliegende Aufgabensammlung soll dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schließen. Sie bietet Lehrpersonen reichhaltige Materialien für die spiralcurricular angelegte, systematische Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeit anhand exemplarischer Inhalte. Orientiert an klaren fachlichen Standards finden sich hier Aufgaben auf vier Niveaustufen, jeweils in Verbindung mit übersichtlichen Merkblättern. Die Aufgaben der beiden unteren Niveaustufen lassen sich bereits für jüngere Lernende der Sekundarstufe einsetzen, Aufgaben der obersten Niveaustufe richten sich an Lernende von Abschlussklassen oder der Studieneingangsphase. Für die Hand der Lehrpersonen werden die Aufgaben und Merkblätter durch fachliche und didaktische Kommentare sowie Lösungshinweise ergänzt. (shrink)