Results for 'Bagher Larijani'

60 found
Order:
  1. Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Theory and Practice in Medicine: A Constructivist Grounded Theory Study.Mansure Madani, AbouAli Vedadhir, Bagher Larijani, Zahra Khazaei & Ahad Faramarz Gharamaleki - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2255-2275.
    Physicians try hard to alleviate mental and physical ailments of their patients. Thus, they are heavily burdened by observing ethics and staying well-informed while improving health of their patients. A major ethical concern or dilemma in medication is that some physicians know their behavior is unethical, yet act against their moral compass. This study develops models of theory–practice gap, offering optimal solutions for the gap. These solutions would enhance self-motivation or remove external obstacles to stimulate ethical practices in medicine. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. An Onto-Epistemological Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    This paper aims to suggest a new arrangement of Plato’s dialogues based on a different theory of the ontological as well as epistemological development of his philosophy. In this new arrangement, which proposes essential changes in the currently agreed upon chronology of the dialogues, Parmenides must be considered as criticizing an elementary theory of Forms and not the theory of so-called middle dialogues. Dated all as later than Parmenides, the so-called middle and late dialoguesare regarded as two consecutive endeavors to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. A Critique of the Standard Chronology of Plato's Dialogues.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    That i) there is a somehow determined chronology of Plato’s dialogues among all the chronologies of the last century and ii) this theory is subject to many objections, are points this article intends to discuss. Almost all the main suggested chronologies of the last century agree that Parmenides and Theaetetus should be located after dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Laws and Philebus. The eight objections we brought against this arrangement claim that to place the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. πολλαχῶς ἔστι; Plato’s Neglected Ontology.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Plato’s Metaphysical Development before Middle Period Dialogues.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Aristotle's Theory of Universal.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    The concept of universal in Aristotle’s philosophy has several aspects. 1) Universal and plurality Aristotle posits universal (καθόλου) versus particular (καθ᾿ ἕκαστον) each covering a range of elements: some elements are universal while others are particulars. Aristotle defines universal as ‘that which by nature is predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of many subjects’ and particular as ‘that which is not’ so. (OI ., I, 7, 17a38-b1) The plurality of possible subjects of universal is what Aristotle insists on. The inclusion of the notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Aristotle’s Theory of Thought.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Thought (νοῦς) for Aristotle is ‘that whereby the soul thinks and judges.’ This identity, however, ‘is not actually any real thing before thinking’ (ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν) and, thus, cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body and cannot acquire any quality or have any organ. (So., Γ, 4, 429a22-27) In fact, Aristotle defines thought more with a capability: ‘That which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought.’ (Met., Λ, 1072b22-23) Thought is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Plato Seeking for “One Real Explanation” in Phaedo.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    This essay intends to discuss what Plato was seeking as an explanation in Phaedo. In this dialogue, we observe Socrates criticizing both the natural scientists’ explanations and Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind because they could not explain all things, firstly, in a unitary and, secondary, in a real way. Thence, we are to call what Plato is seeking as his ideal explanation in Phaedo “One Real Explanation”. He talks at least about three kinds of explanation, two of which, the confused and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. The Concept of Genus in Aristotle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    We have a basic definition of genus in Topics (I, 5, 102a31-35): ‘A genus is what is predicated in what a thing is of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind. We should treat as predicate in what a thing is all such things as it would be appropriate to mention in reply to the question “what is the object in question?”; as, for example, in the case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say “He (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Aristotle's Theory of Relatives.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle classifies opposition (ἀντικεῖσθαι) into four groups: relatives (τὰ πρός τι), contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), privation and possession (στρέσις καὶ ἓξις) and affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). (Cat. , 10, 11b15-23) His example of relatives are the double and the half. Aristotle’s description of relatives as a kind of opposition is as such: ‘Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites (αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστι τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται) or in some other way in relation to them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  52
    پارمنیدس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    پارمنیدس (Παρμενίδης) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  50
    آناکسیماندروس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    آناکسیماندروس (Ὰναξἰμανδρος) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  49
    لئوکیپوس و دموکریتوس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    لئوکیپوس (Λεύκιππος) و دموکریتوس (Δημόκριτος) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Aristotle on Essence, Essential, Accident and Accidental.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    A. Accident 1. We call an accident (συμβεβηκὸς) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually.’ (Met. , Δ, 1025a14-16) 2. Whenever an accident attaches to a subject, it attaches to it not because it is that subject (μὴ διότι τοδὶ ἧν). (Met., Δ, 1025a21-24) 3. ‘There is no definite cause for an accident, but a chance cause, i.e. an indefinite one.’ (Met., Δ, 1025a24-25) 4. ‘The accident has happened or exists, -not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15.  48
    تالس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    تالس (Θαλῆς) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Aristotle on Abstraction.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Abstraction (ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως) or abstracting (χωρίζειν) have the following characteristics in Aristotle: 1. Abstraction is a process of eliminating (περιελὼν) everything else to reach to a single attribute; a process usually done by mathematicians abstracting the quantitative by eliminating all the sensible qualities like weight, lightness, hardness, etc. (Met. , K, 1061a28-b3) 2. Having eliminated every other attribute of a thing in order to have only one abstract thing, we have the thing qua (ᾗ) the abstracted which is an indivisible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17.  46
    پروتاگوراس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    پروتاگوراس (Πρωταγόρας) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18.  46
    آناکساگوراس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    آناکساگوراس (ναξαγόραςἈ) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  45
    آناکسیمنس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    آناکسیمنس (Ἀναξιμένης) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Aristotle on Otherness and Difference.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle differentiates between otherness (ἑτερότης) and difference (διαφορὰ). Otherness has no definite respect: one thing is other than another thing only because they are not the same. Every two things which are not the same are other than each other. Therefore, two things other than each other do not need something in which they are other than each other. Difference, on the other hand, has a definite respect and one thing is different from another thing in some respect. Thus, there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Aristotle on Paradigm.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    There are at least two discussions about Pythagoreans in Aristotle’s works that can be related to paradigm, both in Book A of Metaphysics. In the first, Aristotle says that for Pythagoreans all the things are modeled after numbers (τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἐφαίνετο τὴν φύσιν ἀφωμοιῶσθαι πᾶσιν). (Met., A, 985b32-33) In the second, Aristotle tells us that Pythagoreans take ‘the first subject of which a given term would be predicable (ᾧ πρώτῳ ὑπάρξειεν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὃρος)’ as the substance of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  43
    گزنوفانس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    گزنوفانس (Ξενοφάνης) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23.  43
    هراکلیتوس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    هراکلیتوس (Ἡράκλειτος) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Aristotle on Verb.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    For Aristotle, a verb (ῥῆμα) is that which a) besides a proper meaning b) carry with it the notion of time; c) its parts do not significate separately and d) is a sign of something said of something else (OI ., 2, 16b6-8). This comprehensive definition distinguishes verbs from both nouns (since they do not carry the notion of time with themselves) and sentences or co-positings of words (since they have parts with independent meanings). Based on this definition, a verb (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Aristotle on Opposition.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    There are four ways in which things are said to oppose (ἀντικεῖσθαι) each other: as relatives (τὰ πρός τι), as contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), as privation and possession (στρέσις καὶ ἓξις) and as affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). (Cat. , 10, 11b15-23) Aristotle’s examples are: double and half for relatives, good and bad for contraries, blindness and sight for privation and possession and ‘He is sitting’ and ‘he is not sitting’ for affirmation and negation. We discussed relatives separately thus we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  41
    زنون الئایی: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    زنون (Ζήνων) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Noun or Word in Aristotle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s analysis of language is, firstly, on the basis of co-positing and positing away: this is the starting point of analysis: what is asserted in language either involves a co-positing or does not (Cat. , 2, 1a16-17). Although he does not explain what he means by co-positing, we can see that he considers something like a sentence (his examples: man runs, man wins) and not merely a co-positing of two words like not-man, which he calls an indefinite noun (OI., 2, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  40
    گرگیاس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    گرگیاس (Γοργίας) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Aristotle’s Theory of Correspondence.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi -
    At the very beginning of On Interpretation (I, 1, 16a3-14) Aristotle distinguishes four levels and discusses their relationships. From this text, we can infer the following: 1. There are four levels: writing, speaking, mental experience and external world. Since writing and speaking can truly be taken as belonging to the same realm, we can reduce Aristotle’s distinction to three realms: language, thought and external world. 2. The realm of language, in both levels of writing and speaking, is different for different (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Aristotle’s Theory of Motion.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle defines motion as such: ‘The fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exist potentially, is motion.’ (Phy., Γ, 1, 201a10-11) He defines it again in the same chapter: ‘It is the fulfillment of what is potential when it is already fully real and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion. What I mean by ‘as’ is this: Bronze is potentially a statue. But it is not the fulfillment of bronze as bronze which is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  34
    امپدوکلس: گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    امپدکلس (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς) گزیده ای از پاره ها و شواهد دنیل گراهام ترجمه محمد باقر قمی -/- .
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  94
    Aristotle on πρὸς ἓν.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    It seems that there is a general principle in Aristotle’s philosophy that ‘all things are referred to that which is primary (πὰντα πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἀναφέρεται).’ (Met., Γ, 1004a25-26) This referring relation, however, may be in a different way for each thing: ‘After distinguishing the various senses of each, we must then explain by reference to what is primary in each term, saying how they are related to it; some in the sense that they possess it, others in the sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  94
    The Concept of Like in Aristotle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Like (ὃμοιος) has the following functions in Aristotle’s philosophy: 1. We know from Aristotle that some thinkers believed that ‘like is known by like.’ (ἡ δέ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ). (Met. , B, 1000b5-6 and So., A, 5, 410a27-29 about Empedocles; So., A, 2, 404b16-18 about Plato; So., A, 2, 405b12-16 and b26-28 about those who define the soul by its power of knowing) This, however, is a problematic theory in Aristotle’s point of view. One major problem is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  92
    Aristotle on the Relations between Genera, Species and Differentia.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    The following are the characteristics of a genus: 1. Those to which the same figure of predication applies are one in genus. (Met. , Δ, 1016b32-35) 2. Things that are one in genus are all one by analogy while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus. (Met, Δ, 1016b35-1017a3) 3. A genus includes contraries. (Met., Δ, 1018a25-31) 4. All the intermediates are in the same genus as one another and as the things they stand between. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  89
    Aristotle on Sentence and proposition.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Contrary to nouns and verbs that either do not include a co-positing of parts, including nouns and some verbs, or if they are, their parts do not significate separately, a sentence (λόγος) is a ‘significant portion of speech by co-positing, its parts signify something separately, though not as a positive or negative judgment but as utterance.’ (OI ., I, 4, 16b26-28). Therefore, every utterance in language that i) includes parts, ii) its signification is based on the co-positing of its parts, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  83
    Aristotle’s Semantics.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    It seems that by ‘having meaning’ or ‘significating’ (σημαίνειν) Aristotle has something like kind of determination in mind: ‘If ‘man’ has one meaning, let this be ‘two-footed animal’; by having one meaning I understand this: If such and such is a man, then if anything is a man, that will be what being a man is (τοῦτ’ ἔσται τὸ ἄνθρώπῳ εἶναι).’ (Met., Γ, 1006a31-34) This also brings kind of whole-particular or class-member relationship to mind: if a word has one meaning, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  81
    The Concept of Cause in Aristotle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle distinguishes between four causes (Phy., B, 3; PsA, B, 11, 94a20-24): a) Material cause: that from which; the antecedent out of which a thing comes to be and persists. E.g. the bronze of the statue; the silver of the bowl b) Formal cause: essence; the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence and its genera and the parts in definition; the whole and the co-positing. E.g. the relation 2:1 and generally number as cause of the octave (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  78
    Aristotle on Definition.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Definition has the following features in Aristotle’s philosophy: 1. Each thing has only one definition and ‘it is impossible that there should be more than one definition for the same thing.’ (To., Z, 5, 142b^25; cf. To., Z, 4, 141a26) 2. Definition is ‘a formula of the essence’ (Met., H, 1042a17-18) and, thus, signifies the essence of the thing. (To., I, 5, ^101b30-) About the relation between definition and essence Aristotle regards three possibilities (PsA., B, 94a11-14): a) A definition as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  74
    Aristotle on Time.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s process of constituting the notion of time through Phy., Δ, 10 to Phy., Δ, 12 has the following steps: 1) Time and not-being Since one part of time ‘has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet … one would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality.’ (Phy., Δ, 10) 2) Time, divisibility and now We should not regard time as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  70
    What Does ὑπαρχειν Mean in Aristotle?Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle says that ὑπαρχειν has as many senses as ‘to be true’ (PrA. , A, 36, 48b2-9) and as many ways as there are different categories. (PrA., A, 37, 49a6-9) This may mean that for every ‘is’ there is a ὑπαρχειν. Τhe reason is that Aristotle uses ὑπαρχειν in converse direction of ‘is’. The equal statement of ‘A is B’ with ὑπαρχειν is ‘B ὑπαρχει to A.’ Allen Bāck points to the difference between the use of the verb with dative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  68
    The Sense of ‘in’ in Aristotle’s Philosophy.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    In Physics (Δ, 3, 210a14-24) Aristotle distinguishes eight senses in which one thing is said to be in another thing: 1. Part in whole; e.g. finger in hand 2. The whole in its parts: ‘For there is no whole over and above the parts.’ 3. Species in genus; e.g. man in animal 4. Genus in species (generally: the part of the specific form in the definition of the specific form) 5. Form in matter; e.g. health in the hot and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42.  66
    Aristotle on Truth.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Thought is the primary realm in which truth and falsity may occur and speech the secondary realm of this occurrence while the realm of external being has no truth and falsity in itself. The first and last points are directly asserted by Aristotle in one text: ‘Falsity and truth are not in things-it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false- but in thought.’ (Met., E, 1027b25-27; cf. Met., K, 1065a22-23) The second point (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  66
    Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Some forms of defining PNC in Aristotle’s works are as follows: a) Everything must be either affirmed or denied (φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι). (Met., B, 996b28-29) or: it will not be possible to assert and deny the same thing truly at the same time. (Met., Γ, 1008a36-b1) In other words, ‘contradictory statements (ἀντικειμένας φάσεις) are not at the same time true. (Met., Γ, 1011b13-14) Also, ‘It is impossible that contradictories (ἀντίφασιν) should be at the same time true of the same thing.’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44.  57
    Aristotle on Vicious Circle.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s points about circle and vicious circle are as follows: 1. Aristotle criticizes some thinkers because ‘they see no difficulty in holding that all truths are demonstrated, on the ground that demonstration may be circular and reciprocal.’ (PsA., A, 3, 72b16-18) 2. ‘Not all knowledge is demonstrative’ and ‘knowledge of the immediate premises is independent of demonstration.’ Aristotle brings two reasons for this: ‘Since we must know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  54
    Aristotle on Memory.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s points about memory are as follows: 1. ‘Memory even of intellectual objects involves an image and the image is an affection of the common senses. Thus memory belongs incidentally to the faculty of thought, and essentially it belongs to the primary faculty of sense-perception.’ (OM., 450a^10-13) 2. The fact that animals have memory proves that it is a function of sense perception and not thought: ‘If memory were a function of the thinking parts, it would not have been an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  53
    Aristotle on Sameness.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s points about sameness or identity are as follows: 1. Aristotle speaks of different senses of same (ταὐτόν) in some of his works but it seems that the most comprehensive division is found in Topics (I, 7, 103a7-25) where he mentions three kinds of sameness: numerically, specifically and generically besides a fourth kind he calls ‘in view of unity of species.’ The numerically sameness on which there is the greatest agreement (To. , I, 7, ^103a25) and is the strictest sense (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47.  49
    Aristotle on Place.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    In Physics (Δ, 4, 210b34-211a6) Aristotle enumerates five features of place: i. Place is what contains that of which it is the place. ii. Place is not part of the thing it is its place. (Also cf. Phy., Δ, 2) iii. The immediate place of a thing is neither less nor greater than the thing. iv. Place can be left behind by the thing and is separable. (Also cf. Phy., Δ, 2) Aristotle connects our understanding of place with locomotion: ‘place (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  47
    Aristotle on ‘More or Less’.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    Aristotle’s points about taking ‘more or less’ (μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον) are as following: 1. Substances do not admit of the more and the less. This is supposed to mean that a man is not more a man either than itself or than another man. This is not, however, the case between different substances because one substance can be more a substance than another. (Cat., 5, 3, 3b33-4a2) In Metaphysics, Aristotle tells us that substance in the sense of form does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  46
    Aristotle on Relation.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    However, there are a few points about what we can call ‘relation’ in Aristotle’s works: 1. Sound is always of something in relation to something and in something and it is impossible for one body only to generate a sound. (So., B, 8, 419b9-10) 2. Corresponding relation: ‘Let then C be to D as A, white, is to B, black; it follows alternado that C:A :: D:B. if then C and A belong to one subject, the case will be the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  43
    Aristotle on Recollection.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    1. ‘But occasionally it happens that we get a sudden idea and recollect that we heard or saw something formerly. This happens whenever, from contemplating a mental object in itself, one changes his point of view, and regards it as relative to something else.’ 2. ‘Recollection is not the recovery or acquisition of memory; since at the instant when one at first learns or experiences, he does not thereby recover a memory inasmuch as none has preceded, nor does he acquire (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 60