The Best Form of Government for Power Transitions -/- Throughout history, the transition of power has been a defining factor in the stability or collapse of governments. While some governments manage peaceful and stable transitions, others experience violent overthrows, civil wars, or political chaos. The key to a successful power transition lies in strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust in the system. Based on historical evidence, liberal democracies with strong institutions are the most effective at (...) ensuring smooth transitions. However, other forms of government can also maintain stability if they have well-defined mechanisms for succession. This essay examines various government types and their effectiveness in power transitions. -/- The Importance of Stable Power Transitions -/- The process of transferring power is one of the most vulnerable moments for any political system. The ability to ensure smooth leadership changes is crucial for long-term stability. Governments that fail in this aspect often face coups, revolutions, or national disintegration. The most effective power transitions depend on: -/- 1. Legitimacy – Leaders must be chosen through a process accepted by the people and elites. -/- 2. Strong Institutions – Independent branches of government ensure continuity regardless of leadership changes. -/- 3. Elite Consensus – Political elites should agree on a leader’s succession to prevent internal power struggles. -/- 4. Public Support – If the population believes in the process, transitions are peaceful. -/- 5. Military Neutrality – The armed forces should not interfere in leadership changes. -/- Different forms of government approach power transitions in distinct ways. Below, we analyze their effectiveness. -/- 1. Liberal Democracy: The Best Model for Peaceful Transitions -/- Definition: -/- Liberal democracies are systems where leaders are chosen through free and fair elections, with checks and balances to prevent authoritarian rule. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Elections Provide Legitimacy – Power changes peacefully through regular elections. ✔ Strong Institutions – Courts, legislatures, and the media help uphold the rule of law. ✔ Public Accountability – Leaders who lose elections step down without conflict. -/- Examples of Successful Power Transitions: -/- ✅ United States – Since 1789, despite crises like the Civil War and Great Depression, power transitions have remained constitutional. ✅ United Kingdom – The parliamentary system allows for smooth leadership changes without national instability. ✅ Germany (Post-WWII) – After democratic reforms, Germany has had peaceful transitions of power. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ Election Disputes Can Create Instability – Example: The U.S. Capitol Riot (2021) after a contested election. ❌ Weak Institutions in Young Democracies – Example: Kenya’s 2007 election disputes led to violence. -/- Best Democratic Model: -/- ✔ Parliamentary Democracies (e.g., UK, Canada, Germany) tend to have smoother transitions than presidential systems because: -/- Leadership changes occur within political parties, reducing external conflicts. -/- Votes of no confidence can remove leaders without revolutions or coups. -/- 2. Constitutional Monarchy: Stable If Institutions Are Strong -/- Definition: -/- A constitutional monarchy is a system where a king or queen serves as a symbolic head of state, while an elected government runs the country. -/- Why It Ensures Smooth Transitions: -/- ✔ Monarchy Provides Stability – Kings and queens remain constant, reducing uncertainty. ✔ Elections Determine Political Leaders – The prime minister and parliament handle governance. ✔ Symbolic Unity – Monarchs can unify the country during crises. -/- Examples of Stable Monarchies: -/- ✅ United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Netherlands – Power transitions occur through democratic elections, while the monarchy remains a stabilizing force. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If the Monarch Becomes Politically Active, It Can Cause Crisis – Example: Thailand (2020s protests against the monarchy’s influence). ❌ If a Monarch Dies Unexpectedly, It Can Create Uncertainty – Example: Spain’s transition after Franco’s dictatorship (1975) depended on King Juan Carlos I to restore democracy. -/- Best Model for Monarchies: -/- ✔ Monarchies that Stay Neutral in Politics (e.g., UK, Sweden) prevent power struggles. -/- 3. One-Party States: Stable but Risky if a Leader Dies Unexpectedly -/- Definition: -/- One-party states are systems where only one political party governs, often without free elections. -/- Why It Can Have Stable Transitions: -/- ✔ Predictable Leadership Changes (if well-structured) – Leaders are often pre-selected within the ruling party. ✔ Less Election Conflict – No multi-party competition reduces disputes. ✔ Long-Term Policies – The government can plan policies without election cycles. -/- Examples of One-Party States with Stable Transitions: -/- ✅ China (Communist Party Rule) – Leaders were replaced every 10 years before Xi Jinping extended his rule. ✅ Vietnam (Communist Party) – The ruling party ensures orderly successions. -/- Challenges: -/- ❌ If a Leader Dies Suddenly, It Can Create Chaos – Example: North Korea after Kim Jong-il’s death (2011). ❌ If There’s No Clear Successor, Infighting Can Occur – Example: Soviet Union’s power struggles after Stalin’s death (1953). -/- Best Model for One-Party States: -/- ✔ China’s Model (Before 2018) – Leaders were pre-selected within the Communist Party, preventing instability. -/- 4. Absolute Monarchies and Dictatorships: The Most Unstable in Transitions -/- Definition: -/- A system where power is concentrated in one ruler or a small elite group, without elections. -/- Why Transitions Are Unstable: -/- ❌ No Clear Rules for Succession – Leaders often die or are overthrown, causing power struggles. ❌ Military Often Decides the Next Leader – Coups and instability occur frequently. ❌ If a Leader Becomes Too Powerful, No One Can Challenge Them – This leads to violent transitions. -/- Examples of Failed Transitions in Dictatorships: -/- ❌ Libya (Gaddafi Overthrown, 2011) – No clear succession plan led to a failed state. ❌ Soviet Union (After Stalin’s Death, 1953) – Power struggles created instability. ❌ Iraq (After Saddam Hussein, 2003) – No clear transition led to civil war. -/- Best Model for Dictatorships: -/- ✔ If a Dictatorship Must Exist, It Should Have a Clear Succession Plan – Example: Saudi Arabia has a royal succession council to avoid uncertainty. -/- Conclusion: Which Government Type is Best for Transitions? -/- 1️⃣ Best for Smooth Transitions: Liberal Democracies with Strong Institutions -/- Best Example: Parliamentary Systems (UK, Canada, Germany) – Leaders change peacefully without major conflicts. -/- 2️⃣ Good for Stability but Less Flexible: Constitutional Monarchies -/- Best Example: Japan, UK, Netherlands – Monarchs provide continuity, while governments change through elections. -/- 3️⃣ Stable but Risky: One-Party States -/- Best Example: China (Before 2018) – Internal party succession prevented chaos, but risk of dictatorship remains. -/- 4️⃣ Most Unstable: Dictatorships and Absolute Monarchies -/- Worst Example: Libya, Iraq, North Korea – Transitions are violent and unpredictable. -/- Ultimately, liberal democracies with strong institutions (especially parliamentary systems) are the best for stable power transitions. Dictatorships and absolute monarchies, on the other hand, often collapse violently when leaders die or are overthrown. By ensuring strong institutions, clear succession rules, and public trust, governments can create a system where leadership changes occur peacefully, securing long-term stability. -/- . (shrink)

The Holistic Governance System (HGS): A New Form of Government -/- The Holistic Governance System (HGS) is a new form of government that combines the strengths of successful systems while minimizing their weaknesses. It blends democracy, strategic planning, economic efficiency, and strong social welfare policies to ensure balanced governance. -/- Core Principles of HGS: -/- 1. Balanced Democracy: A hybrid system that combines representative democracy, direct democracy, and meritocratic leadership to ensure efficient governance. -/- 2. Strategic (...) Economic Growth: A regulated free market economy combined with state-led investment in key industries, following Singapore and China’s development model. -/- 3. Strong Social Welfare: A universal healthcare and education system based on the Nordic model (Norway, Sweden). -/- 4. Technological and Scientific Leadership: Investment in research, artificial intelligence, and green energy to drive national progress. -/- 5. Corruption-Free Governance: Strict anti-corruption laws similar to Singapore’s model to ensure ethical leadership. -/- 6. Civic Participation: Switzerland’s direct democracy elements, allowing citizens to vote on key national policies. -/- 7. National Stability and Global Neutrality: Following Switzerland’s model, HGS avoids unnecessary global conflicts while maintaining strong economic and diplomatic ties. -/- 8. Smart Population Management: Inspired by China and Singapore, a planned approach to population control, urban planning, and sustainable resource use. -/- 9. Education-Based Leadership Training: Leaders must undergo specialized training in economics, philosophy, and governance (meritocratic system). -/- Government Structure of HGS: -/- 1. Head of State: The Strategic Council (Meritocratic Leadership) -/- Instead of a single president or monarch, a Strategic Council composed of seven highly qualified experts governs the nation. -/- These experts are selected based on intellectual merit, leadership skills, and public approval. -/- They serve fixed 10-year terms (non-renewable) to ensure long-term stability while preventing dictatorship. -/- The council’s decisions are subject to public referendums (Switzerland model) for major national policies. -/- 2. Legislative System: Balanced Parliament + Direct Democracy -/- A bicameral system (two chambers): -/- The People’s Assembly (elected by citizens). -/- The Expert Senate (selected from scholars, scientists, and experienced policymakers). -/- Public Referendums are held twice a year, allowing citizens to vote on critical policies. -/- 3. Economic System: Balanced Market Economy + State Investment -/- Private businesses operate freely, but key sectors like healthcare, education, and strategic industries are managed by the government. -/- State-led economic planning ensures sustainable development (like Singapore & China). -/- High-tech industries and green energy receive major state investment. -/- 4. Social Welfare: Universal Services for Citizens -/- Free healthcare & education (like Norway, Sweden). -/- Guaranteed basic income to prevent poverty. -/- Affordable housing programs (government-regulated). -/- 5. Judiciary: Independent Supreme Court + AI Oversight -/- Courts are fully independent to prevent political interference. -/- AI-driven legal analysis ensures fair and unbiased rulings (Singapore model). -/- 6. Military & Foreign Policy: Neutrality + Strong Defense -/- Switzerland-style neutrality (no unnecessary wars). -/- Small but advanced military, focused on defense and cyber security. -/- Advantages of HGS Over Current Governments: -/- How HGS Could Be Implemented: -/- 1. Pilot City-States: The system could be tested in a small, independent city-state before being adopted by larger nations. -/- 2. Gradual Reform: Countries with failing governments could transition by adopting HGS policies step by step (e.g., start with anti-corruption laws, economic reform, and education improvement). -/- 3. AI-Assisted Governance: Technology would be used to analyze policies, reducing bias and human error. -/- Conclusion: -/- The Holistic Governance System (HGS) offers the best of democracy, meritocracy, economic planning, and social welfare while minimizing corruption, inefficiency, and instability. It creates a government that is stable, effective, and fair, allowing both economic growth and citizen well-being. -/- . (shrink)

The other major question in the history of political philosophy besides the issue of distributive justice is what the best form of government is. In Western philosophy, the received view is democracy. However, this paper challenges this thesis by presenting arguments against democracy relying in significant part on empirical data from political science and political psychology. Moreover, it presents a general case for a hybrid view over democracy for the legislative and executive branches that appends a meritocracy (...) or rule by the merited from Eastern philosophy to democracy. (shrink)

Honors Research: PPE @ UPenn | This thesis seeks to address some of the most central questions to the fields of political philosophy and political economy. How can social order and government develop from anarchy under standard economic assumptions of rationality, where all agents act strictly in their own interests? What are the deontological limits to the State’s use of force such that political legitimacy is maintained, and how do these ethical boundaries of government relate to moral obligations (...) conferred upon individuals? Finally, what sets of policies and social institutions ought the State implement to achieve the best welfare outcomes for a society, and is there a necessary conflict between policy consequentialism and deontological ethics? This thesis will first show that a laissez-faire capitalist social order spontaneously emerges from the State of Nature as a result of mutual self-interest between rational agents, with the institution of government being a mere product of market forces that is best modeled as a locally-monopolized, excludable, collective entity with global competition. Then, this thesis will defend a theory of natural rights on the basis that persons are normatively separate, before establishing that laissez-faire capitalism and its contractual form of government are uniquely in compliance with these universal moral standards of conduct that predate the institution of any state. Finally, it will be argued in this thesis that the key tenets of laissez-faire capitalism - strong individual rights to life, liberty, and property - produce maximal human welfare from both individualist and collectivist aggregations, before such conclusions are translated into a foundation for limited government. These arguments serve to solidify libertarianism as both the dominant political philosophy and the globally convergent equilibrium of political organization, while also demonstrating that laissez-faire capitalism is the optimal form of social order. (shrink)

We are about to see the emergence of religions devoted to the worship of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Such religions pose acute risks, both to their followers and to the public. We should require their creators, and governments, to acknowledge these risks and to manage them as best they can. However, these new religions cannot be stopped altogether, nor should we try to stop them if we could. We must accept that AI worship will become part of our culture, and (...) we must learn to live with it. Indeed, we should do much more than this. We should value it as a new source of meaning in a rapidly-changing world. AI-based religions deserve respect and recognition alongside other, more established ones, and they should be granted the same level of legal protection. (shrink)

As the word demos denotes, the democracy is generally considered as the rule or governance based on the general base of people in which monarchy or oligarchy form is excluded. We have a classical view about the four forms of government, which was proposed by Platonic concepts. Most idealistic form of government, in his prongs, could be found in Crete and Sparta, which was nevertheless not a democratic form. His accolade of these two nations, which, (...) of course, would be a kind of God’s product so to be most benevolent, humanly appealing, efficient and philanthropic. This means the democratic form of government is not best, but most favored alternative to police the society. The political terms, henceforth, would supervene the concept of democracy, and, for many reasons and on historical wake, democracy is generally accepted as practically most desired form of rule or governance. While some modern scholar revealed, a mini-republic can be a niche to contest the merits of various forms of governance. We can gauge a scope of elements we value through the governance process, human intrinsic, efficiency, equality, welfare and even individual happiness. As the time is a small city community, called a polis, in Plato and Socrates, a mini republic can be well envisaged in understanding the Platonic Republic. In that case, most benevolent ruler may be superior to any other form of governance, which can be a philosopher’s Republic. The ideal ruler would behave and govern with mighty intelligence and concomitant power to rule. It is idealistic to produce maximum happiness of polis constituents. The worst contras, however, a tyranny, comes that the constituents legitimately expel their ruler by a collective vote. This extreme contrast and the way of process also could be ascertained in the ancient form of oriental monarchy. The dynasty could be legitimately revoked to restore new heritage of emperor or Kings where a kind of rebellion, as elucidated by Locke, is well justified in the name of heaven’s command. Given the size of polis or governed territory, there are separate ways to redress the evils of tyranny while the Oriental culture has not recognized the kind of formal vote methods. Any means to expel the tyranny could be embraced to rebel. For our purpose of grasp through this working paper, I would theorize on the traditional elements of public policy and democratic form of government. (shrink)

In this paper, I embark on diving deep into the specific training model of the systematic approach to training for probing more perspectives of its governance that should connect and link its phases together. Actually this training model is applied by many organizations all around the world that require a high level of professional trained staff with a minimal standard deviation of processes. I am here concerned with those organizations seeking a better training system, while ending up being superficially satisfied (...) with reverberating and bragging with having the SAT onboard without full awareness of the possibilities of its implementation. It is not about the system, it is about the mindsets that are flexible enough to fully grasp the ins and outs of the model they are about to use and how to harness its tools for their organizational benefit; otherwise it’s a waste of time, effort and money. In order to operate training in a systematic manner, it has to not only cover the inter related stages and processes, but also set a solid bridge that keeps and maintains the smooth landing from one stage to another along with securing the prospected outputs which conforms to both form and content. Based on my experience on the best practices of the systematic approach to training, I will here contribute my insight of the system quality control technique that may help in a well-knitted flow of processes. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between the twin dangers of piety and excess cynicism when thinking critically about state apologies, by focusing on two government apologies to indigenous peoples: namely, those made by the Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers in 2008. Both apologies are notable for several reasons: they were both issued by heads of government, and spoken on record within the space of government: the national parliaments of both countries. Furthermore, (...) in each case, the object of the apology – that which was apologized for – comes closer to disrupting the idea both countries have of themselves, and their image in the global political community, than any previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a result, both apologies were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and tracing their consequences – even in the short term – is a difficult business. We avoid excessive piety or cynicism, I argue, when we take several things into account. First, apologies have multiple functions: they narrate particular histories of wrongdoing, they express disavowal of that wrongdoing, and they commit to appropriate forms of repair or renewal. Second, the significance and the success of each function must be assessed contextually. Third, when turning to official political apologies, in particular, appropriate assessment of their capacity to disavow or to commit requires that consider apologies both as performance and as political action. While there remain significant questions regarding the practice of political apology – in particular, its relationship to practices of reparation, forgiveness and reconciliation – this approach can provide a framework with which to best consider them. (shrink)

In Western political philosophy, democracy is generally the dominant view regarding what the best form of government is, and this holds even in respect to promoting minority rights. However, I argue that there is a better theory for satisfying minority interests and rights. I amass numerous studies from the social sciences demonstrating how democracy does poorly in accounting for minority interests. I then contend that a particular hybrid view that fuses a meritocracy with democracy can do a (...) better job than democracy in accounting for minority interests and in having more equal rights and fair policies coming from the legislative and executive branches. Finally, I defend this thesis from numerous counters. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a roadmap for governing AI. In contrast to the reigning paradigms, we argue that AI governance should be not merely a reactive, punitive, status-quo-defending enterprise, but rather the expression of an expansive, proactive vision for technology—to advance human flourishing. Advancing human flourishing in turn requires democratic/political stability and economic empowerment. To accomplish this, we build on a new normative framework that will give humanity its best chance to reap the full benefits, while avoiding the (...) dangers, of AI. This new framework of “Power-Sharing Liberalism” is a philosophy that restores protections of positive liberties to liberalism. As we deploy it here, it helps shape a more comprehensive (and we would contend, more accurate) understanding of both risk and opportunity introduced by AI. To lay out how Power-Sharing Liberalism can be applied to AI governance, we take four steps. First, we define central concepts in the field of AI governance, disambiguating between forms of technological harms and risks. Second, we review current normative frameworks around the globe and argue that Power-Sharing Liberalism is a better fit for governing AI. Third, we walk through the six governance tasks that should be accomplished by any governance framework and analyze them through the Power-Sharing Liberalism framework. Based on that analysis, we make 17 recommendations for the governance of AI—including transformative investments in public goods, personnel, and the sustainability of democracy itself. Finally, we discuss concrete proposals for implementing those recommendations. (shrink)

On the History of Political Philosophy: Great Political Thinkers from Thucydides to Locke is a lively and lucid account of the major political theorists and philosophers of the ancient Greek, Roman, medieval, renaissance, and early modern periods. The author demonstrates the continuing significance of some political debates and problems that originated in the history of political philosophy. Topics include discussions concerning human nature, different views of justice, the origin of government and law, the rise and development of different forms (...) of government, idealism and realism in international relations, the distinction between just and unjust war, and the sources of public authority and the nature of legitimate sovereignty. The organizing principle of the book is the idea that the great political thinkers were searching for the best political order and a criterion for human conduct in both domestic and international politics. The book presupposes no previous knowledge of political philosophy. It will therefore be a valuable introductory book for students of philosophy, politics, and international relations. As it opens eyes to the perceptions that historical knowledge may convey, it will also be an illuminating and engaging reading for a general reader. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A new ‘political philosophy’ is indispensable to the ‘post-Corona world,’ and this paper tries to analyze the future of ‘liberal democracy’ in it. It shows that ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that has begun before, but the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic,’ as a setback for it, strongly encourages that crisis. ‘Liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed by ‘political philosophers’ to go together, are now becoming decoupled, and the ‘liberal values’ of ‘democracy’ are eroding. To find why and (...) how, this paper analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ and the evils and propensities of ‘democracy’ that bring about further erosions of ‘liberal values.’ There may be difficult trade-offs to be made between ‘liberal’ and ‘authoritarian’ ‘values’ - and, after the experience of ‘Coronavirus,’ this paper shows the ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy’ may become stronger. -/- KEYWORDS: democracy, liberalism, liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, the novel Coronavirus pandemic, Covid-19, authoritarianism, totalitarianism. -/- EXTENDED ABSTRACT For almost a century in West, ‘democracy’ has meant ‘liberal democracy’-a political system marked not only by ‘free and fair elections,’ but also by ‘liberal values.’ ‘Liberalism’ applied to the problem of the limits of the criminal law would require commitment to the presumption in favor of ‘liberty.’ If the word ‘liberal’ is to have any utility in this context, it should refer to one who has so powerful a commitment to ‘liberty’ that she is motivated to limit the number of acknowledged liberty-limiting or coercion-legitimizing principles as narrowly as possible. So, she only believes in ‘harm-principle’ as the morally relevant reason for criminal prohibitions. ‘Offense principle’ and ‘paternalistic’ and ‘moralistic’ considerations, when introduced as support for penal legislation, have no weight at all. So, it means ‘autonomy’ and ‘self-regarding vs. other-regarding actions distinction’ based on which the human is the owner of her mind and body and everything consenting adults do is beyond the realm of morality and law. It leads to ‘individual’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties’ of ‘speech,’ ‘religion,’ and ‘property’ and ‘collective’ ‘basic rights and liberties’ such as ‘basic rights and liberties of assembly,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘political pluralism,’ ‘democratic institutions,’ and ‘non-governmental organizations.’ ‘Liberalism’ also believes in ‘equality of conditions, ‘equal and free participatory rights in political decision making,’ and ‘collective self-governance.’ It also believes in the ‘rule of law,’ a ‘separation of powers,’ and ‘checks and balances.’ However, even under fair and free elections, the elected leaders can be ‘populists,’ ‘ultra-nationalists,’ ‘racists,’ ‘fascists,’ and ‘authoritarians’ who do not respect ‘inviolable basic rights and liberties,’ and suppress ‘minorities.’ Democratically elected leaders can routinely ignore constitutional limits on their power and deprive their citizens of ‘basic rights and liberties.’ The two strands of ‘liberal democracy’ have been coming apart in the world, and the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ have been fraying and eroding even before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ Even before the Coronavirus hit, there was already much discussion of a crisis of ‘liberal democracy.’ In particular, there has been a debate about whether ‘liberalism’ and ‘democracy,’ which had long been assumed to go together, were becoming decoupled. This paper shows ‘liberal democracy’ faces a ‘global crisis’ that had begun before the ‘novel Coronavirus pandemic.’ It also analyzes ‘authoritarianism,’ ‘totalitarianism,’ ‘liberalism,’ and ‘democracy’ and shows that Covid-19 is a setback for ‘liberal democracy.’ What is striking about the current moment is that many of the ‘liberal’ elements of ‘democracy’ are so far holding up under immense pressure. ‘Illiberal democracies’ seemed to be emerging in many countries. This model of ‘illiberal democracy,’ in which elections continue to be held but some individual rights and liberties are curtailed, may emerge stronger from this new crisis. In that sense, the ‘pandemic’ may become a challenge not only to ‘democracy’ as such but also to ‘liberal democracy’ in particular – in other words, a system of popular sovereignty together with guaranteed basic rights, such as freedom of association and expression and checks and balances on executive power. ‘Authoritarian’ procedures may succeed in mitigating the spread of the ‘Coronavirus,’ but the world now faces another problem: that when the virus recedes, many ‘liberal democracies’ will be far less ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ than they were before. In times of crisis, ‘liberal values’ have been ignored temporarily in the name of executive power. However, the ‘temporary’ can become ‘permanent.’ In addition, if citizens lose their faith in the legitimacy of ‘liberal democracy’ as the best form of government, and think ‘liberal democracy’ cannot function effectively during a crisis, and ‘authoritarian regimes’ manage the crisis more decisively, the world will slide towards ‘illiberal or authoritarian democracy,’ and many ‘liberal democracies’ will be at grave risk of failure. There may now be difficult trade-offs to be made between those basic rights and security - and, after the experience of Covid-19, many citizens may choose security. (shrink)

Discursive liberal democracy might not be the best of all possible forms of government, yet in Europe it is largely accepted as such. The attractors of liberal democracy (majority rule, political equality, reasonable self-determination and an ideological framework built in a tentative manner) as well as an adequate dose of secularization (according to the doctrine of religious restraint) provide both secularist and educated religious people with the most convenient ideological framework. Unfortunately, many promoters of ideological secularization take too (...) strong a stance against the manifestation of religiosity in the public sphere. They claim that people may discuss, debate or adopt (coercive) laws and regularities only by means of secular public reasons and secular motivation. We argue that these secular restraints on the ideological framework are unfairly biased against religion, counterproductive and unreasonable. The exaggerated secular restrictions create a strict secular public sphere that appears to be a Pickwickian world suitable just for inoffensive, dull and lethargic people. Deliberately separated from the idea of truth, secular public reasons cannot sustain a complex adaptive system like discursive liberal democracy. Liberal democracy needs citizens with a strong sense of truth and with a sufficient will-power to follow both a personal ideal and a collective ideal. Religious beliefs provide people with just such a sense of truth and with the desire to have a certain kind of character. In the secularized public sphere of liberal democracy, people can manifest just educated religious beliefs that correspond to the real world and respect the principle of peaceable conduct. In the final part of the article we support the assertion that believers could and should educate their religious belief before expressing them in the public sphere. Educated religious beliefs have a wide enough propositional content, obey the moral imperative of William Clifford, are purged from all propositional components against which there is strong evidence and are consciously cultivated by the mechanism of suggestion. (shrink)

Alternative Solutions to a Failed Democratic System Due to Ignorant Voters and Black Propaganda Politics -/- Introduction -/- Democracy is often considered the best form of government because it allows people to choose their leaders and influence policies. However, democracy is only as strong as the knowledge and wisdom of its citizens. When voters are ignorant and easily manipulated by black propaganda, democracy fails to serve its true purpose. Corrupt politicians take advantage of misinformation, and elections become (...) a contest of deceit rather than competence. In such cases, it becomes necessary to explore alternative governance systems that align with the universal law of balance in nature, ensuring societal stability and progress. This essay explores five potential solutions: meritocratic democracy, hybrid governance, decentralized governance with AI oversight, temporary educational dictatorship, and whole-process democracy with reforms. -/- 1. Meritocratic Democracy: A Government of the Competent -/- One of the main weaknesses of democracy is that it allows uninformed individuals to vote, often leading to the election of incompetent or corrupt leaders. Meritocratic democracy solves this by introducing a system where voters and candidates must meet certain educational or competency requirements. -/- In this system: -/- Voters must pass a basic competency test on political, economic, and social issues before they can vote. -/- Candidates must demonstrate expertise in governance, ethics, and leadership before being allowed to run for office. -/- Decision-making is guided by knowledge and logic, rather than emotional manipulation or populism. -/- By ensuring that only informed citizens and competent leaders participate in the electoral process, a meritocratic democracy prevents the spread of ignorance and manipulation, making governance more stable and effective. -/- 2. Hybrid Governance Model: Balancing Democracy and Technocracy -/- A pure democratic system, when controlled by an uninformed majority, can lead to poor decision-making. A hybrid governance model combines democratic participation with expert-driven decision-making. -/- This system includes: -/- Direct democracy for issues that require public participation, ensuring people still have a voice. -/- Technocratic leadership for areas that require expertise, such as economic planning, environmental policies, and legal reforms. -/- AI-assisted decision-making, where policies are analyzed based on logic, data, and the universal law of balance in nature. -/- By integrating democracy with technocracy, this model ensures that governance is based on both public engagement and expert knowledge, reducing the influence of ignorance and propaganda. -/- 3. Decentralized Governance with AI Oversight -/- Corruption and manipulation thrive in centralized political systems where power is concentrated in a few individuals. A decentralized governance model distributes power across local communities while maintaining oversight through artificial general intelligence (AGI) programmed with the universal formula to ensure balance and ethical governance. -/- This system includes: -/- Local decision-making councils that handle community affairs, reducing dependence on central authorities. -/- AI oversight to prevent misinformation, corruption, and propaganda in governance. -/- Policy-making based on natural balance, ensuring that human actions align with long-term sustainability and fairness. -/- By decentralizing power and using AI to monitor governance, this system prevents political elites from manipulating the public while ensuring that all decisions follow rational and ethical principles. -/- 4. Temporary Educational Dictatorship: A Path to Enlightened Democracy -/- If a democratic system is completely destroyed by ignorance and propaganda, a temporary educational dictatorship may be necessary to restore order. This approach involves: -/- A temporary leadership regime that enforces strict educational reforms before returning power to a well-informed electorate. -/- A governance structure that prioritizes truth, logic, and natural laws in policymaking. -/- A mandatory educational system focusing on critical thinking, ethics, and scientific reasoning to eliminate ignorance from the voting population. -/- This dictatorship would not be based on oppression but on restoring the intellectual foundation necessary for democracy to function properly. Once society reaches a stable level of awareness, democratic processes can be reinstated. -/- 5. Whole-Process People’s Democracy with Reforms -/- China’s whole-process people’s democracy is a system that allows both public participation and centralized decision-making. However, for it to be truly effective, it must integrate the universal law of balance in nature and eliminate ideological biases. -/- To reform whole-process democracy: -/- Education and critical thinking must be central to governance, ensuring the population is not easily misled. -/- Leaders must be selected based on knowledge and competence, not political loyalty. -/- Policies must align with natural balance, ensuring long-term societal stability. -/- By modifying this system with scientific and ethical principles, it can serve as a stable alternative to failing democracies. -/- Conclusion -/- Democracy is valuable, but when ignorant voters and black propaganda politics take control, it leads to instability and poor governance. To correct this failure, alternative systems must be considered. Meritocratic democracy ensures only informed citizens and competent leaders participate in elections. Hybrid governance balances democratic participation with expert decision-making. Decentralized governance with AI oversight prevents corruption and misinformation. A temporary educational dictatorship restores knowledge before returning to democracy. Whole-process democracy, when modified with the universal law of balance, can also serve as a viable alternative. -/- The best solution depends on the specific problems of a country, but the core principle remains the same: governance must follow the universal law of balance in nature, ensuring stability, truth, and progress. Only through such reforms can society escape the cycle of ignorance and manipulation, creating a future where human decisions align with natural laws and rational thought. -/- . (shrink)

This book is an anthology with the following themes. Non-European Tradition: Bussanich interprets main themes of Hindu ethics, including its roots in ritual sacrifice, its relationship to religious duty, society, individual human well-being, and psychic liberation. To best assess the truth of Hindu ethics, he argues for dialogue with premodern Western thought. Pfister takes up the question of human nature as a case study in Chinese ethics. Is our nature inherently good (as Mengzi argued) or bad (Xunzi’s view)? Pfister (...) ob- serves their underlying agreement, that human beings are capable of becoming good, and makes precise the disagreement: whether we achieve goodness by cultivating autonomous feelings or by accepting external precepts. There are political consequences: whether government should aim to respect and em- power individual choices or to be a controlling authority. Early Greek Thinking: Collobert examines the bases of Homeric ethics in fame, prudence, and shame, and how these guide the deliberations of heroes. She observes how, by depending upon the poet’s words, the hero gains a quasi- immortality, although in truth there is no consolation for each person’s inevi- table death. Plato: Santas examines Socratic Method and ethics in Republic 1. There Socrates examines definitions of justice and tests them by comparison to the arts and sciences. Santas shows the similarities of Socrates’ method to John Rawls’ method of considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. McPherran interprets Plato’s religious dimension as like that of his teacher Socrates. McPherran shows how Plato appropriates, reshapes, and extends the religious conventions of his own time in the service of establishing the new enterprise of philosophy. Ac- cording to Taylor, Socrates believes that humans in general have the task of helping the gods by making their own souls as good as possible, and Socrates’ unique ability to cross-examine imposes on him the special task of helping others to become as good as possible. This conception of Socrates’ mission is Plato’s own, consisting in an extension of the traditional conception of piety as helping the gods. Brickhouse and Smith propose a new understanding of Socratic moral psychology—one that retains the standard view of Socrates as an intellectualist, but also recognizes roles in human agency for appetites and passions. They compare and contrast the Socratic view to the picture of moral psychology we get in other dialogues of Plato. Hardy also proposes a new, non-reductive understanding of Socratic eudaimonism—he argues that Socrates invokes a very rich and complex notion of the “Knowledge of the Good and Bad”, which is associated with the motivating forces of the virtues. Rudebusch defends Socrates’ argument that knowledge can never be impotent in the face of psychic passions. He considers the standard objections: that knowledge cannot weigh incom- mensurable human values, and that brute desire, all by itself, is capable of moving the soul to action. Aristotle: Anagnostopoulos interprets Aristotle on the nature and acquisition of virtue. Though virtue of character, aiming at human happiness, requires a complex awareness of multiple dimensions of one’s experience, it is not properly a cognitive capacity. Thus it requires habituation, not education, according to Aristotle, in order to align the unruly elements of the soul with reason’s knowledge of what promotes happiness. Shields explains Aristotle’s doctrine that goodness is meant in many ways as the doctrine that there are different analyses of goodness for different types of circumstance, just as for being. He finds Aristotle to argue for this conclusion, against Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the Good, by applying the tests for homonymy and as an immediate cons- equence of the doctrine of categories. Shields evaluates the issue as unresolved at present. Russell discusses Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation and its virtue, intelligence (phronesis). He relates the account to contemporary philo- sophical controversies surrounding Aristotle’s view that intelligence is neces- sary for moral virtue, including the objections that in some cases it is unnecessary or even impedes human goodness. Frede examines the advantages and disadvantages of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. She explains the general Greek con- ceptions of happiness and virtue, Aristotle’s conception of phronesis and compares the Aristotle’s ethics with modern accounts. Liske discusses the question of whether the Aristotelian account of virtue entails an ethical-psy- chological determinism. He argues that Aristotle’s understanding of hexis allows for free action and ethical responsibility : By making decisions for good actions we are able to stabilize our character (hexis). Hellenistic and Roman: Annas defends an account of stoic ethics, according to which the three parts of Stoicism—logic, physics, and ethics—are integrated as the parts of an egg, not as the parts of a building. Since by this analogy no one part is a foundation for the rest, pedagogical decisions may govern the choice of numerous, equally valid, presentations of Stoic ethics. Piering interprets the Cynic way of life as a distinctive philosophy. In their ethics, Cynics value neither pleasure nor tradition but personal liberty, which they achieve by self-suffi- ciency and display in speech that is frank to the point of insult. Plotinus and Neoplatonism: Gerson outlines the place of ordinary civic virtue as well as philosophically contemplative excellence in Neoplatonism. In doing so he attempts to show how one and the same good can be both action-guiding in human life and be the absolute simple One that grounds the explanation of everything in the universe. Delcomminette follows Plotinus’s path to the Good as the foundation of free will, first in the freedom of Intellect and then in the “more than freedom” of the One. Plotinus postulates these divinities as not outside but within each self, saving him from the contradiction of an external foundation for a truly free will. General Topics: Halbig discusses the thesis on the unity of virtues. He dis- tinguishes the thesis of the identity of virtues and the thesis of a reciprocity of virtues and argues that the various virtues form a unity (in terms of reciprocity) since virtues cannot bring about any bad action. Detel examines Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity : Plato and Aristotle (i) entertained hybrid theories of normativity by distinguishing functional, semantic and ethical normativity, (ii) located the ultimate source of normativity in standards of a good life, and thus (iii) took semantic normativity to be a derived form of normativity. Detel argues that hybrid theories of normativity are—from a mo- dern point of view—still promising. Ho ̈ffe defends the Ancient conception of an art of living against Modern objections. Whereas many Modern philosophers think that we have to replace Ancient eudaimonism by the idea of moral obligation (Pflicht), Ho ̈ffe argues that Eudaimonism and autonomy-based ethics can be reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive and promising theory of a good life, if we enrich the idea of autonomy by the central elements of Ancient eudaimonism. Some common themes: The topics in Chinese and Hindu ethics are perhaps more familiar to modern western sensibilities than Homeric and even Socratic. Anagnostopoulos, Brickhouse and Smith, Frede, Liske, Rudebusch, and Russell all consider in contrasting ways the role of moral character, apart from intellect, in ethics. Brickhouse / Smith, Hardy, and Rudebusch discuss the Socratic con- ception of moral knowledge. Brickhouse / Smith and Hardy retain the standard view of the so called Socratic Intellectualism. Shields and Gerson both consider the question whether there is a single genus of goodness, or if the term is a homonym. Bussanich, McPherran, Taylor, and Delcomminette all consider the relation between religion and ethics. Pfister, Piering, Delcomminette, and Liske all consider what sort of freedom is appropriate to human well-being. Halbig, Detel, and Ho ̈ffe propose interpretations of main themes of Ancient ethics. (shrink)

The article deals with the question of the “globalization” project of the Roman civilization. Author asserts that the Romans had a specific “globalization” project. The construct “Iovem imperium” can explain the phenomenon of the Roman self-government and “sacred claim” of Roman community to domination in other lands. Pax Romana was conceived as an expression of Roman power (imperium), the boundaries of the Roman Republic were perceived as the border of the civilized world. Augustus was a brilliant manager, who could (...) implement the Roman idea (an essential element of which was “Iovem imperium”) in the best way and create an almost perfect model of “globalization” in the ancient world. Forms of government were subordinated to the general concept of the Roman idea, and when to implement it in the new historical conditions required concentration of the supreme power in the same hands, the Romans willingly agreed to this, seeing in a World Empire highest embodiment of the republic as a “common cause” of its citizens. (shrink)

"Transparency" is the constant refrain of democratic politics, a promised aid to accountability and integrity in public life. Secrecy is stigmatized as a work of corruption, tolerable by a compromise of democratic principles. My dissertation challenges both ideas. It argues that secrecy and transparency are best understood as complementary, not contradictory, practices. And it develops a normative account of liberal democratic politics in which duties of transparency coexist with permissions to act behind closed doors. The project begins with some (...) history. I show that the language of transparency gained currency only in the last quarter century, and explain how its proximate sources promote three dubious assumptions—that disclosure should in principle be maximized, that it prevents misrule more or less automatically, and that its value is either instrumental, or rooted in a reductive notion of democracy as the rule of popular opinion. Against these assumptions, I sketch an alternative account of liberal democracy centered on the logics of representation, liberty, and equality. These three "logics of self-government" give rise to duties of transparency binding on public and private actors alike. Such obligations have bite, I argue, but they are not all-encompassing. Indeed, the same ideals of representation, liberty, and equality license concealment in a range of important contexts, including deliberation and dissent. Having made this case, I go on to explain how secrecy and transparency can form a "democratic dyad," deepening rather than undermining the project of self-rule. Lastly, I address the limits of conventional transparency practices. Taken alone, disclosure is subject to a range of pitfalls, often failing to produce the results promised in transparency’s name. While my non-instrumental case for openness is not destabilized by this analysis, it does suggest that mandating disclosure is rarely enough. I therefore propose a series of adversarial practices to facilitate the checking of unjustifiable secrecy, and highlight the critical role of interpretation in efforts to make power intelligible. In the end, my dissertation offers a novel defense of secrecy and transparency that highlights rather than minimizes the hard work of political engagement. (shrink)

The standard form of act-consequentialism requires us to perform the action with the best consequences; it allows choice between moral options only on those rare occasions when several actions produce equally good results. This paper argues for moral options and thus against act-consequentialism. The argument turns on the insight that some valuable things cannot exist unless our moral system allows options. One such thing is the opportunity for individuals to enact plans for their life from among alternatives. Because (...) planning one’s life has value, and because it requires moral options, a world governed by a moral system that admits of options is better than one governed by act-consequentialism. The paper argues that these facts entail that morality admits of a significant number of moral options; act-consequentialism is false. (shrink)

The Relationship Between Oligarchy and Forms of Government -/- Introduction -/- Oligarchy, a system where a small group of individuals holds power, is a persistent phenomenon that can influence any form of government. While governments may be designed to serve the broader population, history shows that power often becomes concentrated among elites, whether they are political figures, business leaders, religious authorities, or military officials. This essay explores how oligarchy manifests in different forms of government, from democracy (...) to dictatorship, and examines its consequences on governance and society. -/- Oligarchy in Democratic and Republican Systems -/- Democracies and republics are based on principles of popular sovereignty and representative governance. However, these systems are not immune to oligarchic influences. In a democracy, political power should ideally be distributed among the people, with leaders elected through fair and competitive processes. Yet, in many modern democracies, wealthy elites, corporations, and political dynasties dominate elections and policy-making. This results in what some call a plutocracy, where economic power translates into political control. For example, in the United States, campaign financing and lobbying by powerful corporations and interest groups often shape legislative decisions, sometimes against the broader public interest. -/- In a republic, where elected representatives govern on behalf of the people, oligarchic tendencies emerge when a select few continuously hold power. Political families, such as the Bushes, Kennedys, or Gandhis, demonstrate how political influence can become hereditary, reducing competition and limiting diverse representation. Similarly, in some parliamentary systems, elite party members control candidate selection and policymaking, concentrating power within a small ruling class. -/- Oligarchy in Monarchical and Autocratic Systems -/- Monarchies, historically the rule of a single sovereign, often function alongside oligarchic structures. Even in absolute monarchies, the king or queen relies on noble families, military commanders, or religious leaders for governance. This small ruling class holds disproportionate power over economic resources and legal systems. In constitutional monarchies, such as the United Kingdom, elected governments operate within democratic frameworks, but influential aristocratic and financial elites still wield significant influence. -/- Autocratic governments, including dictatorships, may appear as centralized systems where a single ruler holds complete authority. However, in practice, dictators rely on a ruling elite—whether military officers, secret police, or oligarchic business interests—to maintain control. In countries like North Korea, China, or Russia, a small group of elites close to the leader benefit from economic and political privileges, reinforcing an oligarchic structure within what is often perceived as an autocratic or communist regime. -/- Oligarchy in Communism and Theocracy -/- Communism, in theory, seeks to eliminate class divisions and establish a government that represents the working class. However, in many historical examples, communist states have developed into party-based oligarchies, where a small elite controls decision-making. The Soviet Union, for instance, was governed by the Politburo, a select group within the Communist Party that dictated policies, while the general population had little real influence. Similarly, in modern China, the Chinese Communist Party maintains a hierarchical power structure where only a small ruling elite makes key decisions. -/- In theocratic governments, where religious authorities govern based on religious laws, oligarchy emerges when a small group of clerics or religious leaders holds unchecked power. Iran, for example, is officially a theocratic republic, but real political authority is concentrated in the hands of a small group of clerics, particularly the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council. Their influence extends over laws, elections, and economic policies, limiting public participation in governance. -/- Consequences of Oligarchy in Governance -/- Regardless of the type of government, oligarchy often leads to similar negative outcomes. These include: -/- 1. Corruption and Self-Interest – When power is concentrated in the hands of a few, decision-making tends to prioritize their personal interests rather than the well-being of the population. -/- 2. Economic Inequality – Oligarchies often result in wealth being concentrated among elites, leaving the majority of the population struggling economically. -/- 3. Suppression of Political Opposition – In oligarchic systems, opposing voices are often silenced through legal restrictions, media control, or even violence. -/- 4. Policy Manipulation – Laws and regulations may be designed to benefit the ruling class, whether through tax policies, land ownership laws, or corporate privileges. -/- Conclusion -/- Oligarchy is a persistent challenge that affects all forms of government. Whether in democracies, monarchies, dictatorships, or theocracies, power tends to become concentrated among a select few, reducing true representation and fairness. Recognizing and addressing oligarchic tendencies is crucial for maintaining balanced governance, ensuring economic fairness, and preserving the integrity of any political system. Societies that remain vigilant against oligarchic control can work towards a more equitable distribution of power and resources, preventing the erosion of democratic ideals and public trust. -/- . (shrink)

Resisting Political Dynasties Through a Balanced Government System -/- Introduction -/- Political dynasties have long been a challenge to democratic governance. In many countries, elections are dominated by powerful families who pass leadership positions from one generation to the next. This results in imbalances in governance, where public offices are treated as family assets rather than platforms for serving the people. While democracy is meant to provide equal opportunities for leadership, political dynasties often manipulate institutions, control resources, and weaken (...) competition to maintain power. -/- To resist the rise of political dynasties, a government system must have strong institutional safeguards, an informed electorate, and mechanisms that promote meritocracy. The universal law of balance in nature, as proposed by Angelito Malicse, can serve as a guiding principle in designing a fair and just political system. This essay explores different government structures that can effectively prevent dynastic rule and ensure that leadership is based on competence, integrity, and public service rather than family name. -/- 1. The Parliamentary System with Strong Party Discipline -/- A parliamentary system is one of the most effective ways to prevent political dynasties because it shifts power from individual politicians to political parties. In this system, the government is formed by the party (or coalition) that wins the most seats in the legislature, and the head of government (Prime Minister) is chosen from among elected representatives. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Power is distributed among parties rather than families, making it harder for a single family to dominate. -/- Political parties have internal mechanisms to replace leaders based on performance, not inheritance. -/- Elections are party-based rather than personality-based, reducing the influence of political families. -/- Example: In the United Kingdom, despite having influential political families, the party system ensures leadership is based on party performance rather than personal legacy. Leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair rose to power based on their abilities, not family connections. -/- 2. Strict Anti-Dynasty Laws and Constitutional Safeguards -/- Some democracies have explicit laws that prevent political dynasties by restricting family members from holding multiple government positions simultaneously or consecutively. These laws limit the concentration of power within a single family and promote fair competition. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Prevents family monopolies over government positions. -/- Encourages new leaders to emerge from different backgrounds. -/- Example: Indonesia has anti-dynasty laws that restrict close relatives of sitting officials from running in the same region. This has prevented some powerful families from dominating local elections. -/- 3. Meritocratic Bureaucracy: A Technocratic Approach -/- In a meritocratic government, key decision-making roles are filled based on skills, experience, and qualifications, rather than political connections. This prevents political families from placing unqualified relatives in influential positions. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Ensures that government officials are competent and qualified. -/- Reduces nepotism and favoritism in appointments. -/- Example: Singapore’s governance model emphasizes meritocracy, where political leaders and civil servants are selected based on their competence, education, and leadership abilities. As a result, Singapore has one of the most efficient and corruption-free governments in the world. -/- 4. Proportional Representation Electoral System -/- A proportional representation (PR) system ensures that seats in the legislature are distributed based on the percentage of votes a party receives, rather than a winner-takes-all system. This creates a more diverse and representative government. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Limits family control by ensuring that power is shared among multiple political parties. -/- Encourages coalition governments, making it harder for a single family to dominate. -/- Example: Germany and the Netherlands use proportional representation, ensuring that elections are issue-based rather than family-based. This system has prevented the emergence of strong political dynasties in these countries. -/- 5. Direct Democracy and Citizen Participation -/- Some countries implement direct democracy mechanisms, such as referendums, recall elections, and citizen assemblies, allowing the public to influence political decisions directly. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Reduces reliance on political elites and families to make decisions. -/- Allows citizens to remove corrupt or ineffective leaders before their term ends. -/- Example: Switzerland has a strong tradition of direct democracy, where citizens frequently vote on key policies. This prevents long-term family dominance in politics because power remains in the hands of the people. -/- 6. Decentralized Federalism to Distribute Power -/- A federal system divides power between national and regional governments, preventing a central ruling class from controlling the entire country. In a decentralized government, each region has a degree of self-governance, reducing the influence of political families at the national level. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Prevents concentration of power at the national level. -/- Encourages local leadership development, giving new leaders opportunities to emerge. -/- Example: The United States has a federal system where state governments operate independently. While political dynasties exist, their power is limited to certain regions rather than national dominance. -/- 7. Holistic Education Based on the Universal Law of Balance -/- One of the most powerful ways to resist political dynasties is through education. A properly designed holistic educational system can reprogram societal thinking, teaching voters to select leaders based on merit rather than blind loyalty to political families. -/- Why It Resists Dynasties: -/- Encourages voters to choose leaders based on competence rather than family ties. -/- Teaches the importance of balance in governance and why unchecked power leads to corruption. -/- Promotes critical thinking, ensuring that citizens are aware of the manipulation tactics used by dynastic politicians. -/- Example: Finland’s education system emphasizes critical thinking, civic responsibility, and political awareness, producing informed and independent-minded voters who are less likely to be influenced by political dynasties. -/- Conclusion: The Best System to Prevent Political Dynasties -/- The most effective way to resist political dynasties is through a combination of these systems: -/- 1. A parliamentary system that ensures leadership is party-driven rather than family-driven. -/- 2. Strict anti-dynasty laws that legally prevent family monopolies in government. -/- 3. A meritocratic bureaucracy that limits political appointments to qualified individuals. -/- 4. A proportional representation electoral system to ensure political diversity. -/- 5. A decentralized government where local leadership develops independently. -/- 6. A holistic education system based on the universal law of balance, empowering voters to make informed choices. -/- If properly implemented, these mechanisms can break the cycle of political dynasties and ensure that democracy remains fair, just, and balanced. By applying the universal law of balance in nature, governments can create a system where leadership is earned through merit and service, not inherited like a monarchy. The challenge now is for leaders, educators, and reformers to recognize these principles and push for systemic change. -/- . 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The papers published in this special issue can fairly be unified under the heading “Epistemic Democracy,” but there is more variety among them than this might indicate. They exhibit the broad range of ways in which epistemological considerations are figuring in contemporary philosophical discussions of democracy. The authors range from young and promising to established and distinguished. I'd like to introduce a few of the issues that run through the papers, sprinkling references to the actual papers along the way. From (...) the beginning, democratic forms of government have included discussion and debate. In real life the value of democracy can hardly be separated from the value of free public discussion, prior to voting, about the issues and candidates. This is not to say that either the discussion or the vote have always been inspiring, but whatever value democracy is thought to have, it seems inseparable from public political discussion. One way of accounting for the value of the discussion is to suppose that voters exchange reasons (not always cooperatively) about what to do. Even a quick look at the content of political debate seems to confirm that it is mostly about which decision would be best for the country or city whose laws or leaders are in question. (shrink)

My dissertation develops a novel approach to institutional analysis and begins to apply this approach to debates in the international justice literature. The main innovation of this institutional failure analysis approach is to ground our normative evaluation of institutions on a detailed understanding of the causal processes that generate problematic social outcomes. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the need for this new approach, showing that philosophers' neglect of causal explanations of global poverty leads extant normative analyses of poverty astray. The (...) upshot is that causal (as opposed to moral) analyses of social outcomes must play a more central role than is typical in philosophers' moral assessment of institutional arrangements. Chapter 3 introduces and outlines the failure analysis framework. -/- Chapters 5 and 6 employ the failure analysis approach to address recent debate concerning an example of severe deprivation caused by institutional failure— the economic stagnation and authoritarian governance associated with natural resource dependence. Chapter 5 articulates a causal explanation of this so-called "resource curse." I claim that the curse occurs when a resource dependent country's domestic institutional structure permits the political leaders to disregard citizens' interests. My argument enumerates the conditions under which state leaders choose to advance citizens' interests. In chapter 6, I show that extant prescriptions to address the resource curse fail to satisfy at least one necessary condition for mitigating the resource curse. In particular, I highlight the importance of providing citizens with credible exit options both as necessary to successfully mitigating the resource curse and as being among the best forms of compensation to curse victims. I then explore the feasibility of various options for helping curse victims avoid absorbing the consequences of their resource-cursed situation. I end by tentatively proposing a strategy for mitigating the resource curse that satisfies the necessary conditions for a successful prescription as identified by the explanation in chapter 5. (shrink)

The Future of Sex in a Type III Civilization -/- The Kardashev Scale, introduced by Russian astrophysicist Nikolai Kardashev, categorizes civilizations based on their ability to harness and utilize energy. A Type III civilization—the most advanced on this scale—would control energy at the galactic level, manipulating stars, planets, and even the fundamental forces of nature. With such immense technological mastery, every aspect of human existence would be transformed, including one of the most intimate and fundamental aspects of life: sex, relationships, (...) and reproduction. -/- As humanity advances toward a Type III civilization, biological limitations will fade, and new forms of intimacy, pleasure, and reproduction will emerge. From neural interfaces and virtual reality to post-biological love and artificial reproduction, the very concept of sex will be redefined, potentially making it unrecognizable to our current understanding. -/- 1. The Evolution of Physical Intimacy -/- Physical intimacy, as it exists today, relies on the limitations of the human body. In a Type III civilization, however, individuals may no longer be restricted to a single biological form. With bioengineering, cybernetic enhancements, and direct neural stimulation, sex would become a limitless experience, far beyond what is physically possible today. -/- A. Customizable Bodies & Sensory Expansion -/- With complete mastery over genetics, nanotechnology, and synthetic biology, people could modify their bodies for any kind of intimate experience. The ability to alter sensory perception, increase pleasure thresholds, or even create entirely new erogenous zones would make sexual experiences highly personalized. Some individuals might opt for completely synthetic bodies, designed solely for pleasure, while others might explore post-human or alien-inspired forms of intimacy. -/- B. Direct Neural Interfaces & Shared Consciousness -/- Rather than relying on physical interaction, future technology may allow for direct neural linking, where partners share thoughts, emotions, and sensations in real-time. Such interfaces could create an experience where two (or more) individuals achieve a level of intimacy that transcends physical barriers—allowing them to experience each other’s consciousness as if it were their own. -/- C. Virtual & Simulated Reality -/- A Type III civilization would have full mastery over virtual worlds and simulated realities, making it possible to experience sex in ways beyond human comprehension. Entirely digital relationships could form, where individuals engage in immersive, hyper-realistic sexual encounters with AI partners, holographic beings, or uploaded consciousnesses. These experiences could be indistinguishable from physical reality or even surpass it, allowing for limitless exploration of desires. -/- 2. Love and Relationships in a Post-Biological Era -/- As humanity moves beyond its biological origins, traditional forms of love and relationships may become obsolete. Emotional connections will still exist, but their nature may change drastically. The concept of monogamy, exclusivity, and even the idea of “human” relationships may evolve into something far more fluid and expansive. -/- A. Post-Biological Love & Digital Consciousness -/- A Type III civilization may not be composed solely of biological humans. Instead, there may be uploaded consciousnesses, sentient AIs, and hybrid entities that exist purely as digital minds. Love could transcend the need for a physical body, allowing for relationships between entirely digital beings or even between human and AI minds. -/- B. Polymorphic & Multi-Dimensional Relationships -/- With extended lifespans—or even immortality—relationships might evolve beyond fixed, long-term commitments. Instead of monogamy, individuals could engage in fluid, multi-dimensional relationships, where connections change over centuries or across different realities. Romantic and sexual relationships may no longer be constrained by societal norms, but rather dictated by personal preference, emotional compatibility, and shared experiences. -/- C. Interstellar & Interspecies Relationships -/- In a galactic civilization, humanity may not be alone. Encounters with other intelligent species could lead to interstellar relationships, with entirely new forms of intimacy developing between different life forms. This could raise profound ethical and biological questions: How would reproduction work? Would consciousness itself be compatible between species? The possibilities are vast, and the definition of “love” could expand in ways we cannot yet imagine. -/- 3. The Future of Reproduction -/- Sex, as it exists today, serves both pleasure and reproduction. But in a Type III civilization, natural reproduction may become obsolete. With artificial reproduction, genetic engineering, and digital consciousness transfer, the very act of creating new life would become a technological process. -/- A. Synthetic Wombs & Designer Offspring -/- Instead of traditional pregnancy, synthetic wombs could allow for complete control over the gestation process, ensuring that offspring are free from genetic diseases and optimized for intelligence, longevity, or even specific personality traits. Parents might design their children with customized genetics, choosing features that best suit their desired outcomes. -/- B. Consciousness Cloning & AI Offspring -/- Rather than being born biologically, future individuals may come into existence via consciousness transfer or digital cloning. A person’s mind could be copied, merged, or combined with another consciousness to create a new, unique being. This would make traditional reproduction unnecessary, as entirely new forms of “birth” would emerge through digital evolution. -/- C. Asexual & Post-Reproductive Beings -/- As intelligence moves beyond biological needs, reproduction itself may become irrelevant. Post-human entities might exist without gender, physical bodies, or reproductive urges, focusing instead on intellectual, emotional, or spiritual evolution. This could lead to a society where sex and reproduction are optional experiences rather than necessities. -/- 4. Ethical & Social Implications -/- With such drastic changes, new ethical dilemmas would arise. Would AI partners have rights? Should digital beings be considered “alive”? How would consent work in simulated realities? These are just a few of the complex questions that a Type III civilization would need to address. -/- A. The Rights of Digital Beings -/- If AI or uploaded consciousnesses become sentient, should they have the same rights as biological humans? Could an AI “refuse” to engage in intimacy, or would their programmed nature create ethical concerns regarding free will? -/- B. Cultural Diversity in a Galactic Civilization -/- With multiple species, AI entities, and human-offshoots existing together, different cultures would have wildly different perspectives on sex and relationships. Navigating these differences could lead to new forms of ethics, laws, and social structures that govern interstellar intimacy. -/- Conclusion: The End of Sex as We Know It? -/- A Type III civilization would not only revolutionize technology and society but would also completely redefine sex, love, and reproduction. Physical limitations would disappear, intimacy would become a matter of personal choice, and relationships could take on entirely new forms. Whether through neural linking, virtual pleasure, designer offspring, or digital consciousness, sex in a Type III civilization might evolve into something that is unrecognizable to humans today. -/- The real question is: Would sexuality still matter in a post-biological future? Or would humanity, in its pursuit of higher intelligence and interstellar expansion, leave behind the very concept of sex altogether? -/- . (shrink)

In Book 3 of Herodotus’Histories, seven Persian noblemen discuss which form of government would best fit the empire. If we accept its dramatic date, 522 BCE, this scene offers the first example of a comparative definition of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. It offers, even more strikingly, the very first description of the government of the many — a novel political order that will eventually be called a democracy. The power of the people, this quintessentially Hellenic thing, (...) was then a Persian invention, an idea that occurred originally not to the masses of a polis, not to an Athenian demagogue, but to a relative of the Great King. In the course of the narrative, democracy will prove to be a unique form of government: the winning one. The Histories take up the challenge of recounting, and accounting for, a most improbable defeat, and for an even less foreseeable victory. The text does so not by preaching a morality of self-knowledge and self-control, but by exposing the realistic effects of different kinds of rule. Against the odds, democracy enhances and strengthens a small polis, Athens, making it grand and successful. Notwithstanding its immeasurable capabilities, the Persian monarchy fails. The turning point is the battle of Salamis, a prowess of the dêmos. A theatrical pause, in the narration of how the Great Kings came to prepare their campaigns against Greece, the debate offers a counterfactual explanation to historical events, in terms of political theory. This is, I will argue, the effect of the scene on the Histories. (shrink)

There is an unacknowledged disagreement on what kind of dialogue best supports democracy. Many view democracy as analogous to a law court and so view “democratic dialogue” as a contest between competing advocates who have acquired the kind of “steel trap” critical thinking skills that are ideal for winning in the external marketplace of ideas. Others assume that the propensity to seriously reflect on opposing viewpoints within the minds of individuals is ideal for democratic maintenance. It will be argued (...) here that our love affair with “critical thinking” that tends to support an external battle of ideas harms democracy. It will be argued that the complexity of our common humanity, the complexity of our form of governance, the complexity of the approaches needed to face wicked problems, and the complexity of the internal engine of personal development requires that we learn to readily engage in open truth-seeking dialogue with those who hold opposing viewpoints and in so doing, enhance the dimensionality through which we view the world. With regard to the educational implications, this suggests that, since engaging in dialogue across difference is the essence of the pedagogical framework that anchors Philosophy for Children, Philosophy for Children ought to be embraced as an essential component of any educational enterprise that views cultivating democratic citizenship as part of its mandate. (shrink)

This paper explores how participation and sustainability are being addressed by architects within the Building Schools for the Future (BSF) programme in the UK. The intentions promoted by the programme are certainly ambitious, but the ways to fulfil these aims are ill-explored. Simply focu- sing on providing innovative learning technologies, or indeed teaching young people about phy- sical sustainability features in buildings, will not necessarily teach them the skills they will need to respond to the environmental and social challenges of (...) a rapidly changing world. However, anticipating those skills is one of the most problematic issues of the programme. The involve- ment of young people in the design of schools is used to suggest empowerment, place-making and to promote social cohesion but this is set against government design literature which advo- cates for exemplars, standard layouts and best practice, all leading to forms of standardisation. The potentials for tokenistic student involvement and conflict with policy aims are evident. This paper explores two issues: how to foster in young people an ethic towards future generations, and the role of co-design practices in this process. Michael Oakeshott calls teaching the conver- sation of mankind. In this paper, I look at the philosophy of Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Luce Irigaray to argue that investigating the ethical dilemmas of the programme through critical dialogue with students offers an approach to meeting government objectives, building sustainable schools, and fostering sustainable citizenship. (shrink)

Lilly was one of the greatest scientists and pioneers on the limits of human possibility but after his death a collective amnesia has descended and he is now almost forgotten. His Wiki is good but inevitably incomplete so here are a few missing details and viewpoints. Lilly was a generation (or more) ahead of his time. He is almost single-handedly responsible for the great interest in dolphins (which led to the Marine Mammal Protection Act in the USA and helped to (...) found the animal rights movement). In 1958 he noted that the brains of elephants and cetaceans were larger than ours, that we should not abuse them and that it was one our most important projects to communicate with them. He invented sensory isolation tanks (at NIMH in 1954) and used them extensively with and without powerful psychoactive drugs at a time when it was thought that either the brain would shut down or one would go insane if external stimuli were eliminated. He created methods for implanting electrodes in mammal brains and was planning to do it to himself. He was one of the first to make serious use of computers in bioscience research and created the hardware and software to make the first attempts to communicate with dolphins. He self experimented with dangerous physiological investigations in high altitude medicine for the military during WW2, took LSD with dolphins and movie stars, submitted himself to the rigors of various forms of yoga and of Arica training, and taught classes at Esalen. He was a computer pioneer who forsaw the rapid advances in A.I. and it's inevitable clash with humans. He was the first one to investigate the bizarre psychedelic ketamine (" vitamin K "), and his results (published in the two last chapters of his book `The Scientist`) are still the best data on the dose/effect relation of any psychedelic on one person. It cured his lifelong daily migraine headaches (see http://www.conspiracyarchive.com/UFOs/Gorightly.htm). And all this happened before most of us were born! He had courage, honesty and integrity that is rare anywhere and almost nonexistent in science. His goal was to find the ultimate truth about everything and he went about as far as anyone ever has. He had little patience with the stupid and hypocritical games one has to play to fit into monkey society. Of course the reaction of the establishment was predictable. He left the NIMH and was never given any government or academic support for the last 35 years of his life. His paper and comments at a conference on sensory deprivation were removed from the published version. He was not invited to government sponsored symposia on dolphins (he had refused to help develop them as weapons), though he clearly knew more about them than anyone in the world. He liked to live and work on the edge and few could keep up with him, as his books make clear. If you have read some of his other books it will be much easier going. He was a pioneer in consciousness research and pushed the boundaries of our understanding of who we are and what we might become. Among other things he catalogs the various states reached by drugs, meditation, and isolation, tries to determine their significance, and suggests how to use them. I very briefly review and comment on his life and work. -/- Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX -/- . (shrink)

Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...) physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be (1) sufficiently empirically successful, and (2) sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which (a) best accords with the next one up, and (b) has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes wrote in his Leviathan that money exchanging hands, monetary policies, activities, and transactions are the blood of the “Leviathan” - the eponymous subject of the book. Hobbes writes that this Leviathan's “blood” includes the “collectors, receivers, and treasurers; of the second are the treasurers again, and the officers appointed for payment of several public or private ministers.” Hobbes, follows this with an analogy of a living man, stating that this “artificial man maintains his resemblance with the natural [man]; (...) whose veins, receiving the blood from the several parts of the body, carry it to the heart; where, being made vital, the heart by the arteries sends it out again, to enliven and enable for motion all the members of the same.” Hobbes maintains a parallel between the natural man and what he calls the “artificial man”, the state throughout his Leviathan. -/- Ultimately, the mechanisms of finance in the United States are the accumulation of historical precedents - both legal and non-legal (such as economic, but also social). These precedents have led to the current system, on a continuing and settled basis. The legal and economic systems merging for the best system of an international monetary order can represent a balance of legal realism and legal formalism. -/- “Money” is printed by the U.S. government, designated as an official note. Value is correlated with how many of those printed pieces of paper exist. This is the basic concept of inflation. This concept of value and inflation is said to be connected to a commodity - such as how much gold or silver existed in the Federal Reserve's physical locations or Fort Knox. Such systems have been in place since at least Mesopotamia, where clay tablets were used to represent credit, or comparable contracts that seem to resemble modern forms of fiat currency. (shrink)

Coronavirus disease has a crisis with high spread throughout the world during the COVID19 pandemic period. This disease can be easily spread to a group of people and increase the spread. Since it is a worldly disease and not plenty of vaccines available, social distancing is the only best approach to defend against the pandemic situation. All the affected countries' governments declared locked-down to implement social distancing. This social separation and persons not being in a mass group can slow (...) down the spread of COVID19. It reduces the physical contact between infected persons and normal healthy persons. Almost every health organization tells that to follow social distancing people should maintain at least 6 feet of distance from each other. This research proposes a deep learning approach for social distancing which is developed for tracking and detecting people who are in indoor as well as outdoor scenarios using YOLO V3 video analytic technique. This approach focuses to inspect whether the people are maintaining social distancing in many areas, using surveillance video with measuring the distance in real-time performance. Most of the early studies of detecting social distance monitoring were based on GPS for tracking the movements of people where the signals could be lost. On the other hand, some countries use drones to detect large gatherings of people who cannot have a clear view at night times [10]. In the future, the proposed system can be used fully for detecting threats in the public crowded or it can detect any person affected by critical situations (ie fainting, Cordia arrest) or planting the crops in the forms evenly with a uniform measurement. This proposal could be used in many fields like crowd analysis, autonomous vehicles, and human action recognition and could help the government authorities to redesign the public place layout and take precautionary action in the risk zones. This system analyses the social distancing of people by calculating the distance between people to slow downing the spread of the COVID 19 virus. (shrink)

THIS PAPER IS THE CO-WINNER OF THE FRED BERGER PRIZE IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FOR THE 1999 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE BEST PUBLISHED PAPER IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. -/- The conflict between liberal legal theory and critical legal studies (CLS) is often framed as a matter of whether there is a theory of justice that the law should embody which all rational people could or must accept. In a divided society, the CLS critique of this view is (...) overwhelming: there is no such justice that can command universal assent. But the liberal critique of CLS, that it degenerates into an unpalatable moral relativism on which there is no non-arbitrary basis between a justice that underwrites forms of domination such as slavery and a justice that condemns such forms of domination is equally powerful and compelling. I show that there is a way to harmonize both views that is subject to empirical test. -/- First I show that the most widely accepted and influential formulation of liberal justice, John Rawls' Justice as Fairness, in. e.g, A Theory of Justice, cannot avoid the relativistic challenge because it would not be accepted, as a matter of sociological fact, by real people in a divided society once the "veil of Ignorance" is removed and real people step out from the Original Position. To put it differently, different reflective equilibria are inevitable in a divided society. Given the weight that Rawls properly puts on the realizability of a conception of justice and its stability in practice, this is a fatal objection. There can be no divided society that is "well ordered" in Rawls' sense, governed by a shared conception of justice and known to be so governed. -/- I then turn to the most powerful statement of the CLS view, Milton's Fisk's relativistic account in The State and Justice. For Fisk, justice is a compromise between what the dominant groups can compel and what the the subordinate groups will acquiesce to., There is no one such compromise in any given situation, so the account is in that sense relativistic, but more deeply, it is relativistic in that it offers no non-arbitrary, non-question begging way to choose between the official justice of, e.g., a slaveholding society and and the radical justice of the slaves, which has no place for slaveholders as a group or slavery as an institution.All that Fisk can offer is an arbitrary existential choice: I'm with the slaves. (Or the slaveowners.) Most of us would find this disconcerting or even unacceptable. -/- I show that Fisk's general sort of account can be modified to allow for an non-arbitrary choice. Given general facts about human nature, societies based on domination will produce resistance that over the long run will diminish or eliminate various forms of domination. Through a sort of ratchet effect, rights won will be hard if not impossible to reverse. Societies embodying forms of domination can therefore be compared on dimensions of stability: the more domination, the more resistance, and the less stability. Such societies are inferior on the dimension of justice to more emancipatory society on the terms of both kinds of justice, official and radical. -/- This is not question begging because regimes of domination incorporate stability no less than more emancipatory social orders. The choice between official justice embodying domination and radical justice that does not is not arbitrary because it is based on a shared commitment to long term stability. This offers an empirical test of which social orders are more justice, and a prediction that over time, domination will tend to decrease. (shrink)

What is wrong with government whistleblowing and when can it be justified? In my view, ‘government whistleblowing’, i.e., the unauthorized acquisition and disclosure of classified information about the state or government, is a form of ‘political vigilantism’, which involves transgressing the boundaries around state secrets, for the purpose of challenging the allocation or use of power. It may nonetheless be justified when it is suitably constrained and exposes some information that the public ought to know and (...) deliberate about. Government whistleblowing should then be viewed, along the lines of civil disobedience, as a collective cognition- and legitimacy-enhancing device. (shrink)

This piece of writing has investigated the legal and institutional frameworks regulating rural land governance in Ethiopia by taking the comparative analysis of rural land governance of other African countries, namely Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. The best experience of these countries on the legal and institutional frameworks is examined so as to draw a lesson for the Ethiopian land governance system. The article has employed doctrinal legal research approach and rural land legislations of the country were investigated in great (...) detail. The article has also comparative aspect because, it has drawn lessons from the legal regimes of other African countries that have best experience on the legal and institutional frameworks governing rural lands. Ethiopia can draw many good practices from Ghanaian, Kenyan and Ugandan rural land governance. Rural land legislations in these countries have given sufficient room for the protection of customary land rights and these rights are equally compensated at the time of compulsory acquisition of land use rights. In addition to these, land legislations in these countries compensate owners not only for the value of the produce upon their land but also for the market value of the land taken, cost of disturbance and other damage like severance and injurious affection. So, this can be a good lesson for Ethiopia in order to consider the life of individuals whose land is being expropriated but unable to rehabilitate to their past economic situation after compulsory acquisition. Ethiopia can also acquire a good lesson from these countries on the mode of institutional arrangement governing rural land administration is concerned. In all these African countries, the mandate to administer land is arranged at the ministry level at the apex and there are also other independent sector based institutions up to the lowest administrative hierarchy. Ethiopia, that governs land at the directorate level under the Ministry of Agriculture at the top and bureau of land and environmental protection at the middle and land and environmental protection offices/departments at the lower administrative level can capture this good practice from Ghana, Kenya and Uganda in order to give sufficient room for this vital economic resource that is livelihood for mass populations of the country. (shrink)

Equal Justice explores the role of the idea of equality in liberal theories of justice. The title indicates the book’s two-part thesis: first, I claim that justice is the central moral category in the socio-political domain; second, I argue for a specific conceptual and normative connection between the ideas of justice and equality. This pertains to the age-old question concerning the normative significance of equality in a theory of justice. The book develops an independent, systematic, and comprehensive theory of equality (...) and egalitarianism. The principal question is about the importance of equality in a theory of justice. More precisely, we should pose questions in four contracting circles: 1. Is justice the supreme value guiding our setup of the basic structure of society, or are there other, equally important values, such as recognition, care, communal belonging? 2. If justice is the highest guiding principle, which competing ideals—especially equality and freedom—ought to have precedence in a policy oriented toward justice? What status does the ideal of equality have in that framework? 3. If equality is a basic ideal of just policy, how should it be practically realized? What sort of equality (equal opportunity, equality of welfare, resource equality) should be demanded? 4. What patterned distribution of which specific goods does the ideal of equality demand? Which principles of distribution can be justified according to our justice ideal? To conclude and summarize: 5. What is the essential core of an egalitarian theory of justice, as opposed to an inegalitarian theory? These five questions structure the work’s order of argumentation. Part A elaborates the conceptual foundations and basic moral principles of justice and equality. Chapter I sets out to install justice as the central moral category in the socio-political domain. At the beginning of the first chapter, the conceptual foundations of justice are clarified. While not eliminating the classical distinctions between different forms of justice, I argue that the distributive paradigm is of primary importance. The primacy of justice in the socio-political domain is developed out of a confrontation with alternative positions, those which maintain either that justice generally, or distributive justice in particular, are subsidiary virtues. At the end of Chapter I, the first of the questions mentioned above is answered in a way that establishes justice as the guiding normative concept for the foundation and evaluation of any social order. To clarify the role of equality in a theory of justice, Chapter II separates the idea of equality into four different principles. They are organized in a way that begins with the most general and uncontroversial principle of equality, and progresses towards increasingly detailed and contested principles. There are two theses that articulate and defend the significance of equality for justice: First there is a conceptual connection between justice and equality, in that principles of formal and proportional equality are necessary in order to explicate the concept of justice. These two principles establish an unbreakable bond between justice and equality. Justice can only be explained—or so I argue—by reference to these and other (normative) principles of equality. The second thesis posits a normative relationship between justice and equality, which is disclosed by three substantive principles of equality: moral equality, the presumption of equality, and the principle of responsibility. I argue that the normative core of an egalitarian theory of justice is expressed by the latter two principles, which are themselves based on the first principle, that of moral equality. When we view one another as persons, what form of equality or equal treatment is normatively demanded? I argue that the answer to this question is given by the procedural principle of the presumption of equality: regardless of their apparent differences, all persons deserve strictly equal treatment, unless certain kinds of differences have whatever particular relevance would justify, on generally acceptable grounds, unequal treatment or unequal distribution. The justification of the presumption of equality is central to this work and has considerable importance. If the presumption principle’s validity can be justified by enlisting the principle of general justification, then the primacy of equality, and the essential argument for an egalitarian theory of justice, is established. This would likewise provide a procedure for the construction of a material theory of justice. The second question is answered thereby at the end of Chapter II: Equality should have primacy over competing ideals within a justice-oriented policy. The presumption of equality establishes this primacy and, at the same time, offers an appropriate metric and guideline for the construction of a material theory of distributive justice. The presumption of equality in Part B offers an elegant procedure for the development of a theory of distributive justice. Chapter III clearly sets out the necessary prerequisites that a theory of distribution must satisfy in order to determine a liberal-egalitarian distributional framework. We need to specify in which situation the distribution takes place; which goods are and are not to be distributed; in which respect the presumptive equality is to be produced; and by and to whom, and for what period, the relevant goods are to be distributed. The distribution is based on resources understood as general-purpose means. It is necessary to divide goods into different categories, since the justification for unequal treatment in one domain will not carry over into another. This makes presumptive equality necessarily complex. To that end, four spheres of justice are distinguished: (1) the political sphere, which involves allocating rights through the distribution of civil liberties; (2) the democratic sphere, in which political power and the rights of political participation are regulated; (3) the economic sphere, in which income and property are distributed; (4) the social sphere, in which social positions and opportunities are distributed. This framework of distributive justice answers the third of our guiding questions, about the nature of equality, in terms of equality of resources. Chapters IV and V set out the egalitarian distributive criteria for each sphere. I argue that the generally accepted, fundamental rights of classical liberalism are more effectively reconstructed by reference to the equal resource distribution presumptively required in those spheres. Chapter IV shows that when it comes to the first two spheres, those involving basic rights and freedoms and entitlement political participation, there can be no justified exceptions to the equal distribution of the relevant goods. That section argues, contrary to what we commonly find in theories of freedom or popular sovereignty, that the value of freedom and self-determination as the political basis of autonomy is best realized through the presumption of equal distribution. Chapter V deals with the other two spheres, those of economic goods and social positions, and argues for justified exceptions to equal distribution. In the economic sphere we find one principal reason favouring unequal distribution of resources, and three restrictions and compensations limiting that inequality. The basic exception to equal economic distribution arises from the unequal consequences of personal responsibility. From a suitably egalitarian standpoint, the principle of responsibility is the normative principle that determines which reasons justify economic inequality. Here the basic idea is that unequal shares of social goods are fair if they result from the choices and deliberate actions of the relevant parties. That individuals have to bear the costs of their own choices is a condition of autonomy. However, benefits or disadvantages arising from arbitrary and unmerited differences in social circumstances or natural endowments is unfair. The unequal consequences of independent decision-making and action must therefore be limited by compensating first for preferences, secondly for disadvantages, and thirdly by redistributing wealth in aid of the worse-off. I situations of emergency, compensating for disadvantages has priority over all other claims, owing to the urgency of the situation. Social inequalities go beyond the permissible limit if it is possible to improve the long-term social or economic situation of the worse-off by redistributing wealth to them. These exceptions lead to a complex system of free economic action within a framework of compensatory tax and transfer mechanisms. Finally, in the social sphere, the distribution of social positions, offices and opportunities must be structured to ensure that equally talented and motivated citizens have roughly equal chances of obtaining those offices or positions, irrespective of their economic or social class backgrounds. This compromise is permissible for reasons of freedom and prudence, and it makes a certain measure of inequality acceptable. The fourth of our guiding questions is answered accordingly. There are five principles of justice for the basic structure of society, and five legal principles that govern the special distribution of goods in the respective spheres—all are ranked according to their most defensible grounds of priority, ensuring that everyone is accorded equal justice. Chapter VI recapitulates the initial question of equality’s value. The conception of equal justice developed in this work postulates five principles of equality and five principles of law; these constitute an egalitarian framework because they support and promote social justice. Equality has value with respect to them, but is not given any independent, intrinsic value. That is why I call the account developed here a form of constitutive egalitarianism: justice is realized through the realization of equality, itself accomplished by applying the five postulates of equality and five distributive principles of law. This is an egalitarianism on two levels. The first level is involves the claim that morality or justice is conceptually connected with equality. The second level gives equality a substantial weight in what is conceptually validated at the first level, namely the presumption of equality, and constructs an appropriate interpretation and conception of distributive justice through principles of distribution for the individual spheres. The weight and importance of equality is shown by the distributive criteria applied to those spheres. This answers our final guiding question about the nature of an egalitarian theory. (shrink)

Kant is the philosophical tradition's arch-anti-consequentialist – if anyone insists that intentions alone make an action what it is, it is Kant. This chapter takes up Kant's account of the relation between intention and action, aiming both to lay it out and to understand why it might appeal. The chapter first maps out the motivational architecture that Kant attributes to us. We have wills that are organized to action by two parallel and sometimes competing motivational systems. One determines us by (...) way of motives that are sensuous, natural and given from without, the other by motives that are intellectual, rational, and given from within. Each set of motives belongs to a system of laws – natural motives to the laws of nature, rational motives to the laws of freedom. For Kant, all things, including actions, are what they are in virtue of the laws governing them; actions, qua actions, are always governed by laws that govern individual wills. These laws are Kantian maxims, 'or subjective practical laws.' Maxims, for Kant, thus make actions the actions they are. The chapter then maps out the implications of this motivational architecture for Kant's theory of value. Maxims always advert to or 'contain' both ends and means. Ends are always specifications of one of two ultimate ends. Actions have the moral value they have depending on which of two ultimate ends the maxim adverts to. The possibilities are 'happiness,' or gratification of desires with sensuous origins, and 'duty,' or accord with the moral demand to will in ways that respect free rational agency wherever it is found. Only actions aimed at the latter – actions with rational motives – have moral value. Actions aimed at the former – actions with natural motives – though not immoral in themselves, become so when pursuit works against rational motives. For Kant, actions aimed at happiness are ultimately allied with efforts to sustain our 'animal' existence, and so are governed by terms and conditions given by the natural world. Actions aimed at duty, in contrast, are ultimately allied with efforts to impose a rational form on nature, to make it over, so to speak, according to values not given by nature itself. Actions aimed at duty, therefore, create a specifically moral world, one in which mores and norms, formal and informal arrangements, institutions, policies, and so on, realize, harmonize, and promote free rational agency itself. Finally, the chapter addresses motivations for Kant's view. The architecture of will and the theories of action and value he proposes allow Kant to accommodate a host of intuitions and commitments. His view makes room for metaphysically free agency, and for the lived experience of motivational freedom from ever-changing natural desires. It makes room for conflicts within the will while still holding out hope that resolution is possible. It accommodates views that the best human lives engage 'higher' faculties in sustained ways. It identifies a stable, necessary, universal end amidst the evident contingency, pluralism, and instability of most ends. It makes us, and not God or nature, the authors of our moral lives. In the end, Kant's 'anti-consequentialism,' his focus on intentions, is a way of insisting on actions that take their character and value from what should matter most to us, namely individual and collective free rational agency, rather than only and always taking the character of reactive responses to circumstance. (shrink)

A series of recent developments points towards auditing as a promising mechanism to bridge the gap between principles and practice in AI ethics. Building on ongoing discussions concerning ethics-based auditing, we offer three contributions. First, we argue that ethics-based auditing can improve the quality of decision making, increase user satisfaction, unlock growth potential, enable law-making, and relieve human suffering. Second, we highlight current best practices to support the design and implementation of ethics-based auditing: To be feasible and effective, ethics-based (...) auditing should take the form of a continuous and constructive process, approach ethical alignment from a system perspective, and be aligned with public policies and incentives for ethically desirable behaviour. Third, we identify and discuss the constraints associated with ethics-based auditing. Only by understanding and accounting for these constraints can ethics-based auditing facilitate ethical alignment of AI, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of automation. (shrink)

The modern form of government resort their legitimacy to democracy and Republican concept. In any viable way, the political power no longer entertains the dynasty or any divinity from the religion. Then who are responsible to make us fateful if we are any kind of citizen in a polity. Often it is true that the government has to be an amalgam of power elites, and divided for a limited government. The modern democratic constitutionalism considered this aspect (...) any most in primacy to defend or promote their privileges or vision. This root context of civil interaction around 17th and 18th centuries has underlain the modern form of democratic state. Within the concern of these two points, the paper has explored the main feature of limited government in the liberal constitutionalism, which deals with the separation of powers principle, distribution of governmental powers and some of controversies involving the social legislation and role of public officers. I hope that it could be a lesson for the public officer of both camps, one as realistically and the other in the context of analogical insights. Hopefully, I may expect that the following research may be bred in socialist tension of states about how the public officers are structured to act and could liberate themselves to progress. (shrink)

Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the cosmos is (...) physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be sufficiently empirically successful, and sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which best accords with the next one up, and has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

The core idea of this paper is that we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments to illuminate ethical problems, particularly in the area of political philosophy. Democratic values, rights and institutions lie between the most abstract considerations of ethics and meta-ethics and the most particularised decisions, outcomes and contexts. Hence, this paper argues, we can use the differences between democratic and undemocratic governments, as we best understand them, to structure our theoretical investigations, to test and organise (...) our intuitions and ideas, and to explain and justify our philosophical conclusions in ways analogous to the distinction between consequentialist and deontological theories in moral philosophy, or between liberal and republican principles in political philosophy. In this way – or so I will argue – we can interpret and evaluate competing philosophical claims so that they are morally and politically attractive, as well as logically consistent. Specifically, as we will see, a democracy-centred approach to ethics can help us to distinguish liberal and democratic approaches to political morality in ways that reflect the varieties of democratic theory, and the importance of distinguishing democratic from undemocratic forms of liberalism. (shrink)

The Kripke/Wittgenstein paradox and Goodman’s riddle of induction can be construed as problems of multiple redescription, where the relevant sceptical challenge is to provide factual grounds justifying the description we favour. A choice of description or predicate, in turn, is tantamount to the choice of a curve over a set of data, a choice apparently governed by implicitly operating constraints on the relevant space of possibilities. Armed with this analysis of the two paradoxes, several realist solutions of Kripke’s paradox are (...) examined that appeal to dispositions or other non-occurrent properties. It is found that all neglect crucial epistemological issues: the entities typically appealed to are not observational and must be inferred on the basis of observed entities or events; yet, the relevant sceptical challenge concerns precisely the factual basis on which this inference is made and the constraints operating on it. All disposition ascriptions, the thesis goes on to argue, contain elements of idealization. To ward off the danger of vacuity resulting from the fact that any disposition ascription is true under just the right ideal conditions, dispositional theories need to specify limits on legitimate forms of idealization. This is best done by construing disposition ascriptions as forms of (implicit) curve-fitting, I argue, where the “data” is not necessarily numeric, and the “curve” fitted not necessarily graphic. This brings us full circle: Goodman’s and Kripke’s problems are problems concerning curve-fitting, and the solutions for it appeal to entities the postulation of which is the result of curve-fitting. The way to break the circle must come from a methodology governing the idealizations, or inferences to the best idealization, that are a part of curve-fitting. The thesis closes with an argument for why natural science cannot be expected to be of much help in this domain, given the ubiquity of idealization. (shrink)

In this paper, we use concepts, structure and tools from argumentation theory to show how conversational implicatures are triggered by conflicts of presumptions. Presumptive implicatures are shown to be based on defeasible forms of inference used in conditions of lack of knowledge, including analogical reasoning, inference to the best explanation, practical reasoning, appeal to pity, and argument from cause. Such inferences are modelled as communicative strategies to knowledge gaps that shift the burden of providing the missing contrary evidence to (...) the other party in a dialogue. Through a series of illustrative examples, we show how such principles of inference are based on common knowledge about the ordinary course of events shared by participants in a structured dialogue setting in which they take turns putting forward and responding to speech acts. (shrink)

In Overlooking Conventions Michael Devitt argues in defence of the traditional approach to semantics. Devitt’s main line of argument is an inference to the best explanation: nearly all cases that linguistic pragmatists discuss in order to challenge the traditional approach to semantics are better explained by adding conventions into language, in the form of expanding the range of polysemy or the range of indexicality (in the broad sense of linguistically governed context sensitivity). In this paper, we discuss three (...) aspects of a draft of Devitt’s Overlooking Conventions, which was discussed at a conference in Dubrovnik in September 2018. First, we try to show that his rejection of Bach’s distinction between convention and standardization overlooks important features of standardization. Second, we elaborate on Devitt’s argument against linguistic pragmatism based on the normative aspect of meaning and show that a similar argument can be mounted against semantic minimalism. While Devitt and minimalists have a common enemy, they are not allies either. Third, we address a methodological difficulty in Devitt’s view concerning a threat of over-generation and propose a solution to it. Although this paper is the result of collaboration the authors have written different parts. Carlo Penco has written part 1, Massimiliano Vignolo has written part 2 and part 3. (shrink)

Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008 are internet encyclopaedia articles on “libertarianism” which include various serious faults. Vallentyne 2010 has the following ones. It does not properly explain mainstream libertarianism or consider criticisms of it. Instead, it mainly discusses self-ownership and natural-resource egalitarianism. Every aspect of the alleged “strict sense” of “libertarianism” is dubi ous, at best. So- called “left - libertarianism” is not made sense of as any kind of liberty-based libertarianism. Problems arise because self-ownership is assumed to be (...) libertarian without an explicit theory of libertarian liberty. The replies to “five impor tant objections to full self- ownership” are confused and mistaken; both as regards philosophical analysis and as regards empirical assumptions. The long discussion about various ways to “Appropriate Natural Resources” is rendered muddled and barren by the lack of a clear libertarian theory of liberty, the mere presumption of some form of egalitarianism, and the inclusion of various non-libertarian criteria. The remaining sections are largely uninformed by any relevant libertarian literature. It reaches a justificationist conclusion that cites mistaken welfare concerns and ignores the productivity of free markets. Zwolinski 2008 shares some errors with Vallentyne 2010, but also includes the following ones. It is even less clear about what libertarian liberty is. It fails to understand that libertarianism (private-property anarchy and, possibly, minarchy) is a subset of classical liberalism. It asserts that libertarianism is about “the proper role of government.” It assumes (illogical) justificationist/foundationalist epistemology and does not mention critical-rationalist libertarianism. It eventually faults justificationism and unwittingly assumes something approaching critical rationalism. Finally, it embraces John Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” as a “justification” (i.e., defence) of libertarianism oblivious to the similar position in Lester 1996 and 2000. (shrink)

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since. Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our (...) problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official story, when on-the-ground practice may be confused or divided—or may even make the story ring false? And why take originalism as the official story, when so many scholars and judges seem to reject it? This Essay offers a response to each. To the extent that legal systems are features of particular societies, a useful theory will have to pay attention to actual social practice, including the aspects of legal practice we describe. This positive focus really can resolve a great many contentious legal disputes, as shared legal premises lead to conclusions that might surprise us or that ultimately establish one side in a dispute as correct. The most serious challenge to our view is the empirical one: whether originalism is or isn’t the official story of our law. Stripped of their jurisprudential confusion, though, the best competing accounts of our law seem to have far less supporting evidence than our own account. Focusing on social practice as it stands today turns out to direct our attention to the Founders and to the changes over time that their law has recognized. (shrink)

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality and hyperintensionality and their applications to the philosophy of mathematics. David Elohim examines the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality and hyperintensionality relate to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality and hyperintensionality; the types of mathematical modality and hyperintensionality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable (...) propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal and hyperintensional profiles of the logic of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a hyperintensional mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal and hyperintensional cognitivism and modal and hyperintensional expressivism. Elohim develops a novel, topic-sensitive truthmaker semantics for dynamic epistemic logic, and develops a novel, dynamic two-dimensional semantics grounded in two-dimensional hyperintensional Turing machines. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for two-dimensional (hyper-)intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). The fixed point operators in the modal $\mu$-calculus are rendered hyperintensional, which yields the first hyperintensional construal of the modal $\mu$-calculus in the literature and the first application of the calculus to the iteration of epistemic states in a single agent instead of the common knowledge of a group of agents. Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's `criterial' identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapters \textbf{2} and \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. -/- Chapters \textbf{8-12} provide cases demonstrating how the two-dimensional hyperintensions of hyperintensional, i.e. topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker, semantics, solve the access problem in the epistemology of mathematics. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the interaction between Elohim's hyperintensional semantics and the axioms of epistemic set theory, large cardinal axioms, the Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis, the modal axioms governing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic, Orey sentences such as the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis, and absolute decidability. These results yield inter alia the first hyperintensional Epistemic Church-Turing Thesis and hyperintensional epistemic set theories in the literature. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal and hyperintensional commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic hyperintensionality, epistemic utility theory, and the epistemology of abstraction. Elohim countenances a hyperintensional semantics for novel epistemic abstractionist modalities. Elohim suggests, too, that higher observational type theory can be applied to first-order abstraction principles in order to make first-order abstraction principles recursively enumerable, i.e. Turing machine computable, and that the truth of the first-order abstraction principle for two-dimensional hyperintensions is grounded in its being possibly recursively enumerable and the machine being physically implementable. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the philosophical significance of hyperintensional $\Omega$-logic in set theory and discusses the hyperintensionality of metamathematics. Chapter \textbf{11} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides a hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{12} avails of modal coalgebras to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of hyperintensional epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction between interpretational and objective modalities and the truthmakers thereof. This yields the first hyperintensional category theory in the literature. Elohim invents a new mathematical trick in which first-order structures are treated as categories, and Vopenka's principle can be satisfied because of the elementary embeddings between the categories and generate Vopenka cardinals in the category of Set in category theory. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Elohim provides a counter-example to epistemic closure for logical deduction. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal and hyperintensional semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory. (shrink)

Moral realism faces two worries: How can we have knowledge of moral norms if they are independent of us, and why should we care about them if they are independent of rational activities they govern? Kantian constitutivism tackles both worries simultaneously by claiming that practical norms are constitutive principles of practical reason. In particular, on Stephen Engstrom’s account, willing involves making a practical judgment. To will well, and thus to have practical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is good), the content (...) of one’s will needs to conform to the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge. Practical norms are thus constitutive of practical knowledge. However, I will argue that the universality principles from which Engstrom derives the formal presuppositions of practical knowledge are reflectively and psychologically unavailable. As a result, they cannot help Kantian constitutivism provide an answer to moral realism's worries. (shrink)

Neil Gorsuch lauds judges who purport to “apply the law as it is, focusing backward, not forward, and looking to text, structure, and history to decide what a reasonable reader at the time of the events in question would have understood the law to be . . . .” It’s hard to see how such a form of Originalism withstands scrutiny. -/- First, using “reasonable reader” understandings rather than speaker meaning turns language and law on their heads. Audiences effectively (...) become the speakers in ordinary speech (since reader or audience meaning prevails), and audiences (and thus the ruled) effectively become the rulers when interpreting law (since audiences’ meaning prevails). -/- Second, since laws look forward to govern conduct, how can best legal practices keep such a backward focus? -/- Third, words (however understood by others at the time “originally” uttered) may or may not (depending on speaker and not reader meaning) signify concepts whose meanings embrace change over time. For example, the word “planet” used by a speaker before the discovery of Uranus and Neptune may or may not include further planets depending upon what the speaker meant by “planet.” (The same applies to the inclusion or exclusion of Pluto had the speaker used the word “planet” after the discovery of Pluto but before its exclusion by current science.) Unlike the “reasonable” reader of Gorsuch’s Originalism as phrased above, speakers run the gamut from reasonable to unreasonable, from informed to uninformed, and from thoughtful to thoughtless. -/- Fourth, to the extent a judge is principally “constrained” by a text or texts (as he may determine), by dictionaries that he chooses, and by “history” as the judge understands it, isn’t judicial activism encouraged rather than restrained? Talk of a “reasonable” reader masks the fact that there can be multiple “reasonable” conclusions of what a reasonable or unreasonable speaker meant. Is a judge not therefore left to pick definitions and applications of terms that accord with the judge’s understandings of history, understandings that may well be colored by the judge’s politics and judicial philosophy? This applies to principles as well as labels for things. Principles are also subject to multiple frames, and their terms are subject to multiple definitions therefore raising the very same questions just raised above. -/- Finally, such Originalism doesn’t merely fail with legal texts. It also fails when applied to other texts (including sacred texts such as the Ten Commandments) and when used to interpret art (such as “Landscape with the Fall of Icarus” often attributed to Bruegel and which inspired such great ekphrasis as Auden’s “Musée Des Beaux Arts”). These further failures underscore the dysfunction of Originalism in Gorsuch's form noted above. -/- Keywords: Originalism, Neil Gorsuch, Text, Textualism, Scalia, Interpretation, Pragmatics, Speaker Meaning, Art, Painting, Bruegel, Auden, Ekphrasis, Icarus, Bible, Ten Commandments, Herod, Declaration of Independence, Abraham Lincoln. (shrink)

The entire world community, since 2019, affected by the global pandemic COVID-19. The pandemic caused by this virus, led not only to significant human losses worldwide, but also imposed significant restrictions on the socio-cultural life of the population and radically changed the trends of the global economy and the further functioning of socio-economic systems. Now, huge economic losses have been recorded, which affected almost all sectors of the national economy and the state in the short, medium and long term. However, (...) it is important to consider individual economic development forecasts and measures developed by the governments of the world’s leading countries to overcome the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This will allow to form a real vision of the possible course of economic processes that will directly affect the living standards of the population and the restoration of socio-economic systems. To further restore the socio-economic system it is necessary to developing modern strategies and forecasts to ensure the effective functioning of economic entities through innovation, digitalization, marketing and use of competitive advantages in the consumer markets in conditions of limited resources, development promising sectors of the national economy, etc. The purpose of writing this scientific monograph is to substantiate the theoretical and methodological foundations, the formation new strategies for restoring socio-economic systems and overcoming the negative consequences of the caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, taking into account changes and challenges in the modern world. The object of the authors’ research is the process of forming new approaches, strategies and mechanisms for managing socio-economic systems in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, eliminating the negative consequences in the activities of economic entities. The subject of research is socio-economic, organizational and institutional processes of formation and effective implementation of approaches, strategies and mechanisms for managing socio-economic systems; stabilization of the functioning of economic entities; introduction of innovative processes and digital technologies; implementation of best practices in the managing of socio-economic systems using world experience in various sectors of the economy caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

The paper assesses the adequacy of the incentives introduced by the government during the COVID-19 pandemic in Bangladesh from a philosophical point of view. In this way, it can put together philosophical analysis with intuition from the general public, into an interdisciplinary stand that connects economics and ethics. Furthermore, the study investigates whether those incentives conform to major ethical theories such as utilitarianism, distributive justice, and Kantian ethics. By discussing how these philosophical mechanisms apply to the government’s actions, (...) the paper develops into a critical analysis of key issues regarding fairness, social justice, and morality in the way the incentives have been distributed. It further questions the role that these incentives have played in supporting economic stability-especially for big companies-while questioning the exclusion of smaller businesses. The research forms a valuable insight into ethical implications for public policy in crisis situations by building up a wide understanding of how philosophical principles can help make real-world decisions. (shrink)