Background -/- Retraction is a correction process for the scientific literature that acts as a barrier to the dissemination of articles that have serious faults or misleading data. The purpose of this study was to investigate the characteristics of retracted papers from Kazakhstan. Methods -/- Utilizing data from Retraction Watch, this cross-sectional descriptive analysis documented all retracted papers from Kazakhstan without regard to publication dates. The following data were recorded: publication title, DOI number, number of authors, publication date, retraction date, (...) source, publication type, subject category of publication, collaborating country, and retraction reason. Source index status, Scopus citation value, and Altmetric Attention Score were obtained. Results -/- Following the search, a total of 92 retracted papers were discovered. One duplicate article was excluded, leaving 91 publications for analysis. Most articles were retracted in 2022 (n = 22) and 2018 (n = 19). Among the identified publications, 49 (53.9%) were research articles, 39 (42.9%) were conference papers, 2 (2.2%) were review articles, and 1 (1.1%) was a book chapter. Russia (n = 24) and China (n = 5) were the most collaborative countries in the retracted publications. Fake-biased peer review (n = 38), plagiarism (n = 25), and duplication (n = 14) were the leading causes of retraction. Conclusion -/- The vast majority of the publications were research articles and conference papers. Russia was the leading collaborative country. The most prominent retraction reasons were fake-biased peer review, plagiarism, and duplication. Efforts to raise researchers’ understanding of the grounds for retraction and ethical research techniques are required in Kazakhstan. (shrink)

Research in this study was conducted in Singkawang city, West Kalimantan Province, Indonesia which embraces a harmonious multicultural society with three major ethnicities, namely TIDAYU (Chinese, Dayak and Malay). The rich cultural diversities give positive advantages for tourism development and bode well for significant local economic growth. Among others, the Cap Go Meh (Chinese religious tradition) is considered to the biggest event in the region that involves the TIDAYU. Even though the Cap Go Meh is annually celebrated in many different (...) parts of the world, the Singkawang Cap Go Meh Festival has unique features that attract Chinese diasporas from other regions in Indonesia and neighboring countries. For that reason, the actors involved in this event constitute various social, economic, and political backgrounds. This research focused on how Singkawang local government can develop a distinctive tourism strategy to address the specific multi stakeholder interactions using a qualitative approach. The research found that in the context of tourism policy development, the interaction and dynamic patterns among policy actors are developed through linear individual cooperation. Within this pattern, the interaction amongst policy actors tend to involve certain individuals who have authority in controlling resources regardless of their origin or organizations. In fact, this pattern is very strongly based on family relationships or friendships found in both public and private domains. The research has shown that the strategies used in developing tourism policy in Singkawang city should be developed based on network management and good stakeholder engagement. (shrink)

In the ongoing process of searching the identity of Islamic education paradigm, theory and practice, there are certain values that should be contemplated with help of the exact traditional methodology of Islamic educational research. Although we could find some alternatives to replace our concrete area of knowledge seeking paradigm, the concept of ‘Murabbi’, the derivative of ‘tharbiyah’ has to be relevantized in the context of globalization of the education. ‘Tharbiya’ in its theoretical aspects cannot be fully related to ‘Murabbi’ in (...) certain conditions through which this paper will be going on. The focus of this paper would be more on how the ‘Murabbi’ has to be philosophically interpreted within the situation of worldwide globalization of education, rather than pointing out the theory and usual application to the present situation. The foundation to establish the concept of ‘‘Murabbi’ as the relevantized character of educator’, the author would analyze some classical educational texts apart from the basic foundations of Islamic education, Qur’Én and Sunnah. The extracts of the globalization concept will be taken out from different available literature in order to make good clarification of how ‘depersonalized knowledge’ can be negatively affect the society in certain aspects. (shrink)

Consciousness is one of the most complex phenomena of the world. As philosophy of mind, together with psychology and cognitive sciences, developed, consciousness was seriously studied in the twentieth century. Many attempts have been made to explain the nature of this mysterious phenomenon and the way in which it has come into being; as a result, different theories have been offered about it. In this paper, a variety of naturalistic theories of consciousness have been considered, and their weakness has been (...) shown. (shrink)

Öz: İslam dünyasında Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlayan birçok burhan zikredilmiştir. Bu burhanlardan biri pek bilinmeyen nefs burhanıdır. Bu burhanın tam olarak gelişmemiş formları Meşşâî filozoflar tarafından dile getirilmiş olsa da tam ve kâmil olarak ifadesini Sühreverdî’de bulmaktayız. Sühreverdî’den sonra ve onun etkisiyle Mîr Dâmâd başka bir nefs burhanı açıklar. İslam düşünce geleneğinde nefs vesilesiyle Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlayan bir diğer filozof da Molla Sadrâ’dır. O, bu iki filozofun nefs burhanlarını benimsememiş ve Hikmet-i Müte’âliye ekolünün ilkeleri çerçevesinde yeni burhanlar dile getirmiştir. İlk (...) burhanında nefsin kuvveden fiile yani heyûlânî akıldan bilfiil akla doğru hareket etmesini ikinci burhanında ise nefsin hudûsunu orta terim kılar. Mefatihü’l-Gayb adlı eserinde de bu iki burhanı birleştirir ve tek bir burhan olarak ifade eder. Molla Sadrâ, Allah’ın varlığını ispatlayan burhanları üç gruba ayırır ve nefs burhanının sıddıkîn burhanından sonra en önemli ve en üstün burhan olduğunu söyler. Molla Sadrâ’nın dillendirdiği nefs burhanlarının en önemli özelliği Allah’ın varlığını ispatlamakla beraber sıfatlarını ve fiillerini de ispatlamasıdır. Bu çalışmada Molla Sadrâ’nın nefs burhanı ile diğer nefs burhanlarının farkı ele alınacak ve Molla Sadrâ’nın bu burhan vesilesiyle Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’u ve sıfatlarını nasıl ispatladığı ve konu hakkında ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği açıklanacaktır. (shrink)

Mümkün varlıkları aracı kılmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlama çabalarının bir sonucu olan sıddıkîn burhanı ilk defa Müslüman filozoflar tarafından dillendirildi. İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) da Fârâbî’nin etkisiyle yeni bir burhan açıkladı ve buna sıddıkîn adını verdi. Molla Sadrâ (ö. 1050/1641) varlığın asaleti ilkesini mutasavvıflardan, teşkîk ilkesini de Sühreverdî’den iktibas ederek yeni bir sıddıkîn burhanı dillendirdi. Bu burhanın, varlığın asaleti, basîtliği/yalınlığı, teşkîkî ve ma’lûlün illete ihtiyacı olmak üzere bazı öncülleri vardır. O, bu öncülleri açıkladıktan sonra teselsüle ihtiyaç duymadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlar. (...) Onun burhanı diğer sıddıkîn burhanlarına nispetle bazı üstün özelliklere sahiptir. Öncelikle bu burhan varlığın asaleti ilkesi üzerine bina edildiğinden dayanağı varlık kavramı değil, varlığın nesnel hakikatidir. İkincisi bu burhan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un zâtını ispatlamakla birlikte Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un birliğini ve kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatlar. Üçüncüsü bu burhana göre mümkün varlıklar hiçbir aracı olmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’a bağımlı olduklarından burhanın açıklanmasında teselsül ve kısır döngüden yararlanma ihtiyacı yoktur. Molla Sadrâ’nın teselsül ve kısır döngüden de yararlanarak Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatladığı burhanlar da vardır. Molla Sadrâ bu burhanıyla hem Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ve hem de onun kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatladığını iddia eder. Bu çalışmada bu iddia incelecek ve ispat-ı vacip meselesinde Molla Sadrâ’nın ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği ele alınacaktır. ABSTRACT A result of the attempts to prove the existence of The Necessary Existence without the mediation of possible beings, proof of the truthful was first expressed by Muslim philosophers called it sıddıkin. Mullā Ṣadrā’s “proof” that he explains has certain premises such as the fundamental of existence, indivisibility of the existence, existential gradation, effect’s need for cause. After explanining these premises, Mullā Ṣadrā then proves the Necessary Existence without needing succession. Mullā Ṣadrā’s proof of the truthful has certain superior features tan the proofs of truthful expressed before him. First of all, as this proof is built upon the principle of the fundamental of existence, its foundation is the external truth of existence, not the concept of existence itself. Secondly, this proof proves the unity and perfection attributes of The Necessary Existence as well as proving the existence of the Necessary Existence. Thirdly, according to this proof, as all possible existences are dependent on The Necessary Existence without any mediation, there is no need to benefit from succession and vicious circle in explaining the proof. However, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the Necessary Existence by benefitting from succession and vicious circle in other proofs. Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that this proof demonstrates the presence of The Necessary Existence and its perfection attributions. This study examines this assertion and addresses what kind of innovations was brought by Mullā Ṣadrā in terms of proving The Necessary Existence. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss the relationship between the two known Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān. I shall argue that Avicenna relies on both (1) Abū Bishr Mattā’s translation and (2) the anonymous translation used by Averroes in the Long Commentary as well as in the Middle Commentary (and also indirectly preserved by Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s work). Although, generally speaking, the problem is relevant to the history of the transmission of (...) the Posterior Analytics from Greek through Syriac into Arabic, I do not intend to give a systematic presentation of the historical setting in which Aristotle’s work became readily available to the Arabo-Islamic culture. My aim here is rather to isolate and discuss some pieces of evidence concerning the texts that seem to have been available to Avicenna. In addition to that, I shall also provide evidence concerning the relationship with the Greek commentary tradition (in particular Philoponus and Themistius) that is likely to have influenced Avicenna in his discussion of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Dâwûd al-Qarisî (Dâvûd al-Karsî) was a versatile and prolific 18th century Ottoman scholar who studied in İstanbul and Egypt and then taught for long years in various centers of learning like Egypt, Cyprus, Karaman, and İstanbul. He held high esteem for Mehmed Efendi of Birgi (Imâm Birgivî/Birgili, d.1573), out of respect for whom, towards the end of his life, Karsî, like Birgivî, occupied himself with teaching in the town of Birgi, where he died in 1756 and was buried next to (...) Birgivî. Better known for his following works on Arabic language and rhetoric and on the prophetic traditions (hadith): Sharḥu uṣûli’l-ḥadîth li’l-Birgivî; Sharḥu’l-Ḳaṣîdati’n-nûniyya (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Şarḥu’l-Emsileti’l-mukhtalifa fi’ṣ-ṣarf (two commentaries, in Arabic and Turkish); Sharḥu’l-Binâʾ; Sharḥu’l-ʿAvâmil; and Sharḥu İzhâri’l-asrâr, Karsî has actually composed textbooks in quite different fields. Hence the hundreds of manuscript copies of his works in world libraries. Many of his works were also recurrently printed in the Ottoman period. One of the neglected aspects of Karsî is his identity as a logician. Although he authored ambitious and potent works in the field of logic, this aspect of him has not been subject to modern studies. Even his bibliography has not been established so far (with scattered manuscript copies of his works and incomplete catalogue entries). This article primarily and in a long research based on manuscript copies and bibliographic sources, identifies twelve works on logic that Karsî has authored. We have clarified the works that are frequently mistaken for each other, and, especially, have definitively established his authorship of a voluminous commentary on al-Kâtibî’s al-Shamsiyya, of which commentary a second manuscript copy has been identified and described together with the other copy. Next is handled his most famous work of logic, the Sharhu Îsâghûcî, which constitutes an important and assertive ring in the tradition of commentaries on Îsâghûcî. We describe in detail the nine manuscript copies of this work that have been identified in various libraries. The critical text of Karsî’s Sharhu Îsâghûcî, whose composition was finished on 5 March 1745, has been prepared based on the following four manuscripts: (1) MS Kayseri Raşid Efendi Kütüphanesi, No. 857, ff.1v-3v, dated 1746, that is, only one year after the composition of the work; (2) MS Bursa İnebey Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Genel, No.794B, ff.96v-114v, dated 1755; (3) MS Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri Efendi Arapça, No. 1752, ff.48v-58r, dated 1760; (4) MS Beyazıt Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Beyazıt, No. 3129, ff.41v-55v, dated 8 March 1772. While preparing the critical text, we have applied the Center for Islamic Studies (İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi, İSAM)’s method of optional text choice. The critical text is preceded by a content analysis. Karsî is well aware of the preceding tradition of commentary on Îsâghûcî, and has composed his own commentary as a ‘simile’ or alternative to the commentary by Mollâ Fanârî which was famous and current in his own day. Karsî’s statement “the commentary in one day and one night” is a reference to Mollâ Fanârî who had stated that he started writing his commentary in the morning and finished it by the evening. Karsî, who spent long years in the Egyptian scholarly and cultural basin, adopted the religious-sciences-centered ‘instrumentalist’ understanding of logic that was dominant in the Egypt-Maghrib region. Therefore, no matter how famous they were, he criticized those theoretical, long, and detailed works of logic which mingled with philosophy; and defended and favored authoring functional and cogent logic texts that were beneficial, in terms of religious sciences, to the seekers of knowledge and the scholars. Therefore, in a manner not frequently encountered in other texts of its kind, he refers to the writings and views of Muhammad b. Yûsuf al-Sanûsî (d.1490), the great representative of this logical school in the Egyptian-Maghrib region. Where there is divergence between the views of the ‘earlier scholars’ (mutaqaddimûn) like Ibn Sînâ and his followers and the ‘later scholars’ (muta’akhkhirûn), i.e., post-Fakhr al-dîn al-Râzî logicians, Karsî is careful to distance himself from partisanship, preferring sometimes the views of the earliers, other times those of the laters. For instance, on the eight conditions proposed for the realization of contradiction, he finds truth to be with al-Fârâbî, who proposed “unity in the predicative attribution” as the single condition for the realization of contradiction. Similarly, on the subject matter of Logic, he tried to reconcile the mutaqaddimûn’s notion of ‘second intelligibles’ with the muta’akhkhirûn’s notion of ‘apprehensional and declarational knowledge,’ suggesting that not much difference exists between the two, on the grounds that both notions are limited to the aspect of ‘known things that lead to the knowledge of unknown things.’ Karsî asserts that established and commonly used metaphors have, according to the verifying scholars, signification by correspondence (dalâlat al-mutâbaqah), adding also that it should not be ignored that such metaphors may change from society to society and from time to time. Karsî also endorses the earlier scholars’ position concerning the impossibility of quiddity (mâhiyya) being composed of two co-extensive parts, and emphasizes that credit should not be given to later scholars’ position who see it possible. According to the verifying scholars (muhaqqîqûn), it is possible to make definition (hadd) by mentioning only difference (fasl), in which case it becomes an imperfect definition (hadd nâqis). He is of the opinion that the definition of the proposition (qadiyya) in al-Taftâzânî’s Tahdhîb is clearer and more complete: “a proposition is an expression that bears the possibility of being true or false”. He states that in the division of proposition according to quantity what is taken into consideration is the subject (mawdû‘) in categorical propositions, and the temporal aspect of the antecedent (muqaddam) in hypothetical propositions. As for the unquantified, indefinite proposition (qadiyya muhmalah), Karsî assumes that if it is not about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a particular proposition (qadiyya juz’iyyah); but if it is about the problems of the sciences, then it is virtually/potentially a universal proposition (qadiyya kulliyyah). This being the general rule about the ambiguous (muhmal) propositions, he nevertheless contends that, because its subject (mawdû‘) is negated, it is preferable to consider a negative ambiguous (sâliba muhmalah) proposition like “human (insân) is not standing” to be a virtually/potentially universal negative (sâliba kulliyyâh) proposition. He states that a disjunctive hypothetical proposition (shartiyya al-munfasila) that is composed of more than two parts/units is only seemingly so, and that in reality it cannot be composed of more than two units. Syllogism (qiyâs), according to Karsî, is the ultimate purpose (al-maqsad al-aqsâ) and the most valuable subject-matter of the science of Logic. For him, the entire range of topics that are handled before this one are only prolegomena to it. This approach of Karsî clearly reveals how much the ‘demonstration (burhân)-centered’ approach of the founding figures of the Muslim tradition of logic like al-Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ has changed. al-Abharî, in his Îsâghûjî makes no mention of ‘conversion by contradiction’ (‘aks al-naqîd). Therefore, Karsî, too, in his commentary, does not touch upon the issue. However, in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd Karsî does handle the conversion by contradiction and its rules. Following the method of Îsâghûjî, in his commentary Karsî shortly touches on the four figures (shakl) of conjuctive syllogism (qiyâs iqtirânî) and their conditions, after which he passes to the first figure (shakl), which is considered ‘the balance of the sciences’ (mi‘yâr al-‘ulûm), explaining the four moods (darb) of it. In his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd, however, Karsî handles all the four figures (shakl) with all their related moods (darb), where he speaks of fife moods (darb) of the fourth figure (shakl). The topic of ‘modal propositions’ (al-muwajjahât) and of ‘modal syllogism’ (al-mukhtalitât), both of which do not take place in the Îsâghûjî, are not mentioned by Karsî as well, either in his commentary on Îsâghûjî or in his Îsâghûjî al-jadîd. Karsî proposes that the certainties (yaqîniyyât), of which demonstration (burhân) is made, have seven, not six, divisions. After mentioning (1) axioms/first principles (awwaliyyât), (2) observata/sensuals (mushâhadât), (3) experta/empiricals (mujarrabât), (4) acumenalia (hadthiyyât), (5) testata (mutawâtirât), and (6) instictives (fitriyyât), that is, all the ‘propositions accompanied by their demonstrations,’ Karsî states that these six divisions, which do not need research and reflection (nazar), are called badîhiyyât (self-evidents), and constitute the foundations (usûl) of certainties (yaqîniyyât). As the seventh division he mentions (7) the nazariyyât (theoreticals), which are known via the badîhiyyât, end up in them, and therefore convey certainty (yaqîn). For Karsî, the nazariyyât/theoreticals, which constitute the seventh division of yaqîniyyât/certainties, are too numerous, and constitute the branches (far‘) of yaqîniyyât. Every time the concept of ‘Mughâlata’ (sophistry) comes forth in the traditional sections on the five arts usually appended to logic works, Karsî often gives examples from what he sees as extreme sûfî sayings, lamenting that these expressions are so widespread and held in esteem. He sometimes criticizes these expressions. However, it is observed that he does not reject tasawwuf in toto, but excludes from his criticism the mystical views and approaches of the truth-abiding (ahl al-haqq), shârî‘â-observant (mutasharri‘) leading sufis who have reached to the highest level of karâmah. (shrink)

This dissertation is an analysis of the development of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical Islamic intellectual history. The central concerns of the thesis are; treatises on the theoretical understanding of the concept of dialectic and argumentation theory, and how, in practice, the concept of dialectic, as expressed in the Greek classical tradition, was received and used by five communities in the Islamic intellectual camp. It shows how dialectic as an argumentative discourse diffused into five communities (theologicians, poets, grammarians, philosophers (...) and jurists) and how these local dialectics that the individual communities developed fused into a single system to form a general argumentation theory (adab al-bahth) applicable to all fields. I evaluate a treatise by Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d.702/1302), the founder of this general theory, and the treatises that were written after him as a result of his work. I concentrate specifically on work by Adud al-Din al-Iji (d.756/1355), Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d.816/1413), Taşköprüzâde (d.968/1561), Saçaklızâde (d.1150/1737) and Gelenbevî (d.1205/1791) and analyze how each writer (from Samarqandi to Gelenbevî) altered the shape of argumentative discourse and how later intellectuals in the post-classical Islamic world responded to that discourse bequeathed by their predecessors. What is striking about the period that this dissertation investigates (from 1300-1800) is the persistence of what could be called the linguistic turn in argumentation theory. After a centuries-long run, the jadal-based dialectic of the classical period was displaced by a new argumentation theory, which was dominantly linguistic in character. This linguistic turn in argumentation dates from the final quarter of the fourteenth century in Iji's impressively prescient work on 'ilm al-wad'. This idea, which finally surfaced in the post-classical period, that argumentation is about definition and that, therefore, defining is the business of language—even perhaps, that language is the only available medium for understanding and being understood—affected the way that argumentation theory was processed throughout most of the period in question. The argumentative discourse that started with Ibn al-Rawandi in the third/ninth century left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history, which was then full of concepts, terminology and objectives from this discourse up until the late nineteenth century. From this perspective, Islamic intellectual history can be read as the tension between two languages: the "language of dialectic" (jadal) and the "language of demonstration" (burhan), each of which refer not only to a significant feature of that history, but also to a feature that could dramatically alter the interpretation of that history. (shrink)

The paper provides some introductory comments and a preliminary translation of Avicenna’s Burhān, IV, 2. I shall first set the stage by outlining the structure of the book (sec. 1). I will then briefly introduce (sec. 2) a number of notions that are dealt with in the first treatise of the Burhān (e.g. definition, description). Burhān, IV, 2 is split into two parts: the first focuses mainly on Aristotle’s An. Post., B, 4, whereas the second covers some of the topics (...) of B, 5 and B, 6. Accordingly, sec. 3 will be devoted to a cursory presentation of Aristotle’s arguments in An. Post., B, 4 along with a more detailed discussion of its Avicennan counterpart, focusing on the indemonstrability of definition; sec. 4, finally, will be a presentation of the second part of the chapter, concerning the relationship between definition and division. An English translation of the entire chapter is appended to the paper and is accompanied by some notes. (shrink)

In this article, three concepts that constitute the pillars of sciences, namely the subject, principle and problem, will be examined relying on Avicenna’s (d. 428/1037) book of Burhān. These three concepts, which generally determine the scope of scientific research and the principles on which it should be based, were introduced systematically for the first time by Aristotle (d. 322 BC) in the history of thought. Through these concepts, philosophical sciences could be distinguished from one another and it became possible for (...) each science to examine specific parts of existence. This distinction, which was also adopted by the scholars of Islamic thought, has presented such an integrity that neither philosophical disciplines nor religious sciences could remain indifferent. As a matter of fact, especially in the later period of theologicians, the information was considered as science only if it was based on these three concepts. Therefore, it can be asserted that these three concepts were considered as the measure of scientific activity, first by peripatetic philosophy and later by other disciplines. (shrink)