Results for 'Daniel Kapust'

984 found
Order:
  1. Letter from the Editor-in-Chief of Polis.Thornton Lockwood - 2020 - Polis 37 (1):1-2.
    It gives me great pleasure and honor to introduce myself as the incoming Editor-in-Chief of Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought. For the last decade I have served as an Associate Editor and the Book Review Editor of the journal. I am very excited about charting new paths for the journal, while continuing to publish first-rate scholarship in our area strengths. Although ‘polis’ is a Greek word that identifies a specific Greek historical political institution, in many (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy?Daniel Susser & Laura Y. Cabrera - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 15 (2):122-133.
    The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World.Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum - 2019 - Georgetown Law Technology Review 4:1-45.
    Privacy and surveillance scholars increasingly worry that data collectors can use the information they gather about our behaviors, preferences, interests, incomes, and so on to manipulate us. Yet what it means, exactly, to manipulate someone, and how we might systematically distinguish cases of manipulation from other forms of influence—such as persuasion and coercion—has not been thoroughly enough explored in light of the unprecedented capacities that information technologies and digital media enable. In this paper, we develop a definition of manipulation that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  4. Technology, autonomy, and manipulation.Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum - 2019 - Internet Policy Review 8 (2).
    Since 2016, when the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal began to emerge, public concern has grown around the threat of “online manipulation”. While these worries are familiar to privacy researchers, this paper aims to make them more salient to policymakers — first, by defining “online manipulation”, thus enabling identification of manipulative practices; and second, by drawing attention to the specific harms online manipulation threatens. We argue that online manipulation is the use of information technology to covertly influence another person’s decision-making, by targeting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  5. Predictive Policing and the Ethics of Preemption.Daniel Susser - 2021 - In Ben Jones & Eduardo Mendieta (eds.), The Ethics of Policing: New Perspectives on Law Enforcement. New York: NYU Press.
    The American justice system, from police departments to the courts, is increasingly turning to information technology for help identifying potential offenders, determining where, geographically, to allocate enforcement resources, assessing flight risk and the potential for recidivism amongst arrestees, and making other judgments about when, where, and how to manage crime. In particular, there is a focus on machine learning and other data analytics tools, which promise to accurately predict where crime will occur and who will perpetrate it. Activists and academics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Invisible Influence: Artificial Intelligence and the Ethics of Adaptive Choice Architectures.Daniel Susser - 2019 - Proceedings of the 2019 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society 1.
    For several years, scholars have (for good reason) been largely preoccupied with worries about the use of artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) tools to make decisions about us. Only recently has significant attention turned to a potentially more alarming problem: the use of AI/ML to influence our decision-making. The contexts in which we make decisions—what behavioral economists call our choice architectures—are increasingly technologically-laden. Which is to say: algorithms increasingly determine, in a wide variety of contexts, both the sets of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7. Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are Valuable Even If Consent Frameworks Aren’t.Daniel Susser - 2019 - Journal of Information Policy 9:37-62.
    The dominant legal and regulatory approach to protecting information privacy is a form of mandated disclosure commonly known as “notice-and-consent.” Many have criticized this approach, arguing that privacy decisions are too complicated, and privacy disclosures too convoluted, for individuals to make meaningful consent decisions about privacy choices—decisions that often require us to waive important rights. While I agree with these criticisms, I argue that they only meaningfully call into question the “consent” part of notice-and-consent, and that they say little about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8. Information Privacy and Social Self-Authorship.Daniel Susser - 2016 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 20 (3):216-239.
    The dominant approach in privacy theory defines information privacy as some form of control over personal information. In this essay, I argue that the control approach is mistaken, but for different reasons than those offered by its other critics. I claim that information privacy involves the drawing of epistemic boundaries—boundaries between what others should and shouldn’t know about us. While controlling what information others have about us is one strategy we use to draw such boundaries, it is not the only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  9. Exploitation in the Platform Age.Daniel Susser - forthcoming - In Beate Roessler & Valerie Steeves (eds.), Being Human in the Digital World. Cambridge University Press.
    In this chapter I consider a common refrain among critics of digital platforms: big tech "exploits" us. It gives voice to a shared sense that technology firms are somehow mistreating people—taking advantage of us, extracting from us—in a way that other data-driven harms, such as surveillance and algorithmic bias, fail to capture. Exploring several targets of this charge—gig work, algorithmic pricing, and surveillance advertising—I ask: What does exploitation entail, exactly, and how do platforms perpetrate it? Is exploitation in the platform (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Measuring Automated Influence: Between Empirical Evidence and Ethical Values.Daniel Susser & Vincent Grimaldi - forthcoming - Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society.
    Automated influence, delivered by digital targeting technologies such as targeted advertising, digital nudges, and recommender systems, has attracted significant interest from both empirical researchers, on one hand, and critical scholars and policymakers on the other. In this paper, we argue for closer integration of these efforts. Critical scholars and policymakers, who focus primarily on the social, ethical, and political effects of these technologies, need empirical evidence to substantiate and motivate their concerns. However, existing empirical research investigating the effectiveness of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Critical Provocations for Synthetic Data.Daniel Susser & Jeremy Seeman - 2024 - Surveillance and Society 22 (4):453-459.
    Training artificial intelligence (AI) systems requires vast quantities of data, and AI developers face a variety of barriers to accessing the information they need. Synthetic data has captured researchers’ and industry’s imagination as a potential solution to this problem. While some of the enthusiasm for synthetic data may be warranted, in this short paper we offer critical counterweight to simplistic narratives that position synthetic data as a cost-free solution to every data-access challenge—provocations highlighting ethical, political, and governance issues the use (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Synthetic Health Data: Real Ethical Promise and Peril.Daniel Susser, Daniel S. Schiff, Sara Gerke, Laura Y. Cabrera, I. Glenn Cohen, Megan Doerr, Jordan Harrod, Kristin Kostick-Quenet, Jasmine McNealy, Michelle N. Meyer, W. Nicholson Price & Jennifer K. Wagner - 2024 - Hastings Center Report 54 (5):8-13.
    Researchers and practitioners are increasingly using machine‐generated synthetic data as a tool for advancing health science and practice, by expanding access to health data while—potentially—mitigating privacy and related ethical concerns around data sharing. While using synthetic data in this way holds promise, we argue that it also raises significant ethical, legal, and policy concerns, including persistent privacy and security problems, accuracy and reliability issues, worries about fairness and bias, and new regulatory challenges. The virtue of synthetic data is often understood (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Transparent Media and the Development of Digital Habits.Daniel Susser - 2017 - In Van den Eede Yoni, Irwin Stacy O'Neal & Wellner Galit (eds.), Postphenomenology and Media: Essays on Human-Media-World Relations. Lexington Books. pp. 27-44.
    Our lives are guided by habits. Most of the activities we engage in throughout the day are initiated and carried out not by rational thought and deliberation, but through an ingrained set of dispositions or patterns of action—what Aristotle calls a hexis. We develop these dispositions over time, by acting and gauging how the world responds. I tilt the steering wheel too far and the car’s lurch teaches me how much force is needed to steady it. I come too close (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Conditions of personhood.Daniel C. Dennett - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   190 citations  
  15. If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.
    In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  16. Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.
    Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  17. Artificial Intelligence and the Body: Dreyfus, Bickhard, and the Future of AI.Daniel Susser - 2013 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 277-287.
    For those who find Dreyfus’s critique of AI compelling, the prospects for producing true artificial human intelligence are bleak. An important question thus becomes, what are the prospects for producing artificial non-human intelligence? Applying Dreyfus’s work to this question is difficult, however, because his work is so thoroughly human-centered. Granting Dreyfus that the body is fundamental to intelligence, how are we to conceive of non-human bodies? In this paper, I argue that bringing Dreyfus’s work into conversation with the work of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. True believers : The intentional strategy and why it works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In Anthony Francis Heath (ed.), Scientific explanation: papers based on Herbert Spencer lectures given in the University of Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  19. From Procedural Rights to Political Economy: New Horizons for Regulating Online Privacy.Daniel Susser - 2023 - In Sabine Trepte & Philipp K. Masur (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Privacy and Social Media. Routledge. pp. 281-290.
    The 2010s were a golden age of information privacy research, but its policy accomplishments tell a mixed story. Despite significant progress on the development of privacy theory and compelling demonstrations of the need for privacy in practice, real achievements in privacy law and policy have been, at best, uneven. In this chapter, I outline three broad shifts in the way scholars (and, to some degree, advocates and policy makers) are approaching privacy and social media. First, a change in emphasis from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Decision Time: Normative Dimensions of Algorithmic Speed.Daniel Susser - forthcoming - ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT '22).
    Existing discussions about automated decision-making focus primarily on its inputs and outputs, raising questions about data collection and privacy on one hand and accuracy and fairness on the other. Less attention has been devoted to critically examining the temporality of decision-making processes—the speed at which automated decisions are reached. In this paper, I identify four dimensions of algorithmic speed that merit closer analysis. Duration (how much time it takes to reach a judgment), timing (when automated systems intervene in the activity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Pandemic surveillance: ethics at the intersection of information, research, and health.Daniel Susser - 2022 - In Margaret Hu (ed.), Pandemic Surveillance: Privacy, Security, and Data Ethics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. pp. 187-196.
    This chapter provides a high-level overview of key ethical issues raised by the use of surveillance technologies, such as digital contact tracing, disease surveillance, and vaccine passports, to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. To some extent, these issues are entirely familiar. I argue that they raise old questions in new form and with new urgency, at the intersection of information ethics, research ethics, and public health. Whenever we deal with data-driven technologies, we have to ask how they fare in relation to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Ihde’s Missing Sciences: Postphenomenology, Big Data, and the Human Sciences.Daniel Susser - 2016 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 20 (2):137-152.
    In Husserl’s Missing Technologies, Don Ihde urges us to think deeply and critically about the ways in which the technologies utilized in contemporary science structure the way we perceive and understand the natural world. In this paper, I argue that we ought to extend Ihde’s analysis to consider how such technologies are changing the way we perceive and understand ourselves too. For it is not only the natural or “hard” sciences which are turning to advanced technologies for help in carrying (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. Ethical Considerations for Digitally Targeted Public Health Interventions.Daniel Susser - 2020 - American Journal of Public Health 110 (S3).
    Public health scholars and public health officials increasingly worry about health-related misinformation online, and they are searching for ways to mitigate it. Some have suggested that the tools of digital influence are themselves a possible answer: we can use targeted, automated digital messaging to counter health-related misinformation and promote accurate information. In this commentary, I raise a number of ethical questions prompted by such proposals—and familiar from the ethics of influence and ethics of AI—highlighting hidden costs of targeted digital messaging (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Why we may not find intentions in the brain.Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager - 2014 - Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in neuroscientific explanations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  25. How to Adopt a Logic.Daniel Cohnitz & Carlo Nicolai - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    What is commonly referred to as the Adoption Problem is a challenge to the idea that the principles of logic can be rationally revised. The argument is based on a reconstruction of unpublished work by Saul Kripke. As the reconstruction has it, Kripke extends the scope of Willard van Orman Quine's regress argument against conventionalism to the possibility of adopting new logical principles. In this paper we want to discuss the scope of this challenge. Are all revisions of logic subject (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  26. Capturing the conspiracist’s imagination.Daniel Munro - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3353-3381.
    Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we’d believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren’t irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don’t fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference.Daniel Cohnitz & Jussi Haukioja - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500.
    We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  28. Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie.Daniel Cohnitz - 2006 - Mentis.
    Wie ist es wohl, eine Fledermaus zu sein? Wäre ein rein physikalisches Duplikat von mir nur ein empfindungsloser Zombie? Muss man sich seinem Schicksal ergeben, wenn man sich unfreiwillig als lebensnotwendige Blutwaschanlage eines weltberühmten Violinisten wieder findet? Kann man sich wünschen, der König von China zu sein? Bin ich vielleicht nur ein Gehirn in einem Tank mit Nährflüssigkeit, das die Welt von einer Computersimulation vorgegaukelt bekommt? Worauf beziehen sich die Menschen auf der Zwillingserde mit ihrem Wort 'Wasser', wenn es bei (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  29. Vendler’s puzzle about imagination.Justin D’Ambrosio & Daniel Stoljar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12923-12944.
    Vendler’s :161–173, 1979) puzzle about imagination is that the sentences ‘Imagine swimming in that water’ and ‘Imagine yourself swimming in that water’ seem at once semantically different and semantically the same. They seem semantically different, since the first requires you to imagine ’from the inside’, while the second allows you to imagine ’from the outside.’ They seem semantically the same, since despite superficial dissimilarity, there is good reason to think that they are syntactically and lexically identical. This paper sets out (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  30. A (Limited) Defence of Priorianism.Daniel Deasy - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2037-2062.
    This paper defends Priorianism, a theory in the philosophy of time which combines three theses: first, that there is a metaphysical distinction between the present time and non-present times; second, that there are temporary propositions, that is, propositions that change in truth-value simpliciter over time; and third, that there is change over time only if there are temporary propositions. Priorianism is accepted by many Presentists, Growing Block Theorists, and Moving Spotlight Theorists. However, it is difficult to defend the view without (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will.Daniel Cohen & Toby Handfield - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):907 - 932.
    In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account rectifies various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not `akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  32. (1 other version)Impossibility and Impossible Worlds.Daniel Nolan - 2021 - In Otávio Bueno & Scott A. Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge handbook of modality. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 40-48.
    Possible worlds have found many applications in contemporary philosophy: from theories of possibility and necessity, to accounts of conditionals, to theories of mental and linguistic content, to understanding supervenience relationships, to theories of properties and propositions, among many other applications. Almost as soon as possible worlds started to be used in formal theories in logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and elsewhere, theorists started to wonder whether impossible worlds should be postulated as well. In many applications, possible worlds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Investigating Emotions as Functional States Distinct From Feelings.Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Andler - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):191-201.
    We defend a functionalist approach to emotion that begins by focusing on emotions as central states with causal connections to behavior and to other cognitive states. The approach brackets the conscious experience of emotion, lists plausible features that emotions exhibit, and argues that alternative schemes are unpromising candidates. We conclude with the benefits of our approach: one can study emotions in animals; one can look in the brain for the implementation of specific features; and one ends up with an architecture (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  34. Will AI Achieve Consciousness? Wrong Question.Daniel C. Dennett - 2019 - Wired 1 (19.02.2019).
    We should not be creating conscious, humanoid agents but an entirely new sort of entity, rather like oracles, with no conscience, no fear of death, no distracting loves and hates.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. The Logic(s) of Modal Knowledge.Daniel Cohnitz - 2012 - In Greg Restall & Gillian Kay Russell (eds.), New waves in philosophical logic. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36. Defending design arguments against Plantinga.Daniel von Wachter - 2014 - Philosophia Reformata 79 (1):54-65.
    This article criticises Alvin Plantinga’s claim that ‘basic’ design beliefs, which arise without a conscious inference, have more positive epistemic status than non-basic ones and that we cannot evaluate the probabilities involved in inferential, inductive design arguments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Thought experiments in current metaphilosophical debates.Daniel Cohnitz & Sören Häggqvist - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 406-424.
    Although thought experiments were first discovered as a sui generis methodological tool by philosophers of science (most prominently by Ernst Mach), the tool can also be found – even more frequently – in contemporary philosophy. Thought experiments in philosophy and science have a lot in common. However, in this chapter we will concentrate on thought experiments in philosophy only. Their use has been the centre of attention of metaphilosophical discussion in the past decade, and this chapter will provide an overview (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Berkeley's Rejection of Divine Analogy.Stephen H. Daniel - 2011 - Science Et Esprit 63 (2):149-161.
    Berkeley argues that claims about divine predication (e.g., God is wise or exists) should be understood literally rather than analogically, because like all spirits (i.e., causes), God is intelligible only in terms of the extent of his effects. By focusing on the harmony and order of nature, Berkeley thus unites his view of God with his doctrines of mind, force, grace, and power, and avoids challenges to religious claims that are raised by appeals to analogy. The essay concludes by showing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  39. Essays in Formal Metaphysics.Daniel Rubio - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswick
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. (1 other version)Is compositionality an a priori principle?Daniel Cohnitz - 2005 - In M. Wening, E. Machery & G. Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Concepts and Meanings: Foundational Issues. Ontos.
    When reasons are given for compositionality, the arguments usually purport to establish compositionality in an almost a priori manner. I will rehearse these arguments why one could think that compositionality is a priori true, or almost a priori true, and will find all of them inconclusive. This, in itself, is no reason against compositionality, but a reason to try to establish or defend the principle on other than quasi-a priori grounds.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  41. Berkeley's Christian neoplatonism, archetypes, and divine ideas.Stephen H. Daniel - 2001 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):239-258.
    Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes explains how God perceives and can have the same ideas as finite minds. His appeal of Christian neo-Platonism opens up a way to understand how the relation of mind, ideas, and their union is modeled on the Cappadocian church fathers' account of the persons of the trinity. This way of understanding Berkeley indicates why he, in contrast to Descartes or Locke, thinks that mind (spiritual substance) and ideas (the object of mind) cannot exist or be thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  42. Modal skepticism: Philosophical thought experiments and modal epistemology.Daniel Cohnitz - 2003 - Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 10:281--296.
    One of the most basic methods of philosophy is, and has always been, the consideration of counterfactual cases and imaginary scenarios. One purpose of doing so obviously is to test our theories against such counterfactual cases. Although this method is widespread, it is far from being commonly accepted. Especially during the last two decades it has been confronted with criticism ranging from complete dismissal to denying only its critical powers to a cautious defense of the use of thought experiments as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43. (1 other version)Berkeley on God's Knowledge of Pain.Stephen H. Daniel - 2018 - In Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-145.
    Since nothing about God is passive, and the perception of pain is inherently passive, then it seems that God does not know what it is like to experience pain. Nor would he be able to cause us to experience pain, for his experience would then be a sensation (which would require God to have senses, which he does not). My suggestion is that Berkeley avoids this situation by describing how God knows about pain “among other things” (i.e. as something whose (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. The Modal Moving Spotlight Theory.Daniel Deasy - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1195-1215.
    Say that the Moving Spotlight Theory (MST) combines the following three theses: A-THEORY : There is an absolute distinction between present and non-present time.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Berkeley's stoic notion of spiritual substance.Stephen H. Daniel - 2008 - In Stephen Hartley Daniel (ed.), New interpretations of Berkeley's thought. Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books.
    For Berkeley, minds are not Cartesian spiritual substances because they cannot be said to exist (even if only conceptually) abstracted from their activities. Similarly, Berkeley's notion of mind differs from Locke's in that, for Berkeley, minds are not abstract substrata in which ideas inhere. Instead, Berkeley redefines what it means for the mind to be a substance in a way consistent with the Stoic logic of 17th century Ramists on which Leibniz and Jonathan Edwards draw. This view of mind, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  46. Honor War Theory: Romance or Reality?Daniel Demetriou - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):285 - 313.
    Just War Theory (JWT) replaced an older "warrior code," an approach to war that remains poorly understood and dismissively treated in the philosophical literature. This paper builds on recent work on honor to address these deficiencies. By providing a clear, systematic exposition of "Honor War Theory" (HWT), we can make sense of paradigm instances of warrior psychology and behavior, and understand the warrior code as the martial expression of a broader honor-based ethos that conceives of obligation in terms of fair (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47. Ørsteds „Gedankenexperiment“: eine Kantianische Fundierung der Infinitesimalrechnung? Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte von ‚Gedankenexperiment‘ und zur Mathematikgeschichte des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts.Daniel Cohnitz - 2008 - Kant Studien 99 (4):407-433.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Author Reply: We Don’t Yet Know What Emotions Are.Ralph Adolphs & Daniel Andler - 2018 - Emotion Review 10 (3):233-236.
    Our approach to emotion emphasized three key ingredients. We do not yet have a mature science of emotion, or even a consensus view—in this respect we are more hesitant than Sander, Grandjean, and Scherer or Luiz Pessoa. Relatedly, a science of emotion needs to be highly interdisciplinary, including ecology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy. We recommend a functionalist view that brackets conscious experiences and that essentially treats emotions as latent variables inferred from a number of measures. But our version of functionalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  49. Why Consistentism Won’t Work.Daniel Cohnitz - 2004 - In E. Weber & T. DeMey (eds.), Modal Epistemology. Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie vor Wetenschappen en Kunsten.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. Berkeley, Suárez, and the Esse-Existere Distinction.Stephen H. Daniel - 2000 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (4):621-636.
    For Berkeley, a thing's existence 'esse' is nothing more than its being perceived 'as that thing'. It makes no sense to ask (with Samuel Johnson) about the 'esse' of the mind or the specific act of perception, for that would be like asking what it means for existence to exist. Berkeley's "existere is percipi or percipere" (NB 429) thus carefully adopts the scholastic distinction between 'esse' and 'existere' ignored by Locke and others committed to a substantialist notion of mind. Following (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
1 — 50 / 984