E-money systems have revolutionized global business transactions through digital payment methods. This quantitative correlational study aimed to assess the awareness and acceptance of e-money among individuals in Balayan, Batangas. Employing quota and purposive sampling, 100 participants aged 21 to 70 completed a survey questionnaire. Statistical analysis revealed that consumers were aware of e-money but lacked comprehensive knowledge. They acknowledged the convenience of e-money for online shopping and expense tracking. Age significantly influenced acceptance, while gender did not exhibit a similar effect. (...) Significant differences were observed in awareness and acceptance levels. Recommendations for improving acceptance include administrator-led campaigns, business incentives, consumer education, financial institution partnerships, and integration into student curricula. The study underscores the need for targeted strategies to translate e-money knowledge into practical use. Future research should explore adoption trends over time, barriers, and the impact of regulations on e-money utilization. (shrink)

The concept of respect for persons is often rejected as a basis for understanding forgiveness. As many have argued, to hold your offender responsible for her actions is to respect her as a person; but this kind of respect is more likely to sustain, rather than dissolve, your resentment toward her (Garrard & McNaughton 2003; 2011; Allais 2008). I seek to defend an alternative view in this paper. To forgive, on my account, involves ceasing to identify your offender with (...) her wrongdoing, and this requires a corresponding affective change on your behalf. While there are different ways this may happen, I argue that respect for your offender as a person can play a significant role in the process. (shrink)

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I (...) then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections. (shrink)

Many philosophers argue that the face-value of moral practice provides presumptive support to moral realism. This paper analyses such arguments into three steps. (1) Moral practice has a certain face-value, (2) only realism can vindicate this face value, and (3) the face-value needs vindicating. Two potential problems with such arguments are discussed. The first is taking the relevant face-value to involve explicitly realist commitments; the second is underestimating the power of non-realist strategies to vindicate that face-value. Case studies of each (...) of these errors are presented, drawn from the writings of Shafer-Landau, Brink and McNaughton, and from recent work in experimental metaethics. The paper then considers weak presumptive arguments, according to which both realist and non-realist vindications of moral practice are possible, but the realist vindications are more natural. It is argued that there is no sense of ‘natural’ available that can make these arguments work. The conclusion is that all extant presumptive arguments for moral realism fail. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (...) (eds.) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field. (shrink)

La philosophie morale est traditionnellement divisée en trois sous-disciplines : l’éthique appliquée, qui, comme son nom l’indique, s’intéresse aux positions à adopter sur des sujets pratiques ; l’éthique normative, où s’opposent un ensemble de théories sur ce qui devrait être, sur ce qui est bon/mauvais, etc. ; et la méta-éthique, qui étudie des questions non morales, mais relatives à la morale 1 . Cette dernière définition peut paraître floue, mais c’est un flou que rend nécessaire l’hétérogénéité propre à la discipline. (...) En effet, celle-ci est elle-même divisée en plusieurs domaines : l’épistémologie morale, l’ontologie morale, la psychologie morale, la phénoménologie morale et la logique morale (l’analyse des concepts moraux). Il n’est pas impossible de croiser les domaines, à l’instar de David McNaughton qui oppose une théorie ontologique – le réalisme – à une théorie épistémologique – le non-cognitivisme. Le réalisme moral affirme l’existence de propriétés morales non réductibles à des propriétés non morales : un acte est condamnable si et seulement s’il possède, à côté de ses propriétés non morales (il s’agit d’un acte délibéré, prémédité, etc.), la propriété d’être condamnable. Et, quant à lui, le cognitivisme soutient qu’une opinion morale n’est rien de plus qu’un état cognitif, qu’une croyance. Ce que nie le non-cognitivisme. Ainsi, selon McNaughton, le principal argument contre le réalisme moral est non cognitiviste. (shrink)

內容型道德感知主義者（Contentful Moral Perceptualists）： Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), Werner (2016, 2018) 宣稱 道德命題(moral proposition)可以作為道德主體的感知內容(content of perception)。然而，在筆 者原創的詮釋下，晚近反駁道德感知主義的學者，如： Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), Chudnoff (2015)，則隱約透露出以下想法：「與其宣稱道德命題是感知內容，不如宣稱道德 命題是認知信念內容(content of cognition)〕更為合理」。Faraci、Väyrynen、Chudnoff 都認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的道德感知」背後其實是受到宰制型的道德原則（dominative moral principles）所主導的，是一種從原則所推論產生的心理狀態; 也因此，上述反駁者認為 「內容型道德感知主義者所謂的〔道德感知〕」缺乏貨真價實的感知經驗所具有的「非推論 的」(non-inferential)特徵，並不是真正的感知。本文將評估：「內容型的道德感知模型」是 否有辦法回應上述反駁者所提出的挑戰呢？ 筆者將為肯定的答案供提初步的辯護。 -/- 關鍵詞：道德感知、現象對比⽅法、感知內容、現象經驗、感知的非推論特徵.

This thesis is a defense of (a version of) moral perceptualism. Moral perceptualism (MP), as is generally understood, advocates the bold view that “moral properties can be perceptual content”; its supporters include Audi (2013, 2015), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2015), and Werner (2016, 2020b). In support of MP, Werner (2016) bolsters what he calls ‘phenomenal contrast arguments(PCAs)’. According to PCAs, the best explanation for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast between two subjects facing the same moral situation is (...) that one subject has moral perceptual experience(s) of moral properties, whereas the other does not. If PCAs are sound, then MP can be justified (in that one subject does perceive moral properties). However, some powerful counterarguments against MP have been proposed by Väyrynen(2018), Reiland(2021), and Chudnoff(2015); each of them provides competing explanations for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast and argues that their explanations are more reasonable than PCAs. My purposes in this thesis are to ascertain (I) which explanation for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast is more reasonable; (II) (how) could moral perceptualists like Werner (2016, 2020b) properly reply to the counterarguments against MP？ Or is there any better alternative explanation that could support MP？ As regards (I), I will argue that Väyrynen’s(2018), Reiland’s(2021), and Chudnoff's (2015) alternative explanatory models for inter-subjective phenomenal contrast are not to be seen as competing explanations against the one provided by MP; rather, they are complementary to it. As regards (II), I argue that Väyrynen’s(2018), Reiland’s(2021), and Chudnoff's (2015) conterarguments against MP at most demonstrate that certain moral properties (e.g., rightness/ wrongness/goodness/badness) can’t be part of the perceptual content, but their arguments do not (or indeed cannot) rule out the possibility that moral salience can be properly construed as part of the perceptual content. In light of this, I argue that an alternative version of moral perceptualism, or what I call ‘moral salience perceptualism’, according to which “moral salience can be part of the perceptual content”, still remains alive and kicking in face of their counteraguments. Moreover, I argue that moral salience perceptualism is explanatorily superior to Werner’s (2016) version of MP in terms of explaining inter-subjective phenomenal contrast. -/- Keywords： moral perceptualism, phenomenal contrast, moral salience, moral experiences, moral judgments -/- . (shrink)

道德感知主義（moral perceptualism）主張「（至少有一些）道德性質（moral properties）可以是主體感知內容（perceptual content）的一部分」，其中的支持者包含了Audi （2013, 2015）; Lord （2018）; McNaughton （1988）; McBrayer （2010a, 2010b）; Cowan （2015）; Werner （2016, 2020b）。其中，Werner （2016）認為他所提出的「現象對比論證（Phenomenal Contrast Arguments, PCAs）」可以用來證立道德感知主義。此論證強調了某些道德情境中有「跨主體的現象對比」（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast）的存在；換句話說，兩個主體面對同一場景時，其經驗各別顯現出不同的現象特性/現象特徵（phenomenal character）。此論證認為對於「跨主體間的現象對比（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast）」的最佳解釋說明是兩個不同主體在道德感知經驗上有所差異(contrast in moral perceptual experience)。簡言之，根據此論證，跨主體的現象對比的最佳解釋是：某個主體感知到了道德性質，但另一個主體則缺乏這種感知。若此解釋成立，則其蘊含，主體的確可以感知到道德性質 （至少其中一個主體的確感知到了道德性質），也因此，道德感知主義就可以被證立。然而，Werner （2016）所擁護的現象對比論證與道德感知主義，卻遭受許多哲學家的質疑與抨擊，尤以Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人為代表。他們也分別提供了各自對於「跨主體間的現象對比」的相競替代解釋方案，並嘗試論證他們的說法相較於Werner （2016）的道德感知主義解釋方案來得更有解釋效力、且更為合理。本篇論文的主要目標是，剖析與回應以下兩個問題：（I）上述質疑者的替代解釋方案是否說得通？它們是否較之道德感知主義的解釋方案來得更好呢？（ II）道德感知主義者是否能恰當回應質疑者的挑戰呢？倘若Werner （2016, 2020b）的說法不足以回應質疑者的話，道德感知主義者是否能夠有其他的解套方案呢？針對問題（I），筆者將論證，Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人對於道德感知主義的質疑大致上言之成理，可和Werner （2016）的理論成為具有同等解釋力的相競解釋方案。但針對問題（II），筆者將指出Väyrynen（2018）; Reiland（2021）; Chudnoff（2015）等人頂多只能說明「對錯好壞」這類的整體道德性質（overall moral properties）無法作為感知的內容，但並未排除掉道德主體仍舊可以感知到「道德顯著性」（moral salience）這類初步確定道德性質（pro-tanto moral properties）的可能性。也因此，這並未排除一種本論文所擁護的改良版本的道德感知主義。根據此改良版本的道德感知主義，雖然對錯好壞這類的整體道德性質本身也許無法做為感知的內容，然而道德顯著性仍然可 以是感知內容。筆者將此改良版本稱之為「道德顯著性感知主義」(moral salience perceptualism)。為了突顯此版本的優點，筆者將進一步論述，此改良版的道德感知主義可以恰當地解釋跨主體間的現象對比（inter-subjective phenomenal contrast），並可規避原來Werner （2016）版本所招來的質疑。 -/- 關鍵詞：道德感知主義、現象對比論證、道德顯著性、道德經驗與道德判斷、道德教育 .

This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances, such as in criminal justice contexts, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. Contributing philosophers include Myisha Cherry, Jonathan Jacobs, Barrett Emerick, Alice MacLachlan, David McNaughton and Eve Garrard. Contributing psychologists include Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Robert D. Enright and Mary Jacqueline Song, C. Ward Struthers, Joshua Guilfoyle, Careen Khoury, Elizabeth van Monsjou, Joni Sasaki, Curtis Phills, Rebecca Young, and (...) Zdravko Marjanovic. (shrink)

Jus post Bellum is, like Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus post Bellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus post bellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while respecting the rights of the aggressors, [2] (...) punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus post bellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus post bellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus post bellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus post bellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that (...) the so-called "moral perception" posited by Contentful Moral Perceptualists is actually dominated by dominative moral principles, representing a psychological state inferred from principles. Therefore, these critics believe that the so-called "moral perception" lacks the non-inferential characteristic of genuine perceptual experience and is not true perception. This paper will evaluate whether the "contentful moral perceptual model" can respond to the challenges posed by these critics. I will provide a preliminary defense for an affirmative answer. -/- Keywords: Moral Perception, Phenomenal Contrast Method, Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Experience, Non-Inferential Characteristics of Perception . (shrink)