14 found
Order:
Disambiguations
David Sackris [15]David C. Sackris [2]
  1. Some Socratic Modesty: A Reconsideration of Recent Empirical Work on Moral Judgment.David Sackris & Michael T. Dale - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 1:1-23.
    One way to interpret the work of Joshua Greene (2001; 2008; 2014) is that the wave of empirical research into moral decision-making is a way for us to become more confident in our ability to gain moral knowledge. We argue that empirical research into moral judgment has shown (both survey-based and brain-based) that the grounds of moral judgment are opaque on several dimensions. We argue that we cannot firmly grasp what the morally relevant/irrelevant features of a decision context are, understand (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. The disunity of moral judgment: Implications for the study of psychopathy.David Sackris - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1.
    Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an inability to make moral judgments is because their research is premised on the assumption that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. The disunity of moral judgment: Evidence and implications.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 1:1-20.
    We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Famine, Affluence, and Amorality.David Sackris - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(A1)5-29.
    I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation, may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5. The Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Judgment.David Sackris - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (4):625-646.
    Realists about aesthetic judgment believe something like the following: for an aesthetic judgment of be correct, it must respond to the intrinsic aesthetic properties possessed by the object in question (e.g., Meskin et al., 2013; Kieran 2010). However, Cutting’s (2003) empirical research on aesthetic judgment puts pressure on that position. His work indicates that unconscious considerations extrinsic to an artwork can underpin said judgements. This paper takes Cutting’s conclusion a step further: If philosophers grant that it’s possible to appreciate artwork (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Is Justification Necessary for Knowledge?David Sackris & James R. Beebe - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 175-192.
    Justification has long been considered a necessary condition for knowledge, and theories that deny the necessity of justification have been dismissed as nonstarters. In this chapter, we challenge this long-standing view by showing that many of the arguments offered in support of it fall short and by providing empirical evidence that individuals are often willing to attribute knowledge when epistemic justification is lacking.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  7. Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments?David C. Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled “aesthetic”, and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating “aesthetic” judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  98
    Dissolving the moral-conventional distinction.David C. Sackris - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology.
    One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judgment is not a distinctive kind of judgment or the result of a specific, identifiable cognitive process. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory.David Sackris & Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (2):245-255.
    In this paper, we consider Noël Carroll’s Content Theory (CT) (2015) and argue that a key problem with CT is that it can be interpreted in two distinct ways: as a descriptive theory of aesthetic experience and as a normative prescriptive theory. Although CT is presented as a descriptive theory of experience, much of what Carroll says implies that CT can also be understood as a theory about how one ought to look at artworks. We argue that when understood as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. (1 other version)Feeling the Aesthetic: A Pluralist Sentimentalist Theory of Aesthetic Experience.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & David Sackris - 2020 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 57 (2):116–134.
    Sentimentalist aesthetic theories, broadly construed, posit that emotions play a fundamental role in aesthetic experiences. Jesse Prinz has recently proposed a reductionistic version of sentimentalist aesthetics, suggesting that it is the discrete feeling of wonder that makes an experience aesthetic. In this contribution, we draw on Prinz’s proposal in order to outline a novel version of a sentimentalist theory. Contrasting Prinz’s focus on a single emotion, we argue that an aesthetic experience is rudimentarily composed of a plurality of emotions. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Considering the Classroom as a Safe Space.David Sackris - 2017 - APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy 17 (1):17-23.
    In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty turn their classrooms into “safe spaces” as a method for increasing the diversity of philosophy majors. The creation of safe spaces is meant to make women and minority students “feel sufficiently comfortable” and thereby increase the likelihood that they pursue philosophy as a major or career. Although I agree with Freeman’s goal, I argue that philosophers, and faculty in general, should reject the call for turning classrooms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction.David Sackris - 2013 - Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.
    In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the act of creating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Preferred Qualifications: Community College Teaching Experience.David Sackris - 2016 - APA Newsletter on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges 16 (1):12-15.
    Given the extremely tight job market for professional philosophers, more Ph.Ds. are beginning to consider jobs at the community college level. There are good reasons for considering this avenue: if you enjoy teaching, the job focus is on teaching, and you evaluation and tenure depend primarily on your performance in the classroom; if the prospect of working with a very diverse student body, both in terms of background and skill set, appeals to you; if the location in which you live (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Genetic Modification and Future Generations.David Sackris - 2006 - Macalester Journal of Philosophy 15 (1).
    One of the most difficult issues to sort out morally is our obligation to future generations. Most individuals feel that they do indeed have some kind of obligation, but face difficulty in explaining the exact nature of the obligation. For one, it seems impossible to know the wants and desires of future generations, and furthermore the existence of the persons we are obligated to is entirely dependent upon the choices that we in fact make. In essence, we could shape future (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark