Results for 'False Consciousness'

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  1. Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Anti-Suffragists.Lee Wilson - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (2):237–258.
    Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due (...)
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  2. False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):159-210.
    The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally (...)
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  3. Why They Know Not What They Do: A Social Constructionist Approach to the Explanatory Problem of False Consciousness.Lee Wilson - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):45-72.
    False consciousness requires a general explanation for why, and how, oppressed individuals believe propositions against, as opposed to aligned with, their own well-being in virtue of their oppressed status. This involves four explanatory desiderata: belief acquisition, content prevalence, limitation, and systematicity. A social constructionist approach satisfies these by understanding the concept of false consciousness as regulating social research rather than as determining the exact mechanisms for all instances: the concept attunes us to a complex of mechanisms (...)
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  4.  78
    Toward a Feminist Model for Women’s Healthcare: The Problem of False Consciousness and the Moral Status of Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery.Shadi Heidarifar - forthcoming - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics.
    Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery (FGCS) is an umbrella term referring to different procedures including labiaplasty (reducing the length of the labia minora), clitoral hood reduction (reducing excess folds of the clitoral hood), hymenoplasty (building the hymen), labia majora augmentation (increasing the labia majora), vaginoplasty (tightening the vagina), and G-spot amplification (increasing the size and sensitivity of the G-spot). This paper is concerned with “all-or-nothing” approaches to FGCS procedures in women’s healthcare, i.e., those that overemphasize either women’s autonomy so as to (...)
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  5. Varieties of Consciousness under Oppression: False Consciousness, Bad Faith, Double Consciousness, and Se faire objet.Jennifer McWeeny - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoff Pfeifer (eds.), Phenomenology and the Political. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 149-63.
    What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. (...)
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  6.  23
    Varieties of Consciousness under Oppression: False Consciousness, Bad Faith, Double Consciousness, and Se faire objet.Jennifer McWeeny - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoff Pfeifer (eds.), Phenomenology and the Political. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 149-163.
    What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. (...)
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  7. Nihilism Today: Enlightened False Consciousness.Anton Heinrich Rennesland - 2020 - Talisik: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-48.
    I present some key ideas for reckoning with nihilism today in light of Nietzsche's conception of nihilism and Sloterdijk's Enlightened False Consciousness.
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  8. How can consciousness be false? Alienation, simulation, and mental ownership.Matteo Bianchin - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (6).
    Alienation has been recently revived as a central theme in critical theory. Current debates, however, tend to focus on normative rather than on explanatory issues. In this paper, I confront the latter and advance an account of alienation that bears on the mechanisms that bring it about in order to locate alienation as a distinctive social and psychological fact. In particular, I argue that alienation can be explained as a disruption induced by social factors in the sense of mental ownership (...)
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  9. False Double Consciousness: Hermeneutical Resources from the Rush Limbaugh Show.Jeff Engelhardt & Sarah Campbell - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (2):298-312.
    This article is a study of the interpretive resources developed by Rush Limbaugh on his radio show. Interpretive resources – also called ‘hermeneutical resources’ – are concepts, narratives, conceptual frameworks, etc. that enable subjects to make sense of themselves and their world. Much recent scholarship has explored how a community's interpretive resources influence social interactions or character traits in the community. In Limbaugh's transcripts, we found a pattern of what we call ‘concept doubling’, wherein terms are characterised in a way (...)
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  10. Conceptualizing Consciousness.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):637-659.
    One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one’s mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. We explore here three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption (...)
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  11. Stinking Consciousness!Benjamin D. Young - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):223-243.
    Contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness are typically based on the study of vision and have neglected olfaction. Several of these (e.g. Global Workspace Theories, the Information Integration theory, and the various theories offered by Crick and Koch) claim that a thalamic relay is necessary for consciousness. Studies on olfaction and the olfactory system's anatomical structure show this claim to be incorrect, thus showing these theories to be either false or inadequate as general and comprehensive accounts of (...). Attempts to rescue these theories by claiming that there is a structure in the olfactory system that is functionally equivalent to the thalamus in the visual system, such as the olfactory bulb or the olfactory cortex, are also shown to fail. If we wish to understand consciousness, we have to wake up and smell it. (shrink)
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  12. Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy.William Hirstein - 2012 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    [This download contains the Table of Contents and Chapter 1]. I argue here that the claim that conscious states are private, in the sense that only one person can ever experience them directly, is false. There actually is a way to connect the brains of two people that would allow one to have direct experience of the other's conscious, e.g., perceptual states. This would allow, for instance, one person to see that the other had deviant color perception (which was (...)
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  13. Consciousness as a Memory System.Andrew E. Budson, Kenneth A. Richman & Elizabeth A. Kensinger - forthcoming - Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology.
    We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good (...)
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  14. Consciousness and causation in Whitehead's phenomenology of becoming.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes (eds.), Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 407-461.
    The problem causation poses is: how can we ever know more than a Humean regularity. The problem consciousness poses is: how can subjective phenomenal experience arise from something lacking experience. A recent turn in the consciousness debates suggest that the hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than the Humean problem of explaining any causal nexus in an intelligible way. This involution of the problems invites comparison with the theories of Alfred North Whitehead, who also saw them (...)
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  15. Consciousness and Reflection in John Locke’s Essay.Vinícius França Freitas - 2022 - Discurso 52 (1):84-100.
    The paper discusses the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘reflection’ in John Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. It attempts to present two criteria by means of which it would be possible to distinguish between these mental activities. Firstly, consciousness is a passive, involuntary activity and does not depend on attention to be exerted, unlike reflection, which is, at least in one of its degrees – since Locke conceives the existence of two degrees of reflection –, an active, voluntary, (...)
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  16. The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    In this paper, I examine the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that in various ways they (...)
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  17. The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.Francois Kammerer - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is (...)
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  18. Force of Consciousness in Mass Charge Interactions.Wolfgang Baer - 2014 - Cosmos and History 10 (1):170-182.
    Primitive awareness leading to consciousness can be explained as a manifestation of internal forces between charge and mass. These internal forces, related to the weak and strong forces, balance the external forces of gravity-inertia and electricity-magnetism and thereby accommodate outside influences by adjusting the internal structure of material from which we are composed. Such accommodation is the physical implementation of a model of the external physical world and qualifies as Vitiello's double held inside ourselves. We experience this accommodation as (...)
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  19. Three philosophical problems about consciousness and their possible resolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
    Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The (...)
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  20. Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1125-1139.
    The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what it’s like to be in them—cannot be explained by appeal to the operation of physiological subsystems. The hard problem arises, however, only given the assumption that hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but (...)
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  21. Reason, Authority and Consciousness: An Analytical Approach to Religious Pluralism.Mudasir A. Tantray - 2018 - International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 6 (1):1832-1834.
    Present world is the victim of conflicts on the basis of misunderstanding of religious dogmas of different religions, irrationality, ignorance and intolerance. People are moving away from knowledge, truth and reason. Indeed people accept false beliefs, hallucinations and myths. The role of religious plurality in philosophy is not to integrate and harmonize religions, especially religions cannot, and rather it is the business of religious pluralism to learn, think and acquire knowledge about the variety of religious beliefs, statements and injunctions. (...)
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  22. The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose - 2009 - Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for (...)
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  23. Process, Image & Intelligence: How Krishnamurti’s experience of the “process” is or is not relevant to models of consciousness.Jim Bardis - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45:49-55.
    Written in broad strokes, this paper attempts to draw form Krishnamurti’s life and teachings, a hermeneutics of the human soul’s quest-journey towards transcendent wholeness. It begins with an attempt to frame K’s “process” (the name given to the painful ordeals in his youth that many believe were the catalyst responsible for his metamorphosis) through a variety of disciplines and cultural perspectives, some of which underscore the impasse of scientific objectivity and the limits of phenomenalist categories in general. It then explores (...)
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  24. How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.
    Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal (...)
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  25. Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test.John N. Williams - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, (...)
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  26. Mind and Life: Is the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature False?Martin Zwick - 2016 - Biological Theory 11 (1):25-38.
    partial review of Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False is used to articulate some systems-theoretic ideas about the challenge of understanding subjective experience. The article accepts Nagel’s view that reductionist materialism fails as an approach to this challenge, but argues that seeking an explanation of mind based on emergence is more plausible than seeking one based on pan-psychism, which Nagel favors. However, the article proposes something similar to Nagel’s (...)
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  27. Quantum Mechanics May Need Consciousness.Andrew Knight - manuscript
    The assertion by Yu and Nikolic that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al. empirically falsifies the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis of quantum mechanics is based on the unfounded and false assumption that the failure of a quantum wave function to collapse implies the appearance of a visible interference pattern.
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  28. An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts.Arjen Rookmaaker - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (1-2):57-90.
    Many philosophers today accept that phenomenal truths cannot be explained in terms of ordinary physical truths. Two possible routes to accounting for consciousness have received much attention: the emergentist route is to accept that ordinary experience is inexplicable in physical terms but that microscopic entities as described in physics nonetheless bring about conscious experience. The second route is to argue that microscopic entities have features not described in physics which can fully explain conscious experience. The view associated with panprotopsychism (...)
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  29. Realism and Anti-Realism Are Both True (and False).Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Mind and Matter 18 (2):121-148.
    The perennial nature of some of philosophy’s deepest problems is a puzzle. Here, one problem, the realism–anti-realism debate, and one type of explanation for its longevity, are examined. It is argued that realism and anti-realism form a dialetheic pair: While they are in fact each other’s logical opposite, nevertheless, both are true (and both false). First, several reasons why one might think such a thing are presented. These reasons are merely the beginning, however. In the following sections, the dialetheic (...)
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  30. A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers.Lorna Green - manuscript
    June 2022 A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers We are in a unique moment of our history unlike any previous moment ever. Virtually all human economies are based on the destruction of the Earth, and we are now at a place in our history where we can foresee if we continue on as we are, our own extinction. As I write, the planet is in deep trouble, heat, fires, great storms, and record (...)
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  31. Beyond Conception: Ontic Reality, Pure Consciousness and Matter.Leanne Whitney - 2015 - Cosmos and History 11 (2):47-59.
    Our current scientific exploration of reality oftentimes appears focused on epistemic states and empiric results at the expense of ontological concerns. Any scientific approach without explicit ontological arguments cannot be deemed rational however, as our very Being can never be excluded from the equation. Furthermore, if, as many nondual philosophies contend, subject/object learning is to no avail in the attainment of knowledge of ontic reality, empiric science will forever bear out that limitation. Putting Jung's depth psychology in dialogue with Patañjali's (...)
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  32. Taking Phenomenology at Face Value: The Priority of State Consciousness in Light of the For-me-ness of Experience.Alberto Barbieri - 2023 - Argumenta.
    An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature (...). I call this the priority of state consciousness thesis (PSC). In this paper, I want to explore how the renewed centrality bestowed to phenomenology in contemporary discussions on consciousness challenges PSC and, consequently, the standard way of framing the problem of consciousness. More precisely, I examine PSC in light of a view about the structure of phenomenal character that is paradigmatic of the approach above. This is subjectivism about phenomenal character (SUBJ), according to which a mental state is conscious when it acquires the property of for-me-ness. I argue that PSC and SUBJ are incompatible because the latter implies that creature consciousness is explanatorily prior to state consciousness. Consequently, if SUBJ is true, then PSC is false, and what constitutes the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of explaining (a kind of) creature consciousness. I conclude by defending my claim from a pair of possible objections and drawing some implications for the discussion of for-me-ness and the debate on the explanation of consciousness. (shrink)
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  33. Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2):67–77.
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of intransitive self-consciousness and second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. (...)
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  34. Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (3):341-361.
    > Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. > Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. > Method • I (...)
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  35. Why All Published Research Findings Are Likely False (and a possible remedy).Richard Sanders - 2017 - Academia.Edu.
    The physiological constraints of our neuro-sensory instrumentation limit the information we receive and from which we fashion our impressions. These limitations precede the psychological issues of data generation and analysis described by Ioannidis [1]. Scientific models widely accepted for at least 50 years [2,3] suggest that the peripheral and central nervous systems do not provide direct information about phenomena as they exist in nature. Instead, perceptible phenomena stimulate sense organs to produce nerve impulses. Sensory nerve impulses are not replicas of (...)
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  36. If Simulation Hypothesis is Possible, Illusionism is False.Wang Zihao - manuscript
    The simulation hypothesis is a view of the nature of reality, suggesting that our world is likely a computer simulation created by an advanced civilization. In contrast, illusionism is a theory about the nature of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and can be fully explained in physical terms. I argue that if our world is a simulated construct, illusionism could be incorrect. Specifically, even if our phenomenal experiences can be explained as illusionism suggests, advanced (...)
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  37. Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2):67–77.
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of intransitive self-consciousness and second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. (...)
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  38. Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.
    Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful (...)
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  39. Searle’s Master Insight and the Non-Dual Solution of the Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems of Consciousness.Robert Elliott Allinson - 2017 - Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):82-93.
    The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a (...)
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  40. Both Materialist & non-Materialist are correct - about themselves: A brain’s self-identification as "Materialist" or “Non-Materialist” (dualist, panpsychist, idealist etc) as reflecting the absence or presence of an associated real non-material awareness/consciousness, rather than merely as a statement of a philosophical stance. A survey will identify relevant candidates of both types for a proposed brain-experiment to determine a possible correlation to the brain’s deep structure/neural wiring.Avi Rabinowitz - manuscript
    We contest the unsubstantiated assumption of both materialists and non-materialist that the ontological status they propose applies to all humans and that the competing claim is false for all - ie we reject both the claim of non-materialists that all humans share the same fundamental aspect of having a "non-material consciousness" (nmc), as well as the contrasting claim of materialists that none do (being fully material as according to eliminative materialists/reductive physicalists etc). Instead, the basic proposition of this (...)
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  41.  56
    Can You See a Ganzfeld? A Critical Notice of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, Susanna Schellenberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, xv + 251 pp., £69.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9780191866784 (online), 9780198827702 (print). [REVIEW]John Dorsch - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1:1-8.
    The first premise of Schellenberg’s particularity argument reads, “If a subject S perceives a particular α, then S discriminates and singles out α” (2018: 25). But this is false if seeing a ganzfeld is possible (i.e., a homogeneous field without any particulars to discriminate). In response, Schellenberg argues that seeing a ganzfeld is impossible by appealing to the ganzfeld effect (viz. hallucinatory experiences caused by ganzfeld exposure) exclusively as a ‘sense of blindness’. I present two challenges for this line (...)
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  42. When are choices, actions, and consent based on adaptive preferences nonautonomous?Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    Adaptive preferences give rise to puzzles in ethics, political philosophy, decision theory, and the theory of action. Like our other preferences, adaptive preferences lead us to make choices, take action, and give consent. In 'False Consciousness for Liberals', recently published in The Philosophical Review, David Enoch (2020) proposes a criterion by which to identify when these choices, actions, and acts of consent are less than fully autonomous; that is, when they suffer from what Natalie Stoljar (2014) calls an (...)
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  43. Foucault, Neoliberalism, and Equality.Tuomo Tiisala - 2021 - Critical Inquiry 48 (1):23-44.
    This article presents a new account of the relationship between Michel Foucault’s work and neoliberalism, aiming to show that the relationship is significantly more complicated than either Foucault’s critics or defenders have appreciated in the recent controversy. On the one hand, I argue that Foucault’s salutary response to some of Gary Becker’s ideas in the lecture course from 1979 should be read together with the argument of Discipline and Punish. By means of this contextualization I show that Foucault’s sympathetic response (...)
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  44. Selfhood and Relationality.Jacqueline Mariña - 2017 - In Joel Rasmussen, Judith Wolfe & Johannes Zachhuber (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nineteenth-Century Christian Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 127-142.
    Nineteenth century Christian thought about self and relationality was stamped by the reception of Kant’s groundbreaking revision to the Cartesian cogito. For René Descartes (1596-1650), the self is a thinking thing (res cogitans), a simple substance retaining its unity and identity over time. For Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), on the other hand, consciousness is not a substance but an ongoing activity having a double constitution, or two moments: first, the original activity of consciousness, what Kant would call original apperception, (...)
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  45. Making a Masala Modern Anglophone Indian Philosophy. [REVIEW]Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach - 2018 - The Berlin Review of Books.
    'Minds Without Fear' attempts to showcase the intellectual agency of Anglophone Indian philosophers living under coloniality. The book’s thirteen chapters are framed by the acute professional anxiety many of them experienced then, and its rippling effects which continue till today. Like their predecessors, contemporary Indian philosophers worry that colonialism has crippled their intellectual abilities. Authors Nalini Bhushan and Jay Garfield argue that this anxiety is simply a type of “false consciousness” (38).
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  46. Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook.Jason A. Springs & Atalia Omer - 2013 - Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.
    Religious nationalism is a complex topic fraught with sensitive questions. Does religion cause violence? Is nationalism a quasi-religion? Are the constant conflicts around the world really about religion, or is religion merely a form of false consciousness? Is religious nationalism primarily a powerful tool that political elites use to manipulate the masses? -/- Religious Nationalism: A Reference Handbook challenges dominant scholarly works on religious nationalism by identifying the preconceptions that skew analysis of the phenomenon dubbed “religious nationalism.” The (...)
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  47. Dislocation, Not Dissociation: The Neuroanatomical Argument Against Visual Experience Driving Motor Action.Benjamin Kozuch - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):572-602.
    Common sense suggests that visual consciousness is essential to skilled motor action, but Andy Clark—inspired by Milner and Goodale's dual visual systems theory—has appealed to a wide range of experimental dissociations to argue that such an assumption is false. Critics of Clark's argument contend that the content driving motor action is actually within subjects' experience, just not easily discovered. In this article, I argue that even if such content exists, it cannot be guiding motor action, since a review (...)
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  48. The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement and the Case Against Illusionism.Hane Htut Maung - 2023 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 16 (1):1-13.
    Illusionism is the view that conscious experience is some sort of introspective illusion. According to illusionism, there is no conscious experience, but it merely seems like there is conscious experience. This would suggest that much phenomenological enquiry, including work on phenomenological psychopathology, rests on a mistake. Some philosophers have argued that illusionism is obviously false, because seeming is itself an experiential state, and so necessarily presupposes the reality of conscious experience. In response, the illusionist could suggest that the relevant (...)
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  49.  55
    Power to the (Right) People: Reply to Critics.Larry Alan Busk - 2024 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 36 (1):92-118.
    This article responds to four critics of Democracy in Spite of the Demos and reiterates its central thesis. Christopher Holman and Théophile Pénigaud attempt to maintain the critical value of democracy by invoking different elements of the deliberative tradition, while Benjamin Schupmann answers my charges by appealing to a strong liberal constitutionalism. I argue that these attempts repeat the ambivalence described and criticized in the book: democracy is taken as an end in itself, but with asterisks that introduce conditions and (...)
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  50. Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental.Jakub Mihálik - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):54.
    While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in (...)
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