V dějinách filozofie se objevilo nespočetné množství snah překonat kognitivní nedostatečnost člověka. Většinový názor zněl, že zatímco vnější smyslové poznání podléhá nejrůznějším klamům, poznání vnitřní je mnohem jistější, či dokonce neomylné. Předpokládaná znalost sebe sama je ovšem iluzorní a stala se důvodem pro vznik mnoha chybných přístupů ke skutečnosti. Kniha se skládá ze tří částí. První kapitola se zabývá introspekcí, především jejím přijetím v dějinách filozofie a odmítnutím v psychologickém behaviorismu 20. století. Druhá kapitola pojednává o iluzornosti svobody rozhodování, která (...) je způsobena řadou nevědomých mechanismů, o jejichž fungování máme zatím jen dosti matnou představu. Ve třetí kapitole jsou domýšleny důsledky kauzálního determinismu pro etiku a právo, především ve smyslu odmítnutí koncepcí morální odpovědnosti a retributivní spravedlnosti. Autor se tak pokouší dokázat, že podstatná část názorů zdravého rozumu je chybná a měla by být nahrazena sadou nových, kompatibilních s dnešní vědou. (shrink)

Reakce na článek Johna Carrolla "Proti svobodné vůli", Proglas, roč. 8, čís. 5-6 (1997), s. 14-18.

Peter Millican je profesor filosofie a Gilbert Ryle Fellow na Hertford College, University of Oxford. Věnuje se především epistemologii, filosofii jazyka a náboženství, zabývá se dílem Davida Huma a Alana Turinga. Je autorem více než padesáti časopisecky publikovaných studií, editoval sborníky The Legacy of Alan Turing (Oxford University Press, 1996) a Reading Hume on Human Understanding (Oxford University Press, 2002). Připravil kritické vydání Humova An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding v edici Oxford World's Classics (Oxford University Press, 2008) a spravuje internetový (...) archiv Humových textů na Hume Texts Online. Rozhovor, který se odehrál v létě roku 2016, poznámkami pod čarou opatřil překladatel. (shrink)

Žádnému tématu – s výjimkou historie Anglie – nevěnoval David Hume více pozornosti než náboženství. Jak už to ale s Humovým filosofickým odkazem bývá, i jeho teorie náboženství byla podrobena celé řadě mnohdy naprosto protikladných interpretací – a právě těm bude věnována první část mého článku. Došlo totiž k pokusům představit jej jako teistu, fideistu, deistu, agnostika nebo ateistu. Ve druhé části budu obhajovat hypotézu, podle níž je úsilí zařadit Huma do jediného údajně správného výkladu liché, protože každá taková snaha (...) naráží na nepřekonatelné terminologické spory, interpretační potíže a argumentační pochybení. Nemusí nás ovšem zajímat, co si Hume ve skutečnosti o náboženství myslel, případně za jaký typ věřícího či nevěřícího se považoval. Mnohem přínosnější je pochopit, jakým způsobem Humova koncepce předchází a obohacuje současnou ateologii. Ve třetí části proto představím textovou evidenci z primárních pramenů, v nichž se Hume zabýval kritikou zjeveného i přirozeného náboženství, morálních i psychologických aspektů religiozity. Závěrem se krátce zamyslím nad Humovou koncepcí „pravého náboženství“ a jejím uplatněním v sekulární společnosti. (shrink)

From the temporal perspective, this article examines shifts in the productionof sociological knowledge. It identifies two kinds of rhythms of sociology: 1) that of sociological standpoints and techniques of investigation and 2) that of contemporary academic life and culture. The article begins by discussing some of the existing research strategies designed to "chase"high-speed society. Some, predominantly methodological, currents are explored and contrasted with the "slow" instruments of sociological analysis composed of different, yet complementary, modes of inquiry. Against this background, the (...) article stresses that it is through the tension between fast and slow modes of inquiry that sociology reproduces itself. The subsequent part explores the subjective temporal experience in contemporary academia. It is argued that increasing administration and auditing of intellectual work significantly coshapes sociological knowledge production not only by requiring academics to work faster due to an increasing volume of tasks, but also by normalizing time-pressure.The article concludes by considering the problem as to whether the increasing pace of contemporary academic life has detrimental consequences for the more organic reproductive rhythms of sociology. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss some problems with Aristotle’s characterization of lucky events as events which are “for the sake of something”. I argue that there is no special sense of the phrase “for the sake of something” when applied to lucky events. Qua event, a lucky event has come about for the sake of something and thus unqualifiedly belongs among things that come about for the sake of something. But qua lucky event, it has not come about for the (...) sake of that thing it has come about qua event, but it nevertheless is, or turns out to be, for the sake of something. (shrink)

The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of (...) conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics. (shrink)

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori (...) reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and a reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. Only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem, can we think of normative solutions to it. (shrink)

Jaroslav Peregrin, Člověk v zrcadle teorie her: Jak nám matematika a filozofie pomáhají zjišťovat, co jsme zač, Praha: Dokořán, 2021, 119 s., ISBN 978-80-7675-012-8.

In this paper, the relationship between the e-value of a complex hypothesis, H, and those of its constituent elementary hypotheses, Hj, j = 1… k, is analyzed, in the independent setup. The e-value of a hypothesis H, ev, is a Bayesian epistemic, credibility or truth value defined under the Full Bayesian Significance Testing mathematical apparatus. The questions addressed concern the important issue of how the truth value of H, and the truth function of the corresponding FBST structure M, relate to (...) the truth values of its elementary constituents, Hj, and to the truth functions of their corresponding FBST structures Mj, respectively. (shrink)

Příspěvek se zaměřuje na zavádějící příběh o tzv. kodaňské interpretaci kvantové mechaniky, již jako údajně nerozpornou či jednotnou vytvořili a sdíleli na základě tzv. kodaňského ducha kvantové teorie její tvůrci v roce 1927. Článek bude vycházet z role, kterou v tomto příběhu sehráli především N. Bohr a W. Heisenberg. První část příspěvku seznamuje s variacemi toho, co se v literatuře považuje za kodaňskou interpretaci. Druhá část odhaluje, že zatímco kvantová mechanika vznikla ve dvacátých letech 20. století, kodaňská interpretace je veskrze (...) problematickým a především Heisenbergovým produktem z let padesátých. Jednou z hlavních motivací, kvůli níž vystoupil s tzv. kodaňskou interpretací, byla obrana vůči množícím se kritikám obhájců kvantové teorie. Jelikož mezi členy tzv. kodaňské školy nepanovala žádná jednotná či nerozporná interpretace kvantové mechaniky, zaměřuje se poslední část příspěvku na několik vybraných rozdílů hlavně mezi Bohrovým a Heisenbergovým výkladem kvantové teorie. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only (...) perception will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price. (shrink)

The paper examines the account of the mortal parts of the human soul in theTimaeus. What is their nature? What is their relationship to the immortal part of the soul and its inner structure on the one hand, and to the body and its organs and their functioning on the other? Are they incorporeal or corporeal? What kind of movement do they have? In what sense precisely are they ‘another kind of soul’ ?

Finding the demarcation criterion for the identification of scientific knowledge is the most important task of normative epistemology. Pseudoscience is not a harmless leisure activity, it can pose a danger to the functioning of liberal democratic societies and the well-being of their citizens. First, there is an outline of how to define science instrumentally without slipping into the detrimental heritage of conceptual essentialism. The second part is dedicated to Popper’s falsification criterion and the objections of its opponents, which eventually led (...) to the abandonment of “naïve” falsificationism. Then I present two promising solutions to the problem, namely the ostensive definition of pseudoscience and the cognitive research of pseudoscientific thinking. In conclusion, I suggest to further extend the typology of alternatives to science to include parascience. (shrink)

Thought experiments are popular tools of argumentation in science and philosophy. The criticism of these experiments from naturalized and experimental philosophers has led to the formation of deflationary and minimalist approaches that weaken the epistemic power of thought experiments and reconcile them with empiricism. This paper aims to demonstrate that these attempts do not overcome the main problems encountered by thought experiments in philosophy. The limits of human rationality and imagination prevent experimenters from solving unrealistic scenarios in a reliable way. (...) Thought experiments in philosophy are different from science because the real ones usually cannot be implemented and are not open to the possibility of empirical falsification. Moreover, they are based on defective analogies and they shift the burden of proof unfairly. The persuasive success of thought experiments is very low; therefore, they cannot contribute to the solution of philosophical problems. The paper concludes that the most common types of thought experiments should be removed from the set of philosophical methods. (shrink)

The term ‘heat’ originates from the Old English word hǣtu, a word of Germanic origin; related to the Dutch ‘hitte’ and German ‘Hitze’. Today, we distinguish three different meanings of the word ‘heat’. First, ‘heat’ is understood in colloquial English as ‘hotness’. There are, in addition, two scientific meanings of ‘heat’. ‘Heat’ can have the meaning of the portion of energy that changes with a change of temperature. And finally, ‘heat’ can have the meaning of the transfer of thermal energy (...) from a hotter to a colder system or body. By contrast, for the Ancients and Scholastics, ‘heat’ was a manifest, real quality of bodies and there was an ontological distinction between biological or innate heat (which was regarded as an innate principle of life for warm-blooded animals) and the physical manifest heat of external objects, which is potentially harmful. During the late Renaissance period, however, both views changed fundamentally and evolved - via the application of physical and mechanical analogies - into the foundations for today’s unified mechanistic theory of heat. (shrink)

Pseudovědecké teorie jsou uzavřeny vůči možnosti vyvrácení, ale s konspiračními teoriemi to tak jednoduché není, protože mnohé zprávy o konspiracích jsou pravdivé. Přijetí jedné konspirační teorie nicméně může vést k přijetí jiné, která je s ní v přímém protikladu. Co nás žene do pasti konspiračního myšlení?

Karl Polanyi's double movement is a dialectical process characterized by a continuous tension between a movement towards social marketization and a movement towards social protectionism. Notably, Polanyi condemns the former movement while defending the latter. Without using the term " double movement " , F.A Hayek's theory of social evolution acknowledges the same phenomenon but reaches different normative conclusions. While for Polanyi the marketization of society is a utopia with dystopian consequences, Hayek's evolutionary explanation of this dialectical process asserts that (...) there is no alternative to a market oriented society. Both authors defend that their favoured movement is the one that truly supports the continuity of life. This article compares the authors' normative readings of the double movement and concludes that, from an evolutionary perspective, Polanyi's conclusion possesses a robustness that Hayek's postulate lacks. (shrink)

Myšlenkové experimenty jsou populárním argumentačním nástrojem ve vědě i filosofii. Jejich kritika ze strany naturalistických a experimentálních filosofů vedla k vytvoření deflačních a minimalistických koncepcí, které oslabují epistemickou sílu myšlenkových experimentů a smiřují je s empirismem. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tyto pokusy nepřekonávají hlavní problémy, se kterými se myšlenkové experimenty ve filosofii střetávají. Omezená lidská racionalita a představivost znemožňují experimentátorům řešit nereálné scénáře spolehlivým způsobem. Myšlenkové experimenty se ve filosofii používají jinak než ve vědě, protože ty pravé jsou obvykle (...) neuskutečnitelné a uzavřené vůči možnosti empirické falsifikace. Navíc jsou založeny na vadných analogiích a neoprávněně přenášejí důkazní břemeno. Persvazivní úspěšnost myšlenkových experimentů je velmi nízká, a proto nedokáží přispět k řešení filosofických problémů. Závěrem článku je, že nejběžnější druhy myšlenkových experimentů by měly být odstraněny ze souboru filosofických metod. (shrink)

Tato studie je inspirována knížkou Petra Urbana Jak rozumíme druhým? Studie o sociálním rozumění a sdílení světa nejen u člověka a věnuje se současným diskuzím o povaze sociálního rozumění, zejména v případě nelinguálních tvorů. Nejvýraznější pozice zastává na jedné straně skupina srovnávacích psychologů kolem M. Tomasella, která vychází z filosofů kolektivní intencionality, na straně druhé D. Leavens a K. Bardová, kteří mají blízko k interaktivistické interpretaci problému sociálního rozumění. Bude ukázáno, že rozdíly ve výsledcích empirických výzkumů mají základ v ontologických (...) závazcích jednotlivých výzkumných programů, přičemž důležitou roli hraje vymezení se vůči problému antropologické diference. Studie se táže, je-li možné prostředky filosofi e vědy mezi soupeřícími teoriemi rozhodnout. Na závěr je uvedena možnost biosémiotické reinterpretace mimo-lidského sociálního rozumění na pozadí teorie umweltu. (shrink)

Any account of Spinoza's understanding of attribute must be able to satisfy his definition criterion; that is, it must coherently accommodate the elements involved in his definition of attribute as “what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence” (E1d4). But this is not enough. There are several available readings that satisfy this criterion and are mutually incompatible. To know what Spinoza means we must supplement his definition criterion with a criterion aiming at consistency with other principles in (...) his system. With the definition and consistency criteria in the backdrop, the aim of this paper is to offer a critical overview of the current state of the debate on Spinoza's theory of attributes. (shrink)

Phenomenology and Quantum theory have defined themselves against the subject-object tradition of thought and against the modern objectivistic attempt to unify explanation of reality or being. Scientific technology and calculative way of thinking have prevailed over meditative and qualitative thinking in modern times. Despite scientific efforts to eliminate any inconsistency caused by metaphysical speculations and systems, in everyday life and science we encounter such phenomena which cannot be explained unambiguously and fully on the basis of purely conventional criteria. This paper (...) focuses on Bohr's framework of complementarity. The idea enables us exploring and describing a given phenomenon in such manner that we get adequate knowledge of the same phenomenon or subject of interest only by completing incompatible descriptions. (shrink)

Filozofie ve 20. století ztratila velkou část svých kompetencí a pro svou údajnou neužitečnost se stala terčem kritiky ze strany přírodních vědců. Vztah mezi filozofií a vědou lze řešit pomocí tří stanovisek, kterými jsou antiscientismus, konceptuální analýza a naturalismus. Obsahem článku je charakteristika jednotlivých přístupů a identifikace problémů, s nimiž se musí jejich zastánci potýkat. Autorovi se jako nejslibnější jeví Quinem inspirovaný naturalismus, podle něhož má veškeré poznání povahu syntetických aposteriorních výroků, a filozofie je proto kontinuální s přírodní vědou. Není (...) třeba obávat se zániku filozofie jako samostatné disciplíny, naturalismus může naopak přispět k dořešení mnohých filozofických problémů pomocí metodologie a poznatků přírodních věd. (shrink)

Článek se zabývá demystifikací dodnes panující legendy o ikoně světové vědy, nositeli Nobelovy ceny za objev štěpení těžkých jader, chemiku Otto Hahnovi. Desítky let byl považován za vzor německé slušnosti, zodpovědnosti a příklad antinacistického vědce, který nekolaboroval se zločinným režimem na jeho válečné mašinérii. Teprve od devadesátých let 20. století se dostávají k rukám historiků archivní materiály, jež umožňují získat ucelenou představu o Hahnově působení v době nacistického Německa a o jeho aktivním zapojení ve válečném uranovém výzkumu, jehož výsledkem mělo (...) být sestrojení jaderných reaktorů a bomb. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

In this paper, we show that there are some strong philosophical and exegetical reasons to argue that according to the view developed in the first chapter of Aristotle’s De Memoria, the objects of memory are non-present, or absent, things and events rather than our past acts of awareness of them. We argue that on Aristotle’s account, the objects of memory can be particulars or universals, perceptibles or intelligibles, and that all these kinds of things are past in the same sense, (...) namely, in the sense of previously having been present to the perceiver or knower. Aristotle’s claim that we remember that we previously learned or saw something is the description of how, rather than what, we remember. Keywords: Aristotle, memory, past, pathos, present. (shrink)

The use of teleological language in biology is burdened with many difficulties. Speakers in everyday and scientific discourse confuse functions with purposes and misunderstand functionality, finality, and intentionality. The paper is structured into three sections. In the first part the difference between Platonic supranatural and Aristotelian quasi-natural account of teleology will be explained, with examples from the history of philosophy of biology. The second part will present the Darwinian approach to etiology that constitutes a more sound alternative to the teleological (...) explanation. In the last section I will briefly introduce the teleological bias that is studied by developmental and cognitive psychologists. I believe that this psychological inclination is the real source of intuitive worldviews that are incompatible with contemporary science. (shrink)

Discussions in contemporary epistemology are burdened with confusions about the terms “rational”, “rationality” and their antonyms. In economy, for an agent to be rational simply means to satisfy the Bayesian probability axioms, but the situation in philosophy is much more complicated. Two kinds of rationality are usually distinguished. Epistemic rationality is an ability to achieve justified and true beliefs, whereas instrumental rationality is a capacity to act in accordance with one’s own interests. This division cleared the way to contemplation about (...) rational irrationality, which is the case when an acceptance of epistemically unwarranted beliefs may increase instrumental profit for an individual. In my article, I will criticize this approach. The proponents of rational irrationality 1) misunderstand the primacy of epistemic rationality over instrumental one; 2) underestimate social nature of normative terms; and 3) misinterpret the evolution of human cognition. I will illustrate my conclusions with an example from applied epistemology – conspiracy theories. It is misleading and disparaging to use the term “rational” in relation to sets of unjustified beliefs that are based on conspiratorial ideation. If philosophers cannot make their ideas on rationality clear, it might be better to leave out rationality completely from the epistemological discourse. (shrink)

The indisputable success of experimental science caused a division in philosophy at the turn of the 21st century. A substantial part of philosophers was inspired by ground-breaking writings of W. V. O. Quine and they followed philosophical naturalism that considers hypothetical-deductive method the most effective or the only way to acquire justified true beliefs. Other philosophers are worried about the hegemony of empirical sciences and warn against excessive ambitions of scientific methodology. Scientism or scientific imperialism is a point of view, (...) according to which there are no boundaries of scientific knowledge. According to its supporters, science can describe and explain what is to be described and explained. In my paper I will introduce some common ways how to define and criticize scientism and scientific imperialism. The aim is to demonstrate that criticism of scientism and scientific imperialism is based on the incorrect understanding of what scientific methodology is, how scientific knowledge emerges from natural cognition and in which ways science differs from its alternatives. (shrink)

Mysterianism has become a popular stance in philosophy of consciousness and other philosophical subdisciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that mysterianism is not justified, mainly because its inclination to epistemic defeatism and the misunderstanding of the division of epistemic labour. In the first part, I will present the history of mysterianism in the 19th and 20th century philosophy. Then, in the second part, I will point out how epistemic defeatism is founded in the unwarranted philosophical futurology. The (...) third part will deal with the division of labour in society, language and knowledge. Because of the division of epistemic labour, the understanding is distributed among numerous agents without possibility of individual comprehension. Finally, I will coin the term “ignorance illusion” that plays the central role in the mysterians’ worldview. (shrink)

Článek se zabývá dějinami střetu mezi analytickou a kontinentální tradicí, který dominoval filozofii 20. století. I když obě tradice vzešly ze stejného intelektuálního prostředí a byly výrazně ovlivněny novokantovstvím, přesto se jejich vzájemné neporozumění postupem času prohlubovalo a při několika příležitostech situace přerostla v otevřené nepřátelství. V článku je popsáno deset nejzávažnějších konfliktů: Russell vs. Bergson, Schlick vs. Husserl, Carnap vs. Heidegger, Ryle vs. Heidegger, Popperova kritika pseudovědy, konference v Royaumont, Searle vs. Derrida, odhalení Heideggerovy nacistické minulosti, Derridův čestný doktorát (...) z Cambridge a Sokalův podvrh. Na počátku 21. století se ukazuje, že rozepře analytické a kontinentální filozofie se vyčerpala. Mnohem podstatnější je spor o samotnou metodologii filozofie, jenž se projevuje v rozhraní mezi naturalisticky a antinaturalisticky zaměřenými mysliteli. (shrink)

Semantics based on representational theories of mind has met challenges recently. Traditional accounts consider meaning as an entity with semantic properties, i.e. a mental object that denotes or represents a real-world object. The paper discusses ways of constructing meaning without representations, as shown in Rapaport’s syntactic semantics and Rosenberg’s eliminative theory of mind and language.

In 2009, we celebrated the bicentennial of the birth of Charles Darwin and the sesquicentennial of the publication of his book The Origin of Species. This seems to be a good opportunity to evaluate the importance of Darwin’s work for the social sciences, mainly for philosophical anthropology. The aim of this paper is to discuss the traditional anthropocentric conceptions of man, which consider our biological species to be exceptional – qualitatively higher than other living organisms. Over the course of the (...) 20th century, philosophers have argued for the claim in a number of ways: man is supposed to be the only animal capable of laughter, love, thought or language. It has also been claimed that only members of Homo sapiens have free will, morality or religion. The paper refutes these arguments on the basis of contemporary studies by M. Davila Ross, H. Fischer, K. Arnold, K. Zuberbühler, G. Konopka, B. Libet, F. De Waal, M. Bekoff, P. Boyer, B. Hood, G. Paul and others. The author argues that the only differences between man and other animals are quantitative, and therefore the nature of humans should be studied using the methods of naturalized philosophy, with respect to the natural sciences. (shrink)

In Ancient Greece, when philosophy began, it included all the theoretical knowledge. But later, in the time of Aristotle, specialized sciences started to emerge and the scope of philosophy grew smaller and smaller. The question is what to do when philosophy has lost its competence to deal with any relevant topic. The paper discusses three possible views of the relation between philosophy and science: anti-scientism, conceptual analysis and naturalism. All these approaches deal with various disadvantages. For anti-scientism it is mainly (...) the inability to explain the unprecedented success of modern science. Proponents of conceptual analysis are confronted with Quine’s attack on analytic statements and its consequences for a priori truths. Finally, naturalistic philosophers might be threatened by hegemony of science and its universal application of hypothetico-deductive method. The worst scenario for naturalistic philosophers is not as bad as some worry. Philosophers can solve their traditional problems using the knowledge of well-established special sciences, even though they might play the role of high-end science journalists. (shrink)

Popularizační článek o britském dokumentárním cyklu Life (BBC, 2009) při příležitosti jeho uvedení na filmovém festivalu AFO.

Los desacuerdos acerca de la ontología científica han sido frecuentemente reconstruidos como el resultado de una disputa entre stances epistémicas rivales. En el presente trabajo, (i) caracterizamos algunos de estos desacuerdos como desacuerdos profundos. Además, (ii) mostramos que los desacuerdos profundos sobre ontología científica pueden surgir no solo de la adopción de diferentes stances epistémicas, sino entre posiciones que se encuadran dentro de una misma stance. El desarrollo de ese punto nos permite, a su vez, establecer una distinción entre tipos (...) de desacuerdos profundos y explorar la posibilidad de que existan diferencias de grado entre ellos. (shrink)

Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy is often presented simply as an interpretation of Descartes’ Principia that does not reveal anything significant about Spinoza’s philosophy and its development. This paper, however, shows that Spinoza altered Descartes’ text in a way congruent with what he would later write in his Theological Political Treatise and the Ethics. More precisely, this paper concentrates not on what Spinoza added to Descartes’ texts but on how he presented them. The paper furthermore examines questions that were obviously (...) important for Descartes but absent in Spinoza’s interpretation. Finally, this paper examines two concrete examples to show that Spinoza’s adaptations function as an unmasking of Descartes’ physics. (shrink)

Disertační práce se zabývá problematikou připisování myšlení jiným entitám, a to pomocí imitační hry navržené v roce 1950 britským filosofem Alanem Turingem. Jeho kritérium, známé v dějinách filosofie jako Turingův test, je podrobeno detailní analýze. Práce popisuje nejen původní námitky samotného Turinga, ale především pozdější diskuse v druhé polovině 20. století. Největší pozornost je věnována těmto kritikám: Lucasova matematická námitka využívající Gödelovu větu o neúplnosti, Searlův argument čínského pokoje konstatující nedostatečnost syntaxe pro sémantiku, Blockův návrh na použití brutální síly pro (...) řešení imitační hry, Frenchova teorie subkognitivních informací a Michieho skepticismus ohledně možnosti umělého vědomí. Závěr práce zachycuje současný stav recepce Turingova testu a představuje pokusy o jeho praktickou realizaci, například v každoroční soutěži o Loebnerovu cenu. Autor práce zastává názor, že ani po více než šedesáti letech od uveřejnění Turingova paradigmatického eseje stále neexistují žádné vážné důvody pro zamítnutí jeho tvrzení. Tradiční komputační funkcionalismus možná není ideální teorií vysvětlující činnost myslí a jako slibnější se může jevit vývoj v neurálních vědách, ale Turingův test je přesto užitečným a snad i jediným nástrojem pro detekci inteligence u lidmi vytvořených strojů. (shrink)

This article aims to elucidate, albeit in a preliminary way, the concept of liquidity in Zygmunt Bauman and its effects onsociety. The deductive-inductive method will be used. As for the methodology, this will be of a bibliographic nature. This study is in line with what the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017), in his texts, postulates that Modernity can be divided into two phases: Solid Modernity and Liquid Modernity. The first began in the 15th century and lasted until the 19th century; the (...) second began in the 20th century and continues to the present time. To describe modern society from the end of the 20th century, Bauman uses the metaphor of 'liquidity', aiming to point out that the contemporary world is going through a period of uncertainty, ephemerality and instabilities. According to Bauman, the modern ideal coined between the 15th and 19th centuries postulated the primacy of reason and the autonomy of capitalist man and such assumptions led society to liquid modernity. In this liquid “contemporaneity”, nothing is lasting, everything is volatile, ephemeral; consumption is the social parameter, whether of the individual, the family, the State or religion. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Γ 4-6 Aristotle argues that Protagoras is committed not just to denying the PNC, but also to asserting its contrary. In this paper, I offer an analysis of this commitment. I try to show that Aristotle is working with a specific idea in mind: a Protagoreanism ontologically linked to the flux doctrine, as Plato suggested in Theaetetus 152-160.

Anti-luck epistemologists tell us that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck and that epistemic luck is just a special case of luck in general. Much work has been done on the intricacies of the first claim. In this paper, I scrutinize the second claim. I argue that it does not survive scrutiny. I then offer an analysis of luck that explains the relevant data and avoids the problems from which the current views of luck suffer. However, this analysis of luck (...) is of no help to the anti-luck epistemologist for it uses knowledge to explain luck, making this account of knowledge circular. The main lesson is that the only viable analysis of luck is not suited for the anti-luck epistemologist's coveted noncircular analysis of knowledge. (shrink)