Desde ines del siglo XX, el Desarrollo Humano (DH) ha planteado la necesidad de un cambio de paradigma que centre su atención en la mejora de la condición de vida de las personas —no únicamente desde la perspectiva de un aumento de ingreso— sino en torno al desarrollo de las capacidades fundamentales o esenciales pertenecientes al ser humano. Esta postura parte de la crítica al utilitarismo y sostiene que el DH tiene que partir de una comprensión profunda del ser humano. (...) Hasta entonces, la pregunta central del desarrollo había sido sobre la capacidad de producción de una nación. Pero, el nuevo planteamiento se preocupa por el estatus de las personas no en cuanto a la felicidad entendida como el poder de generar bienestar en función de obtener placer y evitar el dolor, sino cómo está la gente en sí misma. Entonces, el DH se reiere a un proceso y a un in en sí mismo, mediante el cual la gente accede a oportunidades para ampliar sus capacidades y funcionamientos, puesto que el sujeto de éstas es el hombre mismo. El DH como paradigma tiene que desarrollar un cuerpo teórico de carácter interdisciplinar y, en este punto, la incorporación de la ilosofía se hace urgente. Es necesario incorporar la metafísica del hombre dentro de la antropología social (AS) a la metodología de investigación del DH, a in de responder ¿Cuáles son las capacidades esenciales que le competen a los seres humanos? (shrink)

Una idea casi universalmente aceptada es que es que la filosofía y la ciencia por naturaleza buscan la verdad. No obstante, para que alcancen la Verdad requieren a fortiori de la fe. A partir de estas ideas, nuestra reflexión está organizada en tres apartados: en el primero abordamos la necesidad de la metafísica como disciplina que encuentra los principios en la naturaleza. Así como, la ciencia gracias a la metafísica encuentra las leyes de esta, pero sólo con ayuda de la (...) fe; en la segunda idea nos centramos en explicar el método de la ciencia y nos preguntamos sí sus formas y metodologías van de acuerdo con la fe. La última idea, trata la dimensión de las ciencias sociales cara al Desarrollo Humano (DH). El argumento que se desarrolla en este apartado sostiene que, el motivo por el cual el hombre, con su razón, busca la verdad; es para dar sentido a su existencia. No obstante, hay que reflexionar sobre el devenir de las Ciencias Sociales puesto que ante el establecimiento de linderos, la inflexión de métodos y metodologías se ha desdibujado e incomprendido de los hechos presentes en la realidad y no se ha tendido a la búsqueda de la verdad. Finalmente, se presentan nuestras conclusiones que ahondan en la propuesta del DH y la bibliografía utilizada para elaborar este trabajo. (shrink)

Para comprender la visión peirceana acerca de la subjetividad semiótica es necesario establecer antes tres referentes. Cada uno de estos referentes tiene un constructo teórico efectuado por otra serie de nociones, que en este momento no me detendré a explicar, sin embargo, será necesario más adelante acudir a varias de estas nociones para intentar exponer mi tema de investigación. La filosofía peirceana es un sistema amplio y complejo, va madurando en el tiempo. Peirce va definiendo y redefiniendo sus conceptos, hasta (...) cierto punto lo realiza de una manera imbricada, este es su método. Se presenta la dificultad de que la construcción teórica peirceana depende de conceptos que se explican entre sí, lo que hace la labor de investigación y exposición difícil, pues para fin de exponer una idea se requiere acceder a diferentes referentes conceptuales simultáneamente hasta llegar a una noción central. (shrink)

Ignorance is often a perfectly good excuse. There are interesting debates about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake subvert obligation, but little disagreement about whether non-culpable factual ignorance and mistake exculpate. What about agents who have all the relevant facts in view but fail to meet their obligations because they do not have the right moral beliefs? If their ignorance of their obligations derives from mistaken moral beliefs or from ignorance of the moral significance of the facts they have in (...) view, should they be excused for failing to meet their moral obligations? It is not obvious that they should. In this paper we argue that the best non-skeptical accounts of moral responsibility acknowledge that factual ignorance and mistake will diminish moral responsibility in a way that moral ignorance and mistake will not. That is because factual ignorance is often non-culpable so long as it meets certain merely procedural epistemic standards but the same is not true of moral ignorance. Our argument is that the assumption that it is gets the standards of culpability for moral ignorance wrong, and that the mistake is encouraged by the thought that culpability in general requires an instance of known wrongdoing: that acting wrongly requires de dicto unresponsiveness to one’s obligations at some stage. We deny this and conclude that, therefore, ignorance and mistaken belief are indeed often perfectly good excuses – but far less often than some philosophers claim. (shrink)

In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.

En este trabajo nos enfocamos fundamentalmente en responder dos interrogantes: (a) ¿Pueden las mujeres ser sujetos ilustrados desde la perspectiva de Hume? y en caso de responder afirmativamente, (b) ¿resulta esta ilustración emancipatoria en términos feministas? En primer lugar, reconstruimos las principales líneas de interpretación feministas de la obra de Hume para ubicar nuestra propuesta dentro de una corriente interpretativa poco explorada aún. En segundo lugar, precisamos el sentido que puede adoptar la noción de “ilustración” en la filosofía de Hume, (...) en discusión con debates de la literatura secundaria contemporánea. En tercer lugar, orientamos nuestra reflexión a responder el primero de los interrogantes e indagamos si las mujeres están incluidas dentro de los rasgos ilustrados que podemos reconocer en el pensamiento de Hume y en qué condiciones. En cuarto y último lugar, ensayamos una respuesta al segundo interrogante: si aquello que podemos interpretar como ilustración femenina en clave humeana constituye una vía para la emancipación de la dominación patriarcal o si, por el contrario, refuerza el sometimiento de las mujeres. (shrink)

The concept of psychological trauma is polysemous and remains a subject of ongoing debate among scholars and researchers. One of the most significant discussions surrounding the definition of trauma is the relationship between traumatic events (TE), traumatic memory (TM) and trauma response (TR). Several definitions of trauma provided by world-renowned organizations present the TE as the primary element, suggesting a necessary causal relationship in which the TE is antecedent, and the TM and TR are consequent. I call this the _strong (...) causal view_. In this article, I argue that the strong causal view is problematic as it does not sufficiently account for important trauma-related effects that pose anomalies for the causal position. I argue in favor of two claims. First, in defining psychological trauma, we must move beyond the need for a strong TE-dependent causal relationship and instead adopt a _weak causal view_. To support this, I review the discussion of causation in philosophy of memory that pits causal theories against postcausal theories, and propose two principles that can aid this transition. Second, I propose that among the three elements, TR should be the most critical in defining trauma. My aim is to support those definitions of psychological trauma that focus on TR, as I believe they offer greater explanatory power —especially regarding anomalies that challenge the strong causal view— and are more centered on the survivors' experience than those focused on TE. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...) all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore and offer different hypotheses that could account for an adequate understanding of the duty to die and its relation to biopolitics from two neglected approaches. First, death will be analysed from a biopolitical perspective to understand the crucial role it has in biopower. Second, the focus lies on the two-folded implication that death has in biopower, for it could be either a defiance of it or the final sublimation of its control. Similarly, the next section (...) addresses the relations between death and neoliberalism from a biopolitical perspective, exploring the possibility of understanding the duty to die as resistance to economic mandates or, on the contrary, as the fulfilment of neoliberal interests. Finally, as a continuation of the relations between the duty to die and neo-liberalism, the paper analyses a similar two-folded view of the former from a psychopolitical perspective. (shrink)

Reasons can play a variety of roles in a variety of contexts. For instance, reasons can motivate and guide us in our actions (and omissions), in the sense that we often act in the light of reasons. And reasons can be grounds for beliefs, desires and emotions and can be used to evaluate, and sometimes to justify, all these. In addition, reasons are used in explanations: both in explanations of human actions, beliefs, desires, emotions, etc., and in explanations of a (...) wide range of phenomena involving all sorts of animate and inanimate substances. This diversity has encouraged the thought that the term 'reason' is ambiguous or has different senses in different contexts. Moreover, this view often goes hand in hand with the claim that reasons of these different kinds belong to different ontological categories: to facts (or something similar) in the case of normative/justifying reasons, and to mental states in the case of motivating/explanatory reasons. In this paper I shall explore some of the main roles that reasons play and, on that basis, I shall offer a classification of kinds of reasons. As will become clear, my classification of reasons is at odds with much of the literature in several respects: first, because of my views about how we should understand the claim that reasons are classified into different kinds; second, because of the kinds into which I think reasons should be classified; and, finally, because of the consequences I think this view has for the ontology of reasons. (shrink)

The value of testimony as a source of knowledge has been a subject of epistemological debates. The "trust theory of testimony" suggests that human testimony is based on an affective relationship supported by social norms. However, the advent of generative artificial intelligence challenges our understanding of genuine testimony. The concept of "quasi-testimony" seeks to characterize utterances produced by non-human entities that mimic testimony but lack certain fundamental attributes. This article analyzes these issues in depth, exploring philosophical perspectives on testimony and (...) the implications of conversational AI technologies on our epistemic practices. (shrink)

Se analiza la apertura del hombre a partir de su naturaleza legalizada. Ante el conflicto entre ley, physis y libertad, nos preguntamos: ¿por qué se considera la naturaleza incompatible con la libertad?, ¿por qué la legalidad parece contradecir a la apertura?, ¿ser libre significa estar lejos de cualquier atadura a la ley y a la naturaleza? El texto inicia con una exposición de las nociones de naturaleza y legalidad y de su relación con la libertad, ofrece una definición de la (...) persona basada en su comprensión yoica y su dignidad y una explicación del sentido de la apertura en la dimensión social del ser humano. (shrink)

Las generaciones que hemos vivido los últimos años del siglo XX y los comienzos de esta nueva centuria solemos pensar que cuando este mundo sea realmente perfecto, entonces nadie tendrá que trabajar, pues es común creer que el trabajo es una de las múltiples imperfecciones de esta existencia. Ahora bien, como se sabe el hombre se encuentra arrojado al trabajo, y al ser éste un quehacer de desdicha y cansancio para él, se toman entonces dos posturas ante su “reivindicación”: la (...) primera apunta a la obtención en mayor grado de beneficios externos y riquezas y, la segunda se encamina por la trasmutación del hombre a la máquina. De manera que, la búsqueda de la retribución y la abolición del esfuerzo marcan las pautas del entendimiento sobre el trabajo en este principio del siglo XXI. La retribución es el fin del trabajo y para generar la mayor posible, no se ve como necesario el sudor de la frente. (shrink)

This paper straightforwardly addresses one of the strongest, from an ethical perspective, objections presented to the duty to die, the one concerned with the lack of a normative theory to support it, offered by Seay in his paper Can there be a “duty to die” without a normative theory? The aim of the paper is to provide strong metaethical grounds to support the duty to die without the need of a moral normative theory. First, the definition and main argument for (...) the duty to die will be presented. Second, Seay’s objection will be described and clearly explained. Third, our metaphysical assumptions and a preliminary metaethical discussion will be offered to situate and understand the context. Finally, we will show how the duty to die can be integrated within the metaethical approach previously presented, defending that there is no need of a normative theory to provide good justification and strong ethical grounds for the duty to die, because they will have already been provided by our metaethical argument. (shrink)

This paper seeks a better understanding of the elements of practical reasoning: premises and conclusion. It argues that the premises of practical reasoning do not normally include statements such as ‘I want to ϕ’; that the reasoning in practical reasoning is the same as in theoretical reasoning and that what makes it practical is, first, that the point of the relevant reasoning is given by the goal that the reasoner seeks to realize by means of that reasoning and the subsequent (...) action; second, that the premises of such reasoning show the goodness of the action to be undertaken; third, that the conclusions of such reasoning may be actions or decisions, that can be accompanied by expressions of intention, either in action, or for the future; and that these are justified, and might be contradicted, in ways that are not only peculiar to them (i.e. in ways that diverge from those found in theoretical reasoning), but are distinctively practical, in that they involve reference to reasons for acting and to expressions of intention, respectively.1. (shrink)

Two conceptions of motivating reasons, i.e. the reasons for which we act, can be found in the literature: (1) the dominant 'psychological conception', which says that motivating reasons are an agent's believing something; and (2) the 'non-psychological' conception, the minority view, which says that they are what the agent believes, i.e. his beliefs. In this paper I outline a version of the minority view, and defend it against what have been thought to be insuperable difficulties - in particular, difficulties concerning (...) 'error cases' (cases where what the agent believes is false); and difficulties concerning the explanation of action. Concerning error cases, I argue that if we are motivated by something believed that is true, what motivates us to act is a motivating reason. By contrast, if we are motivated by something believed that is false, then what motivates us to act is merely an apparent motivating reason. Either way, what motivates us is, as the non-psychological conception says, what we believe and not our believing it. I offer an account of the relation between motivating reasons and the explanation of action, and argue that this account helps bring out two important points. One is that the fact that we often do, and indeed sometimes must, use explanations such as 'He did it because he believed that p' does not vindicate the psychological conception of motivating reasons. The other is that endorsing the non-psychological conception of motivating reasons does not commit one to a non-factive view of explanations of action. (shrink)

In ‘Excusing Mistakes of Law’, Gideon Yaffe sets out to ‘vindicate’ the claim ‘that mistakes of law never excuse’ by ‘identifying the truth that is groped for but not grasped by those who assert that ignorance of law is no excuse’. Yaffe does not offer a defence of the claim that mistakes of law never excuse. That claim, Yaffe argues, is false. Yaffe’s article is, rather, an effort to assess what plausible thought might be behind the idea that mistakes of (...) law often should not excuse. (Yaffe is interested in more than just the descriptive claim that in Anglo-American legal jurisdictions mistakes of law routinely do not, in fact, excuse.) More particularly, Yaffe is interested in what plausible normative justification there might be for this asymmetric pattern: -/- Asymmetry: False beliefs about non-legal facts often excuse, but false beliefs about the law rarely excuse. -/- Yaffe offers a complex argument in support of Asymmetry. This paper is organised around my reconstruction of Yaffe’s argument. I argue that Yaffe’s argument does not succeed, but that his argument provides a template for an argument that could succeed. (shrink)

Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

In Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes argues that one cannot trust one’s senses since they are not a reliable source of obtaining knowledge of the world. One of Descartes’s main contentions to support such an argument is from his explanation of dreams, where one can feel one is awake but instead one is dreaming. Native Americans, however, may argue that the experiences one has in dreams are real and are a source of knowledge of the real world. Although Descartes (...) uses dreams to support his argument, some Native Americans have a different take on dreams. Dreams for Native Americans are a source of knowledge as well as a source for obtaining one’s identity. Gregory Cajete, in American Indian Thought, notes that “Dreams and Visions are a natural means for accessing knowledge and establishing relationship to the world. They are encouraged and facilitated.” In other words, it is through dreams that individuals are guided, destined, and informed. Therefore, dreams as understood by some Native Americans are an extension of reality that anticipate events that will happen or can happen. The focus of this paper is an exploration of the philosophical and religious epistemology pertaining to Native Americans as described in their accounts of dreams. (shrink)

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The (...) analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age. (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether it is possible to cause an event by letting it happen.

ABSTRACT: In this text, we are going to try to introduce a few brief notes - without excessive pretensions -, concerning those things that, from a historical and also from an intellectual and point of view, surround the figures of Robert Owen, Fourier or Saint Simon. Certainly, intellectually, our sources do not let us notice a very specific influence on the "utopian socialists" of the 19th Century. It will be very difficult to find historical evidence. However, what we can do (...) is to assume the French Revolution of 1789 as a turning point for the radical traditions, both British and Continental, to introduce Romanticism as the real source from which the utopian nineteenth-century thought was derived from. Then, Romanticism is where we will be able to read something about Robert Owen. Likewise, we will approach a very succinct reading of paleo-socialism, focusing on the context of the British Islands where the Industrial Revolution took place to become another great event in the lifetime of the "utopian socialists". Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In the present text, we are going to introduce a series of notes without excessive pretensions. In these pages, we will try to study figures like Cabet, Fourier or Saint - Simon, and we will do so in order to achieve better understanding concerning their own historical and their own intellectual context. Consequently and leaving our papers on Robert Owen behind, we plan to set special emphasis on the European Continent now. In a special way, we raise awareness on (...) the very significant role that these "utopian socialists" played between modernity and industrial modernity, and also between the 18th and 19th Centuries. Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

En Argentina existió una poderosa influencia de origen francés que modificó profundamente las tácticas militares y la ideología del Ejército entre 1957 y 1963. Estas teorías extranjeras importadas al Cono Sur, tuvieron como origen los aprendizajes obtenidos por el Ejército francés en las guerras de Argelia e Indochina. A partir de tales experiencias, los oficiales franceses desarrollaron técnicas de combate contra la entonces novedosa ‘guerra de guerrillas’ de los grupos rebeldes, que fueron enseñadas posteriormente a los militares argentinos. Esta enseñanza (...) incluía importantes elementos de carácter doctrinario, como la idea de la guerra global contra el comunismo, la noción de enemigo interno, y la convicción de que sus acciones, incluido el uso de tortura como técnica de obtención de información, estaban justificadas por la búsqueda del bien mayor de la nación. Esta ideología influyó profundamente en el Ejército argentino y es posible notar su rastro en el radical proceder que tuvieron los cuerpos militares durante el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In its historical deployment, socialist thought has attracted the attention of numerous experts and thinkers. The results reached from the above mentioned efforts, are quite irregular in fact. These studies are very often linked the marxist tradition, that shifted its identity to label previous social reformers as "utopian socialists". Specifically, our academic Spanish tradition has traditionally been dependant -historically and intellectually- on other Continental currents of thought. We state, that the preeminence and fundamental influence on our Spanish culture in (...) the Iberian Peninsula, has traditionally had its origin here, between modernity and industrialism, in France. Consistently, contributions concerning authors like Saint-Simon, Fourier or Cabet do exist. However, it is necessary to say that there is a bibliographical and very significant emptiness around one of the most relevant figures of European history in the 19th Century. Such emptiness has to do with the absence of publications concerning Robert Owen and his meaning in Spanish. Key words: Christianity, Modernity, Industrialism, Utopian Socialism, Socialism, Rationality, History. (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendemos dar cuenta de cómo los criterios de delimitación entre el conocimiento animal y el conocimiento humano en la epistemología contemporánea no son adecuados para agotar la complejidad epistemológica del fenómeno. Buscamos, así, establecer una tercera vía de interpretación, proponiendo una taxonomía de niveles que satisfaga las necesidades de clasificación del conocimiento animal sin dejar de lado la particularidad propia del conocimiento humano, a saber, la reflexividad. De esta manera, se pretende reinterpretar cómo ha sido concebido el (...) conocimiento animal en la epistemología contemporánea para reconstruir, a partir de las posturas mencionadas, una vía alternativa que dé cuenta, adecuadamente, de las particularidades del conocimiento animal en relación con el conocimiento humano. (shrink)

El Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico afirma que la Lógica es como cualquier otra ciencia. Si esta afirmación es cierta, entonces ella no sólo es revisable, sino que además todo lo que se puede decir sobre las ciencias aplica, mutatis mutandis, para la misma. El propósito de este artículo es explorar esta consecuencia del Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, acercando a la Filosofía de la Lógica el marco teórico de las Máquinas Nomológicas de Nancy Cartwright. De acuerdo con esta visión, lo que hay de verdadero en (...) las teorías científicas no está en el mundo sino en sus modelos: sistemas altamente controlados, estables, artificiales y específicos, dentro de los cuales se manifiestan regularidades sistematizables y enseñables. Mi afirmación es que lo mismo puede decirse de la Lógica: ella no captura las Leyes del Pensamiento o de la Razón, porque el pensamiento y la razón no están gobernados necesariamente por leyes. Sobre lo que sí puede decirse que versan las Leyes de la Lógica son metafísicas posibles: historias acerca de qué son las proposiciones, el pensamiento, la verdad y la validez. A fin de ilustrar y defender esta tesis, presento un ejemplo de Máquina Nomológica de la Lógica Clásica, basada en una lectura original del Tractatus de Wittgenstein, e investigo algunas de sus consecuencias. Mi conclusión es que esta imagen de la Lógica impacta en el problema de la revisión de la Lógica Clásica, en la medida en que muestra que dicha revisión no necesariamente responde a un proceso racional de adecuación de la teoría a los hechos porque los “hechos” relevantes no son anteriores a la teoría misma, sino que están moldeados y conducidos por ella. Palabras clave: Anti-Excepcionalismo Lógico, Abductivismo, Máquinas Nomológicas, Revisión Lógica, Filosofía de la Lógica. (shrink)

This work was my theses to get the MA in Philosophy. Their focus is the ethics implied in digital culture and networked society. Themes are Ethics, culture, technology, political control, autonomous systems.

A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been (...) taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument. (shrink)

(English below) -/- Normalmente se piensa en la percepción y la memoria como dos capacidades independientes, creyendo que la primera solo tiene influencia sobre la segunda durante la codificación. En las entrevistas autobiográficas de historia oral y memoria histórica, los entrevistados seleccionan, adaptan y completan sus recuerdos para crear diferentes versiones de ellos. En este artículo se argumenta que lo anterior es consecuencia de la naturaleza simulativa de la memoria episódica, y del empleo por los entrevistados de información perceptiva para (...) generar y adaptar sus recuerdos a un discurso autobiográfico, buscando satisfacer un propósito comunicativo. Para ilustrar esto, se analizan tres factores contextuales que influyen sobre la construcción del recuerdo en una entrevista autobiográfica (objetivo comunicativo, idioma de comunicación e interacción emocional), mostrando que, en este tipo de recuperación, memoria y percepción contribuyen simultáneamente a construir simulaciones de eventos que se adaptan en tiempo real al contexto donde ocurre la evocación. /////////////Abstract/////////////// Perception and memory are usually thought to be two independent faculties, where the former is believed to only have an influence on the latter at encoding. In autobiographical interviews of oral history and historical memory, interviewees select, adapt, and complete their memories to create different versions. This paper argues that this process is a consequence of the simulative nature of episodic memory and the interviewees’ use of perceptual information to generate and adapt their memories to an autobiographical discourse with the goal of satisfying a communicative purpose. To illustrate this, three contextual factors that influence the construction of a memory in an autobiographical interview are analyzed, showing that, in this type of recall, memory and perception simultaneously contribute to constructing episodic simulations of events, which adapt in real-time to the context in which recall happens. (shrink)

Baruch Spinoza famously said, “Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God, nothing can be, or be conceived”. This form of Pantheism is quite like eastern Pantheism, where in Hinduism they assert that “everything is Brahma”, or in Taoism, where Lao Tzu says, “Heaven and I were created together, and all things and I are one”. Although the western and eastern world shared their respective ideas of Pantheism, Native Americans also contributed to such discussion. However, comparative philosophy between western and (...) Native American philosophy has been far neglected, and the same neglect has been shown regarding Native American contribution to Pantheism. Many Indigenous religions believe that there is a Great Spirit that is manifested as a life force or energy that communicates and speaks through nature. In other words, some Native American tribes believe that nature, or in extension the universe, is part of a Great Spirit that communicates to individuals in a naturalistic way. Such a Great Spirit created the world and is in everything that the Great Spirit created. Moreover, there are other Indigenous beliefs that not only hold a Pantheistic view but hold a Panentheistic perspective where God is a being that is present in creation but transcends from it. Therefore, although Indigenous beliefs about Pantheism or Panentheism have been much neglected, there is much to say about it. With such input from Native American religious culture, this paper seeks to show and compare Spinoza’s Pantheism and that of Native Americans. In addition, I wish to investigate in what ways Native American philosophy contributes to the discussion of cosmology, nature, and Pantheism. In particular, how do some Native American tribes understand God in a Pantheistic sense where nature and cosmology are one. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute acerca de la posibilidad de llevar a cabo afirmaciones epistémicamente objetivas respecto del arte a partir de la filosofía de la sociedad de John Searle y de la epistemología del desacuerdo. Para ello se considerarán las distinciones ontológicamente objetivo/subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo/subjetivo en relación con el arte como fenómeno relativo a la intencionalidad, señalándolo como ontológicamente subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo. Luego se discutirá acerca del desacuerdo en torno a obras polémicas de arte y de la (...) disolución de tales desacuerdos al considerar la oposición entre creencia y aceptación según la propuesta de Jonathan Cohen. Finalmente, mostrando la posibilidad de generar acuerdos en torno al juicio de gustos, se señala el rol de las instituciones relativas al arte en nuestra comprensión del estatuto artístico de las obras polémicas. De esta manera, se pretende señalar que la apreciación de una obra como ‘arte’ es una cuestión objetiva dependiente de las instituciones que operan en nuestra sociedad. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se pretende reconstruir la noción de imaginación expuesta por Kant en la "Crítica de la razón pura", en su primera edición, y en la "Crítica del juicio" con el fin de poder dilucidar un posible papel de este concepto en el marco de la ética kantiana. -/- .

Many current problems surrounding science revolve around the complex epistemological framework that shapes a new vision of knowledge about reality. The traditional epistemological positions are characterized by the explanation of nature by means of concatenated facts; that is, as bricks attached to each other giving shape to the edifice of science. A conception of this nature showed that the idea of certainty was nothing more than a mere illusion, opening the way, on the contrary, to the idea of the uncertainty (...) of knowledge based on the descriptions of quantum physics, also a product of the non-reductionist conception of reality, thus criticizing the specular representation. This article addresses the main problems surrounding the critical conceptions that the emerging epistemology reveals about knowledge, pointing towards a much more complex vision of reality. (shrink)

This article shows how Hume, based on a definition of freedom as a historical process and an understanding of the faction as inevitable phenomenon in human political path, concludes that the harmful effects of the different factions do not crystallize, as in the case of justice and the origin of government, in a spontaneous balance, but require strategies in the executive and legislative to be controlled and reoriented in order to obtain from such control a fundamental socio-political advantage: the development (...) and expansion of the experience of political freedom. (shrink)

Resumen. El presente texto se centra en la crítica que el pensamiento decolonial ha dirigido a la cultura occidental, focalizada en la modernidad, como intrínsecamente violenta y respecto de la cual las culturas que sufrieron la colonización debieran cortar radicalmente. Con el objetivo de poner en cuestión algunos aspectos centrales de este planteamiento se analizan críticamente sus conceptos de modernidad, de geopolítica del conocimiento y de cultura. Palabras clave: modernidad; cultura; geopolítica del conocimiento. [en] The Critique of Modernity in the (...) Decolonial Thought Abstract. This paper takes as its central issue the criticism that the decolonial thought has made to the Western culture, focused on modernity, as an internally violent culture. For this reason, the decolonial authors think that the cultures which have suffered the colonization should set a cut in regard of Western culture. We try to put in question some central aspects of this conception, as their concepts of modernity, culture, and geopolitics of knowledge. Keywords: Modernity; Culture; Geopolitics of Knowledge. (shrink)

Se plantea el problema de la existencia de una campo científico -el geográfico - para el cual existen candidaturas e disciplinas determinadas como la Geografía Física, La Humana, la R egional y la Universal, etc. Se plantea la diferencia entre ciencias naturales y humanas, así como entre ciencias texonómicas y ciencias mereológicas, como marcos de análisis para las ciencias geográficas.

En este trabajo se analiza, en el marco de la epistemología social aplicada (es decir, desde una perspectiva analítica y normativa) el debate en torno a la confiabilidad de Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento, proponiendo que es fiable y que, por tanto, debiéramos confiar en ella para adquirir creencias verdaderas. En primer lugar, se analizan las limitaciones y aciertos de las posturas tradicionales acerca de la fiabilidad de Wikipedia, para luego cuestionar el rol epistemológico que ha adquirido la noción de (...) confianza en dicho debate. En segundo lugar, se introduce la noción de “confianza afectiva” propia de la epistemología del testimonio para contrastarla con la “confianza esperanza”, esto con el fin de caracterizar la normatividad social tanto interna como externa que rige y hace fiable a Wikipedia. Finalmente, se resumen los resultados en una serie de razones de orden epistémico para confiar en Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento como lo son el poseer virtudes en relación con la difusión de información, mecanismos internos y externos que la sustentan, y su supervivencia al colapso del contexto en internet. De este modo, se sugiere que es adecuado, desde el punto de vista epistemológico, emplear con confianza Wikipedia en nuestra vida cotidiana. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Active Powers Active Powers, Human Agency, and Liberty Agent Causation and Volitionism Conclusion: Agent Causation References Further reading.

Hintikka considers that the “Transcendental Deduction” includes finding the role that concepts in the effort is meant by human activities of acquiring knowledge; and it affirms that the principles governing human activities of knowledge can be objective rules that can become transcendental conditions of experience and no conditions contingent product of nature of human agents involved in the know. In his opinion, intuition as it is used by Kant not be understood in the traditional way, ie as producer of mental (...) images, but rather as that which the mind represents an individual. To support this interpretation refers to the lessons of Kant´s Logics, to individuality space time and the thesis, submitted the winning essay in 1764, characterizing the mathematical method by the use of particular representatives of general concepts. Thus, his exegesis considers the Kantian conceptions of the “Doctrine of Method” not later conceptions, as traditionally interpreted, but prior conceptions to the processing of “Transcendental Aesthetic”. This article reconstructs some of their arguments that eventually will equal the Kantian intuition with the Euclidean ecthesis. (shrink)

En este trabajo pretendo señalar en qué consiste el debate entre reduccionismo y antireduccionismo respecto de la justificación testimonial en la epistemología del testimonio. Para esto, se procederá de la siguiente manera: se expondrá las consideraciones epistemológicas de Hume y Reid sobre el testimonio para dar cuenta del reduccionismo y el antireducionismo en filosofía de la modernidad-temprana; por otra parte, se expondrá cómo se ha desarrollado dicho debate en la epistemología contemporánea. De esta manera, se pretende presentar una visión sistemática (...) de las posturas involucradas en el debate entre reduccionismo y antireduccionismo en a la epistemología social. Palabras clave: testimonio; reduccionismo; antireduccionismo; epistemología social. (shrink)