Results for 'Julia Franke-Reddig'

516 found
Order:
  1. Ectogestative Technology and the Beginning of Life.Lily Frank, Julia Hermann, Ilona Kavege & Anna Puzio - 2023 - In Ibo van de Poel (ed.), Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. pp. 113–140.
    How could ectogestative technology disrupt gender roles, parenting practices, and concepts such as ‘birth’, ‘body’, or ‘parent’? In this chapter, we situate this emerging technology in the context of the history of reproductive technologies and analyse the potential social and conceptual disruptions to which it could contribute. An ectogestative device, better known as ‘artificial womb’, enables the extra-uterine gestation of a human being, or mammal more generally. It is currently developed with the main goal of improving the survival chances of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Program explanation: A general perspective.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Analysis 50 (2):107-17.
    Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   225 citations  
  3. What Does It Mean for a Conspiracy Theory to Be a ‘Theory’?Julia Duetz - 2023 - Social Epistemology:1-16.
    The pejorative connotation often associated with the ordinary language meaning of “conspiracy theory” does not only stem from a conspiracy theory’s being about a conspiracy, but also from a conspiracy theory’s being regarded as a particular kind of theory. I propose to understand conspiracy theory-induced polarization in terms of disagreement about the correct epistemic evaluation of ‘theory’ in ‘conspiracy theory’. By framing the positions typical in conspiracy theory-induced polarization in this way, I aim to show that pejorative conceptions of ‘conspiracy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  4. How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.
    According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  5. Paradoxes of Infinite Aggregation.Frank Hong & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Noûs.
    There are infinitely many ways the world might be, and there may well be infinitely many people in it. These facts raise moral paradoxes. We explore a conflict between two highly attractive principles: a Pareto principle that says that what is better for everyone is better overall, and a statewise dominance principle that says that what is sure to turn out better is better on balance. We refine and generalize this paradox, showing that the problem is faced by many theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):281-294.
    In this paper, I highlight an interesting difference between belief on the one hand, and suspended judgment and credence on the other hand. This difference is the following: credences and suspended judgments are suitable to serve as transitional as well as terminal attitudes in our reasoning, whereas beliefs are only appropriate as terminal attitudes. The notion of a transitional attitude is not an established one in the literature, but I argue that introducing it helps us better understand the different roles (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  7. Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.
    This paper proposes a novel answer to the question of what attitude agents should adopt when they receive misleading higher-order evidence that avoids the drawbacks of existing views. The answer builds on the independently motivated observation that there is a difference between attitudes that agents form as conclusions of their reasoning, called terminal attitudes, and attitudes that are formed in a transitional manner in the process of reasoning, called transitional attitudes. Terminal and transitional attitudes differ both in their descriptive and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  8. Philosophical Agreement and Philosophical Progress.Julia Smith - 2024 - Episteme:1-19.
    In the literature on philosophical progress it is often assumed that agreement is a necessary condition for progress. This assumption is sensible only if agreement is a reliable sign of the truth, since agreement on false answers to philosophical questions would not constitute progress. This paper asks whether agreement among philosophers is (or would be) likely to be a reliable sign of truth. Insights from social choice theory are used to identify the conditions under which agreement among philosophers would be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.
    Epistemic permissivism is the view that it is possible for two people to rationally hold incompatible attitudes toward some proposition on the basis of one body of evidence. In this paper, I defend a particular version of permissivism – unacknowledged permissivism (UP) – which says that permissivism is true, but that no one can ever rationally believe that she is in a permissive case. I show that counter to what virtually all authors who have discussed UP claim, UP is an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  10. Diagnosing Diabetic Retinopathy With Artificial Intelligence: What Information Should Be Included to Ensure Ethical Informed Consent?Frank Ursin, Cristian Timmermann, Marcin Orzechowski & Florian Steger - 2021 - Frontiers in Medicine 8:695217.
    Purpose: The method of diagnosing diabetic retinopathy (DR) through artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems has been commercially available since 2018. This introduces new ethical challenges with regard to obtaining informed consent from patients. The purpose of this work is to develop a checklist of items to be disclosed when diagnosing DR with AI systems in a primary care setting. -/- Methods: Two systematic literature searches were conducted in PubMed and Web of Science databases: a narrow search focusing on DR and a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. What Does It Mean to Be Human Today?Julia Alessandra Harzheim - forthcoming - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics.
    With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. Thus, we conceive ourselves “in the image of our machines,” and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. (1 other version)Conspiracy Theories Are Not Beliefs.Julia Duetz - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Napolitano (2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories—i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies—should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of belief—i.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano’s account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  13. Moral Functionalism.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 2023 - In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-64.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Consumer Choice and Collective Impact.Julia Nefsky - 2018 - In Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 267-286.
    Taken collectively, consumer food choices have a major impact on animal lives, human lives, and the environment. But it is far from clear how to move from facts about the power of collective consumer demand to conclusions about what one ought to do as an individual consumer. In particular, even if a large-scale shift in demand away from a certain product (e.g., factory-farmed meat) would prevent grave harms or injustices, it typically does not seem that it will make a difference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  15. Explanation and Cognition.Frank C. Keil & Robert Andrew Wilson - 2000 - MIT Press. Edited by Frank C. Keil & Robert A. Wilson.
    These essays draw on work in the history and philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the development of concepts in children, conceptual..
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  16. Climate Change and Individual Obligations: A Dilemma for the Expected Utility Approach, and the Need for an Imperfect View.Julia Nefsky - 2021 - In Budolfson Mark, McPherson Tristram & Plunkett David (eds.), Philosophy and Climate Change. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-221.
    This chapter concerns the nature of our obligations as individuals when it comes to our emissions-producing activities and climate change. The first half of the chapter argues that the popular ‘expected utility’ approach to this question faces a problematic dilemma: either it gives skeptical verdicts, saying that there are no such obligations, or it yields implausibly strong verdicts. The second half of the chapter diagnoses the problem. It is argued that the dilemma arises from a very general feature of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17. Reinforcement learning: A brief guide for philosophers of mind.Julia Haas - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (9):e12865.
    In this opinionated review, I draw attention to some of the contributions reinforcement learning can make to questions in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I highlight reinforcement learning's foundational emphasis on the role of reward in agent learning, and canvass two ways in which the framework may advance our understanding of perception and motivation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Metabolism Instead of Machine: Towards an Ontology of Hybrids.Julia Rijssenbeek, Vincent Blok & Zoë Robaey - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-23.
    The emerging field of synthetic biology aims to engineer novel biological entities. The envisioned future bio-based economy builds largely on “cell factories”: organisms that have been metabolically engineered to sustainably produce substances for human ends. In this paper, we argue that synthetic biology’s goal of creating efficient production vessels for industrial applications implies a set of ontological assumptions according to which living organisms are machines. Traditionally, a machine is understood as a technological, isolated and controllable production unit consisting of parts. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  19. Can hierarchical predictive coding explain binocular rivalry?Julia Haas - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):424-444.
    Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Explicability of artificial intelligence in radiology: Is a fifth bioethical principle conceptually necessary?Frank Ursin, Cristian Timmermann & Florian Steger - 2022 - Bioethics 36 (2):143-153.
    Recent years have witnessed intensive efforts to specify which requirements ethical artificial intelligence (AI) must meet. General guidelines for ethical AI consider a varying number of principles important. A frequent novel element in these guidelines, that we have bundled together under the term explicability, aims to reduce the black-box character of machine learning algorithms. The centrality of this element invites reflection on the conceptual relation between explicability and the four bioethical principles. This is important because the application of general ethical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  21. Fairness, Participation, and the Real Problem of Collective Harm.Julia Nefsky - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 5:245-271.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  22. Is Synchronic Self-Control Possible?Julia Haas - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):397-424.
    An agent exercises instrumental rationality to the degree that she adopts appropriate means to achieving her ends. Adopting appropriate means to achieving one’s ends can, in turn, involve overcoming one’s strongest desires, that is, it can involve exercising synchronic self-control. However, contra prominent approaches, I deny that synchronic self-control is possible. Specifically, I draw on computational models and empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience to describe a naturalistic, multi-system model of the mind. On this model, synchronic self-control is impossible. Must we, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. Reconciling Conceptual Confusions in the Le Monde Debate on Conspiracy Theories, J.C.M. Duetz and M R. X. Dentith.Julia Duetz & M. R. X. Dentith - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11):40-50.
    This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  24. Presupposing Counterfactuality.Julia Zakkou - 2019 - Semantics and Pragmatics 12.
    There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or ‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conversationally implicating. This paper provides a thorough examination of the arguments against the presupposition view as applied to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. Uses and Abuses of AI Ethics.Lily E. Frank & Michal Klincewicz - 2024 - In David J. Gunkel (ed.), Handbook on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. Edward Elgar Publishing.
    In this chapter we take stock of some of the complexities of the sprawling field of AI ethics. We consider questions like "what is the proper scope of AI ethics?" And "who counts as an AI ethicist?" At the same time, we flag several potential uses and abuses of AI ethics. These include challenges for the AI ethicist, including what qualifications they should have; the proper place and extent of futuring and speculation in the field; and the dilemmas concerning how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Probability without Tears.Julia Staffel - 2023 - Teaching Philosophy 46 (1):65-84.
    This paper is about teaching probability to students of philosophy who don’t aim to do primarily formal work in their research. These students are unlikely to seek out classes about probability or formal epistemology for various reasons, for example because they don’t realize that this knowledge would be useful for them or because they are intimidated by the material. However, most areas of philosophy now contain debates that incorporate probability, and basic knowledge of it is essential even for philosophers whose (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Moral Facts do not Supervene on Non-Moral Qualitative Facts.Frank Hong - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-11.
    It is very natural to think that if two people, x and y, are qualitatively identical and have committed qualitatively identical actions, then it cannot be the case that one has committed something wrong whereas the other did not. That is to say, if x and y differ in their moral status, then it must be because x and y are qualitatively different, and not simply because x is identical to x and not identical to y. In this fictional dialogue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Extended Agency and the Problem of Diachronic Autonomy.Julia Nefsky & Sergio Tenenbaum - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. New York: Routledge. pp. 173 - 195.
    It seems to be a humdrum fact of human agency that we act on intentions or decisions that we have made at an earlier time. At breakfast, you look at the Taco Hut menu online and decide that later today you’ll have one of their avocado burritos for lunch. You’re at your desk and you hear the church bells ring the noon hour. You get up, walk to Taco Hut, and order the burrito as planned. As mundane as this sort (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical Knowledge.Julia Tanney - 2017 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5 (5).
    In the introduction to the special volume, Gilbert Ryle: Intelligence, Practice and Skill, Julia Tanney introduces the contributions of Michael Kremer, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson, and Will Small, each of which indicates concern about the appropriation of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that in seminal work in contemporary epistemology. Expressing agreement with the authors that something has gone awry in these borrowings from Ryle, Tanney takes this criticism to a deeper level. She argues that the very notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Levels of explicability for medical artificial intelligence: What do we normatively need and what can we technically reach?Frank Ursin, Felix Lindner, Timo Ropinski, Sabine Salloch & Cristian Timmermann - 2023 - Ethik in der Medizin 35 (2):173-199.
    Definition of the problem The umbrella term “explicability” refers to the reduction of opacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. These efforts are challenging for medical AI applications because higher accuracy often comes at the cost of increased opacity. This entails ethical tensions because physicians and patients desire to trace how results are produced without compromising the performance of AI systems. The centrality of explicability within the informed consent process for medical AI systems compels an ethical reflection on the trade-offs. Which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  31. 'I Wish My Speech Were Like a Loadstone’: Cavendish on Love and Self-Love.Julia Borcherding - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (3):381-409.
    This paper examines the surprisingly central role of sympathetic love within Margaret Cavendish’s philosophy. It shows that such love fulfils a range of metaphysical functions, and highlight an important shift in Cavendish’s account vis-a-vis earlier conceptions: sympathetic love is no longer given an emanative or mechanistic explanation, but is naturalized as an active emotion. It furthers investigate to what extent Cavendish’s account reveals a rift between the realm of nature and the realm of human sociability, and whether this rift really (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. Classifying and characterizing active materials.Julia R. S. Bursten - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):2007-2026.
    This article examines the distinction between active matter and active materials, and it offers foundational remarks toward a system of classification for active materials. Active matter is typically identified as matter that exhibits two characteristic features: self-propelling parts, and coherent dynamical activity among the parts. These features are exhibited across a wide range of organic and inorganic materials, and they are jointly sufficient for classifying matter as active. Recently, the term “active materials” has entered scientific use as a complement, supplement, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33. Institutions and their strength.Frank Hindriks - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (3):354-371.
    Institutions can be strong or weak. But what does this mean? Equilibrium theories equate institutions with behavioural regularities. In contrast, rule theories explicate them in terms of a standard that people are supposed to meet. I propose that, when an institution is weak, a discrepancy exists between the regularity and the standard or rule. To capture this discrepancy, I present a hybrid theory, the Rules-and-Equilibria Theory. According to this theory, institutions are rule-governed behavioural regularities. The Rules-and-Equilibria Theory provides the basis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Inference to the Best Explanation - An Overview.Frank Cabrera - 2023 - In Lorenzo Magnani (ed.), Handbook of Abductive Cognition. Springer. pp. 1-34.
    In this article, I will provide a critical overview of the form of non-deductive reasoning commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Roughly speaking, according to IBE, we ought to infer the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of our evidence. In section 2, I survey some contemporary formulations of IBE and highlight some of its putative applications. In section 3, I distinguish IBE from C.S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. After underlining some of the essential elements of IBE, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. The Fate of Explanatory Reasoning in the Age of Big Data.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):645-665.
    In this paper, I critically evaluate several related, provocative claims made by proponents of data-intensive science and “Big Data” which bear on scientific methodology, especially the claim that scientists will soon no longer have any use for familiar concepts like causation and explanation. After introducing the issue, in Section 2, I elaborate on the alleged changes to scientific method that feature prominently in discussions of Big Data. In Section 3, I argue that these methodological claims are in tension with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  36. What is the environment in environmental health research? Perspectives from the ethics of science.David M. Frank - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 88 (C):172-180.
    Environmental health research produces scientific knowledge about environmental hazards crucial for public health and environmental justice movements that seek to prevent or reduce exposure to these hazards. The environment in environmental health research is conceptualized as the range of possible social, biological, chemical, and/or physical hazards or risks to human health, some of which merit study due to factors such as their probability and severity, the feasibility of their remediation, and injustice in their distribution. This paper explores the ethics of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  37. String Theory, Non-Empirical Theory Assessment, and the Context of Pursuit.Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese 198:3671–3699.
    In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin 2006). Others, such as Dawid (2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to nonempirical methods of theory assessment given (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  38. Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):727-750.
    In this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’, one that has received scant attention.1 1 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization.Julia Staffel & Glauber De Bona - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3247-3273.
    Standard arguments for Bayesian conditionalizing rely on assumptions that many epistemologists have criticized as being too strong: (i) that conditionalizers must be logically infallible, which rules out the possibility of rational logical learning, and (ii) that what is learned with certainty must be true (factivity). In this paper, we give a new factivity-free argument for the superconditionalization norm in a personal possibility framework that allows agents to learn empirical and logical falsehoods. We then discuss how the resulting framework should be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty – Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational.Julia Staffel - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):463-468.
    In his new book "The Importance of Being Rational", Errol Lord aims to give a real definition of the property of rationality in terms of normative reasons. If he can do so, his work is an important step towards a defense of ‘reasons fundamentalism’ – the thesis that all complex normative properties can be analyzed in terms of normative reasons. I focus on his analysis of epistemic rationality, which says that your doxastic attitudes are rational just in case they are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  41. Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    The Preface Paradox is often discussed for its implications for rational belief. Much less discussed is a variant of the Preface Paradox for knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the most plausible closure-friendly resolution to the Preface Paradox for Knowledge is to say that in any given context, we do not know much. I call this view “Socraticism”. I argue that Socraticism is the most plausible view on two accounts—(1) this view is compatible with the claim that most of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Is Simplicity an Adequate Criterion of Theory Choice.Julia Göhner, Marie I. Kaiser & Christian Suhm - 2008 - In Nicola Mößner, Sebastian Schmoranzer & Christian Weidemann (eds.), Richard Swinburne: Christian Philosophy in a Modern World. ontos. pp. 33-45.
    According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of experimental methods, and truth of new theoretical proposals) cannot (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43. Collectivized Intellectualism.Julia Jael Smith & Benjamin Wald - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):199-227.
    We argue that the evolutionary function of reasoning is to allow us to secure more accurate beliefs and more effective intentions through collective deliberation. This sets our view apart both from traditional intellectualist accounts, which take the evolutionary function to be individual deliberation, and from interactionist accounts such as the one proposed by Mercier and Sperber, which agrees that the function of reasoning is collective but holds that it aims to disseminate, rather than come up with, accurate beliefs. We argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44. Preserving Republican Freedom: A Reply to Simpson.Frank Lovett & Philip Pettit - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (4):363-383.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, Page 363-383, Fall 2018.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  45. Ethical particularism and patterns.Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 2000 - In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 79--99.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  46.  29
    Corporations in the Economy of Esteem.Robert Frank & Philip Pettit - 2018 - In Subramanian Rangan (ed.), Capitalism Beyond Mutuality?: Perspectives Integrating Philosophy and Social Science. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 229-55.
    Even in a regulated and competitive market economy the behavior of firms leaves much to be desired. Looking beyond the invisible hand of the market and the iron hand of the law, this chapter outlines and assesses arguments for the intangible hand of civil society. The central mechanisms in our model depend on the importance of social esteem and self-esteem. Such esteem depends on assessments of true intentions and dispositions for costly pro-social actions. Instrumental or reputation-shaping pro-social actions matter little (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Permissivism.Julia Smith - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Epistemic permissivists believe that sometimes, incompatible doxastic attitudes—such as belief and suspension of judgment—can both be rational responses to a proposition given a single body of evidence. Epistemic impermissivists believe that a body of evidence always determines a unique rational doxastic attitude toward a proposition. This entry provides an overview of the current state of the debate between epistemic permissivists and impermissivists. Three important choice points for the permissivist are identified, and implications are discussed for the plausibility of the resulting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.
    In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  49. A Rawlsian Solution to the New Demarcation Problem.Frank Cabrera - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):810-827.
    In the last two decades, a robust consensus has emerged among philosophers of science, whereby political, ethical, or social values must play some role in scientific inquiry, and that the ‘value-free ideal’ is thus a misguided conception of science. However, the question of how to distinguish, in a principled way, which values may legitimately influence science remains. This question, which has been dubbed the ‘new demarcation problem,’ has until recently received comparatively less attention from philosophers of science. In this paper, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Misery Loves Company.Julia Nefsky - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press.
    When one is going through a personal hardship, it is often comforting, or emotionally helpful, to hear from someone else who has gone through something similar. This is a common, familiar human phenomenon, but this chapter argues that it is philosophically puzzling. Unless one is in some sort of moment of vice, one would not want the other person to have suffered the hardship, and one should be pained to hear that they have. And yet the phenomenon is that hearing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 516