A key objective of the law in the assessment of decision-making capacity in clinical settings is to allow clinicians and judges to avoid making value judgements about the reasons that patients use to refuse treatment. This paper advances two lines of argument in respect of this objective. The first is that authorities cannot rationally avoid significant evaluative judgements in the assessment of a patient’s own assessment of the facts of their case. Assessing reasoning is unavoidably value-laden. Yet the underlying motivation (...) behind clinicians’ and the law’s value-neutral aims, ie, the avoidance of undue paternalism, is worth preserving. That being so, the second line of argument will try to show that that underlying motivation is better served in a limited range of cases by embedding a ‘reversibility standard’ in the assessment process so that the patient can, if they wish, and in due course, bring about the consequences that they were prevented from realising as a result of a determination of incapacity. (shrink)

This article advances two views on the role of evaluative judgment in clinical assessments of decision-making capacity. The first is that it is rationally impossible for such assessments to exclude judgments of the values a patient uses to motivate their decision-making. Predictably, and second, attempting to exclude such judgments sometimes yields outcomes that contain intractable dilemmas that harm patients. These arguments count against the prevailing model of assessment in common law countries—the four abilities model—which is often incorrectly advertised as being (...) value-neutral in respect of patient decision-making both by its proponents and in statute. A straightforward evaluative model of capacity assessment which wears its values on its sleeves and is biased against what are called ‘serious prudential mistakes’ avoids these rational and practical problems. (shrink)

This article takes up the question of whether legal rules are reasons for action. They are commonly regarded in this way, yet are legal rules reasons for action themselves (the reflexivity thesis) or are they instead merely statements of other reasons that we may already have (the paraphrastic thesis)? I argue for a version of the paraphrastic thesis. In doing so, considerable attention is given to the neglected but important puzzle of the opaqueness of rules, which arises out of what (...) some regard as the gap between the evaluative grounds of legal rules and what makes them into reasons for action. After examining an important articulation of the puzzle in the work of Joseph Raz, I argue that the reflexivity thesis is (i) undermined by certain features of rule making and (ii) defeated by the principle of presumptive sufficiency. The result is that it is possible for legal rules to be paraphrastic statements of reasons but, conversely, impossible for them to be reasons in themselves. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for people to hold bizarre views. Sometimes, these views appear before the courts in mental capacity cases. Judges must then decide if the views are so bizarre that they constitute evidence of incapacity or, instead, if those views are the everyday sort that do not constitute such evidence. The idea behind the distinction is that the everyday sort can be false but, in some important sense, not that unreasonable. But what should tip the balance of reasons (...) for a view to count as severely unreasonable rather than merely so? It turns out that capacity law is unable to provide a principled answer to this question because it lacks a standard to parse beliefs. This paper offers such a standard, focussing on the ability to reason, or the ‘use and weigh’ criterion, which features in most capacity statutes. The standard takes the form of a threshold with four necessary conditions. The main idea is that when a person's belief satisfies those conditions, it counts as evidence of an inability to reason. The standard's objective is to displace the various unarticulated conceptions of reasonableness which judges are currently compelled to use to determine questions of reasoning ability. (shrink)

This paper examines a looming reproducibility crisis in the core of the hard sciences. Namely, it concentrates on molecular modeling and simulation (MMS), a family of methods that predict properties of substances through computing interactions on a molecular level and that is widely popular in physics, chemistry, materials science, and engineering. The paper argues that in order to make quantitative predictions, sophisticated models are needed which have to be evaluated with complex simulation procedures that amalgamate theoretical, technological, and social factors (...) – leading to problems with reproducibility. Thus, for methodological reasons, the predictive success causes a reproducibility problem. (shrink)

This essay is an examination of the relationship between phenomenology and analytic method in the philosophy of law. It proceeds by way of a case study, the requirement of compliance in Raz’s theory of mandatory norms. Proceeding in this way provides a degree of specificity that is otherwise neglected in the relevant literature on method. Drawing on insights from the philosophy of art and cognitive neuroscience, it is argued that the requirement of compliance is beset by a range of epistemological (...) difficulties. The implications of these difficulties are then reviewed for method and normativity in practical reason. A topology of normativity emerges nearer the end of the paper, followed by a brief examination of how certain normative categories must satisfy distinct burdens of proof. (shrink)

In my paper, I defend an interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks in Nicomachean Ethics (EN) that the rational aspect of soul is needed in discerning which ends of desire would be good. Many interpreters have traditionally supported this, ‘rationalist’ line of interpreting Aristotle’s theory of value cognition. The rationalist interpretation has, however, recently come under a novel challenge from Jessica Moss (2011, 2012), but has not yet received a defence. Moss attempts to resurrect now virtually abandoned ‘anti-rationalist’ interpretation, which (...) claims, in a contrast to the rationalist one, that discerning good ends may require no activity from the rational aspect, but only well-habituated non-rational desire. Moss’ interpretation appeals to certain Aristotle’s claims in De Anima (DA) 3, which, she thinks, show that non-rational phantasia suffices for discerning good ends if only accompanied with the habituated desire. Although her interpretation can successfully avoid some problems that earlier anti-rationalist interpretations faced with certain passages of EN, I also argue, however that it introduces some new problems, and attributes philosophically incoherent views about moral responsibility to Aristotle. Therefore I conclude that even after Moss’ improvements to the anti-rationalist interpretation, the rationalist interpretation remains overall more plausible. (shrink)

I present a solution to the epistemological or characterisation problem of induction. In part I, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) is discussed as a good contender for such a solution but with a fundamental explanatory gap (along with other well discussed problems); useful assigned probabilities like priors require substantive degrees of belief about the world. I assert that one does not have such substantive information about the world. Consequently, an explanation is needed for how one can be licensed to act as (...) if one has substantive information about the world when one does not. I sketch the outlines of a solution in part I, showing how it differs from others, with full details to follow in subsequent parts. The solution is pragmatic in sentiment (though differs in specifics to arguments from, for example, William James); the conceptions we use to guide our actions are and should be at least partly determined by preferences. This is cashed out in a reformulation of decision theory motivated by a non-reductive formulation of hypotheses and logic. A distinction emerges between initial assumptions--that can be non-dogmatic--and effective assumptions that can simultaneously be substantive. An explanation is provided for the plausibility arguments used to explain assigned probabilities in BCT. -/- In subsequent parts, logic is constructed from principles independent of language and mind. In particular, propositions are defined to not have form. Probabilities are logical and uniquely determined by assumptions. The problems considered fatal to logical probabilities--Goodman's `grue' problem and the uniqueness of priors problem are dissolved due to the particular formulation of logic used. Other problems such as the zero-prior problem are also solved. -/- A universal theory of (non-linguistic) meaning is developed. Problems with counterfactual conditionals are solved by developing concepts of abstractions and corresponding pictures that make up hypotheses. Spaces of hypotheses and the version of Bayes' theorem that utilises them emerge from first principles. -/- Theoretical virtues for hypotheses emerge from the theory. Explanatory force is explicated. The significance of effective assumptions is partly determined by combinatoric factors relating to the structure of hypotheses. I conjecture that this is the origin of simplicity. (shrink)

El presente estudio analiza el avance del populismo penal en Ecuador, tomando en cuenta los últimos índices de violencia, las reformas constitucionales más recientes y los lineamientos para un correcto desarrollo de la política criminal. Se busca contribuir a un debate informado en la academia sobre este tema crucial para la seguridad pública y la justicia en el país, en este momento de coyuntura social en el que el populismo penal ha tomado auge en Ecuador. La presente investigación tiene como (...) objetivo desarrollar un método neutrosófico para la evaluación del avance del populismo penal en Ecuador. Se caracteriza por reformas legislativas que endurecen las penas, amplían el catálogo de delitos y restringen los beneficios penitenciarios. Si bien estas medidas pueden generar una sensación de falsa seguridad en la población, no abordan las causas estructurales de la criminalidad y, en muchos casos, tienen consecuencias negativas en los derechos humanos y la reincidencia delictiva. (shrink)

In recent decades, interest in the history and philosophy of the natural sciences has increased significantly. This interest has made scholars aware of the existing knowledge gap in these areas and has brought a kind of 'pressure' for more articles and books on the subject. Indeed, it also motivates academics to start new projects related to these disciplines. Volumes like this are much needed for scholars in the field, given the high amount of information they contain. This rich volume aims (...) at stimulating the field by presenting current research papers on Avicenna's influence on the fields of physics and cosmology. In order to achieve this goal, this work contains thirteen articles related to the reception of the Persian philosopher's thought in these areas in the Middle Ages. The book revolves around the three different languages and cultures which were crucial for the reception of Avicenna's thought. Hence, the volume is arranged in three main sections focusing on the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin traditions. It also contains an Index of Avicenna's Works with Passages Cited and an Index of Names. The introduction is rather short compared to other sections of the book. It covers the general topics presented in the volume. The first six chapters deal with the Arabic tradition ; the next two have to do with the Hebrew reception of Avicenna, and the last five analyse the Latin reception of Avicenna's physics and cosmology. (shrink)

Das Thema der Misologie und Misanthropie lässt sich wie so viele anderen philosophischen Themen der europäischen Geistesgeschichte bis zu einem platonischen Dialog zurückverfolgen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um Platons berühmten Dialog Phaidon. Nun handelt dieser Dialog bekanntlich von der Frage nach der Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Seele. Dennoch verweist Sokrates an einer bestimmten Stelle des Dialoges auf die für den Menschen drohenden Gefahren der Misologie und der Misanthropie hin, dem Hass auf die Vernunft und den Hass auf den Menschen, (...) die seiner Auffassung nach zusammenhängen. Die sokratische Warnung vor der Misologie und Misanthropie ist um so eindringlicher, als sie auf dem Hintergrund des existenziellen Problems des Todes und der religiösen Frage nach einem Jenseits des Todes diskutiert wird. (Einleitung). (shrink)

Die im Reader versammelten Beiträge verstehen sich als Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Visuellen. Sie untersuchen am Beispiel des Mediums Stadtfilm, welche Rolle die dorterzeugten Bilder großer Städte bei der Produktion urbanistischer Repräsentanten spielen. Aus diesem Grund werden insbesondere Übergänge analysiert, die Spielfilme einerseits und urbanistische Diskurse andererseits miteinander verknüpfen. Gemeinsamer Ausgangspunkt ist die These, daß es vor allem Bilder sind, die solche Verknüpfungen gewährleisten. Es wird unterstellt, daß es das Medium Film erlaubt, gerade über den Einsatz von Bildern "näher" (...) an soziale Wirklichkeiten heranzukommen, als dies textzentrierter Praxis empirischer Sozialforschung möglich ist. Stadtfilme erzeugen wirkmächtige Bilder, auf die dann unter bestimmten Bedingungen in urbanistischen Kontexten zurückgegriffen wird. Die Autoren präsentieren konzeptionelle Überlegungen und Filminterpretationen zu Moebius (1991, Regie: Matti Geschonneck), Der Himmel über Berlin (1987, Regie: Wim Wenders), In weiter Ferne, so nah! (1993, Regie: Wim Wenders), Der Bauch des Architekten (1987, Regie: Peter Greenaway) und Hass (1995, Regie: Mathieu Kassovitz). Sie bedienen sich dabei sehr unterschiedlicher Verfahren. Gemeinsam sind ihnen allerdings die Anliegen, die größere Nähe der Filme zu sozialen Welten hervorzuheben und die Übergänge zwischen Stadtfilmen und Urbanistik herauszuarbeiten. -/- City and Film. Attempts at a 'Visual Sociology' Summary The contributions collected in this reader present attempts at a Visual sociology'. Based on a study on the medium 'city film' the author s determine which role the images of big cities evoked in such films can play for urbanistic representations. Therefore the analysis is, in particular, focussed on points of transition marking a connection of movies, on the one hand, and urbanistic discourse, on the othe r. The common point of departure is the hypothesis that images, more than anything else, do guarantee such connections. The authors assume that the medium film may lead 'closer' to social realities than the text- centered practices of empirical social research. City films produce powerful images which, under certain cond itions, can be utilized in urbanistic contexts. The authors present conceptual considerations and interpretations of the following films: Moebius (1991, director: Matti Geschonneck); Der Himmel über Berlin (1987, director: Wim Wenders); In weiter Ferne, so nah! (1993, director: Wim Wenders); The Belly of the Architect (1987, director: Peter Greenaway); and quite different methods they aim at the same goals: emphasizing the greater closeness of films to social worlds and bringing out the points of transition between city films and urbanistics. (shrink)

This paper introduces the novel concept of Neutro-BCK-algebra. In Neutro-BCK-algebra, the outcome of any given two elements under an underlying operation (neutro-sophication procedure) has three cases, such as: appurtenance, non-appurtenance, or indeterminate.

Wenn ausgerechnet Pazifisten bei der Verfechtung ihrer Position aggressiv werden, so finden wir das besonders verstörend – jedenfalls verstörender als bei anderen Spannungen zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Woran liegt das? Meiner Ansicht nach kommen in diesem Fall drei Elemente zusammen, deren Mischung die pazifistische Position von innen bedroht: Während sich der hasserfüllte Pazifist schon beim Diskutieren schnell von negativen Emotionen fortreißen lässt, also alles andere als Willensstärke dokumentiert, verlangt er in seiner Theorie ein Höchstmaß an Willensstärke, und zwar gerade im (...) Umgang mit Emotionen. Dass er das nicht schafft, wirft nicht nur ein negatives Licht auf seine Person, sondern liefert Gründe gegen seine Theorie. Lektion: Der Pazifist ist gut beraten, vorbildlich mit seinen Emotionen umzugehen. (shrink)