In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

R Core Team. (2016). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Supplement to Occipital and left temporal instantaneous amplitude and frequency oscillations correlated with access and phenomenal consciousness. Occipital and left temporal instantaneous amplitude and frequency oscillations correlated with access and phenomenal consciousness move from the features of the ERP characterized in Occipital and Left Temporal EEG Correlates of Phenomenal Consciousness (Pereira, 2015) towards the instantaneous amplitude and frequency of event-related changes correlated with a (...) contrast in access and in phenomenology. Occipital and left temporal instantaneous amplitude and frequency oscillations correlated with access and phenomenal consciousness proceed as following. In the first section, empirical mode decomposition (EMD) with post processing (Xie, G., Guo, Y., Tong, S., and Ma, L., 2014. Calculate excess mortality during heatwaves using Hilbert-Huang transform algorithm. BMC medical research methodology, 14, 35) Ensemble Empirical Mode Decomposition (postEEMD) and Hilbert-Huang Transform (HHT). -/- In the second section, calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF). In the third section, partial least squares regression (PLSR): the minimal root mean squared error of prediction (RMSEP). In the last section, partial least squares regression (PLSR): significance multivariate correlation (sMC) statistic. (shrink)

La doctrina establecida por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Argentina en relación a los crímenes de lesa humanidad cometidos durante la última dictadura militar, expresamente declaraba la obligación del Estado de investigar y juzgar a los responsables de su comisión. La Corte no sólo caracterizó dichos delitos, sino que también estableció que no eran susceptibles de amnistía, indulto, ni prescripción. Pero, en el año 2017 dictó el fallo “Muiña” donde, por voto mayoritario, decidió otorgarle el beneficio del “2 (...) por 1” a un condenado por dichos delitos. La consecuencia fue su inmediata libertad por el vencimiento de la condena. La respuesta de la sociedad fue clara. Con diversas manifestaciones, la sociedad civil, las instituciones y las personalidades públicas se declararon en contra de la sentencia. Más aún, del voto de los mismos jueces se observan expresiones que denotan un gran pesar a la hora de tomar la decisión. Más precisamente, sostenían estar ante un dilema. En este trabajo, lejos de realizar un análisis de la interpretación jurídica que se efectuó en la sentencia, se propone trabajar sobre el concepto de dilema y la posibilidad de aplicación en el presente caso. La finalidad concreta es indagar si se está ante un dilema y en su caso si los jueces utilizan este concepto como un arma argumentativa para lograr adhesión o compasión de la opinión pública. En este sentido, se comenzará relatando el marco jurídico del fallo, donde se describirá la historia judicial de Muiña y los argumentos dados por el voto mayoritario y el minoritario de la Corte. Luego, se realizará un análisis del concepto de dilema, para reconstruirlo sobre la base de dos grandes posturas: Una lógica conceptual y otra fenomenológica. Posteriormente, se realizará un examen de la dimensión institucional del derecho y la moralidad judicial, para - finalmente - poder intentar responder si se está efectivamente ante un dilema. (shrink)

Malem Seña in “¿Puede las malas personas ser buenos jueces?” analyzed the judicial morality. At first time from a historical analysis, the judges were not required to base their judgments, because they were the mirror of legitimacy and morality of their decisions. With the advent of rationalism and modern State, the sentences should be the foundation. The situation that put the judge person in the background. In this situation, the answer to the question posed in the job would be: "Yes, (...) bad people can be good judges", answer hardly accepted by all. Malem Seña, far from giving a definite answer, ends his work with the insinuation that judges should maintain an image of morality, rather than being morally unimpeachable agents. This situation raises questions about different dimensions of analysis that have been shelved, and in particular try to analyze why this importance takes the image of morality. To do this, from the perspective of the concepts of Slavoj Žižek‘s ideology and fantasy, it will attempt to reach some responses or generate argumentative lines about the importance of the image of morality on morality itself. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

Das Ziel, die Lernenden zu befähigen, als selbstbestimmte und -ermächtigte Bürger*innen am Politischen teilzuhaben, verlangt in einer Mediengesellschaft unter anderem danach, jene Systeme verstehen, kritisieren und gestalten zu können, die politische Information kreieren und verbreiten. Um der Komplexität und den Interdependenzen dieser Systeme gerecht zu werden, ist auf verschiedenste Fachbereiche und deren Zugänge zurückzugreifen. Diese bilden die Grundlage, um Lernende zu befähigen, sich selbstbestimmt und emanzipiert mit den gesellschaftspolitischen Fragen des 21. Jahrhunderts auseinanderzusetzen. Basierend auf den Beiträgen dieses Sammelbandes skizzieren (...) wir grundlegende Aspekte einer Politischen Bildung für die digitale Öffentlichkeit. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering means to provide a method to assess and improve our concepts working as cognitive devices. But conceptual engineering still lacks an account of what concepts are (as cognitive devices) and of what engineering is (in the case of cognition). And without such prior understanding of its subject matter, or so it is claimed here, conceptual engineering is bound to remain useless, merely operating as a piecemeal approach, with no overall grip on its target domain. The purpose of this (...) programmatic paper is to overcome this knowledge gap by providing some guidelines for developing the theories of concepts and of cognition that will ground the systematic unified framework needed to effectively implement conceptual engineering as a widely applicable method for the cognitive optimization of our conceptual devices. (shrink)

Scholars have long recognized the existence of myriad widespread deep disagreements on values, justice, morality, and ethics. In order to come to terms with such deep disagreements, resistant to rational solution, this article asserts the need for developing an ethics of disagreement. The reality that theoretical disagreements often turn into practical conflicts is a major justification for why such an ethics is necessary. This paper outlines an ethics of deep disagreement that is primarily conceived of as a form of virtue (...) ethics. Such an ethics asks opposing parties in moral and intellectual conflicts to acknowledge that (a) deep disagreements exist, (b) opposing positions should be recognized as worthy of respect, and that (c) one should seek dialogue and mutual understanding. This ethical approach conceives of toleration as a moral and political virtue and presents an argument for toleration based on deep disagreements. (shrink)

In the present work I am interested in addressing a specific aspect within the conceptual problem that poena naturalis implies. In other words, here I will answer the question about what is the poena naturalis. We can be recognized three theories: one that affirms that the poena naturalis is a compensation for culpability, another according to which the poena naturalis is the product of clemency or compassion, and the last that defends that the principles of legality, proportionality and rationality allow (...) justifying the poena naturalis. I will stop at each one of them in order to carry out a critical examination that will allow me to conclude which is the conception that best supports natural punishment. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual (...) engineering — namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes explains several observable phenomena showing that they are caused by special arrangements of unobservable microparticles. Despite these microparticles being unobservable, many passages suggest that he was very confident that these explanations were correct. In other passages, however, Descartes points out that these explanations merely hold the status of “suppositions” or “conjectures” that could be wrong. My main goal in this chapter is to clarify this apparent conflict. I argue first that for Descartes it was (...) indeed possible to have knowledge of unobservable particles and structures, and that the possibility of natural explanations being wrong should be understood as these explanations not being absolutely certain, but only morally certain. I use the debate in contemporary philosophy of science between scientific realism and antirealism as a framework to understand how Cartesian explanations work. Especifically, I argue that Cartesian explanations rely on what Ernan McMullin calls retroduction, which is a mode of inference that justifies beliefs in concrete unobservable entities and processes, based on considerations such as simplicity, coherence, etc. This kind of justification is of common use among scientific realists. Thus, another goal of this chapter is to highlight the relevance of Descartes’ ideas about explanation in the contemporary debate on scientific realism. (shrink)

El trabajo consiste en una elucidación de los elementos que conforman el concepto de pena natural (poena naturalis) en el Derecho penal. Se puede caracterizar la pena natural como el daño o sufrimiento que recae sobre el autor de un delito, producto de la comisión del mismo, que debe ser descontado de la pena legal que ha de aplicársele. Si bien existe un mínimo acuerdo sobre esto, tanto en la jurisprudencia como en la doctrina penal se observan serios desacuerdos acerca (...) de los requisitos que se deben cumplir para reconocer que se está frente a una pena natural. Para elucidar los elementos, se utilizará el constructivismo conceptual de Ronald Dworkin, a fin de describir el desacuerdo y sus implicancias, reconocer los elementos principales de la pena natural y justificarlos bajo su mejor luz moral. ABSTRACT This study focuses on the clarification of the conceptual elements of poena naturalis in criminal law settings. The poena naturalis is the damage or suffering that falls on the convict for its commission. This damage must be deducted from the poena forensis to be applied. Although there is a minimum agreement about the concept of poena naturalis, in the jurisprudence and among legal scholars, there are serious disagreements about the elements of poena naturalis. To elucidate the elements, I will adopt Ronald Dworkin’s conceptual constructivism to describe the disagreement and its implications. At last, I will justify the main elements of the poena naturalis by their best moral light. (shrink)

Contra Todd Ryan’s interpretation, I argue that it is possible to reconstruct a metaphysical argument that does not restrict likeness in general to ideas. While I agree with Ryan that Berkeley’s writings provide us with the resources to reconstruct such an argument, I disagree with Ryan that this argument entails a restriction of likeness to ideas. Unlike Ryan, I argue that Berkeley is not committed to the claim that we can compare only ideas, but to the view that the only (...) thing that can be compared to an idea is another idea. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. Some have recently claimed that the implementation of such method in the form of ameliorative projects is truth-driven and should thus be epistemically constrained, ultimately at least (Simion 2018; cf. Podosky 2018). This paper challenges that claim on the assumption of a social constructionist analysis of ideologies, and provides an alternative, pragmatic and cognitive framework for determining the legitimacy of ameliorative conceptual projects overall. The upshot is that one should (...) not ameliorate for the sake of truth or knowledge, in the case of ideologies—at least, not primarily. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. On its ‘broad-spectrum’ version, it is expected to be appropriately applicable to any of our representation-involving cognitive activities, with major consequences for our whole cognitive life. This paper is about the theoretical foundations of conceptual engineering thus characterised. With a view to ensuring the actionability of conceptual engineering as a broad-spectrum method, it addresses the issue of how best to construe the subject matter of conceptual engineering and successively (...) defends the theses that conceptual engineering should be: (i) About concepts, (ii) psychologically theorised, (iii) as multiply realised functional kinds. Thereby, I claim to theoretically secure and justify the maximum scope, flexibility, and impact for the method of conceptual engineering on our representational devices in our whole cognitive life—in other words, a broad-spectrum version of conceptual engineering. (shrink)

There is a close relationship between education and citizenship. Liberal political theorists tend to spend much of their work justifying the role of educational institutions in political communities. However, the development of these proposals is usually thought for subjects who do not have disabilities, arbitrarily excluding a significant proportion of society. This not only happens at an educational level, it is replicated in various areas of social life. In this sense, in the present work I am going to propose that (...) the adequacy approach proposed by Debra Satz is extremely valuable to think about the educational equity of people with disabilities. The choice is not accidental or arbitrary. Satz is a renowned philosopher whose interest in education and its importance in forming citizens for diverse and plural societies. To do this, I will begin by presenting three possible models of special education: the special school, integration and inclusion. Then the two paradigms that prevail in the characterization of disability will be addressed: the social model and the medical model. Instead, I will reconstruct the third proposal elaborated by Satz in order to evaluate with which inclusive education model and disability paradigm it is compatible and why it is presented as a valuable proposal in this field. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to reflect on the impact of biases related to artificial intelligence (AI) systems developed to tackle issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, with special focus on those developed for triage and risk prediction. A secondary aim is to review assessment tools that have been developed to prevent biases in AI systems. In addition, we provide a conceptual clarification for some terms related to biases in this particular context. We focus mainly on nonracial biases (...) that may be less considered when addressing biases in AI systems in the existing literature. In the manuscript, we found that the existence of bias in AI systems used for COVID-19 can result in algorithmic justice and that the legal frameworks and strategies developed to prevent the apparition of bias have failed to adequately consider social determinants of health. Finally, we make some recommendations on how to include more diverse professional profiles in order to develop AI systems that increase the epistemic diversity needed to tackle AI biases during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. (shrink)

Algunos presupuestos teológicos de la crisis de Occidente Some theological presuppositions of the crisis of the West -/- Manuel Ocampo Ponce Universidad Panamericana Departamento de Humanidades -/- Resumen. Muchos hablan de una crisis en occidente y de los distintos factores que han contribuido a la misma. Sin embargo, no son tantos los que involucran los factores teológicos que han influido en dicha crisis. De aquí que el presente estudio sea un intento por presentar algunos de los presupuestos teológicos de (...) lo que se ha llamado “la crisis de occidente”. Se trata de presentar ciertas ideas filosóficas que han repercutido en las propuestas de algunos teólogos y pensadores del siglo XX y lo que va del XXI, y de demostrar que dichas ideas han producido cambios significativos en la concepción de Dios, en la concepción de las dimensiones personal y social del hombre, y con estas en la organización del mundo contribuyendo, en distintos niveles, lo que se ha denominado la crisis de Occidente. -/- Palabras clave: Dios, Cristianismo, ser, Teología, Metafísica, crisis, agnosticismo, relativismo, secularismo. -/- Abstract. Many speak of a crisis in the West and of the various factors that have contributed to it. However, few mention the theological factors that have influenced this crisis. Hence, the present study is an attempt to present some of the theological presuppositions of what has been called "the crisis of the West". The study presents certain philosophical ideas that have had repercussions on the proposals of some representative theologians of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. It seeks to demonstrate that these ideas have produced some changes in the conception of God, in the conception of personal and social dimensions and in the organization of the world. These have favored, at different levels, what has been called the crisis of the West. -/- Key words: God, Christianism, being, Theology, Methaphisics, crisis, agnosticism, relativism, secularism. -/- En las últimas décadas se ha hablado mucho de que el mundo occidental se encuentra en crisis. Crisis de pensamiento, crisis de valores, crisis moral, crisis en los ámbitos científicos, artísticos, humanos, ambientales, etc. Sin embargo, es necesario aclarar que, para comprender Occidente y su crisis, es imprescindible considerar el papel del cristianismo como elemento fundamental de la cultura occidental. No podemos dejar de lado que, si el cristianismo tiene un peso en el desarrollo de Occidente, también debe tener un peso en sus logros y en sus decadencias y fracasos. En efecto, así como no podemos entender el mundo árabe si no conocemos el Islam, o Asia si no conocemos el budismo, tampoco podemos comprender Occidente si no conocemos el cristianismo. Esa es la razón por la que pensamos que cualquier análisis serio de la cultura de Occidente, ha de considerar el cristianismo como elemento clave para su comprensión. Pero hay que ser conscientes de que el cristianismo abarca muchos ámbitos especulativos y prácticos que, en una investigación de esta naturaleza, son imposibles de abarcar. Por lo mismo, el presente estudio se limita a mostrar de manera muy panorámica sólo algunos de los elementos teológicos de la crisis de Occidente que muchas veces son pasados por alto en distintos ámbitos, considerando que la Teología cristiana está conformada por una fuerte base filosófica. Como corolario de este estudio se deduce una solución que deviene de los mismos factores que han sido causas de la crisis. Se ha realizado una selección de algunos autores que he considerado como representativos de movimientos de pensamiento que han dado lugar a ciertos cambios importantes, y presentarlos demostrando el papel que ha tenido la modificación de la Teología cristiana en la crisis de Occidente. (shrink)

La mal llamada “Conquista del Desierto” constituyó una serie de campañas militares ocurridas en el actual territorio patagónico argentino entre los años 1878 y 1885 cuyo resultado fue el asesinato, la violación y sometimiento a la esclavitud de diversos pueblos y comunidades indígenas. Este no fue un caso aislado, sino que se suma a una serie de ataques sistemáticos que han sufrido los indígenas en la Argentina. En los últimos años, a raíz del reclamo y las luchas de los pueblos (...) y comunidades indígenas, así como también de las organizaciones de derechos humanos, se han comenzado a juzgar algunos de estos hechos. En particular, la Masacre de Napalpí (1924) y la Masacre de La Bomba (1947) fueron los primeros que lograron respuestas judiciales favorables. En ambos se determinó que el accionar estatal era constitutivo de un genocidio y, por lo tanto, se debía resarcir a las comunidades actuales. Ahora bien, la Campaña del Desierto, al día de hoy, no tiene respuesta por parte del Estado. Teniendo presente este panorama, nuestro objetivo en este trabajo es reconstruir los diferentes problemas que enfrenta la posibilidad del reclamo judicial. Para ello, comenzaremos describiendo en qué consistió la Campaña del Desierto. Luego, explicaremos la noción de genocidio aplicado a hechos de injusticias históricas. Como tercer paso, reconstruiremos los casos jurisprudenciales que se han preocupado por genocidios indígenas ocurridos en el pasado. Con este panorama revelado, nos enfocaremos en los diferentes problemas jurídicos y políticos que surgen en los reclamos de justicia. (shrink)

This chapter provides summaries of the chapter of this book and introduces the major themes and debates addressed in the volume. Discussed are Nietzsche’s metaphysics; his philosophy of mind in light of contemporary views; the question of panpsychism of Beyond Good and Evil 36; the rejection of dualism in favour of monism, in particular a monism of value; Nietzsche’s positions on consciousness and embodied cognition in light of recent cognitive science; a conception of freedom and agency based on an intrinsically (...) motivating; embodied sense of self-efficacy; a Nietzschean account of valuing understood as drive-induced affective orientations of which an agent approves; the idea of ressentiment conceived as a process of intentional, not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one’s own conscious mental states; and a defence of a Nietzschean naturalism. (shrink)

According to the prevailing opinion, the classical formulation of the principle of the sovereignty of the people is found in Rousseau. Against that view, this article argues that Marsilius of Padua and Locke should be regarded as earlier pioneers and important forerunners of this principle. To demonstrate this thesis, the paper examines Marsilius’s conception of the “human legislator” and Locke’s ideas on legislation, representation, and on the limitation of the legislative power. Though Locke excludes the majority of the people from (...) the right to be represented in the legislative power, his concept of this “supreme power” is progressive compared to the conceptions of “sovereignty” found in Bodin and Hobbes. Even for Rousseau, women are still excluded from the sovereignty of the people. This is a strong argument to include Locke and Marsilius in the history of the idea of the sovereignty of the people. (shrink)

This essay tries to elucidate structural elements of consciousness by drawing on phenomenological descriptions of consciousness and employing representationalist models of consciousness. The aim is not to explain the genesis of self-awareness, but to outline different aspects of its structure.

Conceptual engineering is commonly characterized as the method for assessing and improving our representational devices. Little has been said, however, on how best to construe these representational devices—in other words, on what conceptual engineering should be all about. This paper tackles this problem with a basic strategy: First, by presenting a taxonomy of the different possible subject matters for conceptual engineering; then, by comparatively assessing them and selecting the most conducive one with a view to making conceptual engineering an actionable (...) method, that is, a method that can be applied effectively and consistently to specific case studies. The outcome is that conceptual engineering should be all about concepts on pain of pragmatic inconsistencies otherwise. (shrink)

The central aim of the present investigation is to shed light on Nietzsche’s understanding of happiness and a good life, starting from Nietzsche’s appropriation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrine of a hierarchy of human beings and forms of life.

Justice Across Ages offers an attractive account of justice between the young and the old that brings together three notable principles of age-group justice: complete-lives equality, relational equality, and prudence. Yet, the book says little about the fact that many of us live longer than others, and the little it does say casts doubt on whether lifespan inequality threatens justice as construed by the three principles. This essay argues, instead, that theories of justice between the young and the old should (...) not dispense with a conception of justice between different longevity groups. It concludes that we must be sensitive to lifespan variations when designing policies to promote justice across age groups. (shrink)

Philosophers disagree whether composition as identity entails mereological universalism. Bricker :264–294, 2016) has recently considered an argument which concludes that composition as identity supports universalism. The key step in this argument is the thesis that any objects are identical to some object, which Bricker justifies with the principle of the universality of identity. I will spell out this principle in more detail and argue that it has an unexpected consequence. If the universality of identity holds, then composition as identity not (...) only leads us to universalism, but also leads to the view that there are no mereological atoms. (shrink)

This book is conceived as an introductory text into the theory of syntactic and semantic information, and information flow.

"A theoretical juice extractor: The role of mathematics in scientific explanation". There have recently been proposed cases where, supposedly, mathematics would play a genuinely explanatory role in science. These have been divided into those situations where the explanatory role would be played by mathematical operations, and those where it would be played by mathematical entities. In this article, I analyze some of these purported cases and argue that claims that mathematics can be genuinely explanatory are unfounded. Throughout my discussion, I (...) emphasize the representational role of mathematics, as opposed to its supposed explanatory role: the role of mathematics, even in the cases that I discuss, is to represent physical facts and help draw inferences about those facts. (shrink)

This paper considers three general dilemmas that tend to undermine successful configurations of unity: the either/or dilemma, the synthesis dilemma and the relativism dilemma. It argues that, in his aesthetic writings, Schiller’s critique of Kantian dualisms leads him to an adualistic conception of unity that operates with a different, more inclusive approach to opposition and unification. In order to clarify Schiller’s innovative and often misunderstood position, the paper draws on the disjunctive logic recently developed by Friedrich Kümmel.

In this paper I argue for a novel interpretation of Shepherd’s notion of selfhood. In distinction to Deborah Boyle’s interpretation, I contend that Shepherd differentiates between the mind and the self. The latter, for Shepherd, is an effect arising from causal interactions between mind and body – specifically those interactions that give rise to our present stream of consciousness, our memories, and that can unite these two. Thus, the body plays a constitutive role in the formation of the self. The (...) upshot of this interpretation is that it can dissolve the problem of individuating mind that Boyle identifies. Briefly, the problem consists in Shepherd seemingly individuating minds in terms of their associated bodies and bodies in terms of the minds they are united with. My interpretation, however, allows to see that Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate the mind in isolation of the body and to read the passages, in which the problem seems to arise, as being about what makes living beings individual – with mind and body both playing a crucial role in this context. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the idea of human dignity has a precise and philosophically relevant sense. Following recent works,we can find some important clues in the long history of the term.Traditionally, dignity conveys the idea of a high and honourable position in a hierarchical order, either in society or in nature. At first glance, nothing may seem more contrary to the contemporary conception of human dignity, especially in regard to human rights.However,an account of dignity as high rank provides (...) an illuminating perspective on the role it plays in the egalitarian discourse of human rights. In order to preserve that relational sense regarding human dignity, we can use the notion of moral status, towhich somemoral philosophers have paid attention in recent years.I explore the possibilities of the idea of moral status to better understand the idea of human dignity and its close relationship with human rights. (shrink)

Composition as Identity is the view that an object is identical to its parts taken collectively. I elaborate and defend a theory based on this idea: composition is a kind of identity. Since this claim is best presented within a plural logic, I develop a formal system of plural logic. The principles of this system differ from the standard views on plural logic because one of my central claims is that identity is a relation which comes in a variety of (...) forms and only one of them obeys substitution unrestrictedly. I justify this departure from orthodoxy by showing some problems which result from attempts to avoid inconsistencies within plural logic by means of postulating other non-singular terms besides plural terms. Thereby, some of the main criticisms raised against Composition as Identity can be addressed. Further, I argue that the way objects are arranged is relevant with respect to the question which object they compose, i.e. to which object they are identical to. This helps to meet a second group of arguments against Composition as Identity. These arguments aim to show that identifying composite objects on the basis of the identity of their parts entails, contrary to our common sense view, that rearranging the parts of a composite object does not leave us with a different object. Moreover, it allows us to carve out the intensional aspects of Composition as Identity and to defend mereological universalism, the claim that any objects compose some object. Much of the pressure put on the latter view can be avoided by distinguishing the question whether some objects compose an object from the question what object they compose. Eventually, I conclude that Composition as Identity is a coherent and plausible position, as long as we take identity to be a more complex relation than commonly assumed. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the (...) bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

The paper argues against a commitment to metaphysical necessity, semantic modalities are enough. The best approaches to elucidate the semantic modalities are (still) versions of lingustic ersatzism and fictionalism, even if only developed in parts. Within these necessary properties and the difference between natural and semantic laws can be accounted for. The proper background theory for this is an updated version of Logical Empiricism, which is congenial to recent trends in Structural Realism. The anti-metaphysical attitude of Logical Empiricism deserves revitalization. (...) Another target besides metaphysical necessity are substantial forms of iterated modalities, as used, for instance, in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The Enhanced Indispensability Argument appeals to the existence of Mathematical Explanations of Physical Phenomena to justify mathematical Platonism, following the principle of Inference to the Best Explanation. In this paper, I examine one example of a MEPP—the explanation of the 13-year and 17-year life cycle of magicicadas—and argue that this case cannot be used defend the EIA. I then generalize my analysis of the cicada case to other MEPPs, and show that these explanations rely on what I will call ‘optimal (...) representations’, which are representations that capture all that is relevant to explain a physical phenomenon at a specified level of description. In the end, because the role of mathematics in MEPPs is ultimately representational, they cannot be used to support mathematical Platonism. I finish the paper by addressing the claim, advanced by many EIA defendants, that quantification over mathematical objects results in explanations that have more theoretical virtues, especially that they are more general and modally stronger than alternative explanations. I will show that the EIA cannot be successfully defended by appealing to these notions. (shrink)

Through modern driver assistant systems, algorithmic decisions already have a significant impact on the behavior of vehicles in everyday traffic. This will become even more prominent in the near future considering the development of autonomous driving functionality. The need to consider ethical principles in the design of such systems is generally acknowledged. However, scope, principles and strategies for their implementations are not yet clear. Most of the current discussions concentrate on situations of unavoidable crashes in which the life of human (...) beings is existentially affected. In this paper, we argue that ethical considerations should be mandatory for any algorithmic decision of autonomous vehicles, instead of a limitation to hazard situations. Such an ethically aligned behavior is relevant because autonomous vehicles, like any other traffic participants, operate in a shared public space, where every behavioral decision impacts the operational possibilities of others. These possibilities concern the fulfillment of a road-user’s safety, utility and comfort needs. We propose that, to operate ethically in such space, an autonomous vehicle will have to take its behavior decisions according to a just distribution of operational possibilities among all traffic participants. Using an application on a partially-autonomous prototype vehicle, we describe how to apply and implement concepts of distributive justice to the driving environment and demonstrate the impact on its behavior in comparison to an advanced but egoistic decision maker. (shrink)

This article examines the role of citiziens, women, metics, and slaves in Magnesia, the new city Plato outlines in his "Nomoi".

En la literatura jurídico penal, el arrepentimiento cobra relevancia en un lugar específico: la condena, más precisamente, en la determinación de la pena del sujeto que ha sido encontrado responsable por la comisión de un delito y que, a su vez, se encuentra arrepentido por su accionar. Desde la concepción comunicativa del castigo, en este trabajo contestaré las siguientes preguntas: ¿El arrepentimiento significa un menor reproche penal o es indiferente para la determinación de la pena? en caso de que implique (...) un acercamiento al castigo mínimo establecido en la legislación ¿Cuándo es razonable que esto suceda? (shrink)

El día dieciséis de julio de este año, un día después de la festividad de san Buenaventura, este santo franciscano, doctor de la Iglesia, recibió un regalo: una de las personas que aquí y ahora más conocía de su obra, pensamiento y fuentes, iba a ir a visitarlo. Ambos tenían, al fin, la oportunidad de conocerse en persona. Para sus amigos fue un regalo muy caro. Nuestro amigo Francisco de Asís Clavero Blanco nos dejó físicamente, pero sus estudios y su (...) obra perdura y perdurará con nosotros.' Decir que alguien conoce a san Buenaventura no es fácil, pues en este pensador franciscano se conjugan aspectos filosóficos, teológicos, históricos y espirituales que llevan en sí una carga histórica compleja que se desarrolla en un tiempo, a la vez, complejo, apasionante y alejado en el tiempo: el siglo XIII. No en vano, la figura de san Buenaventura fue tildada por algunos como "la más medieval de la filosofía del Medioevo".Pero Francisco de Asís Chavero se preparó para afrontar este reto y más. Nacido en Rivera del Fresno en 1945, profesó en la Orden Franciscana en la Provincia Bética el 6 de agosto de 1967. Se ordenó presbítero el 21 de julio de 1973. Cursó filosofía y teología en el Centro de Estudios Teológicos de Sevilla, en la Facultad de Teología de Granada, en el Pontificio Ateneo Antonianum y en el Centro de Investigación de Quarachi de la Orden Franciscana situada en Grottaferrata en Roma. Estos estudios hicieron que quedara corta su titulación de Licenciado en S. Teología, sección Histórico?Dogmática. En el momento en el que le sorprendió la muerte era profesor de Teología Sistemática, Antropología Teológica y Pensamiento Franciscano en el Instituto Franciscano de Murcia.El perfil de su formación, trabajo y dedicación nos ayuda a comprender por qué a Francisco de A. Chavero no se le escapaba ningún detalle del pensamiento bonaventuriano. No había aspecto de su pensamiento filosófico, teológico, espiritual o franciscano que no conociera. Su obra, sus ediciones, las fuentes, los estudios e interpretaciones sobre el doctor Seráfico eran, no sólo conocidas por él, sino también estudiadas, pensadas e interpretadas. De todo lo que acabo de decir dan fe sus escritos y las extensísimas notas a pie de página que nos regalaba. Hablando de su trabajo siempre mostraba la visión de fondo que impregnaban sus estudios: el de historiador de la teología. Esto no significa que desde esta perspectiva histórica no fuera capaz de percibir y apuntar conceptos nuevos y visiones originales.Francisco de Asís Clavero Blanco colaboró en numerosas revistas como Verdad 1, Vida, Carthaginensia, Estudios Franciscanos, Doctor Seraphicus, Themata, Archivum Franciscanum Historicurn, etc. Era miembro de la Sociedad Escotista Internacional , del Centro di Studi Bonaventuriani , Asociación Hispánica de Estudios Franciscanos y compañero de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Medieval . Me gustaría en estas páginas repasar aunque sea brevemente el legado intelectual de este pensador franciscano. (shrink)

Why are we still intrigued by Nietzsche? This chapter argues that sustained interest stems from Nietzsche’s challenge to what we might call the ‘staticism’ inherent in our ordinary experience. Staticism can be defined, roughly speaking, as the view that the world is a collection of enduring, re-identifiable objects that change only very gradually and according to determinate laws. The chapter discusses Nietzsche’s rejection of remnants of staticism in Hegel and Schopenhauer (1). It outlines why Nietzsche deems belief in any variant (...) of the staticist picture as problematic (2); and examines his adualistic-dialetheic stance towards, for example, first-person and third-person descriptions in the philosophy of mind (3). The chapter closes with a discussion of the contributions of "Nietzsche on Time and History". (shrink)

Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...) is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages - youth, middle and old age - promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy "freetirement". (shrink)

Retirement is often viewed as a reward for a working life. While many have reason to want a work-free retirement, not everyone does. Should working retirees have to give up their retirement pension and, consequently, their status as retirees? The answer, I argue, boils down to whether we conceive of retirement as free time (need-free) or as leisure (work-free). In this article, I put forward a liberal case in favour of free time, despite whether our liberalism leans towards perfectionism or (...) neutralism, with social primary goods being a case in point. Applying this case for free time to retirement yields two significant policy implications. First, it demands “free synchronic combination” – that retirees may use their retirement pensions however they see fit, including to work. Second, it also yields “free diachronic combination” – that, within limits, individuals have discretionary control over how to combine retirement and work across time – thus challenging the idea that retirement should be available only in old age and not earlier in life. So far, the literature on free time focused only on narrow temporal units, such as hours and days, but there is much to gain by extending the concept into retirement. (shrink)

Schiffer has given an argument against supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, based on reports of vague contents. Suppose that Al tells Bob ‘Ben was there’, pointing to a certain place, and later Bob says, ‘Al said that Ben was there’, pointing in the same direction. According to supervaluationist semantics, Schiffer contends, both Al’s and Bob’s utterances of ‘there’ indeterminately refer to myriad precise regions of space; Al’s utterance is true just in case Ben was in any of those precisely bounded regions (...) of space, and Bob’s is true just in case Al said of each of them that it is where Ben was. However, while the supervaluationist truth-conditions for Al’s utterance might be satisfied, those for Bob’s cannot; for Al didn’t say, of any of those precisely delimited regions of space, that it is where Ben was. In an earlier version of the material presented here (García-Carpintero 2000) I replied to Schiffer’s argument that supervaluationism has an independently well-motivated defense. The response is essentially based on the point that the occurrence of ‘there’ in Bob’s utterance (and of ‘tall’ in Wright’s argument) occurs in indirect discourse, and supervaluationists may allow that it shifts its referent there. Schiffer’s reply to this response shows that it was not made sufficiently clearly. In this paper I will try to improve on that score. In his more recent reply, Schiffer (2000b, 325) dismisses a proposal like the one I will make, mainly because it “undermines … a leading virtue of supervaluationism … its implication that vagueness is … not a feature of the world.” I will argue that my reply does not undermine the fundamental contentions of the supervaluationist account. (shrink)

The truth of a statement depends on the world in two ways: what the statement says is true if the world is as the statement says it is; on the other hand, what the expressions in the statement mean depends on what the world is like (for instance, on what conventions are in place). Each of these two kinds of dependence of truth on the world corresponds to one of the dimensions on the two-dimensional semantic framework, developed in the 1970’ (...) in the work of Evans, Kaplan, Kripke and Stalnaker. The introduction provides a systematic overview of the framework, the ideas of its earlier originators, recent developments and criticism. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume. (shrink)

Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...) approaches on different counts, the most damaging of which is that they make impossible a "logic of demonstratives". The reason for this is that the token-reflexive approach entails that not two tokens of the same sentential type including indexicals are guaranteed to have the same truth-conditions. In this paper I rebut this and other criticisms of the Reichenbachian approach. Additionally, I point out that Kaplan's original theory of "true demonstratives" is empirically inadequate, and claim that any modification capable of accurately handling the linguistic data would have similar problems to those attributed to the Reichenbachian approach. This is intended to show that the difficulties, no matter how real, are not caused by idiosincracies of the "token-reflexive" view, but by deep facts about indexicality. (shrink)