This book first published in the year 2021 June. Paperback: 240 pages Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Includes bibliographical references. 1). Philosophy. 2). Metaphysics. 3). Philosophy, German. 4). Philosophy, German -- 19th century. 5). Philosophy, German and Greek Influences Metaphysics. 6). Nihilism (Philosophy). 7). Eternal return. I. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. II. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-.[Translation from German into English of Friedrich Nietzsche’s notes of 1881]. New Translation and Notes by Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Many of the (...) notes have never been translated into English before. Go inside the workshop of a great philosopher's mind and read these notes. Table of Contents Introduction and Preface (Pages: 1-11 ) Notebook: 11 = M III 1. Spring - Autumn 1881 11 [1 to 348] (Pages: 12-167 ) Nietzsche’s Notebooks in English: a Translator’s Introduction and Afterward (Pages: 168-183 ) The thought of the eternal return of the same (Pages: 184-197 ) Later Recapitulation note of 1888 14 [188] (Pages: 198-204 ) Rejection of the idea of eternal (Pages: 205 ) Translation of 4 notes by Nietzsche on Perspectivism (Pages: 206-210 ) Nietzsche gets some final few words (Pages: 211-216 ) Bibliographies (Pages: 217-236 ) Project started in summer of 2012. No one else has read this book for errors. As always, any errors, mistakes or oversights etc. are mine alone. Given a couple more years, I could improve this book. This is a philosophical translation and not a philological translation. If you want to get in to more philological details you must learn German (see Nietzschechannel plus many published books on the topics). Translation notes. I have not tried to fix, polish-up, or clarify Nietzsche’s unpublished writings. Some of the translator have really refined Nietzsche’s ideas and positions. I have not “fixed” Nietzsche. I have not dropped or added words or changed the wording to make Nietzsche’s position clearer or stronger (others have done enough damage). Learn German and read the texts in German – my best recommendation and advice to you the reader. There are groups on the internet that work on all the details of translating Nietzsche’s remarks. There are many nuances and shades of the meaning in attempting to translate anyone’s language. Some words I could not translate from German and French; and I left those few words in German, but more words in French. I think most of the French texts are quotes that Nietzsche wrote down from French authors that he was reading at the time he wrote these notes. Reader beware. There are many historical and philosophical allusions as in all of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings and these notebooks are similar. Remember these are “notebooks” and include lots of notes or jottings -- and these are neither fragments nor polished drafts for publication. Nietzsche may have written these notebooks from back to front and re-used various notebooks at a later time. In the German text there are missing punctuations marks, missing quotation marks, missing words, abbreviation of words, miss numbered section, working table of contents for project books he wanted to publish, projects outlined, quotes without quote marks. Enjoy reading and thinking with Nietzsche in his unpublished notes. (shrink)

The main assumption and conclusion of this book is summarized by Nietzsche’s thought and his single sentence (Motto): "The tragic era for Europe: due to the struggle with nihilism. (Das tragische Zeitalter für Europa: bedingt durch den Kampf mit dem Nihilismus). " eKGWB/NF-1886, 7 [31]. I have translated the entire group of notes that start with a note giving Nietzsche’s location “Lenzer Heide” (Graubünden, Switzerland) dated June 10, 1887 (Lenzer Heide den 10. Juni 1887). From the first note, (...) eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 [71] and then subsection ending at the final note: eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 [110]. Also in this publication, Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden (KSA). Volume information, KSA 12. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, (1967). Section or notebook, five. 5 = NVÜ3. Sommer 1886—Herbst 1887. The Lenzer Heide subsection is from 5 [71] and goes to section 5 [110]. Pages for this subsection are p. 211-229 (KSA 12). The editor sometimes use letter spacing as way to emphasis what Nietzsche wrote, for example, “N i h i l i s m u s”; for the word ‘Nihilismus’. Over 190+ Nietzsche’s notes are translated in this text. Additional materials from his published writing are also included in the topics discussed. The general background is the context of Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretations. Principle conclusion: all of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought can be seen as his response to the urgent crisis of Nihilism. Countermovement to Nihilism. Additional topics and many more translations covering: the eternal return of the same, Will to Power, B. Spinoza (1632-1677), concept of meaninglessness, Nihilism and Nietzsche Thought, Stages or the outline of Nihilism, Chronological Nietzsche’s Thoughts on Nihilism, and Nietzsche on the Nihilist. Other topics covered are: Nietzsche Contra Metaphysics: Rejection of ontology and Being Rejection of God Rejection of metaphysicians Rejection of the idea of eternal Rejection of supersensuous Rejection of Platonism Rejection of the dignity of humanity (metaphysicians) Rejection of eternal values Rejection of immorality Possible Metaphysical Claims for the idea of Will-to-Power, Connection of Will to Power and Amor Fati, Anti-metaphysical and perspectivism, Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy, and Bibliographic sources. (shrink)

In this article, Shea aims to overturn Jürgen Habermas’s characterization of Nietzsche in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity as a postmodern irrationalist. On Habermas’s account, Nietzsche employs Wille zur Macht both as a principle by which to invalidate the claims of metaphysics and as a primordial “other” to reason that unmasks reason as an expression of domination. If Habermas’s reading is correct, Nietzsche’s work is ultimately incoherent since it either lapses back into metaphysics or puts (...) forward a self-refuting anti-metaphysics. Contrary to Habermas, Shea argues that Nietzsche’s theoretical inquiries result from a considered methodological decision on the part of Nietzsche to suspend metaphysical interpretations. For this reason, Wille zur Macht can be read as the fabrication of a post-metaphysical principle for interpreting life rather than as a purported insight into the ultimate nature of reality and thus as a genuine alternative to the trappings of both metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophies. (shrink)

This is a précis of Nietzsche’s Constructivism: A Metaphysics of Material Objects (Routledge, 2017), for a forthcoming symposium on the book.

Friedrich Nietzsche’s contribution to philosophy is mostly recognized in relation to moral philosophy. His distinction of master and slave morality, critique of the Judeo-Christian morality is what is commonly considered as the main contribution of his philosophy. How-ever, on the other hand, his examination of metaphysics and epistemology comprises fun-damental constituents to apprehend his philosophy. Accordingly, it can be said, Nietzsche’s approach towards morality and politics is a demonstration of his analysis of metaphysics and epistemology. Since (...) the construction of metaphysical and epistemological grounds precedes the construction of ethical systems, the critique of morality is presupposed by the critique of its metaphysical and epistemological foundations. Therefore, the focus of this paper will not be Nietzsche’s critique of morality and politics. Rather, it will critically examine his criticism of the metaphysical and epistemological ba-sis that by virtue of their structural fundamentality acquired the generative potential of values (moral, political, economic, etc.). In view of that, by exposing the vitality of Nie-tzsche’s critique in his discourse on nihilism, the analysis will try to claim the conceptual centrality of nihilism in his philosophy. Furthermore, assert the possible understandability of his critique and discourse, which is mostly concentrated on the advent of European ni-hilism and its countermovement. (shrink)

I examine why Carnap ended his "The Overcoming of Metaphysics" with admiration for Nietzsche, and contextualize his admiration for Nietzsche within their shared commitment to 'modernism.' I show that Carnap's modernism helps explain his enthusiasm for symbolic logic and his attitude towards metaphysics. However, I also argue that Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics may also apply to Carnap's own distinction between what is essential to language and how language appears.

In this paper I discuss the role played by Ernst Mach on Nietzsche’s thought. Starting from the contents of his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen, I’ll show the close similarities between their view on both human knowledge and the scientific world description. In his writing on science Nietzsche shares Mach’s critique to the 19th century mechanism and its metaphysical ground, as much as his way of defining the substantial notions such as matter, ego and free will. Moreover, my (...) investigation will make it clear that Mach cannot be seen as a direct source of Nietzsche’s thought, since the latter wrote many times on the same subjects long before his first reading one of his works. Rather, it is possible to consider the writings of Lange, Spir and Spencer as the first sources of Nietzsche’s views on the main themes Mach dealt with in his work from 1886. (shrink)

Review of Tsarnia Doyle, Nietzsche's Metaphysics of the Will to Power: The Possibility of Value.

Perfazendo a primeira filosofia existencial trágica, a doutrina de Schopenhauer atribui a origem do caráter simultaneamente trágico, absurdo e doloroso da existência ao querer viver, implicando um pessimismo que impõe à felicidade uma condição negativa, à medida que o sofrimento emerge como o fundamento de toda a vida, constituindo-se o prazer estético uma possibilidade quanto à superação da dor e do tédio, conforme assinala o artigo cujo trabalho mostra a correlação envolvendo a perspectiva da metafí­sica da vontade e o pensamento (...) de Nietzsche que, detendo-se no niilismo como um acontecimento que expressa a negação da vida e converge para a sua própria superação, sobrepõe ao dualismo metafí­sico o princí­pio da unidade-múltipla através da construção da sua metafisica de artista, que supõe um movimento da consciência ética para o pathos artí­stico. (shrink)

Symposium on Nietzsche's Constructivism (Routledge, 2018), replies to Adler, Cabrera, Doyle, Migotti, Sinhababu, Pedersen.

The critique of Metaphysics and Morality occupies a central place in post-modern philosophy. The decline and decadence of absolute truths about the true nature of reality, was presented by radical changes in scientific progress. Nietzsche’s proclamation of the Death of God will be set as the starting point for the critique and personal reflection. Nietzsche’s new conception of man, breaks off from traditional understanding, inherited from the pre-Socratics. Nietzsche is not a post-modern philosopher who is against (...) morality, but rather opposed to the traditional way of moral evaluations, which have historically been based on different metaphysical models that presupposes a world replete of universal truths. This work deals with the proposition given on the impossibility of morals based on transcendental truths given a stronger version of Nietzsche‘s Will to Power and the implication of such findings on the most practical aspects of our daily lives and future moral evaluations. (shrink)

During his late period, Nietzsche is particularly concerned with the value that mankind attributes to truth. In dealing with that topic, Nietzsche is not primarly interested in the metaphysical disputes on truth, but rather in the effects that the "will to truth" has on the human being. In fact, he argues that the "faith in a value as such of truth" influenced Western culture and started the anthropological degeneration of the human type that characterizes European morality. To call (...) into question the value of truth is therefore necessary, if one wants to help mankind to find her way in the labyrinth of nihilism. -/- In this new addition to Nietzsche scholarship, Gori explores the origin and aim of the philosopher's late perspectival thought by merging the theoretical with the historical approach, with a special focus on the epistemological debate that influenced Nietzsche. As a result, the book provides a contextual reading of the issue that supports the idea that Nietzsche’s attitude in addressing the problem of truth is, in a broad sense, pragmatic. (shrink)

This article concerns whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about concrete objects, the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one concrete object. I first dispel prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects monism. I then develop the most compelling arguments for monism in Nietzsche’s writings and check for soundness. The arguments seem to be supported by the texts, but they have not been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, I suggest that Nietzsche is actually (...) not sympathetic to monism about objects—but his reasons for siding against monism are not at all obvious. The result should be a new understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological commitments. (shrink)

Nietzsche appears to adopt a radical Kantian view of objects called constructivism, which holds that the existence of all objects depends essentially on our practices. This essay provides a new reconstruction of Nietzsche's argument for constructivism and responds to five pressing objections to reading Nietzsche as a constructivist that have not been addressed by commentators defending constructivist interpretations of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's thought has been of renewed interest to philosophers in the Anglo-American philosophical community as well as to philosophers of a more phenomenological and hermeneutic background. The volume aims to appeal to both communities of scholars as it seeks to deepen the growing interest and appreciation of Nietzsche's contribution to our understanding of the mind. The 16 essays by leading Nietzsche scholars examine Nietzsche's understanding of consciousness and investigate its continuities with current developments in philosophy of (...) mind, neuroscience, neuroethics, psychology, linguistics, and metaphysics. Recent work in philosophy of mind emphasises non-reductive approaches to consciousness and self-consciousness. The mental is understood as always already embodied as well as situated or embedded in and emerging from a complex system. Nietzsche's thoroughly naturalistic philosophy has received renewed attention as it challenges any reductivist attempt to understand the mental exclusively as a physical phenomenon using the methods of the natural sciences. His understanding of nature and the physical, informed by but not reducible to the natural sciences of his time, is highly idiosyncratic. It posits the mental at several levels, from unconscious and proto-conscious drives, affects and emotions, to reflective, higher-order conscious states, intentionality and language. (shrink)

This paper argues that Nietzsche is a panpsychist. Panpsychism holds that mental features are ubiquitous and fundamental in reality. I first argue that Nietzsche’s rejection of Cartesian dualism leads him to substance monism. To better understand his monism, I examine Nietzsche’s rejection of Newtonian atomism. Nietzsche holds that bundles of forces, or will to power, are more fundamental than hard, extended atoms. So, will to power is fundamental. I then investigate Nietzsche’s remarks on organic and (...) inorganic nature to show that he believes both are will to power. So, will to power is ubiquitous. The final step to panpsychism is to show that Nietzsche believes will to power exhibits mental qualities. If all goes well, it should emerge that Nietzsche thinks mental features are fundamental and ubiquitous in reality. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, although implicit, argument for the will to power as ontology—a critical and descriptive, rather than positive and explanatory, theory of reality. Further, I suggest this ontology is entirely consistent with a naturalist methodology. The will to power ontology follows directly from Nietzsche’s naturalist rejection of three metaphysical presuppositions: substance, efficient causality, and final causality. I show that a number of interpretations, including those of Clark, Schacht, Reginster, (...) and Richardson, are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s naturalism, because they presuppose efficient or final causality. In contrast, I argue that the will to power is not an explanatory theory, but a description of the basic, necessary character of reality, designed to critically reveal and minimize metaphysical presuppositions—to reject false explanations of reality and human behavior. It avoids substance-metaphysics by describing reality as will, a causal process without discrete efficient causes or agents. It eliminates efficient causality by describing events as maximal manifestations of power, rather than as agent-actualized potentialities. Finally, it opposes teleology by describing life as tending toward the activity of resistance as such, rather than toward explanatory end-states, such as the accumulation of power or overcoming of resistances. (shrink)

The first essay of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals seeks to uncover the roots of Judeo-Christian morality, and to expose it as born from a resentful and feeble peasant class intent on taking revenge upon their aristocratic oppressors. There is a broad consensus in the secondary literature that the ‘slave revolt’ which gives birth to this morality occurs in the 1st century AD, and is propogated by the inhabitants of Roman occupied Judea. Nietzsche himself strongly suggests such (...) a view. However, in a telling later passage from Ecce Homo, Nietzsche claims that the hsitorical Zarathustra—a Bronze age iranian religious thinker—was the first to consider the opposite of Good vs. Evil; that “Zarathustra created this most fateful of errors, morality” (EH, 'Destiny', §3). However, Nietzsche does not discuss Zarathustra or Zoroastrianism in his critique of moral values and their origin. This creates a prima facie tension. If at least part of what essentially characterises 'morality' preceded Judeo-Christianity, are moral values only contingently related to the feelings of ressentiment essential to Nietzsche’s story of the slave revolt? If the answer is 'yes', then the scope of Nietzsche's critique of morality may be somewhat limited. If the answer is 'no', then we require an answer as to why Nietzsche's genealogy—if it is an exercise in ascertaining the “real history of morality” (GM, Pref: §7)—does not extend further back in history. In this paper, I explore how the extent of Nietzsche's knowledge of Zoroastrianism informs his critique of slave morality in On the Genealogy of Morals. I argue that Nietzsche views the historical Zarathustra—like Socrates and Plato—as a forerunner of ‘morality’ in his creative conception of good and evil in metaphysical terms. From here, it is argued that the proposed tension can be dissolved by viewing Judeo-Christian morality merely as the latest and paradigmatic expression of slave morality. (shrink)

Recent decades have witnessed a flurry of interest in Nietzsche's metaethics — his views, if any, on metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological issues about normativity and normative language and judgment. Various authors have highlighted a tension between Nietzsche's metaethical views about value and his ardent endorsement of a particular evaluative perspective: Although Nietzsche makes apparently "antirealist" claims to the effect that there are no evaluative facts, he vehemently engages in evaluative discourse and enjoins the "free spirits" to (...) create values. Nearly every major type of metaethical "-ism" has been ascribed to Nietzsche in response. This chapter provides a critical introduction to Nietzsche's metaethics, focusing on matters concerning the nature and grounds of normativity. I begin by examining and raising challenges for Nadeem Hussain's prominent interpretation of Nietzsche as a revolutionary fictionalist. I argue that a constructivist interpretation (developed elsewhere) provides an improved account of the connections, for Nietzsche, between evaluative attitudes and the nature of value, and among practical nihilism, art, and value creation. Values, on this view, are treated as grounded purely in facts about creatures’ evaluative attitudes. The chapter concludes by considering several alternative subjectivist, constitutivist, and non-cognitivist interpretations. A nuanced understanding of the space of metaethical theories brings into relief a plausible normative and metanormative view that we can attribute to Nietzsche. (shrink)

During the second decade of the 20th century Hans Kleinpeter, an Austrian scholar devoted to the development of the modern science, published some brief papers on Nietzsche’s thought. Kleinpeter has been one of the main upholders of Mach’s epistemology and probably the first who connected his ideas with the philosophy of Nietzsche. In his book on Der Phänomenalismus (1913) he described a new world view that arose in the 19th century, a perspective that ‒ according to him ‒ (...) completely contrasted the mechanistic and metaphysical world view of the old school of scientific inquiry. The main outcome of the scientists whose name was related with this perspective (e.g. Clifford, Maxwell, Kirchoff and, obviously, Mach himself) has been the refusal of the absolute value of any “truth”. Kleinpeter’s statements on this topic are a good example of the rising of a Scientific Philosophy, whose development involved many scientists and thinkers that later set up the Verein Ernst Mach and the Wiener Kreis. On the other hand, his interest on Nietzsche is a relevant case of reception of the latter’s thought, that Kleinpeter puts into the context of the contemporary epistemology. In fact, he considers Nietzsche as one of the main upholders of the phenomenalistic world view, and states that he «took part at the same renewal of philosophical investigation that arose from the latest results of scientific inquiry» during the 19th century. A renewal whose main outcomes has been presented by John Stallo in his book on The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881), which Kleinpeter translated in German and published in 1901. According to Kleinpeter, in Nietzsche’s writings (mostly unpublished) one can find a theory of knowledge quite close to the one presented by both Mach and the new born Pragmatism, i.e. the complete refusal of an absolute truth and, therefore, the development of an antimetaphysical world view. In my paper I’ll discuss the main statements presented by Kleinpeter on this topic and show which of Nietzsche’s ideas has actually been in compliance with the main outcomes of late 19th century science. Thus, I’ll carry out a reconstruction of an unfamiliar side of the first period of reception of the philosophy of Nietzsche and its relevance to the development of a new (scientific) world view. (shrink)

Lecture on Nietzsche's relativism and perspectivism given at a conference on the 'crisis of reason' in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, October 26, 1991. Nietzsche claims that truth does not exist and knowledge is not possible, because knowledge serves life and is bound to an organic position. In fact, this is a paradox that refutes itself. Knowledge has evolved precisely because organisms must have limited, perspectivistic knowledge of their environment from a subjective point of view. In science, subjectivity can even (...) be transcended to some extent by making models that take into account the effects of our subjective experience of the world. The fact that theories are ‘just models’, ‘just interpretations’ does not mean that knowledge is impossible, because models and interpretations can be improved, corrected and be more or less adequate. In fact, Nietzsche relativism is incompatible with his metaphysical, psychological and ethical claims which implicitly claim a kind of philosophical or scientific progress. (shrink)

The paper explores Nietzsche's observations on language in Human, All Too Human I, 11; reflects on the anti-realist position that Nietzsche defends in that aphorism; and focuses on the role she plays in his later investigation on Western culture and its anthropology. As will be argued, Nietzsche's criticism towards common sense realism is consistent with some pragmatist epistemologies developed during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. This treat of " timeliness " does not limit Nietzsche's originality on (...) the topic. In fact, the idea that philosophy can contrast the metaphysical commitment of common sense can be seen as the theoretical tool that allows Nietzsche to operate on the development of European culture and society. (shrink)

This paper is devoted to a comparison between Ernst Mach's and Friedrich Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical approach to scientific and philosophical concepts. By making reference to Mach’s early essay on the conservation of energy (Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit, 1872), I argue that Nietzsche shares with him the idea that the concepts we adopt are only useful fictions developed during the history of humankind and its culture. This idea is fundamental for the development (...) of modern science, since Mach’s epistemology contributed to give up the mechanistic (Newtonian) view of physics. (shrink)

A critic of metaphysically robust accounts of the human self, Nietzsche means not to do away with the self entirely, but to reimagine it. He pursues an account according to which the unity of the self is born out of a coherent organization of drives and yet is not something other than that organization. Readers of Nietzsche have pointed to a so-called “lack of fit” between this theoretical account of the self, according to which the self is nothing (...) apart from the organization of drives, and Nietzsche’s practical account of human agency, which often seems to require that the self be something more than mere drives. I suggest Nietzsche’s interest in Greek agonistic norms of contest sheds light on this apparent incongruity. Agonistic relationships, insofar as they cultivate contest among diverse forces, are for Nietzsche one appropriate model for the subjectivity of beings whose psychology is similarly characterized by contest among diverse forces—that is, beings like us. (shrink)

This paper argues for interpreting Nietzsche along the lines of a self-constitution view. According to the self-constitution view, a person is a kind of creation: we constitute our selves throughout our lives. The self-constitution view may take more than one form: on the narrative version, the self is like a story, while on the Kantian version, the self is a set of principles or commitments. Taking Marya Schechtman’s and Christine Korsgaard’s accounts as paradigmatic, I take the self-constitution view to (...) emphasize practical considerations and the first person point of view and to conceive of the self as active in self-creation. The interpretation I offer can make sense of Nietzsche’s remarks about self-creation and of many of Nietzsche’s remarks about the self that would otherwise seem contradictory. In particular, Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical remarks about the self fit well with the self-constitution view as long as they are understood as theoretical claims that do not undermine the importance of the practical point of view. (shrink)

In Part One of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche writes that anyone who believes in “immediate certainties” such as “I think” encounters a series of “metaphysical questions”. The most important of these “problems of intellectual knowledge” concerns the existence of an ‘I’, as much as our believing it to be the cause of thinking. Therefore, any remark about our mental faculties directly follows from our defining what we could call the basic psychical unity, i.e. our view on higher-level psychical (...) functions is strictly related with the properties we attribute to the notion of ‘I’. As we know, the main ideas on this subject that Nietzsche states in his book from 1886 come from the neo-kantian views of Lange, Spir and Teichmüller, and we cannot forget the important (even if hidden) reference to Lichtenberg in § 17 of the same work. Nevertheless, Nietzsche seems to move beyond all these sources, and in many of his writings we can find a new definition of the ‘ego’, finally free from any reference to a thing in itself, and for this reason closer to the ideas of the Austrian scientist Ernst Mach. In this paper I shall carry these remarks out. I’ll show the main properties of the notion of ‘I’ Nietzsche concerns with in his writings and, therefore, the grounds of his view on the mind-body problem. Moreover, I will argue that, once we observe that Nietzsche looks at the ‘ego’ as a mere regulative fiction having no ontological value out of the chain of sensation and representation it brings together, we could find out the close similarity with the way Mach defines it in his Beiträge zur Analyse der Empfindungen (1886). This reference could help us to understand in a better way some statements Nietzsche wrote in his notebooks, and, secondly, to show how strictly was his philosophy of mind related with the main outcomes of 19th century science. Indeed, Nietzsche’s refusal of the belief “that there must necessarily be something that thinks” ‒ a view that results from the anti-metaphysical intent leading his naturalism ‒ seems to be one of the most important assumptions of the new born physiological psychology, an idea out of which many of the 20th century philosophical debates arose. (shrink)

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, (...) the theory of Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche was among the figures from the history of nineteenth century philosophy that, perhaps surprisingly, some of the Vienna Circle’s members had presented as one of their predecessors. While, primarily for political reasons, most Anglophone figures in the history of analytic philosophy had taken a dim view of Nietzsche, the Vienna Circle’s leader Moritz Schlick admired and praised Nietzsche, rejecting what he saw as a misinterpretation of Nietzsche as a militarist or proto-fascist. Schlick, Frank, Neurath, (...) and Carnap were in different ways committed to the view that Nietzsche made a significant contribution to the overcoming of metaphysics. Some of these philosophers praised the intimate connection Nietzsche drew between his philosophical outlook and empirical studies in psychology and physiology. In his 1912 lectures on Nietzsche, Schlick maintained that Nietzsche overcame an initial Schopenhauerian metaphysical-artistic phase in his thinking, and subsequently remained a positivist until his last writings. Frank and Neurath made the weaker claim that Nietzsche contributed to the development of a positivistic or scientific conception of the world. Schlick and Frank took a further step in seeing the mature Nietzsche as an Enlightenment thinker. (shrink)

"Nietzsche - Extreme Philosophy of Language?" The coherence of the Nietzschean conception of language is discussed in the article. First, Nietzsche's critique of the referential semantics and the correspondence theory of truth implied by the so-called "tropological" linguistic theory as well as the doctrine of perspectivism is questioned. Consequently, the core of the argumentation is to reveal the naturalistic and metaphysical assumptions of Nietzsche's strict relativistic philosophy of language and interpretation. The conclusiveness of the Nietzschean deconstruction of (...) metaphysics as a pure language creation seems to be doubtful with regard to his construction of the 'will-to-power metaphysics'. Moreover, the reception of the Nietzsche’s philosophy as deconstructivistic after the II World War has to be revised while confronted with his hermeneutical philology. Finally, the status of the Nietzschean affirmation of reality as a play of interpretations in accordance with Paul de Man can be recognized as purely rhetorical. (shrink)

In this paper, I first suggest that Nietzsche and James, two otherwise very different thinkers, both endorse the controversial constructivist view that human representational practices bring all material objects into existence. I then explore their views concerning why and how constructivism can play a vital role in helping us find reality and our lives valuable.

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power and to show that perspectivism is almost a direct and natural consequence of the doctrine of the will to power. Without exploring the doctrine, it is not possible to understand what Nietzsche’s perspectivism is and what he trying to do by proposing it as an alternative to traditional epistemology. To this aim, firstly, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the (...) will to power is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the doctrine, its relation with Darwinism and the claims which say that it is a metaphysical principle are analyzed. Afterwards, Nietzsche’s construction of the world as becoming out of will to power is investigated. Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation as power struggle and its role in perspectivism explained. Then, how Nietzsche’s construction of the world as becoming and his concept of interpretation as power struggle emerge as perspectivism is explained. After that, in order to present the differences between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and traditional understanding of epistemology, Nietzsche’s critiques of some of the fundamental assumptions of traditional epistemology, i.e., causality, logic, and subject-object and apparent-real world distinctions, are investigated. Finally, Nietzsche’s understanding of truth based on his perspectivism is inquired. Its relation with correspondence, pragmatic and coherence theories of truth is explored to show that Nietzsche’s understanding of truth could not be comprehended through these theories. Consequently, it isclaimed that the tendency to attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which is prevalent in the current Nietzsche studies, stems from commentator’s, consciously or unconsciously, ignoring of the relation between his perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power. (shrink)

This essay examines Nietzsche’s musical ontology and situates it within the naturalist and anti-metaphysical framework evident throughout his corpus. Nietzsche often associated this position with the figure of Dionysus, which plays a leading role in The Birth of Tragedy, his most sustained consideration of music and musical ontology. The essay returns to The Birth of Tragedy in an effort to recover Nietzsche’s musical ontology and its relationship with ontology more generally. Heeding Nietzsche’s own remarks, I read (...) this text in light of his mature philosophy. My analysis draws on the work of the late twentieth-century Nietzschean, Gilles Deleuze, whose distinction between “the virtual” and “the actual” enables us to see what is really at issue in The Birth of Tragedy. (shrink)

This volume presents new essays exploring important aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy in connection with two major themes: mind and nature. A team of leading experts address questions including: What is Nietzsche's conception of mind? How does mind relate with the nature? And what is Nietzsche's conception of nature? They all express the thought that Nietzsche's views on these matters are of great philosophical value, either because those views are consonant with contemporary thinking to a greater or (...) lesser extent or because they represent a rich alternative to contemporary attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that The Birth of Tragedy is not a pessimistic book. If it is a pessimistic book, my argument would not be valid because Nietzsche has later developed anti pessimistic teachings such as Amor Fati, eternal recurrence and the will to power. As I have argued in the earlier writings, (Nietzsche’s Response to Schopenhauer) BT can be understood as a template for Nietzsche’s later work, rather than just the early phase during which (...) he, according to Julian Young, completely succumbs to Schopenhauer’s pessimism. As he asserts: ‘The Birth incorporates without modification Schopenhauer’s metaphysics’ (1992, p. 26, emphasis mine). I will prove that the message of BT is very different from that of Schopenhauer’s. To do this, I will show how BT reflects Nietzsche’s position that life is worth living and opposes Schopenhauer’s pessimism and life denial. If I am right, this chapter will prove, contrary to the view propounded by Young that Nietzsche could not escape life-denying pessimism in BT, that BT is the beginning of Nietzsche’s development of the teaching of life affirmation and also the will to power. (shrink)

In this essay are discussed topics for formulation of a brief critique of two conceptions of Euro-Christian cosmology: the negation of the body and the transcendent deity inaccessible to pointout the relation of such points to a more central discourse of religion: the negation of this world infavor of a metaphysical reality unknown and inaccessible by the senses. Nietzsche and Antonio Bispo dos Santos (Nêgo Bispo) assist us in the reflection of such theme, the German philosopher provideshis considerations about (...) the Despisers of the body, the fable of the true world and his criticism of pure Platonism and the people, already the Brazilian quilombola thinker provides us with his considerationson biointeractivity with territorialized gods, explaining why cultures of immanent gods usually have arelationship of greater respect with the environment. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy overcomes the opposition between scientific optimism and Schopenhauerian pessimism with the image of a music-making Socrates, who symbolizes the aesthetic affirmation of life. This article shows how the aesthetic ideal is an illusion whose metaphysical solace undermines itself in being recognized as such, thereby ceasing to be comforting. While I agree with recent commentaries that contest the pervasive Schopenhauerian reading of The Birth, most of these commentaries still support the view that Nietzsche wishes to (...) communicate some fundamental truth about nature or meaning in life. By contrast, I argue that he treats any such truth as a cultural fiction that emerges from the poetic staging of reality, leaving us with a contradiction of appearances deprived of any intelligible ground. (shrink)

In his debut book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche presents what he understands as a metaphysics of art or metaphysics of the artist. As it becomes clear throughout the argument developed in the work, his aim is to favor a justification of the world and of existence as an aesthetic phenomenon. The path to his metaphysics passes through the interaction with Kantian and, mostly, Schopenhauerian formulations, and through a deep dialogue with Greek culture in general and, (...) indirectly, with Pre-Socratic thought. The objective of this article is to delimit the retentions and displacements of the critical tradition in his book from 1872, and highlight the importance of the interlocution with the Greek cultural repertoire in the conformation of his metaphysics of the artist. In particular, the working hypothesis is that Nietzsche, in these approaches and appropriations of critical and archaic philosophical tradition, finds the possibility of an immanent metaphysics in the post-Kantian context, conceived as a physiology (in the antique sense) of aesthetic bias. (shrink)

This article provides a new account of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical project (Section 1), I suggest that to understand the logic of his critique we should reconstruct a taxonomy which distinguishes between ‘rich metaphysics’ and ‘thin metaphysics’ (Section 2). I then consider Nietzsche’s methodological critique of ‘rich metaphysics’, arguing that his position, which alleges motivational bias against ‘rich metaphysics’, is not compelling, since even granting that previous ‘rich metaphysicians’ (...) exemplified such bias there is no necessity to a new ‘rich metaphysician’ doing so (Section 3). Nonetheless, there is much of interest in the second aspect of Nietzsche’s critique, understood in terms of indifference to ‘thin metaphysics’, which I consider in Section 4. I argue that the existing readings are unsatisfactory, and as an alternative we should think of this idea in sceptical terms by drawing on an argument from ‘thin metaphysical’ disagreement. (shrink)

This paper intends to show that Friedrich Nietzsche’s approach to morality or ‘immorality’ involves an attempt to see moral beliefs as a product of human psychology, rather than as a set of metaphysical ‘truths’ that are somehow given to, or discoverable by, us. Nietzsche wants to replace the metaphysical (or supernatural) account of morality with a natural one, and his treatment of moral belief-systems, from the perspective of this concern, can be divided into (a) a psychological analysis of (...) the true nature of moral action and agency, and (b) an historical/genealogical tracing of the real origins of moral values. In this paper I am going to focus on the second dimension of Nietzsche’s analysis through references from his polemical texts Beyond Good and Evil, Genealogy of Morals, Gay Science, and Will to Power. I will outline Nietzsche’s historical leitmotif on the morality of ressentiment or slave morality and will show how it figures as a point of departure for his revolutionary transvaluation of values, one that places a new order of morality which is disparagingly called ‘immoralism.’ Next, I will discuss Nietzsche’s treatment of bad conscience and posit that it involves two different stages: one is the present stage of the bad conscience as a feeling of guilt, and the other is an earlier stage. I shall argue that in order for this earlier stage to develop into the level of guilt, he needs another element, namely an indebtedness towards gods, which finds its most striking culmination in the Christian heritage of religious dogmatism. Finally, I will discuss how for Nietzsche Christianity as an ascetic ideal has promoted to preserve a declining life, i.e. a slave morality, for all of humanity. (shrink)

Review of Marco Brusotti & Herman Siemens (eds.), Nietzsche’s Engagements with Kant and the Kantian Legacy, Volume I: Nietzsche, Kant, and the Problem of Metaphysics. London: Bloomsbury, 2017. xix + 298 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4742-7477-7. Hardcover, $114.00 (volume); $256.00 (collection).

The article critically develops Nietzsche's presence in Heidegger's second great work, Contributions to Philosophy. Heidegger considers Nietzsche the last metaphysicist. However, being Western Metaphysics' zenith is the greatest thing that can be said of a thinker, since being the one who brings to completion a school of thought makes one, at the same time, the precursor of the ‘other’ begining and thus his concept of God's dead, nihilism and truth really can open the door to a kind (...) of post-metaphysical thought, as Heidegger would say, the thought of the history od being. Therefore, between Nietzsche's "God is dead" and Heidegger's "last God" there exists continuity and parallelism that needs future development. (shrink)

In the recent literature, it has been argued that Nietzsche’s perspectivism should not be reconstructed as an epistemological position. This article criticizes both this view and interpretations that reduce perspectivism to a theory of knowledge. It claims that “perspectivism” is also an appropriate name for Nietzsche’s meta-ethical position. The paper argues that Nietzsche should be interpreted as an anti-realist and moral skeptic. Its epistemological claim is that Nietzsche perspectivism provides a hermeneutic method that allows the human (...) animal to achieve knowledge and truth about the world. The article distinguishes between a strong metaphysical and a weak hermeneutic version of the correspondence theory of truth. It argues that Nietzsche only rejects the former: the possibility of knowledge about the essence of the world and things-in-themselves. With his perspectival hermeneutic method, Nietzsche mainly aims at knowledge and truth about objects that are human products and phenomena. (shrink)

Despite his rejection of the metaphysical conception of freedom of the will, Nietzsche frequently makes positive use of the language of freedom, autonomy, self-mastery, self-overcoming, and creativity when describing his normative project of enhancing humanity through the promotion of its highest types. A number of interpreters have been misled by such language to conclude that Nietzsche accepts some version of compatibilism, holding a theory of natural causality that excludes metaphysical or “libertarian” freedom of the will, while endorsing morally (...) substantial alternative conceptions of freedom, autonomy, and responsibility. I argue to the contrary that although Nietzsche’s rejection of... (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss how Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism concerns the complicity between Christian morality and modern atheism. I unpack in what sense Schopenhauer’s ascetic denial of the will signifies a return to nothingness, what he calls the nihil negativum. I argue that Nietzsche’s formulation of nihilism specifically targets Schopenhauer’s pessimism as the culmination of the Western metaphysical tradition, the crucial stage of its intellectual history in which the scientific pursuit of truth finally unveils the ascetic will (...) to nothingness that motivates it. I contend that Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer anticipates current scholarly debates around the significance of the nihil negativum and offers a compelling objection against contemporary proponents of philosophical nihilism such as Eugene Thacker and Ray Brassier. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance (...) for the Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

György Lukács’s Marxist phase is usually associated with his passage from neo-Kantianism to Hegelianism. Nonetheless, Nietzschean influences have been covertly present in Lukács’s philosophical development, particularly in his uncompromising distaste for the bourgeois society and the mediocrity of its quotidian values. A closer glance at Lukács’s corpus discloses that the influence of Nietzsche has been eclipsed by the Hegelian turn in his thought. Lukács hardly ever mentions the weight of Nietzsche on his early thinking, an influence that makes (...) cameo appearances throughout his lifetime writings. During the period of his adherence to a Stalinist approach to communism, his new subjectivity seems to be re-constituted through a disavowal of his earlier romantic anti-capitalism. Implicit in Lukács’s attack on Nietzsche in the Destruction of Reason (1952) is an acerbic reaction to the mute presence of the latter in his earlier thought. Apart from his ignorance of the unreliability of the collection of the Will to Power edited by Peter Gast and Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, his battle against the anti-proletariat Nietzsche in the Destruction is waged on a metaphysical, non-historical plain. Lukács’s pre-Marxist works (Soul and Form, On Poverty of Spirit, and The Theory of the Novel) in a sense betray the instance of a writer who writes most of someone where he omits his name. Thus perceived, Lukács’s early corpus lends itself to a symptomatic reading. -/- This essay seeks to extract the Nietzschean undercurrents of Lukács’s work through a reflection on the romantic anti-capitalist tendencies that the young Lukács shared with Nietzsche. For although it may appear that Nietzsche lacked a clear politics, his criticism of the bourgeois ethos as a structure based on debt/guilt [Schuld], and his critique of modern value-system and nihilism paved the way for the emergence of Lukács’s theory of reification. Nietzsche’s category of 'transvaluation of values’ suggests a total transfiguration of reality, a radical rupture with the ordinary state of things, and as such carries within itself a revolutionary promise. Drawing a distinction between political romanticism and romantic politics, I argue that romantic anti-capitalism contains a potential for the latter. The essay further traces the link between Lukács’s ‘romantic politics’ and the persistence of a thought of the tragic (a ‘tragic vision’) in his texts that, despite its temporary decline during his realist period, is undismissable in different constellations of his thought. (shrink)

Philosophers before Friedrich Nietzsche are more interested in reality than in appearance; they tend to believe that we can access the ultimate truth through hard work, which will set us free. However, in his book, The Gay Science, Nietzsche criticizes this aim of science, or metaphysics. While it has been argued that Nietzsche denies the distinction between perceivable appearances and a concealed, underlying reality, in this paper, I will argue that such a distinction is consistent with (...) Nietzsche’s project and contributes to his perspectivism. (shrink)

Remhof contends that Nietzsche is a metaphysician. According to his Meta-Metaphysical Argument, Nietzsche’s texts satisfy the criteria for an adequate conception of metaphysics. According to his Constructivist Argument, Nietzsche adopts a metaphysical position on which concepts’ application conditions constitute the identity conditions of their objects. This article critically appraises these arguments. I maintain that the criteria advanced in the Meta-Metaphysical Argument are collectively insufficient for delineating metaphysics as a distinct field of inquiry and that the (...) Constructivist Argument attributes a position to Nietzsche that remains vulnerable to his evaluative and psychological indictments of two-world metaphysics. I conclude by discussing how these objections might help non-metaphysical readers of Nietzsche resist Remhof’s interpretation. (shrink)

This chapter provides summaries of the chapter of this book and introduces the major themes and debates addressed in the volume. Discussed are Nietzsche’s metaphysics; his philosophy of mind in light of contemporary views; the question of panpsychism of Beyond Good and Evil 36; the rejection of dualism in favour of monism, in particular a monism of value; Nietzsche’s positions on consciousness and embodied cognition in light of recent cognitive science; a conception of freedom and agency based (...) on an intrinsically motivating; embodied sense of self-efficacy; a Nietzschean account of valuing understood as drive-induced affective orientations of which an agent approves; the idea of ressentiment conceived as a process of intentional, not reflectively strategic, self-deception about one’s own conscious mental states; and a defence of a Nietzschean naturalism. (shrink)

While traces of a post-metaphysical political theory are to be found throughout his oeuvre, Nietzsche himself never explicitly elaborates any such comprehensive theory. Yet, this chapter argues, it is possible to discern a politics beyond ressentiment and the ascetic ideal, which must be both experimental and pluralist. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault thinks the political as a play of force relations immanent to a concrete strategic field, and thus as a multiplicity of power relations existing in agonistic tension rather (...) than as a duality in antagonistic opposition. This makes him one of the most significant inheritors of the Nietzschean challenge to overcome the politics of ressentiment and to think in- stead a politics of affirmation that makes difference constitutive of the political. (shrink)