Culinary products have culinary value. That is, they have value qua culinary products. However, what is the nature of culinary value and what elements determine it? In the light of the central and universal role that culinary products play in our lives, offering a philosophical analysis of culinary value is a matter of interest. This paper attempts to do just this. It develops three different possible models of culinary value, two rather restricted ones and a third more encompassing one, rejects (...) the first two, and defends the third one. (shrink)

I will outline four justifications of regional ecological obligations calling for different political authorities to collaborate for ecological reasons: through voluntary agreement between political entities united by an ecological region; by a shared regional history or cultural relations to an ecological region; with reference to ‘place-based’ duties with an ecological basis; or by obligations to an extended set of individual right-holders. None are conclusive reasons but show that there are normative grounds for regional collaboration of separate political authorities. The article (...) contributes to discussion on, despite its practical relevance, a much neglected concept in political philosophy. (shrink)

‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have (...) to environmental areas and places. (shrink)

I argue that Paul Ricœur displaces and decentres established theodicies; the issue of evil is perceived as a practical rather than a speculative matter. It is the view of evil as a productive aporia, which suggests that evil provokes action and obliges human beings to take a stand ethically and politically. Hence, the topic of evil is not necessarily about putting together a jigsaw puzzle. The central problem of evil has less to do with logic than with resignation, inertia, despair (...) and meaninglessness. (shrink)

Interreligious dialogue and conversion are two contentious foci for understanding how religion operates. An interpretation of George Lindbeck serves as a starting point for discussion in this paper. The dominant reading is that Lindbeck claims that traditions absorb the world. Religious traditions are isolated, and the one with a greater capacity to assimilate others’ concerns emerges the strongest – implying what is called exclusivism. My proposal is that a different reading of Lindbeck is possible; I am not so much questioning (...) Lindbeck as highlighting another aspect of his oeuvre. If grammar, framework and structure – and not propositional first‐order ontological contents – are given first place, dialogue and conversion appear differently. Questions must be raised, however; isn't it true that there is always some content and substance – even if hidden or disguised? (shrink)

This review provides an overview of the ethics of extinctions with a focus on the Western analytical environmental ethics literature. It thereby gives special attention to the possible philosophical grounds for Michael Soulé’s assertion that the untimely ‘extinction of populations and species is bad’. Illustrating such debates in environmental ethics, the guiding question for this review concerns why – or when – anthropogenic extinctions are bad or wrong, which also includes the question of when that might not be the case (...) (i.e. which extinctions are even desirable). After providing an explanation of the disciplinary perspective taken (section “Introduction”), the concept of extinction and its history within that literature are introduced (section “Understanding extinction”). Then, in section “Why (or when) might anthropogenic extinctions be morally problematic?”, different reasons for why anthropogenic extinctions might be morally problematic are presented based on the loss of species’ value, harm to nonhuman individuals, the loss of valuable biological variety and duties to future generations. This section concludes by also considering cases where anthropogenic extinctions might be justified. Section “How to respond to extinctions?” then addresses a selection of topics concerning risks and de-extinction technologies. Finally, the section on “Extinction studies” introduces other viewpoints on the ethics of extinction from the extinction studies literature, followed by the “Conclusion”. (shrink)

he territorial impacts of climate change will affect millions. This will happen not only as a direct consequence of climate change, but also because of policies for mitigating it—for example, through the installation of large wind and solar farms, the conservation of land in its role as carbon sink, and the extraction of materials needed for renewable energy technologies. In this article, we offer an overview of the justice-related issues that these impacts create. The literature on climate justice and territory (...) is vast and spans a range of disciplines, so we limit our discussion to a specific understanding of territory and a specific understanding of injustice that arises from its loss. We understand territory as a normative concept that describes a place under some agent's jurisdiction, where the agent is a politically organized collective and where the jurisdictional rights over that place secure a relevant degree of self-determination for that collective. Accordingly, we consider that the main injustice connected to the loss of territory due to climate change is the loss or undermining of the ability to exercise the collective right to self-determination, which requires some control over the place. This can happen if a territorial agent literally loses the ground where to stand as a direct effect of climate change, raising issues of justice in relocation; or if their place changes due to mitigation policies, affecting their use and understanding of territory, raising issues of justice in energy transition. In concluding, we point to topics for future research. (shrink)

Within the interdisciplinary field of new materialism Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism deconstructs our current euro-western metaphysical perception of the world and our existence within it, to then re-build an understanding based on relatively new findings within quantum physics. In this thesis I try to recreate Barad’s theory to see what ethical consequences might come from it. Together with practical examples within the discourse of today’s social world and our global connectedness I hope to create a better understanding of (...) the impact of our actions and being on our culture and what we call the natural world. Removing the unique agency given to human culture and language to instead, with the help of post-humanistic ideas, add agency as a universal enactment rather than an attribute, we should start to see ourselves as active and real parts of the world-building that is our home. One main question that I see arise in the end is: what does responsibility entail when we all are one and the same? (shrink)

Throughout these last few decades, phenomenology and modern physics have slowly started to approach each other in order to bridge the gap between subjective and objective. In this thesis I aim to show an approach done with the help of Karen Barad's agential realism; a quantum interpretation enabling us to better understand and analyse our complex world, as well as our perception of it. Taking inspiration from new materialism, phenomenology, and physics, I see a need to properly leave discrete dualism (...) behind, in order to be able to describe cultural and material structures as continuous manifolds. Instead of endlessly searching for their binary and changeless parts. (shrink)

This book is in honour of Professor Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th birthday. It consists of eighteen essays on metaphysical issues written by Swedish and international scholars.

This thesis is about the conceptualization of persistence of physical, middle-sized objects within the theoretical framework of the revisionary ‘B-theory’ of time. According to the B-theory, time does not flow, but is an extended and inherently directed fourth dimension along which the history of the universe is ‘laid out’ once and for all. It is a widespread view among philosophers that if we accept the B-theory, the commonsensical ‘endurance theory’ of persistence will have to be rejected. The endurance theory says (...) that objects persist through time by being wholly present at distinct times as numerically the same entity. Instead of endurantism, it has been argued, we have to adopt either ‘perdurantism’ or the ‘stage theory’. Perdurantism is the theory that objects are four-dimensional ‘space-time worms’ persisting through time by having distinct temporal parts at distinct times. The stage theory says that objects are instantaneous temporal parts (stages) of space-time worms, persisting by having distinct temporal counterparts at distinct times. In the thesis, it is argued that no good arguments have been provided for the conclusion that we are obliged to drop the endurance theory by acceptance of the B-theory. This conclusion stands even if the endurance theory incorporates the claim that objects endure through intrinsic change. It is also shown that perdurantism and the stage theory come with unwelcome consequences. -/- Paper I demonstrates that the main arguments for the view that objects cannot endure in B-time intrinsically unchanged fail. Papers II and III do the same with respect to the traditional arguments against endurance through intrinsic change in B-time. Paper III also contains a detailed account of the semantics of the tenseless copula, which occurs frequently in the debate. The contention of Paper IV is that four-dimensional space-time worms, as traditionally understood, are not suited to take dispositional predicates. In Paper V, it is shown that the stage theory needs to introduce an overabundance of persistence-concepts, many of which will have to be simultaneously applicable to a single object (qua falling under a single sortal), in order for the theory to be consistent. The final article, Paper VI, investigates the sense in which persistence can, as is sometimes suggested, be a ‘conventional matter’. It also asks whether alleged cases of ‘conventional persistence’ create trouble for the endurance theory. It is argued that conventions can only enter at a trivial semantic level, and that the endurance theory is no more threatened by such conventions than are its rivals. (shrink)

After a review of previous uses of the term “pseudotechnology”, a definition is proposed: “A pseudotechnology is an alleged technology that is irreparably dysfunctional for its intended purpose since it is based on construction principles that cannot be made to work”. The relationship between pseudotechnology and pseudoscience is discussed, and so is the relationship between pseudotechnology and the much weaker concept of technological malfunction. An explanation is offered of why pseudotechnology is much more seldom referred to than pseudoscience: dysfunctional technology (...) usually reveals itself when put to use, whereas dysfunctional science tends to be more difficult to disclose. (shrink)

Après un examen des emplois antérieurs du terme « pseudotechnologie », une définition est proposée : « Une pseudotechnologie est une technologie présumée, irrémédiablement dysfonctionnelle pour l’usage auquel elle est destinée, puisqu’elle est basée sur des principes de construction qui ne peuvent pas être mis en œuvre ». La relation entre la pseudotechnologie et la pseudoscience est examinée, tout comme la relation entre la pseudotechnologie et le concept beaucoup plus faible de malfonction technologique. Une explication est proposée de la raison (...) pour laquelle la pseudotechnologie est beaucoup plus rarement mentionnée que la pseudoscience : le dysfonctionnement d’une technologie se manifeste généralement au moment de son utilisation, tandis que le dysfonctionnement d’une science est généralement plus difficile à établir. (shrink)

Receiving information about threats to one’s health can contribute to anxiety and depression. In contemporary medical ethics there is considerable consensus that patient autonomy, or the patient’s right to know, in most cases outweighs these negative effects of information. Worry about the detrimental effects of information has, however, been voiced in relation to public health more generally. In particular, information about uncertain threats to public health, from—for example, chemicals—are said to entail social costs that have not been given due consideration. (...) This criticism implies a consequentialist argument for withholding such information from the public in their own best interest. In evaluating the argument for this kind of epistemic paternalism, the consequences of making information available must be compared to the consequences of withholding it. Consequences that should be considered include epistemic effects, psychological effects, effects on private decisions, and effects on political decisions. After giving due consideration to the possible uses of uncertain information and rebutting the claims that uncertainties imply small risks and that they are especially prone to entail misunderstandings and anxiety, it is concluded that there is a strong case against withholding of information about uncertain threats to public health. (shrink)

This article discusses Sven Ove Hansson’s corpus model for the influence of values (in particular, non-epistemic ones) in the hypothesis acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry. This corpus model is based on Hansson’s concepts of scientific corpus and science ‘in the large sense’. I first present Hansson’s corpus model of value influence with some introductory comments about its origins, a detailed presentation of the model with a new terminology, an analysis of its limits, and an appreciation of its (...) handling of controversial non-epistemic values. I conclude that it is a very good candidate for managing value influence, because contrary to other models in the literature it is fairly simple, it provides a universal and systematic procedure for dealing with values, and it syste- matically preserves the epistemic integrity of science. I then study some difficulties associated with the model’s central feature of taking the maximum level of evidence required by the applications of a claim in order for the latter to enter the scientific corpus: the difficulty to identify this maximum requirement; the non-optimality of this requirement with respect to other less demanding requirements; the potentially detrimental consequences of the preference for false negatives over false positives on which it relies; and the issue of whether there can nevertheless be requirements higher than this maximum. I show that these issues may potentially challenge the corpus model. Finally, I call for empirical work (in particular, an investigation of scientists’ and engineers’ own normative views) in order to better assess these issues. (shrink)

Paper presented at the symposium on the occasion of the retirement of Sven Ove Hansson. The symposium took place on 13-14 December 2019 at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden.

Muitos psicólogos ainda pensam que a maior referência para falar sobre a demarcação de ciência/pseudociência é Popper. Entretanto, as discussões sobre o problema da demarcação não se encerraram com o critério da falseabilidade, e a filosofia teve diversos avanços. Este trabalho tem por objetivo atualizar os estudantes e profissionais de psicologia sobre os avanços no campo da filosofia da ciência, com um enfoque na teoria de Hansson. Para isso, foi consultado o livro “Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem”, (...) obra que marcou o começo da reviravolta sobre o alegado fim do problema da demarcação, bem como os ensaios de Hansson disponíveis na literatura. Foi possível observar que, após Popper, Laudan foi outro filósofo que teve um importante impacto no debate. Ele tentou decretar o fim da discussão, tratando a demarcação como um pseudoproblema, e afirmando que todas as tentativas de demarcar ciência/pseudociência anteriores haviam fracassado, incluindo a de Popper. Por muito tempo seu decreto vigorou, até que novas teorias foram desenvolvidas e filósofos da ciência começaram um movimento para contrapô-lo. Uma das teorias contemporâneas é a de Hansson, que propõe uma definição ampliada de ciência, não se resumindo às ciências empíricas. Para ele, ciência é a prática que nos fornece as afirmações mais confiáveis que podem ser feitas, em um determinado momento, sobre um objeto de estudos abarcado por uma comunidade de disciplinas de conhecimento. Já a pseudociência, para Hansson, é uma doutrina desviante que se afasta consideravelmente dos critérios de qualidade científicos, enquanto seus maiores proponentes tentam criar a impressão de que ela representa o que há de mais confiável sobre seu objeto de estudos. A proposta de Hansson também apresenta uma lista de multicritérios, que auxiliam a identificar se uma determinada doutrina é pseudocientífica. Ela inclui os seguintes itens: 1) Credo na autoridade, 2) Experimentos não repetíveis, 3) Exemplos escolhidos a dedo, 4) Resistência à testagem, 5) Desdém com informações refutantes, 6) Construída em subterfúgio, e 7) Explicações são abandonadas sem substituição. Ao discutir as propostas contemporâneas para o problema da demarcação, psicólogos e analistas do comportamento terão melhores recursos para diferenciar ciência da pseudociência. (shrink)

Este resumo é um trabalho baseado no artigo publicado por Ferreira (2021), intitulado "Será a psicanálise uma pseudociência? Reavaliando a doutrina utilizando uma lista de multicritérios". Além de se apoiar nele, coloca uma proposta de expansão sobre as implicações éticas de sua conclusão. O artigo original, publicado na revista Debates em Psiquiatria, busca fazer uma avaliação da doutrina psicanalítica utilizando da proposta de demarcação de Sven Ove Hansson.

Straightening the current ‘value-laden turn’ (VLT) in the philosophical literature on values in science, and reviving the legacy of the value-free ideal of science (VFI), this paper argues that the influence of extra-scientific values should be minimised—not excluded—in the core phase of scientific inquiry where claims are accepted or rejected. Noting that the original arguments for the VFI (ensuring the truth of scientific knowledge, respecting the autonomy of science results users, preserving public trust in science) have not been satisfactorily addressed (...) by proponents of the VLT, it proposes four prerequisites which any model for values in the acceptance/rejection phase of scientific inquiry should respect, coming from the fundamental requirement to distinguish between facts and values: (1) the truth of scientific knowledge must be ensured; (2) the uncertainties associated with scientific claims must be stated clearly; (3) claims accepted into the scientific corpus must be distinguished from claims taken as a basis for action. An additional prerequisite of (4) simplicity and systematicity is desirable, if the model is to be applicable. Methodological documents from international institutions and regulation agencies are used to illustrate the prerequisites. A model combining Betz’s conception (stating uncertainties associated with scientific claims) and Hansson’s corpus model (ensuring the truth of the scientific corpus and distinguishing it from other claims taken as a basis for action) is proposed. Additional prerequisites are finally suggested for future research, stemming from the requirement for philosophy of science to self-reflect on its own values: (5) any model for values in science must be descriptively and normatively relevant; and (6) its consequences must be thoroughly assessed. (shrink)

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual (...) operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations. (shrink)

Introduction: In the past, psychoanalysis was classified as a pseudoscience. Karl Popper was one of those who objected to the idea that psychoanalysis is a science, using falsifiability. However, falsifiability cannot be considered sufficient anymore, since it carries major weaknesses and better alternatives to address the issue are available. Objective: This article intends to evaluate the scientific status of psychoanalysis concerning the demarcation problem. Method: In order to do so, Sven Ove Hansson’s criteria were used. His proposal consists of (...) a set of sufficient and necessary conditions which is complemented by a multicriteria list that helps identifying pseudosciences. It was analyzed how much psychoanalysis fits each of Hansson's seven items, besides proposing the addition of an eighth. Results: The results showed that psychoanalysis was compatible with all eight demarcation of pseudoscience’s items. Conclusion: In the end, the conclusion was that even if falsifiability was to be dismissed, the evidence suggests that there are still enough reasons to affirm that psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience, since it significantly deviates from scientific quality standards. (shrink)

Introdução: A psicanálise já foi classificada como pseudociência no passado. Karl Popper foi um daqueles que traçou objeções à doutrina psicanalítica, usando do critério da falseabilidade. Entretanto, a falseabilidade não pode mais ser considerada suficiente para resolver o problema, já que implica em dificuldades consideráveis, e melhores alternativas para abordar a questão estão disponíveis. Objetivo: Este artigo tem por objetivo avaliar o status científico da psicanálise em relação ao problema da demarcação. Método: Para fazer isso, o critério de Sven Ove (...) Hansson foi utilizado: este consiste em um conjunto de condições suficientes e necessárias, que é complementado com uma lista de multicritérios que auxiliam a identificar pseudociências. Foi analisado o quanto a psicanálise se encaixava em cada um dos sete itens da lista de Hansson, além de ser proposta a adição de um oitavo item. Resultados: Os resultados mostraram que a psicanálise era compatível com todos os oito itens da lista de demarcação de pseudociências. Conclusão: Ao final, a conclusão foi de que mesmo que a falseabilidade deva ser descartada, as evidências sugerem que ainda temos motivos suficientes para afirmar que a psicanálise é uma pseudociência, já que ela se distancia significativamente dos padrões de qualidade científicos. (shrink)