Nota do tradutor: O escopo da psicologia é o primeiro capítulo do tratado The principles of psychology (Os princípios de psicologia) de William James (1842-1910), publicado originalmente em 1890. Nesse capítulo inaugural, James enfrenta uma questão central e perene na psicologia: a necessidade (e dificuldade) da demarcação do campo psicológico. Como representante de uma tradição que ainda falava da psicologia no singular, James vê na multiplicidade de assuntos, métodos e problemas da psicologia um desafio para uma disciplina que se pretendia (...) científica. De um lado, era necessário assumir o caráter plural dos assuntos que merecem ser agrupados pela palavra psicologia, negando um reducionismo grosseiro, que, em favor de uma integração teórica, alijasse a “vida mental” de sua riqueza imanente. De outro lado, havia ainda a esperança de uma sistematização que pudesse evitar a completa fragmentação do campo psicológico. A história parece ter mostrado que a preocupação de James era, de fato, legítima, pois o que se viu a partir do século XX foi o fracasso de diferentes sistemas de psicologia, levando a um círculo vicioso no qual a dificuldade de demarcação do campo psicológico fragmenta cada vez mais a psicologia, o que, por sua vez, torna ainda mais distante a possibilidade de se encontrar critérios que possam sistematizar toda essa diversidade. Nesse sentido, O escopo da psicologia não é apenas uma introdução ao livro Os princípios de psicologia, mas uma introdução à psicologia moderna. (shrink)

The focus of the following article is on the use of new robotic systems in the manufacturing industry with respect to the social dimension. Since “intuitive” human–machine interaction (HMI) in robotic systems becomes a significant objective of technical progress, new models of work organization are needed. This hypothesis will be investigated through the following two aims: The first aim is to identify relevant research questions related to the potential use of robotic systems in different systems of work organization at the (...) manufacturing shop-floor level. The second aim is to discuss the conceptualization of (old) organizational problems of human–robot interaction (HRI). In this context, the article reflects on the limits of cognitive and perceptual workload for robot operators in complex working systems. This will be particularly relevant whenever more robots with different “roles” are to be increasingly used in the manufacturing industry. The integration of such complex socio-technical systems needs further empirical and conceptual research with regard to “social” aspects of the technical dimension. Future research should, therefore, also integrate economic and societal issues to understand the full dimensions of new human–robot interaction in industry today. (shrink)

An approach to the semantics of fiction that uses the tools of truth relativism provides an alternative to Meinongian and pretence-based approaches. The approach is consistent with the deep motivations of John Wood's Truth in Fiction.

Approaching the topic of robotics-work relation in a general and international context enables the possibility to know more about the impacts in different sectors. In this book the main discussion themes are followed in order to understand which the main dimensions are included in such debate. In that way, it becomes possible to understand the possible answers and available alternatives. The book follows the themes of relation between employment and technology, the automation as rationalization process and robotics as a technology (...) reference. The other topics are the emergence of ethical, legal and social aspects of this technology, the development that can be perceived in the case of Portugal, and the conclusions about the limits and perspectives of new robotic developments. This edition has empirical information on the Portuguese case and also includes data from the main resources of the global debate on this issue: the new developments of automation and its relation with the work content and employment. The author underlined the importance of the contribute that he got from the discussions at the ITAS Working Group on Robotics Technology Assessment, and at the ITAS Research Group on Technology and Work, in Germany, and at the Observatory of Technology Assessment at CICSNOVA in Portugal. The book is include in a series supported by the Portuguese-American Foundation for Development (FLAD) and was published by Glaciar. (shrink)

De uma perspectiva comportamentalista radical, o eu é um repertório verbal complexo, que, como tal, tem uma gênese social. O reconhecimento da origem social do “eu” abre caminho para uma análise política, incluindo uma discussão do pa- pel das relações de poder na constituição do eu. Entretanto, uma concepção radicalmente social do “eu”, como a proposta pelo comportamentalismo, suscita um problema político: se o eu é integralmente produto do ambiente social, de onde viria uma eventual “vontade” de romper com esse (...) sistema? Parece que para reconhecer a possibilidade de ação política transformadora seria preciso preservar uma noção descontextualizada de “eu”. Considerando essa dificuldade, o objetivo deste artigo é propor uma interpretação política da constituição do “eu” no âmbito do comportamentalismo radical, mantendo no horizonte a possibilidade de uma ação política transformadora. Para tanto, destacamos como “eus” oprimidos são tornados submissos, mas também como de certas contingências podem emergir “eus” subversivos, que se opõem a um sistema social opressivo. Esse “eu” subversivo é caracterizado por um repertório de autoconhecimento mais amplo, que inclui a discriminação do papel das relações de poder e do controle promovido por instituições. Concluímos, com isso, que um “eu” socialmente constituído pode ser politicamente ativo. (shrink)

In recent years, online “involuntary celibate” or “incel” communities have been linked to various deadly attacks targeting women. Why do these men react to romantic rejection with not just disappointment, but murderous rage? Feminists have claimed this is because incels desire women as objects or, alternatively, because they feel entitled to women’s attention. I argue that both of these explanatory models are insufficient. They fail to account for incels’ distinctive ambivalence toward women—for their oscillation between obsessive desire and violent hatred. (...) I propose instead that what incels want is a Beauvoirian “Other.” For Beauvoir, when men conceive of women as Others, they represent them as simultaneously human subjects and embodiments of the natural world. Women function then as sui generis entities through which men can experience themselves as praiseworthy heroes, regardless of the quality of their actions. I go on to give an illustrative analysis of Elliot Rodger’s autobiographical manifesto, “My Twisted World.” I show how this Beauvoirian model sheds light on Rodger’s racist and classist attitudes and gives us a better understanding of his ambivalence toward women. It therefore constitutes a powerful and overlooked theoretical alternative to accounts centered on objectification and entitlement. (shrink)

In this chapter, the focus is on robotics development and its ethical implications, especially on some particular applications or interaction principles. In recent years, such developments have happened very quickly, based on the advances achieved in the last few decades in industrial robotics. The technological developments in manufacturing, with the implementation of Industry 4.0 strategies in most industrialized countries, and the dissemination of production strategies into services and health sectors, enabled robotics to develop in a variety of new directions. Policy (...) making and ethical awareness addressed these issues using socio-economic knowledge and also in an effort to solve some of the application problems raised in a range of different circumstances and sectoral environments. (shrink)

The idea that women qua women can be dehumanized has been dismissed by feminist philosophers, like Kate Manne, and by philosophers of dehumanization, like David Livingstone Smith. Against these skeptics, I argue that we can and should use dehumanization to explain an important strand of misogyny. When they are dehumanized, women are represented simultaneously as human and as inhuman embodiments of the natural world. They therefore appear as magical, contaminating, sexualized threats towards whom violence is acceptable or even necessary. Misogynistic (...) dehumanization is important to understanding atrocities like the early modern European witch-hunts, but also contemporary phenomena like incel violence. (shrink)

Special issue: "Henri Bergson. Creative Evolution and Philosophy of Life." -/- I read the genealogy of the concept of energy through Bergson's Creative Evolution to argue that, historically, energy and its proto-concepts are grounded in spatialized notions of time. Bergson's work not only demands that we rethink energy and its relation to time, it also allows us to see that the concept of energy as we know it depicts time and materiality as a numerical multiplicity, which effaces the differences in (...) kind which are characteristic of energy transformations and real duration. To make this case, I first provide an analysis of Bergson’s concept of the cinematographical mechanism of thought, which splits duration into a composition of distinct states strung together by the idea of an impersonal becoming. Bergson claimed that this is the epistemological model for both ancient philosophy and modern science, meaning that it is also the epistemological ground within which energy concepts in western philosophy and science have been theorized. I then show how Bergson offers a way to overcome this model of theorizing through his method of intuition, and how these conclusions might be extended to future energy concepts. Thus, I argue that 1) Bergson’s work on duration allow us to interpret the genealogy of energy as the history of attempts to provide an account of change in terms of spatialized notions of time; 2) that his work offers a way of incorporating historicity into our understanding of energy; and 3) that thinking energy in the context of duration offers the possibility of conceptualizing energy as change. (shrink)

This paper compares Nietzsche ́s views on the relationship between philosophical reflection and empirical sciences against the background of some of the debates in the so-called transcendental tradition, in order to characterize his position in terms of a liberal kind of methodological naturalism. Initially, it will be shown that there are some similarities between the debates in the German academic philosophy of the second half of the nineteenth century and the Postquinean contemporary debates on naturalism. I discuss subsequently F. A. (...) Lange ́s historical views concerning the emergence of methodical discipline within the materialistic tradition, as well as Nietzsche ́s reception of them. Next, I present Spir ́s arguments against the naturalizing programs of his time, as well as Nietzsche ́s response to him. In the last section, I discuss the meaning of Nietzsche ́s orientation to a speculative philosophy of the will to power in his late works and whether it is compatible or not with his more liberal conception of naturalism mainly supported in his middle period works. (shrink)

Due to the innovative possibilities of digital technologies, the issue of increasing automation is once again on the agenda – and not only in the industry, but also in other branches and sectors of contemporary societies. Although public and scientific discussions about automation seem to raise relevant questions of the “old” debate, such as the replacement of human labor by introducing new technologies, the authors focus here on the new contextual quality of these questions. The debate should rethink the relationship (...) between technology and work with regard to quantitative and qualitative changes in work. In this article, our example will be the introduction of automation in industry, which has been reflected in the widely recognized study by Frey and Osborne in 2013. They estimated the expected impacts of future computerization on US labor market outcomes as very high, specifically regarding the number of jobs at risk. Surprisingly, this study was the starting point of an intensive international debate on the impact of technologies on the future of work and the role of technological change in working environments. Thus, according to the authors, “old” questions remain important, but they should be reinterpreted for “new” societal demands and expectations of future models of work. (shrink)

One of the key insights of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is the idea that gender-based subordination is not just something done to women, but also something women do to themselves. This raises a question about ethical responsibility: if women are complicit, or actively implicated in their own oppression, are they at fault? Recent Beauvoir scholarship remains divided on this point. Here, I argue that Beauvoir did, in fact, ethically criticize many women for their complicity, as a sign of (...) what she called “bad faith”. I challenge recent accounts by Nancy Bauer and Manon Garcia, who both read Beauvoir as exonerating complicit women. According to this reading, women emerge as human “freedoms” within a social world where a “destiny” of inferiority is already prepared for them. Their self-subordination is then an inevitable product of acting in a patriarchal world. I argue, however, that this interpretation generates a crucial tension, leading Bauer and Garcia to call on women to stop being complicit, while also claiming they cannot avoid complicity. I propose instead a different interpretation, on which feminine complicity is often fueled by criticizable ethical attitudes that are far from inevitable. By revisiting Beauvoir’s notion of “bad faith”, I show that this account is compatible with recognizing the limitations imposed on women’s agency and I show that this feminist ethical criticism is itself an important part of a collective project of social transformation. (shrink)

El presente trabajo de Alex Ibarra Peña recoge los resultados de una investigación cuyo tema es la constitución de un campo de estudios ligado a la filosofía analítica en Chile. El autor se propone una tarea informativa y crítica en la que cifra la novedad de su propuesta. En otros términos, la suya es una labor de rescate, de algunos filósofos y corrientes de pensamiento relegados en las narraciones hegemónicas de la institucionalización de la filosofía en Chile y una tarea (...) que busca corregir el papel asignado a Chile en las visiones panorámicas de mayor circulación sobre la emergencia de la filosofía analítica en nuestro continente. En el cruce de estos dos vectores radica la novedad de la empresa de Ibarra Peña: proponer una visión más ajustada de la recepción de los filósofos analíticos en Chile. En nuestra reseña comentamos los núcleos centrales del trabajo y proponemos algunas hiótesis sobre los conflictos internos al campo cultural que subyacen a las opciones realizadas por el autor. Para finalizar indicamos lo que nos parece ser una falencia del trabajo: un estudio de la constitución de la filosofía analística como campo de estudios no debería dejar de tener en cuenta que el énfasis en la delimitación de la cientificidad por la filosofía analítica tenía en los años 60 y 70 adversarios concretos en el marxismo y el psicoanálisis. (shrink)

Resumen: En el presente trabajo intentaremos analizar cierta serie o tradi-ción de reflexiones sobre el conocimiento científico que lo caracteri-zan por su discontinuidad en relación al conocimiento ordinario osentido común. El origen de esta serie puede localizarse en la obrade Gaston Bachelard y su peculiar estudio de los actos epistemológicoscon los que se rompe con el pasado en una disciplina científica. Estosactos contrastan con lo que este autor califica como el “mitocontinuista” del empirismo. Esta posición será apropiada porAlthusser y desarrollada (...) por sus discípulos Balibar y Pêcheux. Inten-taremos mostrar que el factor común de la discontinuidad no consti-tuye una posición monolítica, sino que cabe reconocer, en las posi-ciones que consideramos, maneras diversas de entender la naturale-za de la misma. En este sentido, la revisión de las posiciones queAlthusser efectuó en su “autocrítica” constituye un punto de obser-vación privilegiado del abanico de alternativas que algunos de susdiscípulos desarrollarían sobre bases diversas. -/- Abstract In the present paper we analyze a tradition of reflections onscientific knowledge which distinguish it because of its“discontinuity” with common sense or ordinary knowledge. The beginning of this tradition can be traced back to Gaston Bachelardand his peculiar study of the epistemological acts which allows ascientific field to break with its past. The study of these acts helps toovercome what Bachelard considers is the empiricist myth ofcontinuity of knowledge. Bachelard’s views were retaken by Althusser and further developed by his students Balibar and Pêcheux.We will try to show the common commitment with discontinuity isnot an homogeneous view. Consequently we will try to showdifferences in the understanding of discontinuity. The revision of hisown positions made by Althusser in his “Self-criticism” is a specialstandpoint in order to consider the alternatives that his disciplesdeveloped on different grounds. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo reflexionamos en torno a una serie de textos en los que Michel Foucault se pregunta por estatuto de la crítica. La cuestión nos parece volverse reflexivamente sobre el propio Foucualt y por ello intentaremos evaluar de qué manera, con sus propios recursos conceptuales, se puede determinar el estatuto de su propio discurso. Para ello recorreremos dos caminos: (i) su rechazo de la noción de ideología que lo pone en tensión con algunas de las tradiciones mayores del (...) pensamiento crítico. La cuestión es aquí: ¿cómo es posible la crítica sin la ideología y sin la verdad?; (ii) la recuperación foucaultiana de la actitud crítica (en los textos sobre Kant y la pregunta Was ist Aufklärung?). A partir de allí Foucault recupera la problemática de la modernidad en términos de una “ontología histórica del presente”. Ambos caminos se cruzan, ya que las observaciones sobre una “política de la verdad” (lo otro de la crítica de la ideología comprometida con una verdad aséptica) se refuerzan con las de la cuestión del gobierno en términos de una “inservidumbre voluntaria”. En ambos casos, la práctica de la crítica, que subjetiviza desujetando, plantea la cuestión de la libertad. -/- We analyze Michel Foucault’s question for the status of critique and its reflexive return over Foucault himself: How Foucault’s discourse, qua critique, should be understood? We will drive two paths: (i) the refusal of the notion of ideology, where the question is: How to think of critique without ideology and truth?; (ii) the Foucauldian recovery of the “critical attitude” (in the texts on Kant’s answer to the question Was ist Aufklärung?) and of the problem of modernity, along the lines of a “historical ontology of the present”. There is a crossroad of (i) and (ii), since the remarks on a “politics of truth” (as opposite to an “ideology critique” committed with an aseptic truth) reinforces mutually with the problem of the government, faced along the lines of an art of the “voluntary inservitude”. In both cases, practice of criticism that subjectifies desubjugating, poses the question of liberty. (shrink)

Resumen: En este trabajo examino la concepción hegeliana del límite intentando clarificar sus principales características.Comienzo ubicando la filosofía hegeliana en el contexto filosófico más general del idealismo alemán, entendiendoeste movimiento como aquel comprometido en el proyecto de proporcionar una deducción trascendental de loabsoluto. Dado este contexto, procedo a examinar las críticas de Hegel a a la filosofía de Kant, principalmente en la“introducción a la Fenomenología del espíritu . El artículo concluye evaluando la adecuación de la elucidación deltratamiento hegeliano del problema (...) del límite mostrando como esta noción funciona en la interpretación del tratamiento hegeliano de la certeza sensorial en la fenomenología. -/- The problem of limit according to Hegel. In this paper I focus Hegelian conception of limit trying to clarify its main features. I begin locating Hegel’s philosophy in the broader philosophical context of German Idealism, understanding it as the intellectual movementconcerned with the project of providing a transcendental deduction of the Absolute. Having this as a background, Iexamine Hegelian critique of Kantian philosophy, mainly in the “Introduction” of Phenomenology of Spirit, and I conclude the paper testing the way I elucidated the problem of limit in this paper showing how this notion can beused to interpret the treatment of “sense certainty” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

Embora não o desenvolva na exposição que se segue, o argumento subjacente à minha contribuição para este volume é bastante simples: há duas vias pelas quais a filosofia de Nietzsche pode contribuir positivamente para uma revisão do modo como os seres humanos no ocidente definiram sua relação com o não humano: (1) a primeira via é a agonística – a tese agonística pode ser mobilizada para combater o viés especista que caracteriza boa parte da reflexão normativa do ocidente sem que (...) isso nos comprometa com a suposição de que é possível abandonar o perspectivismo em sua versão forte (a tese segundo a qual nossos esquemas conceituais e perceptuais, ou o fato de pertencermos a uma mesma história natural, nos aprisionam na perspectiva da espécie humana). O agonismo é uma posição filosófica que recusa a supremacia absoluta de uma formação de domínio como um arranjo prejudicial à própria formação de domínio; (2) a segunda via é a da filosofia da afirmação incondicional do acaso ou da necessidade, como Nietzsche se expressa alternativamente. Esta via comporta uma dimensão religiosa, por mais chocante que isso possa parecer a ouvidos nietzschianos. Nesta perspectiva da afirmação incondicional, todas as forças atuantes são igualmente afirmadas e a perspectiva normativa preservada minimamente na abordagem agonística é como que suprimida e toda tensão dissolvida. Segundo minha interpretação, a filosofia afirmativa defendida por Nietzsche exige uma política da reconciliação que vai além da perspectiva agonística. Ela representa a superação da visão moral de mundo na sua forma mais drástica: com um dizer sim até mesmo à perspectiva do último homem. Mas é justamente aí que as coisas começam a assumir ares dramáticos, pois Nietzsche reconhece que esta perspectiva não pode ser facilmente aceita em suas diversas implicações. Embora as duas vias que acabamos de mencionar possam inspirar legitimamente o projeto de uma revisão do antropocentrismo que caracterizou a reflexão normativa no ocidente, é necessário reconhecer que alguns traços do pensamento nietzschiano tornam esta tarefa de revisão altamente improvável. Uma vez assumida, a segunda via exigiria, por exemplo, a supressão de um dos traços centrais da personalidade filosófica de Nietzsche. Refiro-me a seu incansável ativismo em prol da autossuperação dos tipos mais elevados da humanidade. Esta dificuldade revela uma das facetas mais importantes da filosofia de Nietzsche, que consiste em seu compromisso com uma forma depurada de humanismo; um compromisso radical, que não pode ser ignorado por seus leitores. Esta forma depurada de humanismo fornece a autorização teórica para o lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana: seu flerte com a noção de uma história planificada e de uma administração global da terra, como forma de promover o cultivo dos homens de exceção. Este lado sombrio da utopia nietzschiana pode ser descrito como um desdobramento consequencialista de sua ética perfeccionista, e está na origem das derivações políticas que o filósofo alemão extrai deste compromisso ético. Penso que isso justifique a expressão hiperbólica utilizada no título de minha contribuição: “A catástrofe do humanismo”. Sempre que esta modalidade de humanismo depurado prevalece na reflexão de Nietzsche, a única voz perceptível nesta que é a mais polifônica das escritas filosóficas é a voz do ativista militando em prol dos homens de exceção. Quando esse tipo de engajamento prevalece, não é possível discernir nenhuma contribuição especificamente nietzschiana ao tema em torno do qual nos propusemos a refletir nesta coletânea: nestas ocasiões Nietzsche permanece indubitavelmente no interior de uma tradição que confere exclusividade ao humano em sua reflexão normativa. (shrink)

We explore Peirce’s pragmatic conception of sign action, as a distributed and emergent view of cognition and exemplify with the emergence of classical ballet. In our approach, semiosis is a temporally distributed process in which a regular tendency towards certain future outcomes emerges out of a history of sign actions. Semiosis self-organizes in time, in a process that continuously entails the production of more signs. Emergence is a ubiquitous condition in this process: the translation of signs into signs cannot be (...) inferred from the properties of the components of a semiotic triad alone, but has to take into account a complex interaction between a micro-semiotic and macro-semiotic level of description. This interaction can be understood as an interplay of potentialities and tendencies, or upward constitutive determinative relations and downward selective determinative relations. According to this view, emergence is a central defining condition of processes of meaning. Ballet is a sign in action. The emergence of classical ballet is a self-regulatory process, in which a system of different kinds of cognitive artifacts (musical, bodily/motor, spatial/architectonic) and agents obtained a stable semiotic relation throughout many phases of development between the 16th and the 19th Century. One case is the development of the verticality of dance in classical ballet as a semiotic relation connecting proscenium arch stages, dancing bodies, and audiences. This development is micro-semiotically determined by the spatial constraints of the proscenium arch stage, and macro-semiotically determined by a historical construction of the dancing body as a sign within a network of semiotic chains, such as the intersemiotic regulation of body of the dancer by principles coming from painting. This is not only the emergence of actual meaning, but also the emergence of an open-ended field of potential and general meanings, an autonomous tendency of development. To say that ballet, as sign action, emerges, is to say that cognitive artifacts such as dancer’s bodies, stages and audience’s point of view, musical compositions, costumes, all sorts of supporting institutions, etc, constitute a niche for sign action, interacting according to tendencies of development that didn’t exist before. (shrink)

The aim of the present article is to display and debate the main interpretive and philosophical claims defended by Simon Robertson in his Nietzsche and Contemporary Ethics. Robertson presents innovative and stimulating arguments that might interest primarily readers willing to better understand the Nietzschean moral theory and researchers interested in broader issues of contemporary moral theory, particularly in the analytic tradition. The author covers the main debates in the area, taking sides in disputes going on in normative theory, metaethics, moral (...) psychology and Nietzschean studies. Robertson mobilizes a set of interpretive and (purely) philosophical arguments, which deliver to the reader a final picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionist ideal. It is a theoretically consistent ideal that can be endorsed as a relevant alternative in the contemporary landscape of ethical theories. This alternative involves a powerful critique of the normative authority of morality, a sentimentalist moral psychology, a conception of the good life that combines the goods of excellence and flourishing, a modest conception of normativity that brings together internalist and externalist elements, and, finally, an irrealist metaethics that differs both from realism (which presupposes ontologically robust normative properties)and from reformist views (such as fictionalism and non-cognitivism). The article reconstructs Robertson's main arguments in favour of this set of claims, seeking to assess (1) to what extent they are convincing, both in their philosophical and interpretive ambitions and (2) how capable his methodological choices are to address critical challenges. (shrink)

The first part of my paper offers a brief characterization of what I call the non-hegemonic tradition of interpretation of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical program. In the second part, I suggest some small adjustments in the main argument of this tradition of interpretation. In general terms, the non-hegemonic tradition can be characterised by the claim that Nietzsche is a legitimate heir of the metaphilosophical programme first formulated by Friedrich Albert Lange in his ˜History of Materialism and Critique of its Significance for the (...) Present". None of the main interpreters of Nietzsche that I affiliate with this tradition of interpretation has formulated this claim quite explicitly, but I do not think that this characterization is inappropriate and I submit they could all accept it in the terms put forward in the present article. The main thesis states that Lange provides Nietzsche not so much with substantive theses as with the formal aspects of a philosophical programme whose content is drawn from other sources. This is the case, for example, in the attempt (in his early works) to mobilise Schopenhauer's metaphysics without committing himself to his epistemic claims. The attempt to execute this programme is surrounded by tensions that result not so much from Lange's sceptical theses as from what ultimately motivates them: the imperative of intellectual consciousness. This conflict remains unresolved as long as Nietzsche remains committed to the thesis of practical idealism according to which it is up to philosophy to satisfy certain metaphysical needs that are anthropologically unavoidable. The commitment to this anthropological thesis is what effectively places the young Nietzsche in the company of Kant, Schopenhauer and Lange. As soon as Nietzsche has abandoned this youthful commitment, he is prepared to revise his metaphilosophical convictions. (shrink)

This paper discusses two theses about Plato that Nietzsche defends in his lectures on the Athenian philosopher offered by him at the University of Basel during the 1870s. Nietzsche’s first claim concerns Plato’s philosophy: relying on Aristotle, Nietzsche holds that Plato was initially brought to a metaphysically motivated version of scepticism as a result of his affiliation to the Cratilian interpretation of Heraclitus. Although the Socratic method of defining and testing concepts as well as its metaphysical complement, the theory of (...) Forms, has allowed Plato to overcome this kind of metaphysically motivated scepticism, Nietzsche argues that such an overcoming is only provisional if one needs to accept the authenticity of Parmenides, then the arguments displayed in this later dialogue lead to a sceptical conclusion regarding the theory of Forms. The second claim advanced by Nietzsche in his lectures concerns Plato’s philosophical character, which is identified with the figures of the legislator and the political reformer. According to Nietzsche, all of Plato’s philosophical commitments must ultimately be interpreted in the light of his political project, for here there is no place for scepticism anymore. (shrink)

A hipótese que procuro defender neste ensaio é a seguinte: a famosa expressão " Am Leitfaden des Leibes", que surge nos póstumos de 1884 e desaparece um ano depois, contabilizando pouco mais de dez ocorrências no conjunto dos fragmentos póstumos e nenhuma na obra publicada, é uma expressão cujo sentido e intenção devem ser desvendados tendo como pano de fundo o crescente interesse de Nietzsche, na virada da primeira para a segunda metade dos anos oitenta, na reabilitação da atividade especulativa. (...) Minha segunda hipótese é que, ao cunhar esta expressão, Nietzsche se inspira na reivindicação metodológica de Schopenhauer, segundo a qual o corpo é o único fio condutor que nos resta se queremos nos mover com alguma segurança pelo labirinto da especulação. Por "corpo próprio‘" (Leib), Schopenhauer designa um tipo específico de experiência intuitiva que teria sido negligenciada por Kant: a experiência do conjunto de nossa vida afetiva. Segundo a minha hipótese, a partir da segunda metade dos anos oitenta Nietzsche estaria disposto a reconhecer que a intuição metodológica de Schopenhauer estava correta. O erro de Schopenhauer teria consistido simplesmente em partir de uma concepção equivocada do corpo e do tipo de acesso que temos a ele. A divergência, portanto, não incidiria sobre o método próprio à especulação, mas sobre o conteúdo ao qual o método se aplicaria, ou seja, sobre a representação do corpo próprio e dos traços que lhe seriam essenciais. Persistem as divergências quanto ao que implica seguir este preceito metódico (por exemplo, sobre o que deve e o que não deve ser evitado no antropomorfismo subjacente ao método de projeção analógica), ou quanto ao meio mais apropriado de se obter uma representação do corpo próprio. Segundo Schopenhauer, nós teríamos uma intuição do que é essencial no corpo mediante a experiência imediata do querer. Segundo Nietzsche, somente após um longo e penoso processo que envolve tanto a investigação empírica quanto a reflexão conceitual chegamos a alguns resultados tímidos. Portanto, mesmo a especulação que se serve do corpo como fio condutor representa uma extrapolação em relação ao que estaríamos autorizados a inferir em um ambiente epistemicamente mais rigoroso. E isso não apenas pela razão de que a inferência analógica é por si mesma uma inferência logicamente abusiva (mas tolerável, na ausência de outro recurso), mas também pelo fato de que aquilo que serve de base para a inferência analógica é uma imagem seletiva e arbitrariamente construída, cuja legitimidade epistêmica, mesmo quando restrita ao domínio da fisiologia humana, é apenas relativa. Estas considerações fornecem parte das razões (as de ordem epistêmica) de porque Nietzsche nunca conseguiu se persuadir inteiramente de que o seu projeto de reabilitação da filosofia especulativa era legítimo. Esta indecisão o levou a postergar e, segundo alguns intérpretes, a finalmente abandonar a sua execução, ou pelo menos a sua tradução em uma obra literária sistemática. (shrink)

Defensores do princípio da precaução propõem com frequência mudanças nas práticas científicas, para que elas facilitem o mesmo objetivo do princípio: evitar ameaças incertas ao ambiente ou à saúde humana. A ciência deveria ser uma ciência precautória. Apesar da importância prática da ciência precautória e da sua proximidade com os debates sobre ciência e valores, ela ainda não foi sistematicamente examinada. Neste artigo, pretende-se contribuir para a literatura sobre a ciência precautória de dois modos: sistematizando sua literatura prévia e propondo (...) uma definição de um de seus elementos principais, a precaução epistêmica, como uma orientação específica para a gestão de riscos indutivos. Conclui-se com algumas objeções que tal definição levanta, bem como caminhos de pesquisas futuras para abordá-las. (shrink)

What effect has finding the Archimedean point in ourselves had on how we look at ethics? The modern era of philosophy began with Descartes finding within himself an unshakable point from which to pursue knowledge of the world and himself. This intellectual alienation from the world into the universal mathematical structures of the human mind has led to a reversal where, henceforth, production, rather than contemplation, of knowledge became epistemologically superior. Guided by Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the Archimedean point and (...) Earth alienation in the Human Condition, I will argue that this scientific form of thinking made its way into ethical investigation in the age of modern philosophy. Furthermore, I will provide an analysis of Kant’s categorical imperative and John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism to show that despite modern science’s success in elucidating universal laws of nature, a scientific approach to ethics has not universalized our judgments of good and evil. (shrink)

COMUNIDADES DE DIALOGO E INDAGACION, PARA EXPERIENCIAS AGROECOLOGICAS EN EDUCACION INTERCULTURAL / CommunitIes of Dialogue and Inquiry, for agroecological experiences about intercultural education La Comunidad de indagación, practicada como herramienta para facilitar diálogos interculturales en el ámbito de la AgroEcología, en combinación con el “Método de Campesino a Campesino”. Propuestas metodológicas de la Filosofía con niñez y adolescencia, adaptadas a espacios educativos en zonas rurales atendiendo colectivos de diversas generaciones. Compartiremos experiencias acerca de Sistematización y Evaluación de proyectos educativos, con (...) énfasis en interculturalidad, relacionadas a la praxis de la agroecología, soberanía alimentaria y sustentabilidad. Entre Chiapas, México, del año 2001 al 2016; Huehuetenango, Guatemala, de 2009 a 2016, y una estancia como docente voluntario en el Instituto de Agroecología LatinoAmericana "IALA María Cano" en Cundinamarca, Colombia, en la primavera de 2017. Con el objetivo de compartir propuestas para otros espacios de construcción colectiva de saberes. -/- Community of Inquiry, practiced as a facilitation tool for intercultural dialogues in the environment of Agroecology, combined with the Method of “Campesino a Campesino”. Proposals from Philosophy for Children and Teenagers, adapted to rural education spaces attending to collectives of diverse ages. We´ll share experiences about systematization, and evaluating education projects with an intercultural emphasis, related with the praxis of agroecology, food sovereignity and sustainability. Between Chiapas, México, from the years 2001 to 2016; Huehuetenango, Guatemala, from 2009 to 2016, and a teaching volunteer stay during the spring of 2017 at the Institute of Agroecology for LatinAmerica “IALA María Cano” of Cundinamarca, Colombia. Aiming to share proposals for other spaces of collective construction of knowledges. (shrink)

This paper aims to map the different theoretical options related to the Precautionary Principle (PP). Great part of the literature on it can be systematized by answering to three different questions: is there a basic structure in the PP? If so, in which interpretation of the PP does this structure express itself? Finally, are its damage or knowledge conditions fixed or adjustable? The first question separates realist from non-realist approaches. The second question allows us to discriminate monist, dualist, or pluralist (...) positions in relation to the three interpretations of the PP: decision rule, procedural requirement, or epistemic rule. Finally, the third question distinguishes rigid from non-rigid formulations of the principle. Based on this mapping, one can not only navigate through the different formulations of the PP present both in official documents and in specialized literature, but also deflect some of its common objections, and understand Hans Jonas’ eventual connection with PP. Notwithstanding, this mapping does not capture other important themes attached to PP, which motivates a final distinction between narrow and broader forms of PP. (shrink)

Ziel meines Aufsatzes ist es, die Frage zu stellen, ob die Art und Weise, wie Nietzsche sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft bezieht, mithilfe des zeitgenössischen methodologischen Naturalismus beschrieben werden kann. Leiter (2009) hat diese Frage mit einem entschiedenen Ja beantwortet, ohne jedoch die Spannungen, die eine solche Antwort mit sich bringen, ausführlich zu diskutieren. Zumindest aus zwei Gründen scheint die Philosophie Nietzsches sich mit der stärkeren Version des methodologischen Naturalismus nicht so leicht in Einklang bringen zu lassen: (...) Erstens aufgrund des Prinzips des Willens zur Macht, das die These impliziert, dass das Intentionalitätsvokabular primitiver bzw. gründlicher als das physikalistische Vokabular sei, als einer Konsequenz aus der Verwendung des pragmatischen Prinzips der Sparsamkeit auf die ontologische Debatte (JGB 36, KSA 5, 54 f.); zweitens aufgrund Nietzsches Auffassung der spezifischen Aufgabe der Philosophie als einer normativen Aufgabe (JGB 211, KSA 5, 144 f.; GM I Anmerkung, KSA 5, 289). Gegen die starke Interpretation Leiters werden hier die folgenden Thesen vertreten: Nietzsche kann nur insofern als ein Vertreter des methodologischen Naturalismus betrachtet werden, als er der Auffassung ist, dass der Philosoph epistemische Tugenden erst dann gewinnt, wenn er sich mit einer wissenschaftlichen Methode vertraut macht (MA I 256, KSA 2, 212). Das bedeutet, dass er sich zumindest vorläufig den Regeln unterwirft, die innerhalb einer bestimmten wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft gelten (MA I 635, KSA 2, 360 f.; JGB 188, KSA 5, 108 ff.). Der Philosoph soll dies tun, um die epistemischen Tugenden zu erlangen, die für die normative Aufgabe der Philosophie unentbehrlich sind. Diese epistemischen Tugenden sind wesentlich skeptischer Natur. Sie zu kultivieren, bedeutet sicherlich, epistemische Werte zu fördern, nicht aber unbedingt für sie (AC 54, KSA 6, 236 f.), geschweige denn für ein kausales, bzw. monokausales Erklärungsmodell Exklusivität beanspruchen zu müssen (JGB 21, KSA 5, 35 f.). (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the temporal experience of decolonization/decoloniality through Furio Jesi's phenomenology of revolt, using the Puerto Rico summer protests of 2019 as a case study, to suggest that decolonization inhibits the functionality of the mythological machine because in the context of coloniality, revolt is the product of a biological exigency. In addition, I argue that decolonization should not be understood as an inevitable end point, or end goal, known a priori, but rather it is an anti-teleological process (...) and subjectivity that at once fuses the time of revolt and revolution; an impossible task in Jesi's framework. (shrink)

O propósito deste artigo é aprofundar o debate da narratalogia cognitiva sobre o papel das emoções e afetos na escrita e leitura do texto ficcional. Para tanto, buscamos fundamentos teóricos em teorias recentes da afetividade situada, em particular nos conceitos de andaimes, arranjos e milieus afetivos, a fim de observar como textos codificam afetos para suscitar estados afetivos e emocionais nos leitores. O mérito da interlocução virá da capacidade de fertilizar a compreensão do papel das emoções na construção de textos (...) ficcionais, mediante a análise do seu papel na composição de um texto em particular: o conto “Criançada”, de Anton Tchekhov. Como teorias da afetividade situada reservam um papel de destaque para o ambiente externo na construção da afetividade humana, argumentamos que a aplicação dessas teorias ao nosso objeto permite observar como a construção do espaço, a descrição dos objetos e os afetos dos personagens estão intimamente ligados, alimentando-se reciprocamente e fortalecendo-se em relações de feedback. Essas análises podem permitir que a narratologia cognitiva saliente elementos afetivos dos textos ficcionais até aqui pouco explorados nos estudos literários. (shrink)

This text intends on putting what may be called a philosophy of marronage1 in conversation with Indigenous thought, particularly by engaging with the thought of Cherokee Nation philosopher Brian Burkhart from his essay “Locality is a Metaphysical Fact.”2 While the topic is treated in detail in Burkhart’s Indigenizing Philosophy through the Land (2019), my engagement with that specific text will be reserved for a separate project. What is of interest to me here is Burkhart’s elaboration of the concept of locality, (...) which refers to an “ontological kinship with the land” that serves as a bulwark against the sedimentation of the coloniality of being in the ontology of the Indigenous subject. I would like to add some nuance to it from the positionality of a subject whose ontological kinship with the land was severed through the kidnapping and enslavement of the ancestors from the African continent. In the process, my intent is to offer an alternate reading of Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) which may allow Fanonian thought to be reconciled with North Native American Indigenous thought, which has typically rejected Fanon’s rejection of a return to ancestral ways. This alternate reading of Fanon shows that a reconnection with ancestral ways, and reconstruction of locality, constitutes only part of the liberation project for Afro-diasporic subjects. (shrink)

I develop a genealogy of the concept of ‘energy’ in western philosophy and science, focusing on how energy concepts (e.g., energeia, vis viva, kinetic/potential energy) have been theorized in relation to time. Looking especially to the ideas of Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger, I argue that the thread that connects energy concepts through time is the epistemological tendency to derive conceptual accounts of change from a prior ontological sameness or essence. I then attempt to lay the (...) groundwork for a process metaphysics that harmonizes with contemporary findings in the physical sciences, while also extending the concept of energy to account for the presence of subjectivity in nature. (shrink)

Habit in semiosis can be modeled both as a macro-level in a hierarchical multi-level system where it functions as boundary conditions for emergence of semiosis, and as a cognitive niche produced by an ecologically-inherited environment of cognitive artifacts. According to the first perspective, semiosis is modeled in terms of a multilayered system, with micro functional entities at the lower-level and with higher-level processes being mereologically composed of these lower-level entities. According to the second perspective, habits are embedded in ecologically-inherited environments (...) of signs that co-evolve with cognition. Both descriptions offer a novel approximation of Peirce’s semiotics and theoretical findings in other areas (hierarchy theory, evolutionary biology), suggesting new frameworks to approach the concept of habit integrated with its role in semiosis. (shrink)

The following paper puts the history of race and colonialism in conversation with the history of the concept of energy. The objective is to understand what a critical decolonial perspective can teach us about the central role that energy plays in western culture, materially and epistemologically. I am interested in how this approach to political, epistemological, and ontological questions demands that we reconceptualize energy to account for the historical particularity of the concept and the phenomena of history and intersubjectivity, which (...) are eschewed in a purely materialistic and quantitative conception of energy. We will see how energy has been complicit in the racialization of black and indigenous bodies, and how the privileged place that the concept of energy has occupied in the canon of western physics has served to obscure the theological, metaphysical, and cultural assumptions that constitute it. (shrink)

The icon is the type of sign connected to efficient representational features, and its manipulation reveals more information about its object. The London Underground Diagram (LUD) is an iconic artifact and a well-known example of representational efficiency, having been copied by urban transportation systems worldwide. This paper investigates the efficiency of the LUD in the light of different conceptions of iconicity. We stress that a specialized representation is an icon of the formal structure of the problem for which it has (...) been specialized. By embedding such rules of action and behavior, the icon acts as a semiotic artifact distributing cognitive effort and participating in niche construction. (shrink)

Feminists have always been concerned with how the clothes women wear can reinforce and reproduce gender hierarchy. However, they have strongly disagreed about what to do in response: some have suggested that the key to feminist liberation is to stop caring about how one dresses; others have replied that the solution is to give women increased choices. In this paper, we argue that neither of these dominant approaches is satisfactory and that, ultimately, they have led to an impasse that pervades (...) the contemporary feminist debate. The problem is that both sides of the debate understand women’s complicity in patriarchal subordination as a matter of what women wear and do. Instead, we propose a phenomenological analysis that understands complicity as based in our relations to our clothes. Starting from this phenomenological perspective, we sketch a new relational feminist ethics of dressing. This alternative ethical paradigm cannot yield a simple recipe for how to dress or tell us what garments are off-limits. But it can offer a way to make critical feminist judgements about clothes without veering into a stifling new prescriptivism. (shrink)

A comienzos de los años 60 el marxismo althusseriano y el psicoanálisis lacaniano coincidían en un punto: su voluntad de intervenir críticamente en una coyuntura teórica caracterizada por el avance de las ciencias humanas. Ambas corrientes señalaban, con grandes convergencias, que las “ciencias humanas” (de manera evidente en sus versiones “tecnocráticas”: ego psychology, pisicología social, sociología en sus distintos avatares, etc.) cumplían funciones de adaptación de los individuos al sistema social, considerado como un invariante. Dichas ciencias humanas se presentaban como (...) obstáculos epistemológicos para lo que entonces se pensaba como el re-comienzo del materialismo histórico y del psicoanálisis. El hallazgo de obstáculos semejantes no es una mera coincidencia. Ambas líneas de pensamiento convergen en puntos importantes, afirmando, en lo que podría pensarse como una común tendencia materialista, la subordinación de la esfera biológica a la de lo simbólico o a la práctica social, la primacía del significante sobre el sentido, la necesidad de conceptualizar formas originales de la causalidad, cuyo leit-motiv es la sobredeterminación. El presente trabajo busca explorar algunas de las tensiones contenidas en esta coincidencia. El punto de mayor tensión lo suscitan los desarrollos de Althusser y algunos de sus seguidores (en particular Pêcheux y Lecourt) acerca de la relación entre la categoría de sujeto, la de ideología y el conocimiento científico en tanto que “proceso sin sujeto”, al sostener la imposibilidad de un “sujeto de la ciencia”, tesis que sin embargo juega un rol importante en el pensamiento de Lacan. Esta tensión remite a diferentes factores: la diferente herencia epistemológica (Bachelard en un caso, Koyré en el otro), la diferente recepción de la historia de la filosofía (el caso de Descartes), como así también diferencias de registro de los conceptos clave: inconsciente por un lado, ideología y lucha de clases, por el otro. En este trabajo haremos algunas observaciones sobre los efectos que acarrea la diferente recepción de la filosofía de Descartes. (shrink)

Aproximaciones a la escuela francesa de epistemología Los problemas que dominan a la epistemología pueden contextualizarse históricamente como una forma de racionalidad filosófica. La filosofía se ha presentado a lo largo de la historia como un discurso en el que sus diversos componentes (metafísica, ontología, gnoseología, ética, lógica, etc.) se mostraron unidos en el molde de la ?unidad del saber?. En este marco unitario alguna de las formas del saber filosófico detenta usualmente una posición dominante. El énfasis colocado en la (...) unidad del saber filosófico, o en ?la unidad del pensamiento humano?, es una herencia que el pensamiento filosófico recibe de sus raíces mítico-teológicas. Dicha visión se vio sometida, en la historia de la filosofía, a un proceso de secularización por el cual la instancia dominante pasó de la teología a la metafísica y de ésta a la teoría del conocimiento. Entre los siglos XIX y XX, este proceso atestiguó un cambio ulterior, colocando a la epistemología como instancia dominante de la racionalidad filosófica. La sucesión debe verse como una consecuencia de la funcionalización social de los dispositivos de creencias (ideología), lo que provoca que los mismos se conviertan, en determinado momento, en un obstáculo para la producción de nuevos conocimientos. De esta manera, los nuevos conocimientos, para desarrollarse, se ven forzados a provocar reestructuraciones en el campo filosófico, ya sea mediante el reemplazo de la instancia dominante, la incorporación o creación de nuevas formas de saber filosófico -tal el caso de la epistemología-, o de la marginalización relativa de otras. Se trata de en un proceso complejo (que no es ni lineal, ni biunívoco), en el que cabe no obstante discernir un esquema de la sucesión temporal de las formas filosóficas que dominan la pretendida ?unidad del pensamiento humano? (filosofía). El que acabamos de describir es un proceso lento de sustitución y reemplazo en el tipo de garantías que se le exige elaborar a la filosofía. Algunos momentos, como el ocaso de las garantías de la fe, acaecido con el surgimiento de la filosofía moderna, podrían parecer a primera vista contrajemplos para esta concepción de la evolución del saber filosófico. Podría creerse, en efecto, que con la constitución de esferas autónomas de discurso (teología, ciencia, filosofía), del discurso filosófico se desgajó en un discurso de una naturaleza diferente: la ciencia. Sin embargo, una mirada más atenta revela un paisaje diferente, puesto que esta transformación estuvo acompañada, primero, por la aparición de una nueva instancia dominante de la unificación del conocimiento filosófico. Se trata de la búsqueda de una nueva clase de garantías, las del origen y el fundamento del conocimiento, es decir, las de la gnoseología o teoría del conocimiento, en el interior de la cual se verificó finalmente un nuevo desplazamiento, con la constitución, a fines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XX, de la ?filosofía de la ciencia? o epistemología. Este modelo para la conceptualización del desarrollo del discurso filosófico tiene la ventaja de permitirnos pensar la relación que la epistemología guarda con la instancia de saber filosófico dominante en el seno de la cual se desarrolla: la de la gnoseología. A partir de las relaciones que la epistemología guarda con la temática de las garantías del conocimiento podemos apresar, en un esquema heurístico que será complejizado de diversos modos en este libro, la diferencia entre las tesis características de la epistemología anglosajona y de la epistemología francesa. De acuerdo con en este esquema heurístico, el rasgo más característico de la epistemología anglosajona es su sujeción, en la mayor parte de su desarrollo, a la teoría del conocimiento, lo que se revela en la persistencia de algunos aspectos de la filosofía de la representación y en la reproducción de la oposición idealista entre sujeto y objeto como dos polos cuya armonía debería establecerse, filosóficamente, en términos de la verdad. En su lugar, la epistemología francesa se propuso el estudio de los mecanismos de producción de los conocimientos. La epistemología, desde esta perspectiva, ya no fue vista primordialmente como el estudio de los fundamentos del conocimiento científico, sino como la teoría de las condiciones y las formas de la práctica científica y la historia de esta práctica, tal como aparece en las distintas ciencias concretas. Expresado de otra manera, el contraste se podría establecer mediante la observación de que mientras los anglosajones hacen filosofía de la ciencia como una extensión de la lógica, los franceses la hacen como una extensión de la historia de la ciencia, es decir, encontrando en la historia el laboratorio del epistemólogo. Ahora bien, según veremos, el campo de la epistemología francesa ha cobijado una buena cantidad de debates que tienen que ver primordialmente con dos tendencias en tensión: la que enfatiza la autonomía de lo epistemológico y aquella que destaca la determinación social del pensamiento. Los trabajos de este libro esperan problematizar este y otros ejes, explorando las perspectivas de los ?clásicos? de la escuela francesa en epistemología (Bachelard, Canguilhem, Althusser, Foucault, etc.), las relaciones entre los mismos y los diálogos que cabe establecer entre estos y otras corrientes de pensamiento. ÍNDICE: La ruptura epistemológica, de Bachelard a Balibar y Pêcheux, Pedro Karczmarczyk La ruptura epistemológica según Bachelard, Althusser y Badiou, Carlos Gassmann Visitaciones Derrideanas, Jazmín Anahí Acosta Epistemología sin sujeto cognoscente. Superación, disolución o sujeción de la subjetividad en Popper, Wittgenstein y Foucault, Silvia Rivera; La torsión política del concepto de verdad en Michel Foucault, Manuel Cuervo Sola Canguilhem y Foucault. De la norma biológica a la norma política, Andrea Torrano Psicología e ideología: Foucault, Canguilhem y Althusser, Matías Abeijón . (shrink)

(CONTENIDO: LA FILOSOFÍA DE ALTHUSSER A 50 AÑOS DE LIRE LE CAPITAL Pedro Karczmarczyk, 3; DISCURSO Y DECRETO: SPINOZA ALTHUSSER Y PÊCHEUX Warren Montag 11; ALTHUSSER LECTOR DE GRAMSCI Vittorio Morfino 43 LAS ABSTRACCIONES, ENTRE LA IDEOLOGÍA Y LA CIENCIA João Quartim de Moraes 67 ELOGIO DEL TEORICISMO. PRÁCTICA TEÓRICA E INCONSCIENTE FILOSÓFICO EN LA PROBLEMÁTICA ALTHUSSERIANA, Natalia Romé 85 MARXISMO Y FEMINISMO: EL RECOMIENZO DE UNA PROBLEMÁTICA1 115 Luisina Bolla* / Pedro Karczmarczyk* 115 RRESEÑAS El materialismo de (...) Althusser. Más allá del telos y del Eschaton de Vittorio Morfino, por Valentín Huarte 153; El sujeto en cuestión, Pedro Karczmarczyk (ed.) por Constanza Storani; 159 La posición materialista. El pensamiento de L. Althusser entre la práctica teórica y la práctica política, de Natalia Romé, por Ingrid Sarchman y Carolina Collazo 164. (shrink)

Rigidity does interesting philosophical work, with important consequences felt throughout metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and so on. The authors’ aim in this article is to show that rigidity has yet another role to play, with surprising consequences for the problem of free will and determinism, for the phenomenon of rigidity has the upshot that some metaphysically necessary truths are up to us. The significance of this claim is shown in the context of influential arguments against free will. The authors (...) show that some virtually indisputable inference rules employed in formulations of the Consequence Argument, as well as in fatalistic arguments, fail with a variety of counter-examples. Along the way, the authors compare the present arguments to other, similar arguments made in recent years. (shrink)

In debates concerning the consequence argument, it has long been claimed that [McKay, T. J., and D. Johnson. 1996. “A Reconsideration of an Argument Against Compatibilism.” Philosophical Topics 24 (2): 113–122] demonstrated the invalidity of rule (β). Here, I argue that their result is not as robust as we might like to think. First, I argue that McKay and Johnson's counterexample is successful if one adopts a certain interpretation of ‘no choice about’ and if one is willing to deny the (...) conditional excluded middle principle. In order to make this point I demonstrate that (β) is valid on Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals. This result is important and should not be neglected, I argue, because there is a particular line of objection to the revised formulations of the consequence argument that does not succeed against the original version. (shrink)

The methodological differences of understanding, versus explaining, have been at the centre of a century-long methodenstreit debate (and disagreement) among philosophers and scientists. Karl Jaspers managed to import this discussion to the realm of psychiatry and psychopathology in a significant, but unresolved, manner. Side-tracked by the advent of various changes in psychiatry during the 20th century, phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry have made a comeback in the last decades and, since then, developed new contributions to this subject. Quite similarly, the (...) study of time experience, standing on the shoulders of notorious philosophers, has too witnessed a similar renaissance, with groundbreaking developments across several conditions, including depression. The present essay is essentially exploratory, but during its development, after addressing the concepts of the methodenstreit debate, and tackling both meaningful and causal connections behind time dysperception in depression, I argue that understanding, at least in this context and at present time, is not entirely reducible to causal explanations, for some things are only gained in understanding, such as the feeling of being understood and the implications it carries for a therapeutic relationship and the treatment plan. (shrink)

Der Denkweg Hegels kann als ein Bildungsprozess von Einheitsbegriffen angesehen werden. Dieser Weg lässt sich in zwei Phasen einteilen: eine spekulative und eine vorspekulative Phase. Die These dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, dass der Begriff der Einheit sich innerhalb beider Phasen jenes Denkweges entwickelte und dabei die gleichen allgemeinen Formen annimmt. Von daher kann der Weg dieses Denkens durch einen Doppel-Begriff, den der spekulativen und den der vorspekulativen Einheit, rekonstruiert werden. Im Blick auf das Ganze lässt sich also sagen, dass beide (...) Phasen am Ende durch die fundamentale Entscheidung Hegels eines „Eingreifens in das Leben der Menschen“ verbunden sind. Und die letzte Form der Einheit in der spekulativen Phase – die der absoluten Idee – wird dementsprechend eine gewisse aufgehobene Bewegung der Subjektivität und der Objektivität sein, an der sich die Einheit als Freiheit zeigt. (shrink)

Resumen: Los trabajos abordan, desde diferentes perspectivas a la categoría de sujeto como una categoría crucial del pensamiento contemporáneo. El ámbito de preocupaciones es amplio: la perspectiva del filósofo norteamericano S Cavell quien hace una originalísima recepción de la herencia de Austin y Wittgenstein; la perspectiva fenomenológica de Sartre en diálogo y conflicto con la del psicoanálisis lacaniano y las reconceptualizaciones de la ideología realizadas por Louis Althusser; la constitución del sujeto en tensión entre la sujeción al poder y las (...) posibilidadesde resistencia según la perspectiva de Judith Butler; una relectura de la implicación de estructura y sujeto en la perspectiva estructural abierta por Saussure y continuada por Lévi-Strauss, Benveniste y Lacan, tema que recibe un tratamiento circunscripto al pensamiento del argentino Ernesto Laclau, en el que se distinguen distintas etapas; las implicaciones que los eventos fundamentales de la historia del siglo XX acarrean para una conceptualización de la subjetividad en la perspectiva de Theodor Adorno y las limitaciones que la conceptualización de la obra de arte como juego en la obra de Gadamer impone a la concepción moderna de la subjetividad. -/- Índice: Presentación del compilador La crítica de Heidegger a la noción de sujeto: un análisis a partir de la incidencia de su reflexión sobre la técnica y el lenguaje, Luciana Carrera Aizpitarte El juego como auto-representación y modo de ser de la obra de arte en la estética hermenéutica de Gadamer, Paola Belén El yo sobre la línea de ficción: análisis de las concepciones de Sartre y Lacan, Luisina Bolla El poder y el sujeto. Sujeción, norma y resistencia en Judith Butler, Matías Abeijón Theodor W. Adorno: la crítica al sujeto después de Auschwitz, Gustavo Robles Estructura, discurso y subjetividad, Pedro Karczmarczyk Transformaciones, rupturas y continuidades entre la perspectiva de Ernesto Laclau y la tradición (post)estructuralista, Hernán Fair La recuperación del sujeto: escepticismo, autoconocimiento y escritura en S. Cavell, Guadalupe Reinoso . (shrink)

La obra es un estudio de una de las nociones fundamentales en la filosofía de Gadamer, el concepto de aplicación. Se intenta dar cuenta de la manera en que dicho concepto viene a solucionar, o tal vez sería mejor decir, a disolver, en la reflexión del siglo XX, el problema que enfrentaban las ciencias históricas en el siglo XIX para convertirse en conocimiento objetivo. Dicho problema consistía en dos importantes dificultades vinculadas entre sí: la imposibilidad de disponer de un objeto (...) independiente, el pasado “tal cual ocurrió” para confrontar la adecuación de las visiones del mismo constituidas desde el presente, por un lado, y la imposibilidad de erradicar la perspectiva del presente (intereses, ideologías, etc.)en los relatos históricos. Para abordar este problema, Gadamer acomete nada menos que una revisión de las categorías fundamentales en las cuales se inserta esta dificultad, esto es, las nociones de conocimiento, realidad y verdad modeladas, a través de Kant, de acuerdo a la perspectiva de la moderna ciencia de la naturaleza. Un paso fundamental será entonces examinar el problema del valor cognitivo del arte, esto es, elucidar las nociones de realidad y experiencia a partir de la experiencia artística, para extender luego estas conclusiones a la historia y el lenguaje. En el marco de esta revisión se perfila el concepto de aplicación, el cual destaca que nuestra condición de agentes históricos, insertos en una tradición y en una comunidad lingüística, no es un obstáculo, sino justamente la condición que hace posible que podamos comprender lo diferente a lo propio, ya sea en la forma de la alteridad histórica, lingüística o meramente personal. La tesis de la obra que presentamos es que la estructura de la aplicación, con la consecuente historicidad que acarrea, se presenta de manera semejante tanto en las macro-estructuras de la comprensión (comprensión de textos, de la tradición, del arte) como en las estructuras de un nivel inferior o más básico, como la realización de juicios y la comprensión de conceptos, punto que se elabora, en esta obra, a través de una comparación con las ideas del segundo Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Poems are treated by translators as hierarchical multilevel systems. Here we propose the notion of “multilevel poetry translation” to characterize such cases of poetry translation in terms of selection and rebuilding of a multilevel system of constraints across languages. Different levels of a poem correspond to different sets of components that asymmetrically constrain each other (e. g., grammar, lexicon, syntactic construction, prosody, rhythm, typography, etc.). This perspective allows a poem to be approached as a thinking-tool: an “experimental lab” which submits (...) language to unusual conditions and provides a scenario to observe the emergence of new patterns of semiotic behaviour as a result. We describe this operation as a problem-solving task, and exemplify with Augusto de Campos’ Portuguese translation of John Donne’s poem “The Expiration.”. (shrink)

En este trabajo analizamos la reivindicación gadameriana del valor cognitivo de arte como un ejemplo de un modo de conocimiento que permite concebir de mejor manera la comprensión que tiene lugar en las ciencias del espíritu. Dicha reivindicación presupone el desconocimiento del valor cognitivo del arte operado por la subjetivización de la estética con Kant y una vuelta a los presupuestos de la tradición humanista. Por ello en la introducción presentamos en esquema los conceptos humanistas de tacto, gusto, sentido común (...) y juicio y comparamos el concepto de experiencia que corresponde a los mismos con la noción de experiencia modelada por la ciencia moderna. En la primera parte del trabajo examinamos en detalle la subjetivización de la estética que comienza con Kant y culmina con la “conciencia estética”. En la segunda parte examinamos cómo la reivindicación del valor cognitivo del arte corre pareja con el desarrollo de una ontología de la obra de arte. Concluimos señalando cómo el recorrido realizado facilita la comprensión de la especificidad de las ciencias del espíritu (humanidades). (shrink)

Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason to regard miracle workers as metaphysically impossible. However, the paper contends that miracle workers (...) are indeed impossible according to well-known theories concerning the laws of nature. This result highlights the reliance of the consequence argument on a plausible premise, which is widely accepted by proponents of non-Humean views of laws. The paper also provides a way to explain away the intuition that miracle workers are possible, but this has the upshot that a recent, two-dimensional formulation of the consequence argument is unsound. (shrink)

No presente trabalho, com vistas para uma análise conceitual e crítica acerca do modelo de democracia representativa, bem como uma proposta de mudança sistemática e ordenada, iremos nos debruçar sobre os conceitos e perspectivas elencadas por Arendt e Bobbio no cerne da questão participativa. Hannah Arendt (1941-1975), ilustre teórica política, compreende a sociedade consolidada pós revoluções americana e francesa como fortemente apolitizada, visto o afastamento dos cidadãos dos assuntos públicos na atual democracia indireta. Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), renomado jusfilósofo, define com (...) rigor analítico a categoria representativa da participação popular nas questões coletivas, indicando suas limitações e possibilidades. Em vista disso, faz-se necessário o estudo conjunto de ambas personalidades para o entendimento da disposição comum no que diz respeito à representatividade política que, segundo a autora alemã, impede a efetiva realização da vida cívica e atomiza os sujeitos, suscitando o desinteresse pela coisa pública e facilitando a oligarquização da mesma. A partir da inferência no que se refere ao foco central deste artigo, e da investigação complementar sobre os próprios riscos da implementação excessiva dos cânones reverberados pela tradição antiga — a qual pressupõe o envolvimento direto dos cidadãos no governo —, perpassaremos pela alternativa proposta por Arendt, a saber: a criação de conselhos deliberativos nos diversos níveis subnacionais a fim de fomentar o maior interesse e atuação popular na tomada de decisões, salvaguardando, assim, parte significativa do espírito revolucionário mas, sem retirar a centralidade de um governo bem estabelecido. Dessa maneira, a relação entre Arendt e Bobbio se designará no exame do sistema democrático representativo com respeito às limitações impostas pelo próprio sistema que impede a plena participação popular qualitativa, juntamente com a orientação arendtiana para rarear essa problemática — embora sem buscar a completa aniquilação do mecanismo de partidos, mas a união deste com o modelo de conselhos. (shrink)