In his Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel tries to explicate his claim that what he calls the System of Science should be organized merely through the "Life of Concept". In this paper, first, we will try to survey the role(s) Hegel assigns to the Concept in Phenomenology of Spirit. Then, we will examine his use of this term in Phenomenology of the Spirit and we will discuss the meanings of this term in that book. (...) Thereafter We will discuss whether in Phenomenology of the Spirit, Concept is finite (as we have seen in Kant's philosophy) and whether it is limited to an external limit or not, and eventually we will try to show that in Phenomenology of Spirit, the absolute knowledge should be understood not as attaining a pure and simple static truth, but it must be understood as infinite unity of Concept and in fact as infinite movement of it. In fact, drawing on the interpretations of Pippin, Houlgate, and Stern, we argue that in contrast to the prevailing interpretations in contemporary Hegel studies, at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is the concept that becomes absolute, not consciousness. (shrink)

Reading Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit - Irfan Ajvazi.

Kierkegaard's preoccupation with a separation between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ runs through his work and is widely thought to belong to his rejection of Hegel's idealist monism. Focusing on The Concept of Irony and Either/Or, I argue that although Kierkegaard believes in various metaphysical distinctions between inside and outside, he nonetheless understands the task of the philosopher as that of making outside and inside converge in a representation. Drawing on Hegel's philosophy of art, I show that Kierkegaard's project in (...) both of these books is the aesthetic project of revealing the inner essence of something in its outward appearance. Kierkegaard's portrait of Socrates in The Concept of Irony is a phenomenology of the spirit of irony. My interpretation adds a new dimension to our understanding of Kierkegaard's aesthetics and his relation to Hegel; it presents him as a follower of Plato, whom he is usually thought to have dismissed; and it uncovers a deep connection between Kierkegaard's first two books, which are never read in conjunction. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

Hegel uses the term Einsicht (‘insight’) throughout several key subsections of Chapter Six of the Phenomenology of Spirit (notably in ‘Faith and Pure Insight’ and ‘The Struggle of the Enlightenment with Superstition’). Nowhere else in his work does the term enjoy such a sustained treatment. Commentators generally accept Hegel’s use of the term in the Phenomenology as simply referring to the type of counter-religious reasoning found in the French Enlightenment. I show how Hegel derives the term, through (...) the lens of Kant’s essay, ‘What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’ from the Pantheismusstreit, the philosophical debate between Mendelssohn and Jacobi about knowledge of God. The Aufklärung provenance of Einsicht shows how a deep complicity between faith and reason, in the form of immediate knowing, leads beyond the Terror to a happier outcome in the Morality section. Finally, passing reference to Einsicht in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic confirms its role in the ethical and political vocation of Hegel’s Science. (shrink)

This paper walks through four different approaches to Hegel's notion of Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Through taking four different approaches our aim is to explore the multifaceted nature of the phenomenological movement of consciousness. The first part provides an overview of the three chapters of the section on Consciousness, namely Sense-Certainty, Perception and Force and the Understanding, attempting to unearth the implicit logic that undergirds Consciousness’ experience. The second part focuses specifically on the shape of Sense-Certainty, (...) providing an analysis of the movement from Sense-Certainty to Perception from a neuroscientific view. Thirdly, we consider an inferentialist reading of the chapters on Consciousness which has been made popular by Robert Brandom. We think that while this view elucidates the connection that Hegel draws between meaning and use, it fails to account for the vital place of immediacy in each of the shapes. Finally, the fourth part suggests that Hegel’s notion of Consciousness improves the reading of tragedy he develops in chapters 5 and 7 of the Phenomenology. While many critics have noted that Hegel fails to do justice to tragic experience, Consciousness contains an epistemology that develops analogously to the heroes of ancient tragedy. Each approach in this paper comes at Hegel’s description of the journey of Consciousness from a different angle, and together they paint a multi-layered picture of a highly important part of Hegel’s corpus. (shrink)

Abstract:This article provides a novel interpretation of the so-called transition to self-consciousness in The Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel argues that the failure of the protagonist consciousness to formulate an understanding of the world in terms of forces and laws necessitates the shift to an investigation of its own self-conscious subjectivity. The author argues that we can make sense of the transition by attending to Hegel's account of the metaphysical structure of forces and laws, on the one hand, (...) and the structure of self-consciousness, on the other. Following this approach, she argues that the transition represents the realization by the protagonist consciousness that the object of phenomenological inquiry must be metaphysically self-determining (or "infinite," in Hegel's terminology). The standpoint of self-consciousness accordingly emerges because the protagonist consciousness takes itself qua subject to exhibit the requisite self-determining structure. In addition to making sense of the transition to self-consciousness, this line of argumentation illuminates Hegel's subsequent focus on the activity of "desire.". (shrink)

This article will explain that the difficulty in understanding the role of the "We" in the Phenomenology arises from the confusion between the two distinct ways that consciousness appears in its basic nature, where "consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, consciousness of itself" (PhdG §85). Firstly, there is consciousness of an object, let's call it C(O), which also holds that there is a distinction between itself, C(O), and the object in-itself, "O." (...) Thus we have C(O) + O. Here, "consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it" (PhdG §82). Secondly we have a consciousness of C(O) + O, which can be written as C[C(O)+O]. The first "C" in this formula is called observing consciousness, and the second "C" is the observed consciousness. The observed consciousness may also be called natural or ordinary consciousness. However, both observing and observed consciousness are essentially one and the same consciousness, "C," merely differing in form, at one and the same time both subject and object to itself. (shrink)

Sense-certainty is the consciousness that Truth (what is/being) lies in particular external objects. For example, considering that the mountain is true, the tree is true, and so on. But truth is not immediate. Truth is necessarily mediated, i.e. a result, implying that it is arrived at. Thus, if a crime is claimed against someone before a judge, the judge does not accept it immediately as true. The truth of the claim has to be established, arrived at, through due process of (...) presenting evidence, circumstances and arguments. The naïve realist accepts the evidence of his/her senses as true, as does the empirical scientist, but is unaware of the fact that there is process involved in making that determination. Divine Reason acts within all of creation, in which Man participates to some finite degree and, accordingly, is able to articulate that in the world. It is not so clear-cut as this, however, as the understanding would like it to be. The principle of the identity of identity and difference blurs the distinctions between God and Man so that, although the distinction is there, identity is also to be accounted for. It is this principle of simultaneous oneness and difference beyond understanding, and comprehensible only to what Hegel calls Speculative Reason that unlocks the door to the sphere of Spirit, or Absolute Knowledge. This is of course the broader perspective—the real science is in the details. Study of the Phenomenology is useful because it deals with the perspective of Reality from within consciousness and gradually leads to the comprehension of the Concept of which consciousness is only one aspect. (shrink)

This chapter aims to situate Hegel’s philosophical outlook by illuminating it against the backdrop of Immanuel Kant’s transcendental philosophy, some early skeptical critiques of that philosophy, Fichte’s philosophy of freedom, and finally the Spinozistic thinking of Schelling and of Hegel himself.

With regard to the contemporary discussion of recognition and disrespect in social philosophy, this chapter argues that Hegel is not only a seminal 'theorist of recognition,' but also a sophisticated 'theorist of disrespect.' By means of the relationship of lord and bondsman as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit it is shown that for Hegel the emergence of recognition not only involves freedom and autonomy but can also result in dependency and asymmetry. Building on this assumption, the paper (...) pursues a threefold aim: first, to show, through a reconstruction of Hegel's thoughts on the development of self-consciousness, that a successful form of subjectivation is only possible when a subject can actualize itself in so called 'egalitarian' and 'differential' acts of recognition. The second part aims at a re-reading of Hegel's thinking of the lord/bondsman-relationship. In opposition to the classic 'heroic reading' of this relationship, I make the case for a 'subaltern reading,' arguing that Hegel presents in the figure of the bondsman a form of asymmetric recognition, in which the subject is bound to those conditions that hold it in disrespect. Finally, the third part aims at a reinterpretation of Hegel's thought from the perspective of disresprect in order to show that the other side of Hegel's theory of recognition forms a theory of symbolic vulnerability. Starting from this theory one can understand the paradoxical dynamic of disrespect that leads subjects to identify with the relations that subjugate them. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Hegel‘s Phenomenology of Spirit - Irfan Ajvazi.

This philosophical investigation interrogates the relationship between G.W.F. Hegel’s concept of the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Spirit and the critique and reformulation of it by Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks. As a means of contextualization and expansion of Hegel’s original textual account, I consider Susan Buck-Morss’ seminal defense through grounding the dialectic in Hegel’s possible historical knowledge of the Haitian Revolution. I maintain that despite a compelling picture, Buck-Morss’ insights are unable to fully vindicate (...) Hegel from the rebukes of Fanon, and as a result, Hegel’s phenomenology necessitates a concrete analysis of the actual conscious experiences of the racialized and colonized subject in order to realize its aims. In pursuit of this critical methodology, I develop the upshot and positive movement of Fanon’s critique through what I describe as a “phenomenology of flesh” in conversation with Maurice Merleau Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible. (shrink)

In this article, I explicate Husserl’s phenomenology of the person as found in Ideen II by examining the most important aspects of persons in this work. In the first section, I explicate the concept of the surrounding world (Umwelt) with special attention to the difference between the different attitudes (Einstellungen) that help determine the sense of constituted objects of experience. In the second section, I investigate Husserl’s description of the person as a founded, higher order, spiritual (geistig) objectivity. I (...) consider this description of the person by examining the symmetry between the organization of Ideen II as a whole and the order of the constitution of the person. In the final section, I look at the relationship between the constitution of the person and the spiritual (geistig) world. (shrink)

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is typically read as a work that either rehabilitates the metaphysical tradition or argues for a new form of idealism centred on social normativity. In the following, I show that neither approach suffices. Not only does the metaphysical reading ignore how the Phenomenology demonstrates that human rationality can never adequately capture ultimate reality because ultimate reality itself has a moment of brute facticity that resists explanation, which prevents us from taking it as a (...) logically self-contained, self-justifying metaphysical zone traditionally known as ‘substance,’ but it also ignores how the Phenomenology equally demonstrates that human rationality creates a historically self-unfolding universe of meaning that is, because it displays a rational systematicity and consistency unlike anything else in the world, the closest thing we have to substance, but which, given its freedom, is more correctly called ‘subject.’ Consequently, while the non-metaphysical reading rightly recognizes that the Phenomenology develops a radically innovative account of intersubjectivity, it neglects how the social theory that it develops comes fully equipped with various metaphysical commitments concerning nature, spirit, and the relationship between them without which this theory would be unintelligible. (shrink)

The present article aims to make good on Roland Barthe’s unfulfilled promise to provide an eidetic phenomenology for the photograph. Though the matter deserves consideration simply because no relevant account has yet been provided, the consequences of adumbrating eight eidetic features, we hope to show, bear directly on the phenomenology of time, the possibility of technological events, and the status of truth as what Heidegger called alētheia . Finally, and most importantly for the enterprise of phenomenological reflection, if (...) we are successful in this endeavor, we shall have established a new way to use eidetic phenomenologies: not for Husserl’s original aim of executing a rigorous science, but in a more Derridian spirit as a way to destabilize consensus. (shrink)

This dissertation engages in a critical analysis of the work of Adolf Reinach in the theory of knowledge and legal philosophy. Reinach had trained as a lawyer and brought that perspective and experience to bear in his phenomenological work on problems in evidence and legal philosophy. His contributions to phenomenology in the early 20th century provide a window into the earliest phases of the development of the phenomenological movement, prior to World War I. This dissertation locates this work in (...) the European intellectual context of the era and finds analogies with key philosophical dilemmas and developments in England during the same period, arguably ones with shared intellectual roots. Valued for his talent as an inspiring university lecturer, Reinach was a central figure in the circle of young scholars who practiced phenomenology in the spirit of the "early" "pre-Ideen" phase of phenomenology. The dissertation Appendices include translations of selected excerpts from the Nachlass. My translation of the obituary Edmund Husserl wrote and published following Adolf Reinach's death in WWI is published separately. Professor Raymond Klibansky was my supervisor and mentor throughout. (shrink)

Abstract: The present text compare the concepts of Spirit and Dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and Kierkegaard's Sikness unto Death respectively. For this, the clarifications made by one author and the other of the concepts to be compared are taken, as a starting point, in order to detect whether or not these concepts have some kind of relationship that serves to bring german and danish closer together. -/- .

The ontological paradigms of Schelling and the late Merleau-Ponty bear striking resemblances to Spinoza’s ontology. Both were developed in response to transcendental models of a Cartesian mold, resisting tendencies to exalt the human ego to the neglect or the detriment of the more-than-human world. As such, thinkers with environmental concerns have sought to derive favorable ethical prescriptions on their basis. We begin by discerning a deadlock between two such thinkers: Ted Toadvine and Sean McGrath. With ecological responsibility in mind, both (...) actually resist Spinozist reduction of the human being to the status of a mere mode among modes. But despite having the same general aim, they end up endorsing contrary practical conclusions. Our objective is to pinpoint the reasons behind this deadlock, indicative of two strands of post-Spinozist environmental thought which stand in tension, and to begin to propose an integrative way forward. The ethical weight afforded by Toadvine to the notion of resistance in the work of the late Merleau-Ponty, namely nature’s resistance to harmonizing, unifying pretensions, invites inquiry into two Merleau-Pontean notions he does not address: the barbarian principle, and the proposal to “Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature.” We trace these to their origins in the works of Schelling’s middle period, arguing that the Schellingian location of resistance in Spirit’s dark ground—alternately conceived as primordial Dionysiac madness, bottled-up within the substratum of consciousness—lends to an understanding of the human, and human responsibility, that harbors favorable implications for environmental ethics. (shrink)

Hegel believed the Antigone tragedy not only revealed the national spirit of ancient Greece but was indeed the greatest artwork of all time. displaying the “Logic of History”, was the critical role Antigone tragedy played in the phenomenology of spirit from the standpoint of Hegel. This article will attempt to answer how Hegel reads Antigone's tragedy and how he observes the “Logic of History” in it. Ancient Greek society, In Hegel’s point of view, has constantly been the (...) symbol of “unity of life”. however, Hegel believes that at certain times in history, this unity of ethical life and its state of joy in Greece has been destroyed. Since Hegel believes literary works have historical-cultural implications and considers art and literature as the first medium by which the spirit becomes self-conscious, in the section “True Spirit, ethical Life” from the book Phenomenology of Spirit, he describes the fall of the ethical life of Greek society by reading of the Antigone tragedy. What Hegel understood from the Antigone tragedy was a series of painful conflicts that ensued as a consequence of a contradiction between ethical powers within Greek society. powers that had heretofore been in unreflected unity, but now that their contradictions revealed, the ethical life of society collapsed and the spirit moved to a more rational and liberated stage. These stages are in fact very much the irreversible final course of history toward achieving freedom. (shrink)

In recognizing the wide range of sensuous perception and at the same time the originary capacity of aesthetic experience, Mikel Dufrenne has shown us the rich capabilities of phenomenology. It is in that spirit that this essay explores musical performance. Music is a multiple art. Its many traditions, forms, genres, and styles, its large variety of instruments and sounds, and its diverse uses and occasions make it difficult to speak of music as a single art form. There are, (...) nonetheless, certain common characteristics that all musics share in the ordering of successive sounds and silences in movement, pattern, and studied length. And, of course, these sounds and silences must be devised and generated, usually by a person but increasingly by other means, especially electronic. Finally, music has its contexts, the particular occasions when it is produced and heard. Perhaps there is indeed a generic musical art, a common ground where all these disparities come together. (shrink)

This article draws on Hegel's description of the tragedy of "Oedipus at Colonus" based on the text of "Phenomenology of spirit". Because Hegel considers art to be the product of the spirit of the times and believes it emerges from the culture and ethics of societies, he reflects on the spirit of Greek society through reading Greek tragedy. The most prominent feature of ancient Greek society has been the "unity of life" among most philosophers. But Hegel (...) believes that because this unity was unconsidered and immediate, the Greek ethical life (Sittlichkeit) collapses. Although Hegel in the phenomenology of spirit makes no direct reference to the play of Oedipus at Clonus, this article compares the text of phenomenology with the text of the tragedy of Oedipus at Colonus and reveals that Hegel's understanding of ancient Greek society is completely intertwined with the aforementioned tragedy. Hegel’s reading of this tragedy focuses on the confrontation between the roles of woman/man and family/state in ancient Greek society. These confrontations appear in the characters of Antigone and Ismene (daughters of Oedipus) against Eteocles and Polynices (sons of Oedipus). While describing the war between two brothers, Hegel goes on to describe the "war" phenomenon in the context of the establishment of unity in society, which is part of Hegel's political philosophy. (shrink)

In the history of interpretations of Hegel, how one reads the chapter on “Absolute Knowing” in the Phenomenology of Spirit determines one’s whole perspective. In fact, Marx’s only comments on the Phenomenology concern this final chapter, taking it as the very “secret” of Hegel’s philosophy. But what is the secret hidden within the thicket of this impenetrable prose? My suggestion is that it turns on a very specific meaning of the “abolition of time” that Hegel describes in (...) the very last paragraphs. But the meaning of this idea is not what Marx criticized in his last Manuscript of 1844, that is, it is not simply a form of idealism which abolishes the finitude of man. Rather this relationship to time accepts such finitude, making it the central axis upon which the possibility of freedom turns. In this paper, I will present a reading of “Absolute Knowing” that focuses on the meaning of overcoming time, and connect it to some thoughts on “disposable time” that Marx discusses in the Grundrisse. (shrink)

The purpose of the present essay is to explicate the basic movement which the Understanding exercises upon itself at the end of the chapter on “Force and the Understanding” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Unlike many other commentators on the Phenomenology, I hope to show how Hegel’s argumentation in this chapter applies not merely to the Newtonian paradigm (to which Hegel makes explicit reference), but to any paradigm which involves the objectivistic presuppositions of the Understanding.

The nature of the philosophical description of consciousness requires a mode of reflection that is different from ordinary understanding, including most of what transpires in the name of philosophy. Therefore, it will be helpful to review once again the basic development that has been covered thus far in previous articles. The consciousness of Understanding deals with the aspects or the “in-so-far-as” perspective of things. It does not deal with things in their contradictory wholeness. Rational consciousness, however, deals with wholes that (...) are only abstractly divided for the sake of Understanding. It is the task of Reason to determine how to deal with wholes as wholes. Most importantly, is that comprehension of the whole, even when that is attained, puts the comprehending consciousness outside the whole that it is comprehending. This is therefore not the whole as it is in and for itself. The whole must include the consciousness comprehending it as well as everything else, and it must have its own being beyond any finite conception of it, and in fact produce the finite conception of itself. It is perhaps one of the most significant achievements of Hegelian philosophy to be able to reach this goal—Truth in and for itself and not only for consciousness. Another is that Hegel is able to expound a scientific system that deals with a substantial Reality that is essentially Subject, i.e. a Truth that is rationally conscious of itself—God. And finally within his system he is able to deal with all the problems of philosophy in a consistently methodical way that proves to be both necessary and complete. All of this is the product and development of Reason which is the integrating and differentiating substance of Reality that is essentially Subject— viz., the Absolute Reason of God. (shrink)

Central to Bataille’s critique of Hegel is his reading in ‘Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice’ of ‘negation’ and of ‘lordship and bondage’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Whereas Hegel invokes negation as inclusive of death, Bataille points out that negation in the dynamic of lordship and bondage must of necessity be representational rather than actual. Derrida, in ‘From Restricted to General Economy’ sees in Bataille’s perspective an undercutting of the overall Hegelian project consonant with his own ongoing deconstruction of (...) Hegelian sublation. I argue that not only does Hegel fail to adequately pursue his own best advice to ‘tarry with the negative,’ but Bataille and Derrida’s critique misconstrues the relation between sublation and dialectic in Hegel’s work. I explicate Adorno’s ‘negative dialectic’ by way of alternative both to Hegelian speculative dialectic and to its Bataillean–Derridean deconstruction. (shrink)

In the chapter Spirit of the book "Phenomenology of spirit" in a section called "True spirit, ethical Life", Hegel looks into the happy state of "ethical life" in Greece. The concept of ethical life is a very crucial concept because it formulates Hegel's fundamental political and social ideal, which is to establish synthesis between the community and the individual. In this research, we study the ethical life of people who are unreasonably immersed in the customs and (...) laws of a certain society. In the following, we see that this world is divided and the unity of laws in it is shaken. For this reason, Hegel discusses the literary genres of epic and tragedy in order to show that in them, a person progressively becomes himself and becomes aware of his individual character. Hegel destroys his primitive ethical substance dialectically through essential conflicts, with forced actions and untangling choices of people with will and as a result people are deprived of their social identities. In this dialectical process, the "living unity" of the polis is fragmented and becomes a mass of separate atoms. (shrink)

A close reading of the final chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, with special attention to dialectical method, to the relation of ch.s 6c on Objective Spirit and 7c on Revealed Religion to ch. 8 on Absolute Spirit, and to the relations of the absolute standpoint to time and to history.

What follows are the introductory remarks and a series of questions that were raised for a discussion about what Hegel is doing in the paragraphs 669-71 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, with reference back to paragraphs 444 and 650-5. Broadly speaking, the issues concern the place and the nature of that self-consciousness that Hegel describes as the universal and mediating element in which spirit comes to itself. I also ask about the applicability of his dialectic of forgiveness (...) to a particular situation today. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in (...) the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood. (shrink)

In the Phenomenology Hegel insists there are no presupposed standards of truth: standards are internal. "Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself"(PhdG 84). We need only contemplate "the matter in hand as it is in and for itself"(PhdG 84). The Phenomenology is a characterisation of consciousness taking on increasingly adequate forms, testing its own internal standards against experience. The Philosophy of Right is a search for right, (...) not, as in the Phenomenology, for the reality of cognition; but one of the methods Hegel adopts and which helps make sense of the structure of Philosophy of Right is the method he uses in the Phenomenology. This paper offers an alternative, though not necessarily conflicting, interpretation to that given in recent accounts of Philosophy of Right that emphasize its "logical spirit." While the phenomenological account is not necessarily incompatible with these others, it will point to a nonfoundational interpretation of Hegel's phenomenological method that is. (shrink)

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. The (...) loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

Greek tragedy, in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, represents the performative realization of binary political difference, for example, “private versus public,” “man versus woman” or “nation versus state.” On the other hand, Roman comedy and French Revolutionary Terror, in Hegel, can be taken as radical expressions of political in-difference, defined as a state where all mediating structures of association and governance have collapsed into a world of “bread and circuses.” In examining the dialectical interplay between binary, tragic difference and (...) comedic, terrible in-difference, the paper arrives at hypothetical conclusions regarding how these political forms may be observed today. (shrink)

The classic analytic tradition associated the philosophy of George Berkeley with idealism. Yet in terms of the German Idealismus, Berkeley was no idealist. Rather, he described himself as an “immaterialist”. In the classic analytic tradition we find a misunderstanding of the German Idealismus. This paper will suggest, through reference to the work of Paul Redding, that Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents Idealismus as that which reconciles objectivity and subjectivity in the experience of consciousness. Hegel’s Phenomenology develops this (...) idea in the elaboration of a remarkably novel theory of consciousness. For Hegel, the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience are a dialectical movement between consciousness and the object, or immediacy and mediacy. In the whole movement of consciousness we have the logic of contradiction working at the back of phenomenological experience that Hegel will make explicit in the Science of Logic, a logic that involves the thinker becoming consciously aware of their own thought processes. Yet Hegel’s Logic is different from the common meaning of ‘logic’. His Logic is not a formal approach to valid inference but captures the method and the moments and movement of logic. For Hegel, the great problem of classical logic is the immobility of the categories. This paper proposes that Hegel’s ‘holism’ entails the description wherein Logic, Nature, and Spirit are articulated as a whole in dialectical movement. (shrink)

This integral investigation explored phenomenological and neurophysiologic, individual and collective dimensions of Christian Trinitarian meditation experiences in a volunteer, convenience sample of 10 practicing Christians, 6 men and 4 women, with a mean age of 48 years and an age range from 21 to 85 years. Participants meditated for a minimum period of 15 minutes, during which neurophysiologic data in the form of electroencephalographic (EEG), electromyographic (EMG), blood volume pulse (BVP) and respiratory activity were recorded. A phenomenological analysis indicated that (...) the meditation process generally involved a movement from body to mind to spirit as evident in reports of an increasingly relaxed, contented and focused state of consciousness characterised by Christian Trinitarian imagery, wonder, surrender, peace, bliss, openness and formlessness. The neuropsychological findings indicated significant increases, from baseline to meditation recordings, in the alpha and beta range, accompanied by increasing mean trends in the theta and gamma range, and decreasing mean trends in the delta range, EMG, BVP and respiration. Integrative findings indicated the practical theological value of small doses of Christian Trinity meditation to enhance spiritual life for those forms of waking, thinking, conscious behaviour needed in everyday world involvement and healing. Findings were discussed in relation to further integrative investigations and interventions with practical theological implications. (shrink)

In his classic article, “Hegel's Phenomenological Method” (1970), Kenley R. Dove suggests that in chapters 1-3 of the Phenomenology of Spirit, “we” (understood roughly as the readers) actively participate in the dialectic of consciousness. In this paper I show – drawing on Joseph Gauvin's work on the “for us” written the same year as Dove's – that the latter's account regarding the “we” is inexact. I argue that this misunderstanding stems from a quid pro quo between merely stylistic (...) occurrences of the word “we” and interventions of texts “for us”, i.e. texts that express the particular viewpoint on experience attributed in the Phenomenology to its readers. Beyond the historical interest of reassessing Dove's commentary, this paper is intended to help readers avoid similar confusions themselves. This, by providing a rule of thumb enabling a more accurate identification of texts expressing “our” point of view. This is important since in the Phenomenology texts that are “for us” contain – in contrast to mere appearance “for consciousness” – the philosophical position Hegel considers to be true. (shrink)

While it is widely agreed that Hegel’s philosophy is a philosophy of freedom, the significance and scope of Hegel’s theory of freedom is disputed. Most scholarly work on this topic has been devoted to the socio-political philosophy of the Philosophy of Right. But Hegel also speaks of freedom in a way which extends beyond the concerns of his socio-political thought. This dissertation demonstrates how Hegel’s theory of freedom is more fully grasped when it is understood as a comprehensive philosophy which (...) also involves an ontology (a logic of being) and a phenomenology (a direct experience of this logic). The free state which Hegel outlines in the Philosophy of Right is still only a limited manifestation of a freedom which also pervades other aspects of human experience. A way of thinking which is “free” (in the sense that it does not restrict itself by assuming false methodological limitations) is itself essential to our capacity for rational self-determination. Moreover, this “speculative” perspective has only been achieved through the gradual cultivation (Bildung) of the free personality throughout history. -/- This dissertation therefore investigates why Hegel thinks that freedom is at issue in abstract philosophical thought (in his logical works) as well as in concrete historical phenomena (in the Phenomenology of Spirit). This logic and appearance of freedom explicates Hegel’s statement in the Preface of the Phenomenology that the absolute is not only substance, but also subject. Having shown that both the ancient freedom of the “social substance” and the modern freedom of the “pure I” are untenable on their own terms, Hegel advances a logical and phenomenological theory of freedom in which these one-sided truths are reconciled with each other. The “substantial subject” of Hegelian freedom more fully actualizes the purely subjective freedom of the Enlightenment, enabling true individual self-determination. Freedom appears not just as the right to make arbitrary choices, but as substantial thought and conviction. (shrink)

According to a widely shared view, a radical change took place in the role of intersubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy somewhere between Jena and Berlin. For instance, Jürgen Habermas's judgement is that whereas in the Jena writings – in the JenaRealphilosophien, and perhaps still in the 1807Phenomenology of Spirit– Hegel conceived of intersubjectivity as an essential element in the constitution of subjectivity and of objectivity, in Berlin Hegel's intersubjectivist conception was replaced by a metaphysics of the absolute I or absolute (...) self-consciousness, in which intersubjectivity no longer plays any important constitutive role.Perhaps it is due to something like this view having been mostly taken for granted even among Hegel-specialists that scholarly literature on intersubjectivity in Hegel's late Encyclopaedic system is indeed very scarce. Robert R. Williams'Hegel's Ethics of Recognitionargues convincingly that the theme of intersubjective recognition can be seen as a central thread running through the whole of Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy ofobjectivespirit. But very little has so far been written on the theme of intersubjectivity or intersubjective recognition in Hegel's Encyclopaedic philosophy of subjective spirit. My thesis in what follows is that intersubjectivity or intersubjective mediation in recognition can and should in fact be seen as an essential constituent also of subjective spirit as Hegel conceptualises it in the 1830 Encyclopaedia. (shrink)

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, chapter IV, Hegel attempts to show how consciousness becomes self-consciousness. Self-consciousness manifests itself both as the ground on which it makes its object opposite to itself, and as a higher truth by demolishing the otherness of its object in order to preserve it for self-consciousness. Since it presupposes itself as the inner truth (or ground) it realizes itself both as the origin and the aim of desire. In other words, by virtue of presupposing (...) its identity in its dissolution, self-consciousness desires to re-constitute the unity with itself. Therefore, it grasps everything else as a negative object of desire in advance. That is to say, its appearance seems to be an ‘obstacle’ before its satisfaction. However, through experience of negating, self-consciousness learns that its object is also a ‘means’ (i.e., has truth or positive aspect) for its end point. It realizes this latter aspect of its object especially when it is faced with another self-consciousness. At this level, self-consciousness comes to see that there is a counter-balance of opposing powers between itself and the other self-consciousness. This counter-balance leads both self-consciousness to a mutual recognition and, then satisfaction of mutual desires. Therefore, since both the origin and the aim of desire is self-consciousness itself, it (self-consciousness) grasps itself as the positive (real) object of desire and then discerns in the mutual recognition the positive aspect of another which was taken as a negative element before. The satisfaction of desire begins with realizing this positive aspect of another self-consciousness. (shrink)

The purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is to demonstrate that the Concept is the underlying reality or Truth that lies hidden to ordinary knowing. Once the Concept is revealed it becomes the object of scientific development in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, but because of its absolute nature the Concept and its development are identical while different simultaneously. On the absolute platform opposites are identical in their differences, just as the absolute value |1| is the same (...) as the absolute value |-1| in mathematics. To be able to think in terms of absolute knowledge therefore one has to leave the duality of relative knowing or understanding and raise oneself to the level of dialectical unity or Reason. (shrink)

[The review is in German] Theunissen has developed an interesting account of metaphilosophy that–as a discipline–does not start in 1960s, but already and especially with Kant, Fichte and Hegel. The constant growth of philosophical theories around 1800 (what Koselleck called “Sattelzeit”) made metaphilosophical constructions necessary. He reads–and is not the first author who does so–Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a metaphilosophical theory. Although I like and share many ideas with Theunissen, there are three objections that I raise in (...) my review: (i) His account of isosthenia as a basic problem behind all philosophical positions (which makes metaphilosophy necessary) undermines the importance of dissent, dogmatism and intra-philosophical struggles; (ii) Theunissen’s understanding of metaphilosophy is not neutral (just as any account of metaphilosophy): it is predetermined by Hegel’s thought and the author’s understanding of Phenomenology of Spirit; (iii) Therefore, it fits well to this particular work of Hegel, but not (a) to the overall system of Encyclopedia and (b) Kant’s metaphilosophical deliberations (which Theunissen misses). I end the review with the statement that we need to ask ourselves how metaphilosophy is possible as a unified discipline despite of different philosophical backgrounds of authors–we need a meta-metaphilosophy or a critique of metaphilosophical reason. (shrink)

In his 1802 article for the Critical Journal, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,” Hegel attempts to articulate a form of skepticism that is “at one with every true philosophy.” Focusing on the priority that Hegel gives to ancient skepticism over its modern counterpart, Michael Forster and other commentators suggest that it is Pyrrhonism that Hegel views as one with philosophy. Since Hegel calls attention to the persistence of dogmatism even in the work of Sextus Empiricus, however, I argue that it (...) is only a sublated form of Pyrrhonism, what in the Phenomenology of Spirit he calls “self-completing skepticism,” that Hegel takes to be part of genuine philosophical cognition. In this way, I hope to show that the insight that motivates Hegel’s engagement with skepticism in the 1802 essay comes to inform the philosophical itinerary of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the largely ignored ethical dimension in the first section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Sense-certainty, which tends to be understood exclusively as an epistemological critique of sense-data empiricism. I approach the ethical aspect of the chapter through Hegel’s analysis of language, there, as unable to refer to individual things. I then show that the position Hegel analyses is akin to the one presented by Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan, as well as in his (...) De Corpore, and which serves to ground his naturalistic ethics. The linguistic juxtaposition consequently allows me to relate the ethics of sense-certainty to Hobbes, not only to his “shallow” empiricism, as Hegel puts it, but to the ethical vision Hobbes presents in his state of nature. (shrink)

The claim that we want to put forward is that Thomas Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge concept is drawn upon Heidegger’s epistemology. To bolster the tenet the corresponding works of both thinkers are considered. As a result, the one-to-one correspondence between the key propositions of Heideggerian epistemology and the basic tenets of Kuhn ’s growth of knowledge model is dawned. The tenets under consideration include the holistic nature of a paradigm, the incommensurability thesis, conventional status of a paradigm caused by (...) pragmatist way of its vocabulary justification and even the basic instance – connection between Aristotelean and Newtonian mechanics. It is conjectured that an indirect influence of Heidegger upon Kuhn should be taken into account to explain the isomorphism. For instance, through the works of Alexandre Koyré admired by Kuhn. As is well-known, Koyré had close professional links with another Russian émigré – Alexandre Kojev – who presented in his 1933-1939 Paris lectures Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” seen through the cognitive lens of Heideggerian phenomenology. Key words: Martin Heidegger, Thomas Kuhn, growth of knowledge, paradigm, incommensurability thesis, holism, pragmatism. (shrink)

This study attempts to understand whether there were changes over time in Hegel’s opinions on the idea of recognition, which were the basis of Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, and how later philosophers writing on recognition and intersubjectivity have comprehended Hegel’s intellectual heritage, together with their criticism of peculiar aspects of Hegel’s point of view. In this regard, in order to be able to understand Honneth’s theory of recognition, it is necessary to inquire into the relation between Honneth’s and Hegel’s (...) theories in a philosophical context. The current inquiry is both related to the aspects of how Honneth was affected by Hegel, and is also particularly focused on Hegel’s Jena period. The point of emphasis in this study is whether or not Hegel abandoned the theories of intersubjectivity and recognition after his Jena period. Therefore, the discussion focuses on Hegel’s Jena period and the aspects which distinguished this period from others. This study also critically examines the views respecting the abandonment of the recognition on the Phenomenology of Spirit and intersubjectivity after the Jena period, and suggests that recognition and intersubjectivity still retain their dominance on this work known also as Jena Phenomenology, dated as the end of the Jena period. -/- Keywords: Honneth, Hegel, Recognition, Intersubjectivity -/- Türkçe Özet Bu çalışma, Axel Honneth’in tanınma kuramına temel teşkil eden Hegel'in tanınma ve öznelerarasılık üzerine görüşlerinin zaman içinde değişip değişmediğini; tanınma üzerine yazan sonraki kuşak düşünürlerin Hegel’in düşünsel mirasını nasıl algıladıklarını ve görüşlerini hangi açılardan eleştirdiklerini anlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Honneth’in tanınma kuramını anlayabilmek için onun Hegel ile düşünsel bağlamda ilişkisinin sorgulanması gerektiğini ileri sürmektedir. Mevcut sorgulama, Honneth’in Hegel’den ne bağlamda ve ne şekilde etkilendiğiyle ilgili olmakla birlikte özellikle Hegel’in Jena dönemine odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu makalede, Hegel’in Jena dönemi sonrası felsefesinde öznelerarasılık ve tanınma kuramlarını terk edip etmediği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Bu sebeple ilk önce Hegel’in Jena dönemi ile bu dönemi farklı kılan yönler ele alınmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Jena dönemi sonrasında, Tinin Fenomenolojisi’nde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın terk edildiğine dair görüşlerin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği; Hegel’in felsefesinde Jena döneminin bitişine tarihlenen ve Jena Fenomenolojisi olarak da bilinen bu eserde tanınma ve öznelerarasılığın halen gücünü koruduğu savunulmaktadır. -/- Anahtar Kelimeler: Honneth, Hegel, Tanınma, Öznelerarasılık. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to clarify the role wrong plays in Hegel ’s system of right, as both a form of freedom and the transition to morality. Two approaches will be examined to explore wrong in practical philosophical terms: First, one could take the transition to be descriptive in nature. The transition describes wrong as a realized fact of the human condition that one inherits from the outset. Second, one could see it as prescriptive. Actual wrongdoing would be (...) essential for the subject’s progression to becoming moral. Though both are most likely the case, emphasis is given to the latter since it represents the actualization of potential. Furthermore, it will be suggested that wrong plays a similar role as that which alienation does in the Phenomenology of Spirit; both bridge the will as abstract personality with the moral point of view. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the (...) project of philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own philosophical project at nearly every stage of his career. (shrink)

This paper reconsiders Antigone’s role in the ancient Greek polis in the framework of Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit, as developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit. My main hypothesis is that Antigone appears to challenge both the Greek androcentric order and Hegel’s hypotheses on subjectivity. I prove this by reevaluating Hegel’s notion of the Ethical act (sittliche Handlung). Finally, I identify the endowment of Sittlichkeit on natural sexual distinction as the real reason for its collapse and point out the problematic (...) consequences of such endowment for further development of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)