Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...) irrationally acting; second, according to the “blindspots” theory, we outline some restrictions from a theory of rationality to the authority. (shrink)

This dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise – in the spirit of those of Carroll and Hofstadter – argues against the idea, identified with the “traditional” interpretation of Aristotle’s “sea battle argument”, that future contingents are an exception to the Principle of Bivalence. It presents examples of correct everyday predictions, without which one would not be able to decide and to act; however, doing this is incompatible with the belief that the content of these predictions lacks a truth-value. The cost (...) of using a non-classical logic to cope with that may be too high for Stagirite’s defenders, and they would still need to explain why our ordinary predictions seem to have a binary truth-value. In the end, the paper suggests that the problem of future contingents – and of free will – is not a logical problem at all, but rather a limit on what an agent can believe before taking a decision. (shrink)

This paper reviews debates related to the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the challenge of pricing uncertain damages that will occur only in the future. They often revolve around the pure time preference rate, which reflects how much one favors present over future well-being. The SCC measures the marginal cost of the impact on economic growth caused by the emission of a quantity of greenhouse gases equivalent to an additional ton of carbon dioxide (tCO2eq). There is significant variance among (...) estimates of the SCC; one of the reasons for it is a disagreement on how to bring future damages to present values, especially over the so-called "delta parameter" – the pure time preference rate – of the corresponding discount function. On the one hand, the descriptive approach, associated with William Nordhaus, proposes to use the time preference empirically observed among individuals, which would result in a significant limitation of the present value attributed to the distant future. On the other hand, the normative approach, associated with Nicholas Stern, proposes to treat everyone impartially, in every generation, and so implies transferring more resources to future generations. In the limit, assuming exponential population growth, it would lead to a philosophical stance akin to the so-called "longtermism" (as defended by William MacAskill in What we owe the future). In addition, the analysis points out obstacles to using the SCC to price carbon for climate policies. These include aspects related to economic methodology (such as ecological economics critiques of welfarist accounts of intergenerational allocations) as well as political philosophy. Thus, challenges related to uncertainty about socioeconomic development trajectories, intergenerational justice, and public reason become key. Finally, we present the target-consistent pricing approach, where one calculates a carbon price compatible with specific mitigation targets – an alternative to SCC methodologies. This approach is advocated as a way to avoid the uncertainty and the disagreements associated with the SCC, emphasizing the importance of meeting goals set by binding political decisions – such as the Paris Agreement. (shrink)

Translation into Portuguese of SEP entries on Philosophy of Economics.

O Judiciário moderno constitui um sistema hierarquizado e centralizado, em que cortes superiores, com um número pequeno de membros, têm a função de “dar a última palavra” para resolver desacordos doutrinários entre instâncias inferiores – e inclusive rever decisões das demais autoridades. Essa estrutura hierárquica implica uma fonte peculiar de instabilidade: o tribunal superior se torna como que um “ponto único de falha” suscetível à captura, à pressão indevida, à sobrecarga, e até a súbitas mudanças doutrinárias – pondo em risco (...) seu alegado papel de estabilizador do regime democrático. Isso é salientado quando tais cortes sofrem pressão, ou quando há reviravoltas decorrentes de uma maioria frágil no tribunal – a exemplo do debate sobre a prisão em segunda instância no Brasil. Analiso como o desenvolvimento tecnologias de informação e comunicação (TICs) poderia mitigar este problema por meio de um sistema que agregue decisões judiciais de instâncias inferiores a fim de resolver conflitos de jurisprudência numa determinada jurisdição; isso equivaleria a um sistema de votação que substituiria a atuação da corte de última instância na unificação de jurisprudência – como se a última instância fosse, na realidade, composta pelo judiciário como um todo. Isso alteraria a estrutura de decisão hierarquizada do judiciário, no que diz respeito a divergências entre magistrados, aumentando a descentralização do sistema – associada ao ideal da tradição de common law. Embora original, a proposta é modesta, e poderia ser atingida por meio de mudanças incrementais, sem ruptura institucional, a partir de práticas e tecnologias já existentes – e uso como exemplo ferramentas de legal analytics e o sistema de “repercussão geral de recursos extraordinários” do Brasil, no qual se utiliza processamento de linguagem natural para filtrar e classificar processos de acordo com o tema. Ao final, discutem-se possíveis vantagens e desvantagens dessa proposta, como características epistêmicas da descentralização e o risco de “rigidez” na evolução da doutrina jurídica – em especial no que se refere aos longos mandatos de membros de tribunais superiores. Concluímos que a descentralização da unificação da jurisprudência pode contribuir para mitigar o risco de, com o desenvolvimento da tecnologia, maior concentração de poder. (shrink)

From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version (...) of the sources thesis (which is what Raz intends to prove). In conclusion, we return to the arguments presented, concluding with a possible difficulty for the adoption of exclusive positivism by people inside a legal practice. (shrink)

O escritor A. J. Jacobs (2018) decidiu agradecer todas os envolvidas na preparação de seu cafezinho diário; isso o levou a uma jornada épica para contatar milhares de pessoas, desde a barista que lhe vendia o expresso matinal, passando por designers e inventores, até os agricultores que plantaram e colheram o grão em outro continente. Não existe um único indivíduo ou grupo responsável pelo seu café: é preciso um mundo para produzi-lo; é resultado de uma cadeia produtiva, uma rede decentralizada (...) que envolve diversos serviços espalhados internacionalmente – e todas essas pessoas, por sua vez, consomem outros produtos, com outras cadeias. Como este livro. Contraste esse exemplo com a anedota do diplomata soviético que, visitando Londres, fica maravilhado com as padarias – e então pergunta pelo encarregado da distribuição de pães na cidade (Harari, 2016, p. 372). Para seu espanto, os economistas ingleses respondem que ninguém tem esse cargo: o fornecimento de pães é resultado de um agregado de decisões individuais, em que cada fornecedor de matéria-prima (como farinha, sal, fermento) e serviços (transporte, padaria, limpeza) regula sua oferta a partir do que espera que os consumidores querem consumir – e o quanto estes estão dispostos a pagar. É o caso clássico do funcionamento de uma economia de mercado – em contraste com uma economia de comando, onde um grupo de pessoas, conscientemente, toma decisões sobre produção e distribuição. Esses exemplos ressaltam as “vantagens” dos mercados; pode ser tentador pensar, a partir deles, que todos os bens e serviços deveriam ser fornecidos dessa forma, porque isso maximiza a liberdade individual ou tende a 553 levar ao bem-estar coletivo, e que o melhor a fazer é evitar interferências nesse sistema – ideias associadas ao liberalismo econômico, uma teoria política e econômica que tem por patrono Adam Smith (o primeiro economista clássico). No entanto, mesmo economistas liberais reconhecem que há falhas de mercado (como bens públicos e monopólios129). Voltemos a A. J. Jacobs, o qual frisa seu agradecimento ao serviço de fornecimento de água, um “milagre moderno”: ao longo da história, a imensa maioria das pessoas não teve acesso a água encanada – mesmo hoje, 2 bilhões de pessoas ainda carecem de condições sanitárias adequadas (água e esgoto), o que causa doenças que matam 829 mil por ano (WHO, 2015). É um problema que não pode ser resolvido só por mercados, nem por associações filantrópicas; na maior parte do mundo, é um serviço público, geralmente fornecido ou regulado por estados – e sua ausência decorre de falhas de governo. (shrink)

One of the explanations for the Great Crisis of 2007-2008 was that financial authorities should have issued stricter regulations to prevent the housing bubble. However, according to Alan Greenspan, President of the Federal Reserve System (FED) from 1987 to 2006, this is to judge with hindsight. No one can guess when a “bubble” begins, nor when it ends; they happen because of the “irrational exuberance” in investors’ behavior, which causes boom and bust cycles. Regulators are not in a better situation (...) for assessing risks, though: since market participants supposedly know their own risks better than the regulator (a kind of informational asymmetry), an intervention (except to ensure law-enforcement) would imply unjustified paternalism. However, a regulator does not have to be conceived as a paternalistic authority. We sketch an objection to Greenspan's argument, arguing that crises don’t require a defective reasoning such as the “irrational exuberance” – our usual bounded rationality might be enough to provide the kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy” observed in the rise and fall of bubble assets value. Given the possibility of grave externalities, authorities are justified in adopting measures to ensure investors behave in a prudent way, even if they supposedly know better their own risks. (shrink)

Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty – in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself – it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance – Laplace’s principle (...) of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule – and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) – and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. (shrink)

After the 2008 crisis, there were several debates on the bail-out and the lack of accountability of financial institutions; this supposedly affects politica l values such as equality and responsibility: it implies transferring resources from the public (for instance, poor people) to specific economic agents who have chosen to incur certain risks. On the other hand, it is arguable that it would not be up to the regulators to protect investors’ interests, and that there would be more efficient and less (...) burdensome instruments associated with prudential regulation. Our goal is to provide a justification for the bail-out and for holding bankers accountable. In section 2, we present a brief description of the problem in the context of the crisis, followed by a justification for the bail-out through the incentives argument, based on Rawls’s difference principle. In section 3, we provide an ethical discussion over the corresponding moral hazards, and investigate how to mitigate it through coercive measures. (shrink)

Abstract: We face objections against punishing financial firms and managers for producing risks for the financial system – that it’s either paternalistic or inefficient. Against the first: financial crises are so damaging that governments and deposit insurance funds have to intervene – an implicit guarantee to creditors. This is controversial from the perspective of political morality: it implies using resources from the public for the benefit of better-off people who willingly incur risks. So, we begin by studying a possible justification (...) for this arrangement from the ‘incentives argument’ derived from the Rawls difference principle, in the light of G. Cohen’s criticisms. Against the second: we cannot completely dispense with coercive instruments - mainly for the moral hazard entailed by the implicit guarantee. Therefore, we conclude the threat of liability must have a punitive and a preventive character, extending to non-compliance with norms on risk even before generating major economic effects. Keywords: Incentives, Responsibility, Moral Hazard, Justice, Finances JEL Classification: D63, G28, K42 -/- Resumo: Enfrentamos duas objeções à punição de instituições financeiras e gestores pela produção de riscos ao sistema financeiro – que seria paternalista e ineficiente. Contra a primeira: crises financeiras prejudicam tanto a economia que governos e fundos garantidores são obrigados a intervir – uma garantia implícita aos credores. Isso é polêmico da perspectiva da moralidade política: implica utilizar recursos do público em benefício de pessoas em melhor situação que voluntariamente incorrem em riscos. Na primeira seção, estudamos justificar esse arranjo a partir do “argumento do incentivo”, decorrente do princípio da diferença de Rawls, à luz das críticas de G. Cohen. Contra (b), arguimos que não podemos prescindir completamente de instrumentos coercitivos – mormente pelo risco moral decorrente da garantia implícita. Logo, é preciso que a ameaça de responsabilização tenha um caráter punitivo e preventivo, se estendendo ao descumprimento de normas sobre risco mesmo sem gerar efeitos econômicos maiores. Palavras-chave: Incentivos, Responsabilidade, Risco Moral, Justiça, Finanças JEL Classification: D63, G28, K42 -/- (This is a translation of the working paper "Equality and Responsibility"). (shrink)

This paper argues, through conceptual analysis, against an objection to the disapproval of banks for the 2007-8 crisis: the idea that they could not have acted otherwise (at least not rationally) and that no one should be blamed for a fact one could not have avoided. If true, it would threaten the justification of corporate social responsibility and the legal liability of managers. Identified as the ‘inevitability thesis’, this objection is illustrated by an analysis of the film Margin Call (2011) (...) and associated with other investigations on ethics and responsibility. The target thesis stems from a confusion between different notions of responsibility (for a task, for a decision, for causing an event and for repairing it) and leads to an incoherent form of fatalism. Finally, it is suggested that the invocation of ‘inevitability’ may be a way of rationalizing the decision, obscuring reasons to the contrary. (shrink)

This essay argues, through conceptual analysis, against an objection to reproaches addressed to financiers after the Crisis of 2007-8: the idea that they could not have acted otherwise (at least, not rationally) and that no one should be blamed for a fact one could not have avoided. If correct, this would threaten the justifiability of corporate social responsibility and legal responsibility of directors. Identified as the “thesis of inevitability”, this objection is illustrated by an analysis of the film Margin Call (...) (2011) and associated with other investigations on ethics and responsibility. This target-thesis follows from a confusion between different notions of responsibility (for an assignment, for a judgment, and causal and liability responsibility) and leads to an inconsistent form of fatalism. It is suggested, finally, that invoking the “inevitability” can be a way to rationalize the decision, obscuring reasons against it. (shrink)