This volume aimed to highlight narrative identities of European cities or city neighbourhoods that have been overlooked, such as mid-sized cities. These cities are neither small towns nor metropolises, cities that are now unveiling their appeal or specificity. The present special issue thus covers a range of representations of cities. The articles investigate more systematically how different texts deal with various cities from different experiential and fictional perspectives. The issue covers the geographical scope across Europe, from east to west or (...) vice versa, as well as a range of different works of national literature(s), but with a clear emphasis on mid-sized European cities that have until now been deemed as lesser-known, secondary, peripheral, ‘other’ cities that are in the focus of the research of the COST project Writing Urban Places. New Narratives of the European City, within which this journal issue is being published. (shrink)

In “The Best of All Possible Worlds” William E. Mann argues that some possible worlds are morally incommensurable with some others, because some choices are between incompatible alternatives that are themselves incommensurable. The best possible world must be better than, and hence commensurable with, every other world. So if anyone in the actual world ever faces a choice between incompatible alternatives that are morally incommensurable, this is not the best possible world. But it seems that some of us do, on (...) occasion, face such choices. So this is not the best possible world. (shrink)

Remarks on naturalism--the belief that there is nothing besides the subway and its riders--and also on non-naturalism and supernaturalism, transcribed and edited from a notebook found on a subway train.

‘Adams worlds’ are possible worlds that contain no creature whose life is not worth living or whose life is overall worse than in any other possible world in which it would have existed. Creating an Adams world involves no wrongdoing or unkindness towards creatures on the part of the creator. I argue that the notion of an Adams world is of little value in theodicy. Theists are not only committed to thinking that this world was created without wrongdoing or unkindness (...) but also must rule out the possibility that the world might have been better had God not existed. Nor is there much reason, independent of the availability of a satisfactory theodicy, for believing that the actual world is an Adams world. The need for a theodicy constructed along Leibnizian lines, incorporating the claim that this world is the best possible, is thus reinforced. (shrink)

In der Korrespondenz mit Clarke ist Leibniz' Standardargument gegen die Annahme, daß Raum und Zeit absolut seien, daß Gott sich bei der Wahl des zu erschaffenden Universums gezwungen sähe, gegen das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes zu verstoßen, wenn diese Annahme richtig wäre: Bloße Unterschiede in räumlicher und zeitlicher Hinsicht ergeben keinen Vorteilsunterschied, und da Gott nur aus Vorteilsgründen handelt, sind solche Unterschiede nicht möglich. Leibniz stellt dieses Argument als ausschließlich abhängig vom Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes dar, eine gängige Interpretation ist (...) aber, daß dies Prinzip determinierte Objekte göttlicher Wahl nur dann ergibt, wenn ein ergänzendes Prinzip von Kontingenz hinzutritt. Diese Auslegung muß falsch sein, wenn Leibniz hier authentisch bleibt, und insofern wäre doch das Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes eher als irgendein Prinzip des Besten Leibniz' Prinzip der Kontingenz. (shrink)

The quantitative argument against the notion of a best possible world claims that, no matter how many worthwhile lives a world contains, another world contains more and is, other things being equal, better. Parfit’s ‘ Mere Addition Paradox ’ suggests that defenders of this argument must accept his ‘ Repugnant Conclusion ’ : that outcomes containing billions upon billions of lives barely worth living are better than outcomes containing fewer lives of higher quality. Several responses to the Paradox are discussed (...) and rejected as either inadequate or unavailable in a theistic context. The quantitative argument fails if some world is such that addition to it is not possible, i.e., if it is intensively infinite, as Liebniz claimed. If the notion of such a world is incoherent, then no world is quantitatively best and the quantitative argument succeeds, but only at the cost of embracing the Repugnant Conclusion. (shrink)

‘Rival creator’ arguments suggest that God must have created the best of all possible worlds. These arguments are analyzed and evaluated, and Leibniz’s position defended.

Some of the most threatening perspectives of our time are related to climate changes with Global Warming, caused by the emission of greenhouse gasses , and the severe pollution of the environment causing destruction of ecosystems and the extension of species. Recent scientific research points to an unusual increase in temperatures on earth seen in Al Gore’s film “An Inconvenient Truth ”. The climate changes are both natural and man-made; the topics here are the man-made problems among which consumer mentality (...) and overpopulation can be mentioned. Why are so many individuals ignoring the consequences of such selfish behavior? In spite of the warnings from scientists and ecological movements, the problems seem to be increasing. The domestication of nature in an artificial reality of modern times reduces humans to numbers and robots. Even though many of these conditions can be described as the consequences of the technological development, they also point to a sick society in which the connection between man and Nature has been lost. To a certain extend we are all responsible for what happens to the earth and ourselves because we are part of Nature. In order to find some answers man should look deeper into himself and his own passions. Such analysis is the task of this paper based on self-realization in subject-object relations with the appearance of self-consciousness and a third factor defined as God or Nature. The questions are: How can the link between man and Nature be re-established? How can each individual participate in changing the negative pattern? (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to present the distinct ways in which Wolff, Baumgarten, and Kant understand the relationship between necessitation, constraint, and reluctant action in an effort to illustrate the subtle ways in which their conceptions of obligation differ from each another. Whereas Wolff conceives of natural or moral obligation as incompatible with constraint, Baumgarten holds that constraint and reluctant action are, in some instances, compatible with natural obligation. Kant departs from Baumgarten by conceiving of obligation as necessarily (...) involving constraint: as Kant’s reply to Schiller’s famous objection reveals, obligation must take on the character of constraint to reluctant action on account of the fact that human beings possess inclinations that always threaten to impel them in directions that oppose morality. (shrink)

We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the logical consequences (...) of such knowledge and beliefs, by paying a cognitive cost. The framework is applied to three instances of limited rationality, widely discussed in cognitive psychology: Stereotypical Thinking, the Framing Effect, and the Anchoring Effect. (shrink)

Philosophers, psychologists, economists and other social scientists continue to debate the nature of human well-being. We argue that this debate centers around five main conceptualizations of well-being: hedonic well-being, life satisfaction, desire fulfillment, eudaimonia, and non-eudaimonic objective-list well-being. Each type of well-being is conceptually different, but are they empirically distinguishable? To address this question, we first developed and validated a measure of desire fulfillment, as no measure existed, and then examined associations between this new measure and several other well-being measures. (...) In addition, we explored associations among all five types of well-being. We found high correlations among all measures of well-being, but generally correlations did not approach unity, even when correcting for unreliability. Furthermore, correlations between well-being and related constructs (e.g., demographics, personality) depended on the type of well-being measured. We conclude that empirical findings based on one type of well-being measure may not generalize to all types of well-being. (shrink)

The present collection of translations arises from our work within Writing Urban Places, a network of researchers interested in the different ways citizens appropriate meaningful built environments through stories, and in doing so are also better able to integrate with others. A key locus in this respect is what our network has termed the ‘mid-sized’ [or ‘intermediate’] European city. Often afforded only cursory attention in the discussion of both culture and society, overlooked in favour of more usual suspects, such urban (...) places allow for a more de-centred, and on occasions regionally focused, view of urban practices, even as they play host to a significant element of contemporary European life and experience. The quest for meaningfulness and appropriation of the urban environment through co-creative, adaptive, and transformative processes (many of which have a textual quality) became central to the theoretical framework of this initiative. Between the individual places in which such processes could be observed and documented, we hypothesized, arises the problem of intermediation – the move from place to place, and its techniques. Translation, more than a textual practice among others, emerged as a structuring consideration of the project at a European scale. Other Destinations is the outcome of this collective process presented here, offering entry into this work to an English-language readership for the first time. We hope that, even as they bring their cities of origin somewhat closer to a new readership, those readers will be uprooted and moved some distance in the direction of these ‘other destinations.’ -/- The edited volume Other Destinations. Translating the Mid-sized European City thus features English translations of 15 21st century (mainly) literary texts published in different media (books, podcasts, journals, online/social media) originally written in languages other than English and that have not previously been translated into English. The selected texts cover the topic of mid-sized European cities, where mid-sized does not solely refer to the size in terms of geographical scope or the number of inhabitants, but also to their socio-historical context of urban identity where these cities are neither metropolises nor small towns, but “other”, lesser-known European cities. The texts selected to be translated in this edited volume cover cities like Volos, Canakkale, Varna, Plovdiv, Durres, Tirana, Porto, Den Haag, Osijek, Salzburg, Naples, Zrenjanin, Loule and others…. The publication intends to enhance the dissemination and accessibility to an international readership of texts about overlooked urban contexts, “other”, lesser-known European cities, their stories and signifying practices in order to develop a better awareness of these cities, their self-constructions, and their responses to the challenges of the present. (shrink)

I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge (...) that the comparison with proforms is explanatorily idle. The last objection is that, given a complete semantic account of pronouns, proadjectives, antecedents, etc., together with a complete (PT), the essential semantic character of "true" could be deduced, but then, the idleness of the comparison with pronouns would be apparent. It turns out that objections (2) and (3) are related in the following way: the prosentential terminology is held to conceal the lack of unity in (PT), by describing the different data in the same terms ("proform", "antecedent", etc.). But this, I argue, is only a way of truly describing, rather than explaining, the data, these being certain relations of equivalence and consequence between sentences. I consider a language for which (PT) would be not only true, but also explanatory, but note that this language is very different from English. I end by showing that Robert Brandom's case that "is true" is not a predicate fails, and that his motivation for saying so is based on fallacious reasoning (namely, Boghossian's argument against deflationism). (shrink)

PHILIPPA RUTH FOOT was born on 3 October 1920, the second daughter of William Bosanquet, who had done mathematics at Cambridge and became the manager of a steelworks in Yorkshire, and Esther Cleveland, daughter of President Grover Cleveland. She was educated mainly at home in the country by governesses, and not well. She said, many years later, that, ‘unsurprisingly’, she had been left ‘extremely ignorant’, and when the last one, ‘who actually had a degree’, suggested to her that she (...) should go to Oxford, she had to work for it. She spent a year with an established Oxford entrance coach and took a correspondence course to acquire the necessary entrance Latin; the result was a place at Somerville College, where she went to read Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) in 1939. (shrink)

Fericirea este un concept fuzzy. Ea poate fi definită în termeni de a trăi o viață bună sau de a înflori, mai degrabă decât de a experimenta o emoție. Fericirea în acest sens a fost folosită pentru a traduce eudaimonia greacă și este încă folosită în etica virtuții. A existat o tranziție în timp, de la accent pe fericirea virtuții la virtutea fericirii. În psihologie, fericirea este o stare mentală sau emoțională a bunăstării, care poate fi definită, printre altele, de (...) emoții pozitive sau plăcute, variind de la mulțumire până la bucuria intensă. În Vedele hinduse, ānanda semnifică fericirea veșnică, cea care însoțește sfârșitul ciclului de renaștere. Pentru grecii antici, ataraxia este o stare lucidă de echilibru robust, caracterizată de elibertatea continuă de teama primejdiei și îngrijorare. Filosofii consideră că fericirea poate fi înțeleasă ca fiind scopul moral al vieții sau ca aspect al hazardului, explicând fericirea fie ca o stare de spirit, fie ca o viață înfloritoare pentru persoana căreia i se aplică. „Conceptul de fericire este un concept atât de vag încât, în ciuda dorinței fiecărui om de a fi fericit, nimeni nu poate spune niciodată în termeni preciși și coerent ce vrea și dorește cu adevărat. Motivul este că elementele care fac parte din conceptul de fericire sunt în totalitate empirice, adică trebuie împrumutate din experiență, și că în același timp, pentru ideea fericirii, un întreg absolut, este necesar un maxim de bunăstare în starea actuală și cea viitoare. Ori, este imposibil ca o persoană finită să fie atât de perspicace și, în același timp, atât de puternică încât să se presupună că poate crea un concept cert despre ceea ce își dorește cu adevărat. Bogăție? ... Cunoaștere? ... Viață lungă? .. Sănătate? Prin urmare, nu există, în acest sens, un imperativ care să ne impună în sensul strict al cuvântului ce să facem pentru a fi fericiți, deoarece fericirea este un ideal nu al rațiunii, ci al imaginației." (Emmanuel Kant, Critica facultății de judecată) -/- CUPRINS: -/- Fericirea - Definiție - Legătura cu sănătatea fizică - Filozofie - Religie - - Religiile orientale - - - Budism - - - Hinduism - - - Confucianismul - - Religiile abrahamice - - - Iudaismul - - - Catolicismul roman - - - Islam - Psihologie - - Ierarhia nevoilor a lui Maslow - - Teoria autodeterminării - - Psihologie pozitivă - - Măsurarea fericirii - Viziunea economică și politică Ānanda - Diferite sensuri de fericire în filosofia hindusă - - Swami Vivekananda - - Sri Aurobindo - - Advaita vedanta - - Dvaita vedanta - - Vishishtadvaita vedanta - - Sri Ramana Maharshi - Modalități de realizare a ānandei Ataraxia - Epicureismul - Pironism - Stoicism Indici ai fericirii: Fericirea Națională Brută - Definirea FNB - Implementarea FNB în Bhutan - Răspândirea FNB în afara Bhutan - Critica Filosofia fericirii - Grecia antică - - Platon - - Aristotel - - Cinism - - Cirenaicism - - Pironism - - Epicureism - - Stoicism - Roma antică - - Școala lui Sextius - - Augustin de Hippo - - Boețiu - Evul Mediu - - Avicenna - - Al-Ghazali - - Maimonide - - Thomas de Aquino - Perioada modernă timpurie - - Michel de Montaigne - - Jeremy Bentham - - Arthur Schopenhauer - Perioada contemporană - - Władysław Tatarkiewicz - - Herbert Marcuse - - Viktor Frankl - - Robert Nozick - Scientismul - Studiul fericirii - - Sonja Lyubomirsky Teoria (etica) virtuții - Concepte cheie - Istoria virtuții - - „Turnura aretaică” contemporană Consecințialism - Filosofii - - Consecințialismul de stat - - Utilitarism - - Egoismul etic - - Altruismul etic - - Consecințialismul regulilor - - Consecințialismul pe două niveluri - - Consecințialismul motivațional - - Consecințialism negativ - - Etica teleologică - - Actele și omisiunile, și "doctrina actelor și omisiunilor" Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)