Important conceptual and metaphysical issues arise when we try to understand the mental lives of “split-brain” subjects. How many distinct streams of consciousness do they have? According to Elizabeth Schechter’s partial unity model, the answer is one. A related question is whether co-consciouness, in general, is transitive. That is, if α and β are co-conscious experiences, and β and γ are co-conscious experiences, must α and γ be co-conscious? According to Schechter, the answer is no. The partial unity model faces (...) some serious objections. Its underpinnings are suspect, and ways of working out the model fall into trouble of various sorts: incoherence, emptiness, or unacceptable indeterminacy about the identity of (token) conscious states. One apparent lesson is that a subject can host two distinct conscious experiences of the same sort. Another is that the co-consciousness relation is transitive after all. (shrink)

Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind<D>, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...) the general principles governing it. Those principles are inconsistent, as shown by a variant of Godel's argument. Thus the inconsistency Wright found has nothing to do with the special premises of Cartesian skepticism, but is embedded in his own conceptual apparatus. Lastly, we show how a Cartesian skeptic could avoid Wright's critique by reconstructing a skeptical argument that does not use the claims Wright ultimately finds objectionable. (shrink)

This paper discusses two novels by contemporary writer Inga Iwasiów (b. 1963), Bambino (2008) and Ku słońcu [Towards the Sun] (2010), in the context of geopolitical, ideological, social and psycho-cultural transformations as they specifically affect different generations of inhabitants of the Polish city of Szczecin (pre-1945 German Stettin) from 1945 until the first decade of the 21st century. Bambino covers the years 1945–1981, but also contains flashbacks to pre-war memory of Stettin and to the suppressed experiences of the new post-war (...) inhabitants, as well as ‘flash-forwards’ to post-1989, post-communist reality; Ku słońcu covers 1981 to the first decade of 2000s. It shows how the novels portray these transformations through the experience primarily of women (but not only) — in Bambino, through the main protagonists: Ula (formerly Ulrike), Anna and Marysia, and through that of the hidden narrator Magda (Marysia’s daughter born in the same year as the author, Iwasiów, 1963); and in Ku słońcu, primarily through the experience of Magda herself, as well as through that of two generations of ‘feminist’ academics: Małgorzata and Sylwia (in which it is hard not to perceive the personal experience of the author, though she is at pains to emphasize elsewhere that her work is a collective biography of the city, not so much of herself). The analysis follows Katarzyna Chmielewska’s supposition that contemporary Polish fiction dealing with the past ‘constantly oscillates between memory and genealogy’, and that it raises raw issues not yet addressed by historians; it also derives inspiration from the new ‘postdependency’ studies proposed by Hanna Gosk and Ryszard Nycz. It also attempts to capture the specific nature of Iwasiów’s use of language, her style of feminism, her method of portraying place, and the connections in her prose between place and memory. (shrink)

A proposta deste trabalho é investigar a contribuição da filosofia de Henri Bergson para as discussões atuais sobre a memória. Atualmente, o debate concentra-se entre as teorias causalistas e as teorias simulacionistas acerca da memória. O primeiro grupo defende que entre a representação atual de uma experiência passada e esta experiência, há uma conexão causal. Por outro lado, o segundo grupo entende que a principal contribuição para as representações atuais a respeito de eventos passados surge das condições do momento presente, (...) dispensando a necessidade de uma relação entre a experiência e a representação atual. Henri Bergson, no final do século XIX, apresentou a memória como uma faculdade prática, cuja função é auxiliar na tomada de decisões a partir das informações adquiridas anteriormente. De modo que são as condições do sujeito no momento presente que indicarão quais lembranças serão evocadas. Os conteúdos destas lembranças não são idênticos aos conteúdos do momento em que foram apreendidos, pois as lembranças, na sua concepção, alteram-se ao longo do tempo conforme novas informações são obtidas. Até este ponto, parece haver uma grande aproximação entre a filosofia bergsoniana acerca da memória e a compreensão simulacionista. Contudo, Bergson também entende que a lembrança retida depende da percepção, ocasionando uma representação, que o sujeito teve no momento da experiência, afirmando a existência de uma relação causal entre a representação no momento passado e a representação no momento em que a lembrança é evocada. Portanto, podemos reconhecer aspectos da memória na concepção bergsoniana tanto no modelo causalista, quanto no modelo simulacionista apresentados no debate contemporâneo. A nossa pretensão é, a partir da verificação sobre quais aspectos a filosofia de Bergson se aproxima e se afasta das teorias atuais, reconhecer a quais objeções ela está exposta, bem como que vantagens tem na pesquisa contemporânea em filosofia da memória. Assim como todo estudo relacionado à mente, o trabalho em torno da memória trouxe diversas descobertas e hipóteses no último século, ou seja, o conhecimento a respeito do tema avançou significativamente desde as considerações realizadas por Bergson. Acreditamos que o resgate histórico é importante para evitar a possibilidade de que elementos inclusos em constatações filosóficas mais antigas, e que podem ser de interesse para a pesquisa atual, não sejam vistos. Dividiremos a apresentação deste trabalho em três seções: na primeira, abordaremos as teorias causalista e simulacionista da memória; na segunda, exporemos a filosofia da memória de Bergson; por fim, relacionaremos a compreensão bergsoniana acerca da memória com o debate atual para detectarmos quais aspectos foram derrotados e quais têm se mantido ao longo de todos estes anos após a publicação de Bergson. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende analisar três teorias a respeito do que é o objeto intencional da memória. As teorias abordadas são o realismo direto, o realismo representativo e o pragmatismo em filosofia da memória. A primeira delas defende que quando lembramos, acessamos um evento passado sem intermédios; a segunda argumenta que acessamos diretamente uma representação do evento passado; a última, elaborada recentemente, afirma que nossas lembranças são determinadas por nossas ações. Apresentamos a ideia central de cada teoria, com quais outras teorias (...) sobre a memória elas relacionam e as principais objeções que enfrentam. Após isso, demonstramos a nossa posição, qual seja, o realismo representativo nos parece a alternativa mais viável entre as opções atuais. (shrink)

I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...) Case concerns knowledge of nomological necessities. A proposed revision to NA is: (ENA) S knows that P when S’s belief that P is non-accidentally true because (i) it is based on good evidence, and (ii) in and of themselves, beliefs based on good evidence tend to be true. ‘knowledge-as-credit’ accounts have been offered as an alternative way of sharpening NA. I argue that such accounts face serious objections that don’t apply to ENA. Finally, I take up Lackey’s worry that the credit-based approach mishandles knowledge via testimony. ENA faces no difficulty on that score, which counts in its favor. (shrink)

In an important study, Lawrence Sklar has defended a doctrine of methodological conservatism (very roughly, the principle that a proposition derives some sort of epistemic warrant from being believed). I argue that Sklar's careful formulation of methodological conservatism remains too strong, and that a yet weaker version of the doctrine cannot be successfully defended. I also criticize Sklar's argument that the rejection of methodological conservatism would result in total skepticism. Finally, I turn to a closely related issue, and try to (...) show why different people with the same evidence should be justified in believing the same things. (shrink)

The Realist that investigates questions of ontology by appeal to the quantificational structure of language assumes that the semantics for the privileged language of ontology is externalist. I argue that such a language cannot be (some variant of) a natural language, as some Realists propose. The flexibility exhibited by natural language expressions noted by Chomsky and others cannot obviously be characterized by the rigid models available to the externalist. If natural languages are hostile to externalist treatments, then the meanings of (...) natural language expressions serve as poor guides for ontological investigation, insofar as their meanings will fail to determine the referents of their constituents. This undermines the Realist’s use of natural languages to settle disputes in metaphysics. (shrink)

Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...) sort of situation the skeptic describes (e.g. having one’s brain manipulated by deceitful experimenters). This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic beliefs, the availabiIity of something “given,” or the epistemic priority of experience. As to “epistemological realism,” I find that Williams has offered no principled way to distinguish between ordinary chaIIenges to knowledge and skeptical challenges which, supposedly, have no cIaim on our concem. (shrink)

A prominent response is that Cartesian skepticism is too Cartesian. It arises from outmoded views in epistemology and the philosophy of mind that we now properly reject. We can and should move on to other things. §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, under-determination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism. §3 shows how skeptical arguments that emphasize causal considerations can avoid some suspect Cartesian (...) commitments. §4 explores the related idea that perceptual knowledge is what I call instrumental knowledge. Drawing on that connection, §5 examines a skeptical argument based on minimal assumptions, and explains why a Moorean response to it is unsatisfactory. The problem of skepticism is still with us, and it requires a substantive solution. (shrink)

A recent focus on philosophical methodology has reinvigorated ordinary language philosophy with the contention that philosophical inquiry is better served by attending to the ordinary use of language. Taking cues from findings in the social sciences that deploy methods utilizing language, various ordinary language philosophers embrace a guiding mandate: that ordinary language usage is more reflective of our linguistic and conceptual competencies than standard philosophical methods. We analyze two hypotheses that are implicit in the research from which ordinary language approaches (...) take their cues. This pair of optimistic assumptions (a) bind word meanings to properties of their corresponding concepts and (b) regard language as a direct reflection of our underlying cognitive processes and competencies. Polysemy and pragmatics complicate each assumption. Because the ordinary language philosopher’s methodological mandate compels us to consider how individuals process the utterances they encounter in deciphering the communicative intentions of speakers, failing to attend to the import of polysemy and pragmatics in philosophical and empirical methods has the potential to frustrate the aims of their insightful mandate. The significance of those two complications is worked out with the case study of knowledge. (shrink)

It is hardly a novel claim that the work of Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018) contains influences from philosophical Daoism, but I argue that this influence has yet to be fully understood. Several scholars criticize Le Guin for misrepresenting Daoist ideas as they appear in ancient Chinese philosophical texts, particularly the Dao De Jing and the Zhuangzi. While I have sympathy for this charge, especially as it relates to Le Guin’s translation of the Dao De Jing, I argue that (...) it fails to understand the extent to which her fiction contains her own philosophical development of Daoist ideas. Looking at some of her most influential works (e.g., The Left Hand of Darkness, The Dispossessed, The Lathe of Heaven, A Wizard of Earthsea, etc.), I suggest that Le Guin’s fiction is better seen as a refocusing of Daoist concepts such as complementary contrasts and non-action (wu wei) in the contexts of modern feminism, modern anarchism, science fiction, and fantasy. Le Guin was not trying to represent ancient Daoism as a scholar. Rather, she was trying to reimagine Daoism as a creative artist and philosopher in her own right. This way of viewing Le Guin’s work does not fully exorcise the specter of the possibility of Orientalist cultural appropriation, but it does make the issue more complex in a way that can deepen further conversations. To what extent can an artist be guilty of misrepresentation if representation was not, strictly speaking, her goal? I end with a brief reflection on what is perhaps the deepest philosophical lesson of Le Guin’s work: everything is more complicated than it first appears. On that note, the present article is an attempt not just to do philosophy about Le Guin, but to do philosophy in a Le Guinian fashion, which requires rethinking the metaphor of combat that guides much academic philosophy today. (shrink)

Harman’s lottery paradox, generalized by Vogel to a number of other cases, involves a curious pattern of intuitive knowledge ascriptions: certain propositions seem easier to know than various higher-probability propositions that are recognized to follow from them. For example, it seems easier to judge that someone knows his car is now on Avenue A, where he parked it an hour ago, than to judge that he knows that it is not the case that his car has been stolen and (...) driven away in the last hour. Contextualists have taken this pattern of intuitions as evidence that ‘knows’ does not always denote the same relationship; subject-sensitive invariantists have taken this pattern of intuitions as evidence that non-traditional factors such as practical interests figure in knowledge; still others have argued that the Harman Vogel pattern gives us a reason to abandon the principle that knowledge is closed under known entailment. This paper argues that there is a psychological explanation of the strange pattern of intuitions, grounded in the manner in which we shift between an automatic or heuristic mode of judgment and a controlled or systematic mode. Understanding the psychology behind the pattern of intuitions enables us to see that the pattern gives us no reason to abandon traditional intellectualist invariantism. The psychological account of the paradox also yields new resources for clarifying and defending the single premise closure principle for knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

I defend external world realism. I assume that the principle of inference to the best explanation is justified: roughly, a hypothesis that provides a better explanation of the total evidence is more probable than one that does not. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical hypotheses. This paper thus pursues the explanationist strategy of Laurence BonJour (...) and Jonathan Vogel. It is an improved, more compelling defense, for at least two reasons. First, the attention to spatial properties, and in particular to what I call perspectival projections, makes the explanatory power of the realist hypothesis much more vivid and concrete. Second, the argument preserves and elucidates much that seems correct in the explanationist arguments others have offered while avoiding significant problems and shortcomings. (shrink)

This essay offers a revisionist defense of classical utilitarianism from an infamous objection to it, which is derived from American science fiction writer, Ursula Le Guin’s, short story, “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas.” To that effect, the reply takes inspiration from Le Guin and John Stuart Mill in appealing to the natural law theoretical concept of conscience. I argue that a conscientious utilitarian ethic can escape Le Guin’s objection more satisfactorily than other popular utilitarian ethics. Along the (...) way, this essay discusses at length conscience and its place in moral epistemology, both as it occurs in the natural law tradition and in Mill. The natural law account of conscience is defended and Mill’s account is critiqued. Consequently, this paper also provides an interesting synthesis of utilitarianism with natural law ethics. (shrink)

This paper challenges the notion that the only way to progress to a post-capitalist society is through the wholesale destruction of the capitalist economic system. Instead, I argue that Craft —an existential state and praxis informed by the creation and maintenance of objects of utility—is uniquely situated to effectively reclaim these systems due to its its focus on materiality over abstraction and its unique position as a socially aware form of praxis. This argument focuses not on competition, but on hyper-abstraction (...) as the key driver of capitalist exploitation and its most glaring ethical flaw. Karl Marx's work on commodity fetishism is key to understanding this misguided form of abstraction which displaces commodities so far from their functional form that they feed into what Martin Heidegger termed gestell , or enframing. Postmodern attempts to destabilize capitalist influence in the fine arts, like the de-objectification of the 1960s described by Ursula Meyer, often fell victim to the same fetishistic mindset and simply increased the hold of capitalism within the arts. The enframing worldview that Heidegger warns us about is fed by hyper-abstraction, and while he directly offers up art as the remedy to this situation via poiēsis , key moments in his writings on the related notion of geschick support this new notion of Craft , rather than the fine arts, as a more capable system for the rehabilitation of modern society. (shrink)

Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as (...) the discussed cases suggest, then we face a generality problem. Our higher-level beliefs as formalized by Becker and Salerno turn out to be sensitive according to a wide reading of bootstrapping, but insensitive according to a narrow reading. This particular generality problem does not arise for the alternative accounts of process reliabilism and basis-relative safety. Hence, sensitivity accounts not only deliver opposite results given different formalizations of higher-level beliefs, but also for the same formalization, depending on how we interpret bootstrapping. Therefore, sensitivity accounts do not fail because they make higher-level knowledge impossible, as Vogel argues, and they do not succeed in allowing higher-level knowledge, as Becker and Salerno suggest. Rather, their problem is that they deliver far too heterogeneous results. (shrink)

Using Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Left Hand of Darkness as an inspirational backdrop, a novel whose story unfolds on a genderless planet that nevertheless relies on reproductive sex for the sake of generativity, this paper tackles the sex/gender debate, its entanglements with procreation, and its consequences for transgender pregnancies. More specifically, I analyze three issues that pose barriers to thinking about a more inclusive reproductive ethics: state-sanctioned sterilization, non-reproductive futurism, and access to assisted reproductive technology.

Vogel, Sosa, and Huemer have all argued that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that you do not believe falsely, therefore the sensitivity condition must be false. I show that this objection misses its mark because it fails to take account of the basis of belief. Moreover, if the objection is modified to account for the basis of belief then it collapses into the more familiar objection that sensitivity is incompatible with closure.

This paper defends Aristotle’s project of deriving the order of time from the order of change in Physics 4.11, against the objection that it contains a vicious circularity arising from the assumption that we cannot specify the direction of a change without invoking the temporal relations of its stages. It considers and rejects a solution to this objection proposed by Ursula Coope, and proposes an alternative solution. It also considers the related problem of how the temporal orders and directions (...) derived from individual changes can together constitute a single, globally consistent order and direction of time. (shrink)

On ground shared by environmental hermeneutics, critical social theory, and environmentally minded feminism, this article attempts to conciliate between the nearly antithetical ethical viewpoints of environmental philosophers David Abram and Steven Vogel. It will demonstrate first that Abram’s linguistic arguments for extending ethical considerability to nonhuman nature succumb to two of Vogel’s debilitating critiques, which it labels the social constructivist critique and the discourse ethics critique, and secondly that Abram fails to guard against the problem of human-human oppression. (...) The article also points out, on the other hand, that while Vogel evades the problem of human-human oppression, his view fails to protect against the problem of dangerous anthropocentrism. Operating within the boundaries that Vogel establishes, it will seek to avoid the pitfalls of Abram’s view, to address the underlying ideology that leads to both types of oppression, and to eliminate the problem of dangerous anthropocentrism. To do so it draws upon the arguments of Trish Glazebrook, contending that Abram’s appeals to the “speech” of nature can be more effectively conceptualized as erotic appeals, and that engaging in this call-and-response eros promotes the development of virtues that undermine our current ideology and extend to both the human and the nonhuman. (shrink)

Pretheoretically we hold that we cannot gain justification or knowledge through an epistemically circular reasoning process. Epistemically circular reasoning occurs when a subject forms the belief that p on the basis of an argument A, where at least one of the premises of A already presupposes the truth of p. It has often been argued that process reliabilism does not rule out that this kind of reasoning leads to justification or knowledge. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject (...) reliabilism. Those who try to defend reliabilism have two basic options: (I) accept that reliabilism does not rule out circular reasoning, but argue that this kind of reasoning is not as epistemically “bad” as it seems, or (II) hold on to the view that circular reasoning is epistemically “bad”, but deny that reliabilism really allows this kind of reasoning. Option (I) has been spelled out in several ways, all of which have found to be problematic. Option (II) has not been discussed very widely. Vogel considers and quickly dismisses it on the basis of three reasons. Weisberg has shown in detail that one of these reasons is unconvincing. In this paper I argue that the other two reasons are unconvincing as well and that therefore option (II) might in fact be a more promising starting point to defend reliabilism than option (I). (shrink)

Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to (...) appreciate what I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy. (shrink)

D’où vient la difficulté des démocraties libérales à résorber les inégalités de distribution des risques environnementaux qui affectent davantage les personnes racisées? Dit autrement, d’où vient leur incapacité à contrer le racisme environnemental? En mobilisant la notion de réification, cet article cherche à analyser les causes de la perpétuation de cette forme particulière de racisme dans nos sociétés. Après avoir défini ce concept et celui de racisme environnemental, nous explorons deux possibles explications s’appuyant sur des conceptions différentes du processus de (...) « réification de l’environnement ». La première est inspirée de Steven Vogel et György Lukács et la seconde de Simon Hailwood et Axel Honneth. Plutôt que de proposer une thèse forte, ce travail souhaite ouvrir un nouvel angle de recherche sur les racines conceptuelles d’un problème aux conséquences politiques, économiques et sociales qui maintient certaines populations dans des situations de plus grande précarité matérielle et morale. (shrink)

Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.

According to the influential thesis of attentional transparency, in having or reflecting on an ordinary visual experience, we can attend only outwards, to qualities the experience represents, never to intrinsic qualities of the experience itself, i.e., to “mental paint.” According to the competing view, attentional semitransparency, although we usually attend outwards, to qualities the experience represents, we can also attend inwards, to mental paint. So far, philosophers have debated this topic in strictly armchair means, especially phenomenological reflection. My aim in (...) this paper is to show how to design an experiment, using the change detection paradigm for studying visual working memory that, if yielding positive results, would support AS. The structure of the argument is as follows. In standard change detection tasks, which involve attention to qualities the experience represents, there exists a known object integration effect (Luck and Vogel in Nature 390(6657):279–281, 1997). I formulate a hypothesis I call “the turn-off hypothesis,” according to which this effect does not exist in change detection tasks where subjects are instructed to attend to mental paint. I argue that, given AS, we have some reason to expect the turn-off hypothesis to be true, but given AT, we do not. Consequently, the truth of the turn-off hypothesis would support AS. I further argue that one can straightforwardly test the turn-off hypothesis, taking the standard change detection paradigm and instructing participants to attend inwards. (shrink)

Providing the most thorough coverage available in one volume, this comprehensive, broadly based collection offers a wide variety of selections in four major genres, and also includes a section on film. Each of the five sections contains a detailed critical introduction to each form, brief biographies of the authors, and a clear, concise editorial apparatus. Updated and revised throughout, the new Fourth Edition adds essays by Margaret Mead, Russell Baker, Joan Didion, Annie Dillard, and Alice Walker; fiction by Nathaniel Hawthorne, (...) Ursula K. LeGuin, Anton Chekov, James Joyce, Katherine Mansfield, F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Alice Walker, Louise Erdrich, Donald Barthelme, and James McPherson; poems by John Donne, Robert Browning, Walt Whitman, Edwin Arlington Robinson, e.e. cummings, Langston Hughes, W.H. Auden, Philip Levine, and Louise Gluck; and plays by August Wilson, Marsha Norman, Wendy Wasserstein, and Vaclav Havel. The chapter devoted to film examines the relation of film to literature and gives the complete screenplay for Citizen Kane plus close analysis of a scene from the film. With its innovative structure, comprehensive coverage, and insightful and stimulating presentation of all kinds of literature, this is an anthology readers will turn to again and again. (shrink)

Wir wissen, dass eine Transformation von globalem Ausmaß bereits begonnen hat, und wir wissen, dass ihre Entfaltung nicht vorhersehbar ist. Wir können sicher sein, dass es eine Herausforderung sein wird: Wir werden inmitten tiefgreifender Veränderungen leben, unser Überleben wird ständig auf dem Spiel stehen. Werden wir das Verständnis, die Weisheit erreichen, um diese Herausforderung zu bestehen? Hier sind einige Gedanken und Überlegungen, die uns helfen, den Zustand zu erreichen, in dem wir eine positive Antwort geben können. -/- Zurückblicken, um nach (...) vorne zu sehen -/- Dies wird nicht das erste Mal in der Geschichte sein, dass für die Menschheit eine Periode der Transformation auf globaler Ebene angebrochen ist. Der Wissenschaftsphilosoph Holmes Rolston wies darauf hin, dass unsere „große Geschichte“ drei solcher Transformationen umfasst – wahre „Urknalle“.1 Die erste war der physische Urknall, der vermutlich vor etwa 13,8 Milliarden Jahren stattfand. Es gebar das manifeste Universum mit seinen Quantenteilchen, vielfältigen Arten von Energien und Milliarden von Galaxien. Es führte zur Bildung von Sonnensystemen mit Sonnen und Planeten und Energieflüssen, die die Entwicklung von lebenden (glücklich gelegenen) Planeten ermöglichen, die aktive Sonnen umkreisen. Eine weitere grundlegende Transformation – ein „zweiter Urknall“ – war die Entstehung lebender Organismen in den komplexen Systemen, die sich auf der Erde und vermutlich auch auf anderen Planeten entwickelt haben. Es wird angenommen, dass diese Transformation vor etwa 3,8 Milliarden Jahren stattgefunden hat. Es begann mit der Entstehung einzelliger Prokaryoten in der Ursuppe, die die Oberfläche des Planeten bedeckte. Der „dritte Urknall“ soll vor etwa 120.000 Jahren stattgefunden haben. Es hat das Bewusstsein unserer Spezies grundlegend verändert – „entwickelt“. Homo soll sapiens geworden sein. Zu den evolutionären Vorteilen des weiterentwickelten Bewusstseins gehörte eine flexiblere und schnellere Form der Kommunikation. Die Kommunikation war nicht mehr auf halbautomatische Reaktionen beschränkt, die durch wiederkehrende Bedingungen und Ereignisse ausgelöst wurden; Anstatt sich auf Zeichen zu beschränken, basierte die menschliche Kommunikation auf einvernehmlich entwickelten Symbolen. -/- Die Entwicklung der Symbolsprache war ein großer Sprung. Einerseits brachte es soziale Strukturen hervor, die auf kollektiv erworbener Bedeutung beruhten, und andererseits produzierte es verbesserte manipulative Fähigkeiten. Gesellschaften könnten sich auf der Grundlage gemeinsamer Kulturen entwickeln, die mächtige Technologien einsetzen. Homo sapiens begann andere Arten zu dominieren und wurde zu einem Schlüsselfaktor in der Evolution des Lebens in der Biosphäre. Der dritte Urknall erzeugte eine Explosion der menschlichen Bevölkerung, aber er brachte nicht die Weisheit hervor, die sicherstellen würde, dass die erweiterte Bevölkerung das Gleichgewicht aufrechterhalten könnte, das für das Gedeihen des Lebens auf diesem Planeten unerlässlich ist. Diese Gleichgewichte wurden immer mehr beeinträchtigt. Der kurzsichtige Einsatz von Technologie und die Missachtung natürlicher Kontrollmechanismen brachten die Menschheit dorthin, wo sie heute ist: an einen „Chaos-Punkt“, an dem die Wahl klar ist: zwischen Zusammenbruch und Durchbruch.2 Eine weitere globale Transformation ist unvermeidlich geworden und ist es noch tatsächlich im Gange: ein vierter Urknall. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen. Der Aufbau unserer Herrschaft auf dem Planeten hängt davon ab, ob wir die Herausforderung dieser Transformation meistern. -/- Die erste und grundlegende Lektion ist einfach und offensichtlich. Wir haben uns von der natürlichen Welt getrennt und müssen zurückkommen – nicht um Wilde und „Primitive“ zu werden, sondern Wesen, die auf die Welt um sie herum eingestimmt sind, die im Einklang mit den Rhythmen und Gleichgewichten der Natur leben und kompatibel erschaffen und nachhaltige eigene Rhythmen und Balancen. Wir sind nicht mehr auf die Rhythmen und Balancen der Natur ausgerichtet. Obwohl wir durch unsere biologische Evolution in diese Rhythmen und Balancen „eingebaut“ sind, haben wir unsere eigenen künstlichen Rhythmen und gefährlichen Balancen geschaffen, die die natürlichen Rhythmen ignorieren und oft mit ihnen in Konflikt stehen. Mit der Sonne aufzugehen und sich mit der Sonne zurückzuziehen bedeutet, sich an den zirkadianen 24-Stunden-Rhythmus anzupassen, der durch die Bewegung der Erde um die Sonne geschaffen wurde, und die sogenannten primitiven Menschen leben immer noch in Harmonie damit, und das tun die meisten auch die restlichen indigenen und traditionellen Kulturen. Aber moderne Menschen missachten die Rhythmen und Gleichgewichte der Natur und glauben, dass sie sie ersetzen können, indem sie Lichter und andere künstliche Annehmlichkeiten mit dem Umlegen eines Schalters ein- und ausschalten. Doch der menschliche Körper passt sich nicht den künstlichen Rhythmen an, und wir leiden unter den Folgen. -/- 3Die Wirksamkeit des Immunsystems ist beeinträchtigt, und trotz einer Flut von biochemischen Medikamenten breiten sich Krankheiten aus. Moderne Bevölkerungen sind Stadtbewohner und haben nur begrenzten Kontakt mit der Natur. Sie leben in einer künstlichen Welt und denken, dass es die reale Welt ist. Sie halten sich anderen Lebensformen überlegen und glauben, die Natur nach Belieben beherrschen zu können. Noch vor fünfzig Jahren musste die Tierintelligenzforscherin Jane Goodall gegen die damals noch vorherrschende Überzeugung ankämpfen, dass ChiMenschen sind biochemische Reiz-Reaktions-Mechanismen, keine lebenden und fühlenden Wesen. Heute erkennen wir, dass nicht nur höhere Säugetiere, alle lebenden Organismen und sogar Bäume und Pflanzen sensible Lebewesen sind und sich in dieser Hinsicht nicht grundlegend von uns unterscheiden. Es liegt im besten Interesse unseres körperlichen und geistigen Wohlbefindens, dass wir diese Missverständnisse und fehlerhaften Verhaltensweisen korrigieren. Wenn wir dies tun, gewinnen wir unsere natürliche Gesundheit und Vitalität zurück. Die heilende Wirkung natürlicher Substanzen und Lebensweisen war schon in der Antike Heilern und Weisen bekannt. Seit Hippokrates, der als Vater der modernen Medizin gilt, suchen Mediziner nach Substanzen und Methoden, die das Gleichgewicht und die Verbindung zwischen Mensch und Natur wiederherstellen. Heute wird dieser Anspruch überschattet von einer oft kommerziell motivierten Abhängigkeit von synthetischen Substanzen und naturverachtenden Praktiken. Die Szene ist nicht nur negativ: Wie wir sehen werden, gibt es positive Entwicklungen in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Strebens, einschließlich Heilung und Medizin. Die Verbindung mit der Natur ist ein Hauptziel der alternativen Heilmethoden, die als Informations- und Energiemedizin bekannt sind. Diese Form der Heilung erlebt in verschiedenen Teilen der Welt, vor allem im Orient, eine Renaissance. Shirin yoku, die japanische Kunst des Waldbadens, ist ein Paradebeispiel. Um es zu praktizieren, müssen wir in einen Wald gehen und uns auf seine Rhythmen und Energien eingestimmt fühlen – den Wind durch die Blätter rauschen hören, das Lichtspiel auf der Oberfläche eines Teichs spüren, mit den Wolken schweben, wenn sie sich durch den Himmel bewegen. Psychotherapeuten finden, dass sogar die Geräusche der Natur, das Zwitschern der Vögel, das Rauschen der Bäche heilend wirken. Einfach in einem Wald zu sein oder neben einem Baum zu stehen, beruhigt und heilt das Nervensystem. Eine weitere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft zu erkennen und daran anzuknüpfen. -/- Es gibt positive Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft, und es gibt gesunde, lebensspendende und erhaltende Prozesse in der Natur. Wir könnten wieder in die Natur eintauchen und an positiven Entwicklungen in der Gesellschaft teilhaben. Und doch gelingt uns das nicht. Wir beschreiten einen Weg, der eher zum Zusammenbruch als zum Durchbruch führt. Wir müssen überdenken, wie wir gehen, und vor allem, wohin wir gehen. Wir sind eine von mehr als hundert Millionen Arten in der Biosphäre, wobei jede Art Millionen und in einigen Fällen Milliarden von Individuen umfasst. Unter all diesen Arten und Individuen befinden wir uns in einer privilegierten Position: Wir haben ein hoch entwickeltes Gehirn und Bewusstsein. Dies ermöglicht uns zu fragen, wer wir sind, was die Welt ist und wie wir in der Welt leben können und sollen. Ein fortgeschrittenes Bewusstsein ist eine einzigartige Ressource, und wir machen keinen guten Gebrauch davon. Wir stellen nicht die richtigen Fragen und suchen nicht nach den richtigen Antworten, sondern gehen einfach vorwärts und vertrauen auf das Glück. Wir haben unsere Zahl erhöht, aber nicht die Vorteile, die unser Bewusstsein denen verleihen könnte, die wir in die Welt bringen. Wir haben ausgeklügelte Technologien entwickelt und angewendet, um unseren Bedürfnissen und Wünschen gerecht zu werden, haben aber die Mehrheit der fortgeschrittenen Arten beschädigt oder zum Aussterben gebracht. Fünfzig Prozent aller Wildtiere auf dem Planeten sind verschwunden, und jeden Tag verschwinden vierundvierzigtausend Populationen lebender Arten. Wir sind zu einer Gefahr für das Leben in der Biosphäre geworden. Die Geschichte lehrt uns, dass Urknalle, globale Transformationen, nicht unbedingt eine gerechte und blühende Welt hervorbringen; sie können zu einem Zusammenbruch führen. Wir haben die Schwelle eines vierten Urknalls erreicht, und wir tun nicht, was wir können, um einen Zusammenbruch abzuwenden. Der Großteil der heutigen Bevölkerung ist frustriert und depressiv und wird gewalttätig. Menschen leiden unter einer veränderten -/- über Klima, Umweltverschmutzung und unzählige Formen der Umweltzerstörung. Millionen durchstreifen den Planeten auf der Suche nach einem Ort, an dem sie nur überleben können. Die Lehren der Geschichte liegen vor uns, und wir ignorieren sie. Dennoch könnten wir die Lektionen lernen und unsere Wege korrigieren. Wir sind durchaus in der Lage, auf diesem Planeten zu leben, ohne das Gleichgewicht und die Ressourcen zu zerstören, die für ein gesundes Leben für uns und andere Arten erforderlich sind. Keine Spezies müsste dezimiert, unterworfen oder zum Aussterben getrieben werden, um uns am Leben zu erhalten. Wir könnten nachhaltig leben, mit anderen Arten koexistieren und die Grenzen des Lebens auf dem Planeten respektieren. Wir könnten die Verfügbarkeit lebenswichtiger Ressourcen für alle Menschen und Bevölkerungsgruppen sicherstellen. Dennoch treiben wir unzählige Arten zum Aussterben und schädigen die gemeinsame Umwelt. Die bloße Tatsache, dass wir es geschafft haben, als biologische Spezies fünf Millionen Jahre und als bewusste Spezies fünfzigtausend Jahre zu überleben, ist ein Beweis dafür, dass unsere grundlegende Natur nicht das Problem ist. Es ist nicht die Masse der menschlichen Bevölkerung, die dafür verantwortlich ist, zu einer Geißel des Lebens auf dem Planeten zu werden, sondern nur ein Teil. Die Frage ist, warum dieses Segment unhaltbare und jetzt kritische Bedingungen für geschaffen hat die höheren Formen des Lebens auf der Erde? Und kann es sich rechtzeitig ändern und transformieren, um eine große Katastrophe zu vermeiden? Theologische und mystische Annahmen wurden manchmal als Grund dafür angeführt, dass wir zu dem wurden, was wir sind, aber unser Verhalten göttlichen oder anderen transzendenten Ursachen zuzuschreiben, ist nicht die Antwort. Wir sind weder Engel noch Teufel. Wir wurden zur Geißel, zu der wir unbeabsichtigt geworden sind. Zu Beginn des Neolithikums begann ein Teil der Menschheit, die Ressourcen des Planeten ohne Rücksicht auf irgendetwas und irgendjemanden zu nutzen und sich nur darauf zu konzentrieren, seinen eigenen Komfort und seine eigene Macht zu verbessern. Auf einem endlichen und voneinander abhängigen Planeten führte dies zu unausgewogenen und unhaltbaren Bedingungen. Der egozentrische Umgang mit Ressourcen hat das Netz des Lebens beschädigt. Die menschliche Spezies wurde zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten und auch für sich selbst: Die Gesundheit des Netzes des Lebens ist eine Vorbedingung für die Gesundheit der dort lebenden Spezies. Dies ist eine relativ junge Erkenntnis. Jahrtausendelang gingen die Menschen ihren Daseinsaufgaben nach, ohne sich bewusst zu sein, dass die unreflektierte Verfolgung ihrer eigenen Interessen um sie herum zum Fluch des Lebens wird. -/- Wir sind zu einem Fluch für das Leben auf diesem Planeten geworden; Wir haben die Welt zu einem Spielzeugladen gemacht, in dem wir die leistungsstarken Spielzeuge bauen, die unseren wahrgenommenen Interessen dienen. Wir spielen mit unseren Spielsachen unabhängig davon, ob sie wirklich unseren Bedürfnissen dienen, und ohne Rücksicht auf die Bedürfnisse anderer. Wir setzen die Energie des Atoms frei und nutzen sie, um Systeme anzutreiben, die unsere Bedürfnisse befriedigen. Wir leiten Elektronenströme in integrierte Schaltkreise und verwenden die Schaltkreise, um die Technologien zu beherrschen, die unseren Anforderungen an Kommunikation und Information dienen. Wir spielen im globalen Spielzeugladen ohne Rücksicht auf die Folgen für andere und für den gesamten Laden. Dies ist ein kurzsichtiges und gefährliches Verhalten. Wir greifen auf Energie auf eine Weise zu, die nicht unseren wirklichen Bedürfnissen dient, sondern nur unseren kurzfristigen, egozentrischen Bedürfnissen. Ähnlich kurzsichtig manipulieren wir Informationen. Beispiele dafür sind die Atombombe und das Atomkraftwerk auf der einen Seite und der Computer mit seinem Netzwerk aus globalem Geschwätz auf der anderen Seite. Atomkraft, selbst für friedliche Zwecke, und künstliche Intelligenz, selbst wenn sie gut gemeint ist, sind gefährliche Spielzeuge. Sie können zu technologischen Überschreitungen werden, die am Ende unser Leben und das gesamte Lebensnetz in der Biosphäre schädigen. Wir sind an sich gut, aber egozentrisch und kurzsichtig. Aber das kann nicht unwidersprochen bleiben. Die Zeit, in der wir naiv mit mächtigen Spielzeugen spielen konnten, ist vorbei. Ihre unvorhergesehenen „Nebenwirkungen“ sind zu einer Bedrohung für alles Leben auf dem Planeten geworden, einschließlich unseres eigenen. -/- Vorwärts gehen. -/- Wir sind an der Schwelle des vierten Urknalls angekommen. Was machen wir jetzt? Wenn wir gedeihen oder auch nur überleben wollen, muss sich unser Bewusstsein ändern. Gelingt dies nicht, wird der nächste Urknall unser letzter sein. Eine globale Transformation ist ein riskanter Prozess: Soll sie nicht zum Zusammenbruch, sondern zum Durchbruch führen, muss sie gesteuert werden. Wir können mit der bewussten Führung unserer Evolution beginnen, indem wir Gandhis Rat folgen: Sag anderen nicht, was sie tun sollen; Werde du selbst zu dem, was sie und die Welt werden sollen. Unsere wesentliche Aufgabe ist es, die Transformation der Welt zu werden. Wir müssen Ausdruck eines reifen und gesunden Lebens in der Biosphäre sein. Wenn diese kritische Masse erreicht wird, wird der „vierte Urknall“ nicht das Ende des Lebens auf dem Planeten markieren. Es wird eine disruptive globale Transformation sein, aber keine destruktive. Es wird eine neue Phase in der Amtszeit der Menschheit auf dem Planeten auslösen und nicht das Ende dieser Amtszeit. Es ist an der Zeit, die Lehren aus der Geschichte zu ziehen – zurückzublicken, um nach vorne zu sehen. Das Überleben einer fortgeschrittenen Spezies und die Zukunft des Lebensnetzes auf diesem Planeten liegt in unseren Händen. Noch nie waren so viele von der Weisheit so weniger abhängig. Wir müssen erwachen – um erwachsen zu werden. Die Kraft des Bewusstseins zu nutzen, die in unseren Händen liegt. Es ist nicht an der Zeit zu fragen, ob wir den vierten Urknall, die bereits begonnene globale Transformation, überstehen werden. Es ist an der Zeit, sich daran zu machen, es zu schaffen. (shrink)

The state of our current world has brought about a very active discussion concerning possible alternatives to our current society. In this article, I wish to consider Marx’s idea of communism as a possible alternative, by understanding it as an undetermined concept that only proposes a society without classes and private property. The thesis I will defend here is that we can meaningfully think about such an alternative through the means of Science Fiction literature. In particular, I will take (...) class='Hi'>Ursula Le Guin’s The Dispossessed (2006) as a case study. To clarify this relation between science fiction (SF) literature and communism as a particular case of an alternative society, I will introduce some concepts of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological theory. Thus, I shall argue that in SF we can presentify in bounded phantasy an alternative lifeworld, so furnishing with content the undetermined idea, and in doing so, strengthen the belief in the possibility of such an alternative society. (shrink)

Rawls’ realistic utopia has been subject to much criticism. The Realist claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be too utopian. The Cosmopolitan, on the other hand, claims Rawls’ realistic utopia to be insufficiently utopian. In this essay, I argue that the criticism can be circumvented by means of clarifying an ambiguity in the concept of utopia. I argue that the Realist is not criticizing Rawls for being utopian, but unrealistic, impractical and idealistic (quixotic). The Cosmopolitan might be right in criticizing Rawls (...) for not being utopian enough. The orthodox understanding of utopia, adopted by the Cosmopolitan is, however, in itself quixotic. Drawing on Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, I propose a novel understanding of how utopia ought to be understood. Once the Rawlsian adopts this conception of utopia, it alleviates the objections raised by the Realist and the Cosmopolitan. (shrink)

The Dispossessed has been described by political thinker Andre Gorz as 'The most striking description I know of the seductions—and snares—of self-managed communist or, in other words, anarchist society.' To date, however, the radical social, cultural, and political ramifications of Le Guin's multiple award-winning novel remain woefully under explored. Editors Laurence Davis and Peter Stillman right this state of affairs in the first ever collection of original essays devoted to Le Guin's novel. Among the topics covered in this wide-ranging, international (...) and interdisciplinary collection are the anarchist, ecological, post-consumerist, temporal, revolutionary, and open-ended utopian politics of The Dispossessed. The book concludes with an essay by Le Guin written specially for this volume, in which she reassesses the novel in light of the development of her own thinking over the past 30 years. (shrink)