Results for 'We'

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  1. How We Get Along.J. David Velleman - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not (...) artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds for morality, though not a rational guarantee. He maps a middle course between skepticism and rationalism, arguing that practical reasoning is 'pro-moral' without requiring moral action. The result is what he calls a 'Kinda Kantian metaethics'. How We Get Along is the summation of Velleman's thinking to date, incorporating and unifying previous work on agency, the self, the emotions, narrative and Kantian moral theory. (shrink)
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  2. Can We Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.
    I consider the problem of how to derive what an agent believes from their credence function and utility function. I argue the best solution of this problem (...)
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  3. Why We May Not Find Intentions in the Brain.Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager - 2014 - Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project (...)
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  4. How We Think and Act Together.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):298-314.
    In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect (...)
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  5. Collective Moral Obligations: ‘We-Reasoningand the Perspective of the Deliberating Agent.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2019 - The Monist 102 (2):151-171.
    Together we can achieve things that we could never do on our own. In fact, there are sheer endless opportunities for producing morally desirable outcomes together with (...)
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  6. Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem?Fiona Woollard - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):677-690.
    Our pollution of the environment seems set to lead to widespread problems in the future, including disease, scarcity of resources, and bloody conflicts. It is natural to (...)
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  7. Why We Still Need Knowledge of Language.Barry C. Smith - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (18):431-457.
    In his latest book, Michael Devitt rejects Chomskys mentalist conception of linguistics. The case against Chomsky is based on two principal claims. First, that we can (...)separate the study of linguistic competence from the study of its outputs: only the latter belongs to linguistic inquiry. Second, Chomskys account of a speakers competence as consisiting in the mental representation of rules of a grammar for his language is mistaken. I shall argue, fi rst, that Devitt fails to make a case for separating the study of outputs from the study of competence, and second, that Devitt mis-characterises Chomskys account of competence, and so his objections miss their target. Chomskys own views come close to a denial that speakers have knowledge of their language. But a satisfactory account of what speakers are able to do will need to ascribe them linguistic knowledge that they use to speak and understand. I shall explore a conception of speakers knowledge of language that confi rms Chomskys mentalist view of linguistics but which is immune to Devitts criticisms. (shrink)
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  8. How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.
    Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to (...)
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  9. Why "We" Are Not Harming the Global Poor: A Critique of Pogge's Leap From State to Individual Responsibility.Uwe Steinhoff - 2012 - Public Reason 4 (1-2):119-138.
    Thomas Pogge claims "that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global (...)
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  10.  23
    Should We Talk About theBenefitsof Breastfeeding? The Significance of the Default in Representations of Infant Feeding.Fiona Woollard - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (11):756-760.
    Breastfeeding advocates have criticised the phrasebreast is bestas mistakenly representing breastfeeding as a departure from the norm rather than the default for infant feeding. Breastfeeding (...)
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  11. What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.
    This paper is about an overlooked aspectthe cognitive or epistemic aspectof the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not (...) only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other. (shrink)
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  12. Should We Respond to Evil with Indifference?Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):613–635.
    In a recent article, Adam Elga outlines a strategy forDefeating Dr Evil with Self-Locating Belief”. The strategy relies on an indifference principle that is not (...)up to the task. In general, there are two things to dislike about indifference principles: adopting one normally means confusing risk for uncertainty, and they tend to lead to incoherent views in someparadoxicalsituations. I argue that both kinds of objection can be levelled against Elgas indifference principle. There are also some difficulties with the concept of evidence that Elga uses, and these create further difficulties for the principle. (shrink)
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  13. Have we Lost Spacetime on the Way? Narrowing the Gap between General Relativity and Quantum Gravity.Baptiste Le Bihan & Niels Siegbert Linnemann - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 65:112-121.
    Important features of space and time are taken to be missing in quantum gravity, allegedly requiring an explanation of the emergence of spacetime from non-spatio-temporal theories (...). In this paper, we argue that the explanatory gap between general relativity and non-spatio- temporal quantum gravity theories might significantly be reduced with two moves. First, we point out that spacetime is already partially missing in the context of general relativity when understood from a dynamical perspective. Second, we argue that most approaches to quantum gravity already start with an in-built distinction between structures to which the asymmetry between space and time can be traced back. (shrink)
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  14. On Whether We Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that (...)we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible. (shrink)
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  15. Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibilist About Determinism and Moral Responsibility?Ben Vilhauer - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):719 – 730.
    In this paper, I discuss Hud Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, which is based on Davidson's anomalous monism. I sketch an (...)
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  16. Why We ShouldnT Reject Conflicts: A Critique of Tadros.Uwe Steinhoff - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):315-322.
    Victor Tadros thinks the idea that in a conflict both sides may permissibly use force should (typically) be rejected. Thus, he thinks that two shipwrecked persons should (...)
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  17. We Are Not Witnesses to a New Scientific Revolution.Gregor Schiemann - 2014 - In A. Nordmann & H. Radder (eds.), Science Transformed? Debating Claims of an Epochal Break. Velbrück. pp. 31-42.
    Do the changes that have taken place in the structures and methods of the production of scientific knowledge and in our understanding of science over the past (...)
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  18. What We Know and What to Do.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2291-2323.
    This paper discusses an important puzzle about the semantics of indicative conditionals and deontic necessity modals (should, ought, etc.): the Miner Puzzle (Parfit, ms; Kolodny and MacFarlane, (...)
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  19. Do We See Apples as Edible?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
    Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an (...)
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  20. We Cannot Infer by Accepting Testimony.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2589-2598.
    While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. (...)
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  21. Ought We to Forget What We Cannot Forget? A Reply to Sybille Schmidt.Attila Tanyi - 2015 - In Giovanni Galizia & David Shulman (eds.), Forgetting: An Interdisciplinary Conversation. Magnes Press of the Hebrew University. pp. 258-262.
    This is a short response to Sybille Schmidt's paper (in the same volume) "Is There an Ethics of Forgetting?". The response starts out by admitting (...)
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  22. Do We Need an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis?Massimo Pigliucci - 2007 - Evolution 61 (12):2743-2749.
    The Modern Synthesis (MS) is the current paradigm in evolutionary biology. It was actually built by expanding on the conceptual foundations laid out by its predecessors, Darwinism (...)
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  23. We-Attitudes and Social Institutions.Petri Ylikoski & Pekka Mäkelä - 2002 - In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen.
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  24. What We Together Do.Derek Parfit - manuscript
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  25.  6
    Can We Do Without a Metaphysical Theory of Personal Identity in Practice?Radim Bělohrad - 2014 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 13 (2):315-334.
    In this paper, I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfits (...)
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  26. We Remember, We Forget: Collaborative Remembering in Older Couples.Celia B. Harris, Paul Keil, John Sutton, Amanda Barnier & Doris McIlwain - 2011 - Discourse Processes 48 (4):267-303.
    Transactive memory theory describes the processes by which benefits for memory can occur when remembering is shared in dyads or groups. In contrast, cognitive psychology experiments demonstrate (...)
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  27. Should We Aim for a Unified and Coherent Theory of Punishment?: Thom Brooks: Punishment. Routledge, New York, 2012, 282 Pp., ISBN 978-0-415-43181-1, 978-0-415-43182-8.Mark Tunick - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (3):611-628.
    Thom Brooks criticizes utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment but argues that utilitarian and retributive goals can be incorporated into a coherent and unified theory of punitive (...)
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  28. Yes, We Have Conscious Will.Mark Sharlow - 2007
    In this paper I examine Daniel M. Wegner's line of argument against the causal efficacy of conscious will, as presented in Wegner's book "The Illusion (...)
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  29. Local Determination”, Even If We Could Find It, Does Not Challenge Free Will: Commentary on Marcelo Fischborn.Adina Roskies & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):185-197.
    Marcelo Fischborn discusses the significance of neuroscience for debates about free will. Although he concedes that, to date, Libet-style experiments have failed to threatenlibertarian free (...)will”, he argues that, in principle, neuroscience and psychology could do so by supporting local determinism. We argue that, in principle, Libet-style experiments cannot succeed in disproving or even establishing serious doubt about libertarian free will. First, we contend thatlocal determination”, as Fischborn outlines it, is not a coherent concept. Moreover, determinism is unlikely to be established by neuroscience in any form that should trouble compatibilists or libertariansthat is, anyone who thinks we might have free will. We conclude that, in principle, neuroscience will not be able undermine libertarian free will and explain why these conclusions support a coherent compatibilist notion of causal sourcehood. (shrink)
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  30. Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?Angus Ross - 1986 - Ratio (1):69-88.
    It is argued that reliance on the testimony of others cannot be viewed as reliance on a kind of evidence. Speech being essentially voluntary, the speaker cannot (...)
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  31. Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing?Re’em Segev - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2049-2068.
    Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoingan action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint? This question is perplexing. On (...)the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing wrongdoing does not necessarily amount to doing harm or intending harm, for example. The puzzle is reinforced due to the fact that the intuitive response to other cases seems to be different, namely that there is no reason in favour of preventing deontological wrongdoing. This question is thus interesting in itself. It might also shed light on additional questions such as theparadox of deontologyand the appropriate response to wrongful actions more generally. Yet, despite its importance, this question is typically overlooked. The paper explores this question. (shrink)
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  32. Do We See Through a Microscope?Ian Hacking - 1981 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (4):305-322.
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  33.  85
    Should We Eliminate the Innate? Reply to Griffiths and Machery.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):505 – 519.
    Griffiths and Machery (2008) have argued that innateness is a folk notion that obstructs inquiry and has no place in contemporary science. They support their view by (...)
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  34. What We Hear.Jason Leddington - 2014 - In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
    A longstanding philosophical tradition holds that the primary objects of hearing are sounds rather than sound sources. In this case, we hear sound sources byor in (...)virtue ofhearing their sounds. This paper argues that, on the contrary, we have good reason to believe that the primary objects of hearing are sound sources, and that the relationship between a sound and its source is much like the relationship between a color and its bearer. Just as we see objects in seeing their colors, so we hear sound sources in hearing their sounds. (shrink)
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  35. Each-We Dilemmas and Effective Altruism.Theron Pummer & Matthew Clark - 2019 - Journal of Practical Ethics 7 (1):24-32.
    In his interesting and provocative articleBeing Good in a World of Need’, Larry Temkin argues for the possibility of a type of Each-We Dilemma in (...)which, if we each produce the most good we can individually, we produce a worse outcome collectively. Such situations would ostensibly be troubling from the standpoint of effective altruism, the project of finding out how to do the most good and doing it, subject to not violating side-constraints. We here show that Temkins argument is more controversial than it may appear initially regarding both impartiality and goodness. This is because it is both inconsistent with (i) a plausible conception of impartiality (Anonymity) and inconsistent with (ii) the standard view of goodness (the Internal Aspects View). Moreover, because (i) and (ii) are entailed by the sense ofimpartial goodnessthat effective altruism tentatively adopts, Temkins argument is less relevant to effective altruism than he suggests. (shrink)
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  36. Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve (...)
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  37. Do We Reflect While Performing Skillful Actions? Automaticity, Control, and the Perils of Distraction.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (7):896-924.
    From our everyday commuting to the gold medalists world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of (...)
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  38. Evidence and Simplicity: Why We Should Reject Homeopathy.Scott Sehon & Donald Stanley - 2010 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):276-281.
    Homeopathic medications are used by millions, and hundreds of millions of dollars are spent on these remedies in the USA alone. In the UK, the NHS covers (...)
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  39. Should We Enhance Self-Esteem?Rebecca Roache - 2007 - Philosophica 79:71-91.
    The conviction that high self-esteem is beneficial both to the individual and to society in general has been pervasive both in academia and in popular culture. (...)If it is indeed beneficial, it is a prime candidate for pharmacological enhancement. There is evidence to suggest, however, that the benefits of high self-esteem to the individual have been exaggerated; and that there are few - if any - social benefits. With this evidence in mind, I consider in what ways high self-esteem is valuable, and suggest how enhancement could play a role in maximising its valuable aspects. (shrink)
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  40. Must We Measure What We Mean?Nat Hansen - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (8):785-815.
    This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the (...)
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  41. Should We Campaign Against Sex Robots?John Danaher, Brian D. Earp & Anders Sandberg - 2017 - In John Danaher & Neil McArthur (eds.), Robot Sex: Social and Ethical Implications. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    In September 2015 a well-publicised Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR) was launched. Modelled on the longer-standing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the CASR opposes the development (...) of sex robots on the grounds that the technology is being developed with a particular model of female-male relations (the prostitute-john model) in mind, and that this will prove harmful in various ways. In this chapter, we consider carefully the merits of campaigning against such a technology. We make three main arguments. First, we argue that the particular claims advanced by the CASR are unpersuasive, partly due to a lack of clarity about the campaigns aims and partly due to substantive defects in the main ethical objections put forward by campaigns founder(s). Second, broadening our inquiry beyond the arguments proferred by the campaign itself, we argue that it would be very difficult to endorse a general campaign against sex robots unless one embraced a highly conservative attitude towards the ethics of sex, which is likely to be unpalatable to those who are active in the campaign. In making this argument we draw upon lessons from the campaign against killer robots. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that although a generalised campaign against sex robots is unwarranted, there are legitimate concerns that one can raise about the development of sex robots. (shrink)
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  42.  28
    We Are Not in the Dark: Refuting Popular Arguments Against Skeptical Theism.Perry Hendricks - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Critics of skeptical theism often claim that if it (skeptical theism) is true, then we are in the dark about whether (or for all we know) there (...)
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  43. Do We Need Partial Intentions?Avery Archer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):995-1005.
    Richard Holton has argued that the traditional account of intentionswhich only posits the existence of all-out intentionsis inadequate because it fails to accommodate dual-plan (...)cases; ones in which it is rationally permissible for an agent to adopt two competing plans to bring about the same end. Since the consistency norms governing all-out intentions prohibit the adoption of competing intentions, we can only preserve the idea that the agent in a dual-plan case is not being irrational if we attribute to them a pair of partial intentions. I argue that, contrary to initial appearances, (i) Holton has yet to offer us an actual account of partial intentions, and (ii) that the traditional account of intentions already has the resources necessary to accommodate dual-plan cases. (shrink)
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  44. Rubber Ring: Why Do We Listen to Sad Songs?Aaron Smuts - 2011 - In John Gibson & Noel Carroll (eds.), Narrative, Emotion, and Insight. Penn State UP. pp. 131.
    In this essay, I discuss a few ways in which songs are used, ways in which listeners engage with and find meaning in music. I am most (...)
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  45. Could We Experience the Passage of Time?Simon Prosser - 2007 - Ratio 20 (1):75-90.
    This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is (...)claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. There is also some discussion of some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon-Mitchell along with objections raised against them recently by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively. (shrink)
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  46. Do We Sense Modalities with Our Sense Modalities?1.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Ratio 24 (3):299-310.
    It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, (...)
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  47. Why We Should Create Artificial Offspring: Meaning and the Collective Afterlife.John Danaher - 2018 - Science and Engineering Ethics 24 (4):1097-1118.
    This article argues that the creation of artificial offspring could make our lives more meaningful. Byartificial offspringI mean beings that we construct, with a mix (...)
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  48.  30
    Why We Need Religion.Stephen T. Asma - 2018 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    How we feel is as vital to our survival as how we think. This claim, based on the premise that emotions are largely adaptive, serves as the (...)
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  49. Must We Act Only on What We Know?Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (8):463-473.
    What relation is there between knowledge and action? According to Hawthorne and Stanley, where your choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition that (...)p as a reason for acting iff you know that p (RKP). In this paper, I shall argue that it is permissible to treat something as a reason for action even if it isn't known to be true and address Hawthorne and Stanley's arguments for RKP. (shrink)
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  50. Should We Be Dogmatically Conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.
    A familiar complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they are self-defeating or incoherent because theycall for their own rejection’. This complaint seems to (...)be influential but it isnt clear whether conciliatory views call for their own rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves conciliatory views untouched. A subtle version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the conciliatory view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to be conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others). (shrink)
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