Desire theories of well-being claim that how well our life goes for us is solely determined by the fulfilment and frustration of our desires. Several writers have argued that these theories are incorrect because they fail to capture the harms of self-sacrifice and severe depression. In this paper, I argue that desire theories of well-being can account for the harm of both phenomena by rejecting proportionalism about desire and motivation. This is the view that desires always motivate proportionally (...) to their strength. If we reject this view, then we can explain the harm of many cases of self-sacrifice as arising when we act upon our weaker desires and thereby frustrate our stronger desires. Moreover, the harm of many cases of severe depression can be explained by its suppression of the motivational force of desires. This inevitably frustrates desires that we are left unmotivated to fulfil. I argue that this approach captures the experiential quality of self-sacrifice and severe depression better than rival views that seek to problematise these phenomena for desire theories of well-being. Moreover, these theories have sufficient conceptual resources to account for residual cases of self-sacrifice and severe depression that are less well explained by this approach. (shrink)

Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show (...) that they can’t do so. Second, we develop what we take to be the most promising response to that problem for expressivists. We end by noting that this response faces an important challenge pertaining to the psychology of epistemic criticism and praise. (shrink)

How can what we view as morally correct be the motive force for our actions? This work investigates this question with a view to Kant's action theory and moral philosophy, based on a close textual reading. In addition to a historical and systematic framework, it provides a comprehensive textual analysis of Kant's arguments, which also takes into account aspects of the history of his works. The result is a rich picture of Kant's theory of moral motivation, which is (...) not only rooted in Kant's concept of moral justification, but also supports it. Respect for the law is thus to be understood as a way in which human beings make the practical norm their own. According to the interpretation proposed here, moral reasons turn out to be unconditional, universally valid rules whose practical significance as subjective principles of action and motive can only be understood through Kant's theory of moral-rational sensibility. Kant's approach is thus not only of interest within his own work, but also makes an inspiring contribution to a contemporary theory of practical normativity. (shrink)

1. The no form action theory is a novel philosophical theory that transcends traditional dualisms such as matter and spirit, form and substance. It establishes a two-dimensional theoretical framework composed of form and no form, and uses this two-dimensional theory to understand various aspects of the world. 2. The three key actions of no form are: isolation action (e.g., distinguishing between different things), motive force action (e.g., driving changes in things), and manifestation action (e.g., allowing us to perceive (...) things). These three actions have strong "self-reflexivity". For example, the relationships between these three actions can be divided into: isolation relationship, motive force relationship, and manifestation relationship. These three relationships, in turn, belong to isolation action, motive force action, and manifestation action respectively. 3. The no form action theory have strong universality, capable of providing unified theoretical explanations across various disciplines. For example, it can be used to explain quantum entanglement phenomena in physics, as well as the mechanism of consciousness generation in psychology; it can explain ontology, as well as time and space; it can explain emotions, as well as logic. It can explain language, as well as the macroscopic world. 4. The completion of the core ideas of the no form action theory marks the beginning of a new historical stage in philosophical research. It provides a completely new set of methods and perspectives to understand the world, and has achieved a series of important results: (1) It offers new interpretations of the most fundamental philosophical concepts such as "being", "existence", "is", "freedom", "consciousness", "beauty", "space", "time", "basis", "cause", "self", "identity", etc., and introduces many new concepts. It binds these concepts technically within the framework of the no form action theory. This establishes a highly logical and explanatory philosophical system. As a result, philosophical research now has clearer, more rigorous, and more reliable technical operational methods. (2) It derives and explains the three basic laws of formal logic, and demonstrates that they are interdependent and form an inseparable whole. (3) It provides a new solution to Descartes' "mind-body problem" and also explains difficult issues in physics such as quantum entanglement. (4) It discovers a third dimension in the world besides time and space: "now". This discovery provides a completely new perspective for understanding reality, consciousness, and the nature of the universe. (shrink)

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents’ moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people’s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants’ moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs (...) themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. (shrink)

The Profit Motive: A Reality or an Illusion of Capitalism? -/- Introduction -/- The profit motive has long been considered a fundamental driver of economic activity, particularly in capitalist societies. It is the principle that businesses, individuals, and economies are primarily motivated by financial gain. However, when examined through the lens of capitalism and fiat currency, an important question arises: Is the profit motive a genuine economic force, or is it an illusion created by the artificial (...) value of money? This essay explores the nature of the profit motive, its connection to capitalism, and the potential illusory aspects of wealth accumulation within a fiat currency system. -/- The Role of the Profit Motive in Capitalism -/- Capitalism institutionalizes the profit motive by making financial success the key measure of progress. In a capitalist system, individuals and businesses seek to maximize their earnings through innovation, efficiency, and strategic decision-making. The promise of financial gain incentivizes entrepreneurs to take risks, develop new products, and improve services. -/- Supporters of capitalism argue that the profit motive leads to economic growth, job creation, and technological advancements. Competition in the marketplace forces companies to innovate and provide better goods and services at lower costs. Additionally, businesses that generate profits attract investments, which allows them to expand and create more economic opportunities. Thus, the profit motive serves as a crucial mechanism in capitalist economies. -/- However, the pursuit of profit can also lead to negative consequences, such as wealth inequality and environmental degradation. Those who control financial and industrial resources often accumulate disproportionate amounts of wealth, while lower-income individuals may struggle to compete. This raises ethical questions about whether the profit motive truly benefits society or if it primarily serves the interests of the elite. -/- Fiat Currency and the Illusion of Wealth -/- The concept of fiat currency further complicates the understanding of the profit motive. Unlike commodity-backed money (such as gold or silver), fiat currency derives its value from government regulation and public trust rather than intrinsic worth. Since money in modern economies is created through banking systems and debt, its value is largely based on collective belief rather than tangible assets. -/- This raises concerns about whether financial profits are an illusion rather than a reflection of real wealth. If money itself has no intrinsic value, then the pursuit of profit—measured in fiat currency—could be seen as chasing a fabricated metric rather than achieving real economic progress. Inflation, economic crises, and financial bubbles reveal the vulnerabilities of a system that relies on fiat currency, making profits unstable and sometimes illusory. -/- Furthermore, the constant need for economic growth in a fiat-based system pressures businesses and individuals to continuously accumulate more wealth, regardless of actual resource availability. This dynamic fosters consumerism, financial speculation, and debt-driven economies, which can lead to economic instability and artificial booms and busts. -/- Is the Profit Motive an Illusion? -/- The debate over whether the profit motive is an illusion depends on perspective. From a practical standpoint, profit is necessary for businesses to survive and grow. It determines purchasing power, access to resources, and overall economic influence. In this sense, profit is not an illusion but a real force shaping human behavior and societal structures. -/- However, from a philosophical and systemic perspective, the profit motive can be seen as a social construct rather than an absolute reality. The value of money is dictated by economic policies and collective agreements, meaning that financial wealth is only meaningful as long as society recognizes it. If fiat currency were to collapse, the illusionary nature of profit would become evident, as material goods and essential resources would become the true determinants of wealth. -/- Alternative Perspectives on Success -/- While capitalism promotes profit as the primary measure of success, alternative economic models suggest different ways of defining progress. Some propose prioritizing sustainability, resource-based economies, or social well-being rather than monetary accumulation. Economic models like cooperative businesses, universal basic income, and post-scarcity societies challenge the traditional view that profit is the ultimate goal. -/- In such systems, success is defined not by financial gain but by factors such as quality of life, environmental balance, and social equity. This perspective aligns with the idea that the profit motive may not be the only—or even the best—way to drive human progress. -/- Conclusion -/- The profit motive is both a reality and a construct shaped by the economic system in which it operates. In capitalism, it serves as a driving force for innovation, competition, and economic growth. However, its dependence on fiat currency introduces elements of illusion, as financial wealth is largely based on societal belief rather than intrinsic value. While profit remains a central force in modern economies, reconsidering its role in defining success may open pathways to more sustainable and equitable economic models. Ultimately, the question is not just whether profit is an illusion, but whether society should continue prioritizing it as the primary measure of success. -/- . (shrink)

This book is an anthology with the following themes. Non-European Tradition: Bussanich interprets main themes of Hindu ethics, including its roots in ritual sacrifice, its relationship to religious duty, society, individual human well-being, and psychic liberation. To best assess the truth of Hindu ethics, he argues for dialogue with premodern Western thought. Pfister takes up the question of human nature as a case study in Chinese ethics. Is our nature inherently good (as Mengzi argued) or bad (Xunzi’s view)? Pfister (...) ob- serves their underlying agreement, that human beings are capable of becoming good, and makes precise the disagreement: whether we achieve goodness by cultivating autonomous feelings or by accepting external precepts. There are political consequences: whether government should aim to respect and em- power individual choices or to be a controlling authority. Early Greek Thinking: Collobert examines the bases of Homeric ethics in fame, prudence, and shame, and how these guide the deliberations of heroes. She observes how, by depending upon the poet’s words, the hero gains a quasi- immortality, although in truth there is no consolation for each person’s inevi- table death. Plato: Santas examines Socratic Method and ethics in Republic 1. There Socrates examines definitions of justice and tests them by comparison to the arts and sciences. Santas shows the similarities of Socrates’ method to John Rawls’ method of considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. McPherran interprets Plato’s religious dimension as like that of his teacher Socrates. McPherran shows how Plato appropriates, reshapes, and extends the religious conventions of his own time in the service of establishing the new enterprise of philosophy. Ac- cording to Taylor, Socrates believes that humans in general have the task of helping the gods by making their own souls as good as possible, and Socrates’ unique ability to cross-examine imposes on him the special task of helping others to become as good as possible. This conception of Socrates’ mission is Plato’s own, consisting in an extension of the traditional conception of piety as helping the gods. Brickhouse and Smith propose a new understanding of Socratic moral psychology—one that retains the standard view of Socrates as an intellectualist, but also recognizes roles in human agency for appetites and passions. They compare and contrast the Socratic view to the picture of moral psychology we get in other dialogues of Plato. Hardy also proposes a new, non-reductive understanding of Socratic eudaimonism—he argues that Socrates invokes a very rich and complex notion of the “Knowledge of the Good and Bad”, which is associated with the motivating forces of the virtues. Rudebusch defends Socrates’ argument that knowledge can never be impotent in the face of psychic passions. He considers the standard objections: that knowledge cannot weigh incom- mensurable human values, and that brute desire, all by itself, is capable of moving the soul to action. Aristotle: Anagnostopoulos interprets Aristotle on the nature and acquisition of virtue. Though virtue of character, aiming at human happiness, requires a complex awareness of multiple dimensions of one’s experience, it is not properly a cognitive capacity. Thus it requires habituation, not education, according to Aristotle, in order to align the unruly elements of the soul with reason’s knowledge of what promotes happiness. Shields explains Aristotle’s doctrine that goodness is meant in many ways as the doctrine that there are different analyses of goodness for different types of circumstance, just as for being. He finds Aristotle to argue for this conclusion, against Plato’s doctrine of the unity of the Good, by applying the tests for homonymy and as an immediate cons- equence of the doctrine of categories. Shields evaluates the issue as unresolved at present. Russell discusses Aristotle’s account of practical deliberation and its virtue, intelligence (phronesis). He relates the account to contemporary philo- sophical controversies surrounding Aristotle’s view that intelligence is neces- sary for moral virtue, including the objections that in some cases it is unnecessary or even impedes human goodness. Frede examines the advantages and disadvantages of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. She explains the general Greek con- ceptions of happiness and virtue, Aristotle’s conception of phronesis and compares the Aristotle’s ethics with modern accounts. Liske discusses the question of whether the Aristotelian account of virtue entails an ethical-psy- chological determinism. He argues that Aristotle’s understanding of hexis allows for free action and ethical responsibility : By making decisions for good actions we are able to stabilize our character (hexis). Hellenistic and Roman: Annas defends an account of stoic ethics, according to which the three parts of Stoicism—logic, physics, and ethics—are integrated as the parts of an egg, not as the parts of a building. Since by this analogy no one part is a foundation for the rest, pedagogical decisions may govern the choice of numerous, equally valid, presentations of Stoic ethics. Piering interprets the Cynic way of life as a distinctive philosophy. In their ethics, Cynics value neither pleasure nor tradition but personal liberty, which they achieve by self-suffi- ciency and display in speech that is frank to the point of insult. Plotinus and Neoplatonism: Gerson outlines the place of ordinary civic virtue as well as philosophically contemplative excellence in Neoplatonism. In doing so he attempts to show how one and the same good can be both action-guiding in human life and be the absolute simple One that grounds the explanation of everything in the universe. Delcomminette follows Plotinus’s path to the Good as the foundation of free will, first in the freedom of Intellect and then in the “more than freedom” of the One. Plotinus postulates these divinities as not outside but within each self, saving him from the contradiction of an external foundation for a truly free will. General Topics: Halbig discusses the thesis on the unity of virtues. He dis- tinguishes the thesis of the identity of virtues and the thesis of a reciprocity of virtues and argues that the various virtues form a unity (in terms of reciprocity) since virtues cannot bring about any bad action. Detel examines Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of normativity : Plato and Aristotle (i) entertained hybrid theories of normativity by distinguishing functional, semantic and ethical normativity, (ii) located the ultimate source of normativity in standards of a good life, and thus (iii) took semantic normativity to be a derived form of normativity. Detel argues that hybrid theories of normativity are—from a mo- dern point of view—still promising. Ho ̈ffe defends the Ancient conception of an art of living against Modern objections. Whereas many Modern philosophers think that we have to replace Ancient eudaimonism by the idea of moral obligation (Pflicht), Ho ̈ffe argues that Eudaimonism and autonomy-based ethics can be reconciled and integrated into a comprehensive and promising theory of a good life, if we enrich the idea of autonomy by the central elements of Ancient eudaimonism. Some common themes: The topics in Chinese and Hindu ethics are perhaps more familiar to modern western sensibilities than Homeric and even Socratic. Anagnostopoulos, Brickhouse and Smith, Frede, Liske, Rudebusch, and Russell all consider in contrasting ways the role of moral character, apart from intellect, in ethics. Brickhouse / Smith, Hardy, and Rudebusch discuss the Socratic con- ception of moral knowledge. Brickhouse / Smith and Hardy retain the standard view of the so called Socratic Intellectualism. Shields and Gerson both consider the question whether there is a single genus of goodness, or if the term is a homonym. Bussanich, McPherran, Taylor, and Delcomminette all consider the relation between religion and ethics. Pfister, Piering, Delcomminette, and Liske all consider what sort of freedom is appropriate to human well-being. Halbig, Detel, and Ho ̈ffe propose interpretations of main themes of Ancient ethics. (shrink)

[Open Access.] Perceptual experiences have presentational phenomenology: we seem to encounter real situations in the course of visual experiences, for instance. The current paper articulates and defends the claim that the contents of at least some perceptual experiences are inherently presentational. On this view, perceptual contents are not always forceless in the way that, say, the propositional content that 2 + 2 = 4 is generally taken to be, as a content that may be asserted or denied or merely supposed; (...) rather, there are perceptual contents such that any mental state or episode which has the relevant content must be one in which things seem to the given subject to be a certain way. Intuitive motivation for the view is presented and an explanatory line of argument in support of it is developed: it is argued that the recognition of inherently presentational perceptual contents allows us to explain certain representational limitations to which ordinary visualizations and other forms of perceptual mental imagery are subject. Some potential objections to the position are explored, leading to further elaboration of it. (shrink)

In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason cannot determine our (...) ends. Our ends are determined by our desires and reason is limited to the role of identifying the relevant means to these ends. The second component, which Korsgaard calls motivational scepticism, suggests doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. The claim here, as Korsgaard interprets Hume’s view on this matter, is that “all reasoning that has motivational influence must start from a passion, that being the only possible source of motivation” (SPR, 314).2 Korsgaard’s fundamental objective in “Skepticism about Practical Reason” is to show that motivational scepticism must always be based on content scepticism. In other words, according to Korsgaard, motivational scepticism has no independent force. In this paper I argue that Korsgaard’s attempt to discredit motivational scepticism is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...) international law (e.g., crystallizing norms of customary law) can be binding in much the same way as better-established doctrine. This point becomes perspicuous, I argue, once we get a clear sense of the plausible options for grounding the moral authority of international law generally. -/- This result is interesting in its own right, but it also reveals two other features of the character of state responsibility under international law. First, the distinction between legislation and compliance is less pronounced compared to domestic law. Consequently, the virtues of good governance will frequently be pertinent to determining the content of states’ obligations under international law. Second, normally more powerful and influential agents will be more strongly bound by international law than other subjects. This is an attractive result, addressing a concern that motivates many international lawyers to view international law as absolutely binding. An absolutist view international legal authority is unnecessary for showing that the most powerful and dangerous states are strongly bound by the terms of much existing law. (shrink)

Christine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational to do (...) should be the agent’s dispositional desire strengths, as our normative intuitions respond to these. (shrink)

Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement (...) or belief. -/- It should be clear that (3) is true, given that infants lack the required reflective and conceptual capacities. So doxasticists have to reject either (1) or (2) (or both). But this forced choice may be understood as a dilemma for doxasticism. On the hand, doxasticists may adopt a Kantian approach and reject (2), precisely because they think that motivation presupposes the doxastic recognition of reasons, and because infants lack the capacity to doxastically recognise reasons. But this choice seems to wrongly reduce the responses of infants to mere reflexes or instinctive reactions. On the other hand, doxasticists may choose a Humean route and deny (1) by espousing a purely causal or teleological account of motivation. But this would mean detrimentally ignoring the normative nature of (some instances of) motivation. -/- One elegant way of avoiding this dilemma is to give up doxasticism and instead endorse experientialism – the view that we enjoy some experiential access to reasons, which is independent of, and perhaps more fundamental than, our capacity to form normative judgements and beliefs. In this talk, I would like to provide an argument for the existence of such a non-doxastic form of access to reasons. More specifically, I aim to defend the claim that our basic awareness of reasons is phenomenal in nature. What this means is that it forms part of our access from the inside to those of our mental episodes that provide us with access to reasons. In other words, when we introspectively attend to reason-giving mental episodes and what they are about, we have the impression of the presence of a reason for us. My defence of this experientialist alternative to doxasticism will primarily focus on perceptual reasons for first-order beliefs about the external world. (shrink)

Philosophical work in the ethics of thought focuses heavily on the ethics of belief, with, in recent years, a particular emphasis on the ways in which we might wrong other people either through our beliefs about them, or our failure to believe what they tell us. Yet in our own lives we often want not merely to be believed, but rather to be understood by others. What does it take to understand another person? In this paper, I provide an account (...) of interpersonal understanding that speaks to this widespread human desire to be understood by others. On the view I defend, to be understood by another person is for them to see our motivating reasons as justifying reasons, whether or not they actually take our reasons to have that normative force. I then provide an explanation of why such understanding is valuable in our lives, which emphasizes how being understood by another person is a way of being more fully with them. (shrink)

The main message of Neuroethics is that neuroscience forces us to reconceptualize human agency as marvelously diverse and flexible. Free will can arise from unconscious brain processes. Individuals with mental disorders, including addiction and psychopathy, exhibit more agency than is often recognized. Brain interventions should be embraced with cautious optimism. Our moral intuitions, which arise from entangled reason and emotion, can generally be trusted. Nevertheless, we can and should safely enhance our brain chemistry, partly because motivated reasoning crops up in (...) everyday life and in the practice of neuroscience itself. Despite serious limitations, brain science can be useful in the courtroom and marketplace. Recognizing all this nuance leaves little room for anxious alarmism or overhype and urges an emphasis on neurodiversity. The result is a highly opinionated tour of neuroethics as an exciting field full of implications for philosophy, science, medicine, law, and public policy. (shrink)

The dichotomy between the research to generate knowledge and the application of that knowledge to benefit mankind seems to be a recent development. In fact, more than 100 years ago Louis Pasteur avoided this debate altogether: one of his major, yet forgotten, contributions to science was the insight that research and its applications are not opposed, but orthogonal to each other (Stokes, 1997). If Niels Bohr ‘invented’ basic academic research—which was nevertheless the basis for many technological inventions and industrial applications—Pasteur (...) developed what we might call ‘motivated’ research. -/- How is research motivated and by what? By definition, scientists are citizens and members of the general public and, like the public, they are motivated by two forces: on the one hand, in Rudyard Kipling's words, “man's insatiable curiosity”; on the other hand, a desire for maintaining and improving their well‐being. These are not contradictory to one another; curiosity nourishes dreams of a brighter future and leads to discoveries that contribute to well‐being. (shrink)

The idea of Europe has already a long history and beyond its ethical attractiveness it became victorious in the political praxis of the 2nd half of the 20th century first of all as a motive force serving the aim of a long-term restoration of peace in the post-war Western Europe and then as a unifying principle for the whole continent after the collapse (implosion) of “really existing socialism”. A little later, in the course of the expansion of the (...) free market economy towards the previously centralized economies of Eastern Europe it soon became obvious that the idea of Europe was not everywhere interpreted the same way and that in some cases it seemed to cause more problems than the ones it should have solved. Especially the current refugee crisis that has initially emerged in the so-called developing world outside of Europe but nevertheless significantly affects the Old Continent can be seen as a major theoretical and practical challenge around the fundamental sustaining (and in itself sustainable) concept of European openness: i.e. in order to remain open in its internal function the liberally organized Europe has to close its outer borders and to decisively limit the access of many humans to its single common market, thus imposing obstacles to the generalization of prosperity and liberty that once were felt as its core values. We will try to show that apart from the immediate cultural, ideological and strategic aspects of such phenomena and the often unavoidable pitfalls of short-term decision making it is important to study and explore the necessity of the current processes. The idea of Europe became, at least partly, synonymous with the overall economical and social globalization of our times whereas such a major process cannot unfold its inherent dynamic without the constitutive role of certain crises that eventually pose existential challenges or otherwise enable the stabilization of the newly emerging system(s). (shrink)

In Republic 8–9, Socrates describes four main kinds of vicious people, all of whose souls are “ruled” by an element other than reason, and in some of whom reason is said to be “enslaved.” What role does reason play in such souls? In this paper, I argue, based on Republic 8–9 and related passages, and in contrast to some common alternative views, that for Plato the “enslavement” of reason consists in this: instead of determining for itself what is good, reason (...) is forced to desire and pursue as good a goal determined by the soul’s ruler. (shrink)

I will begin this paper by identifying the problem within the theory of ethics, which contractualism as a moral theory is attempting to address. It is not that of solving the problem of moral motivation like the ‘arch-contractualist’, Thomas Scanlon, often claims, but rather that of describing a class of fundamental moral reasons – contractualist reasons for short. In the second section, I will defend the contractualist idea of how the nature of these moral reasons provides us with sufficient, independent (...) tools to construct the content of public moral principles. The rest of my paper is defensive. It addresses the main challenges set to the contractualist account of moral reasons. In the third section, I will discuss a frequent objection according to which the contractualist reasons are a redundant addition to the space of moral reasons. In the fourth section, I will examine the worry that acting from these reasons would not lead to morally admirable action but rather to vice. In the last section, I will investigate the criticism according to which the normative force of the contractualist reasons is insufficient for rationalising our moral actions in certain difficult circumstances. In this section, we get to the heart of the matter – what the reasons contractualism describes truly are, and how they can explain the generally overriding strength of our moral requirements. I hope to conclude that even after these serious challenges contractualism remains a philosophically viable account of morality's rationalistic appeal. (shrink)

Igal Kvart RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT Abstract In the past couple of decades, there were a few major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Epistemic contextualism has flaunted the notion of a conversational standard, and Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) promoted stakes, each of which, according to their proponents, play a major role as pragmatic components in the truth conditions of (...) knowledge ascriptions. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by examples of knowledge ascriptions with obvious pragmatic aspects that seemed to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. However, if such examples can be adequately explained not by pragmatic encroachment purely pragmatically, the central role that such examples play in supporting these accounts will be undermined. I lay out here a new pragmatic account, offering a different, purely pragmatic picture that explains such examples, and much more. If such an account and its associated explanations are adequate, then much of a need or a motivation for pragmatic encroachment is undermined. Specifically, I will develop the notion of rational assertibility, appealing to rational norms (which are not Gricean) as interfacing with semantic and epistemic (and other) norms to yield assertibility simpliciter. More importantly, I will argue for a well-entrenched pragmatic profile of knowledge, the so-called steering role of knowledge. Knowledge ascriptions, or simple assertions (that don't invoke the notion of knowledge), it will be argued, play a pragmatic role of steering audiences in joint deliberational setups to the speaker's preferred action by invoking an impending practical inference leading to that preferred action, and of ignoring incompatible alternatives. The recognition of rational forces as affecting, sometimes strongly and predominantly, intuitions associated with knowledge ascriptions, has important implications to philosophical methodology regarding what count as evidence for semantic features. One such lesson calls for securing examples with no significant rational forces at play in order to establish semantic features. Another calls attention to the ill-suitability of employing assertibility by figures in examples featuring deliberational setups for such a purpose in view of the role that such assertibility plays in reflecting rational aspects of such figures, in addition to their epistemic and semantic characteristics. Still another lesson points to a specific role that audiences play in such deliberational setups. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that friendship can constitutively require epistemic irrationality against a recent, forceful challenge, raised by proponents of moral and pragmatic encroachment. Defenders of the “encroachment strategy” argue that exemplary friends who are especially slow to believe that their friends have acted wrongly are simply sensitive to the high prudential or moral costs of falsely believing in their friends’ guilt. Drawing on psychological work on epistemic motivation (and in particular on the notion of “need for closure”), I propose (...) a different picture of what friendship requires in the doxastic realm. I argue that contrary to what the encroachment strategy suggests, exemplary friends’ belief formation ought not be guided by a concern with accuracy or error avoidance, but instead by a need to avoid a “specific closure” – namely, a need to avoid concluding in their friends’ guilt. I propose that exemplary friendship often generates a defeasible, doxastic obligation to exemplify such a need, despite its inherent corrupting effects on exemplary friends’ epistemic faculties. (shrink)

Nature of Consciousness in relation to my Universal Formula -/- By : Angelito Enriquez Malicse -/- The functioning of consciousness is a complex and debated topic that spans neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. While there is no universally agreed-upon explanation, several frameworks attempt to describe how consciousness functions. Here are key aspects: -/- 1. Perception and Awareness -/- Consciousness allows us to be aware of our environment and ourselves. -/- Sensory Input: Consciousness integrates information from our senses (sight, sound, touch, etc.) (...) to create a unified experience. -/- Selective Attention: It filters out irrelevant stimuli, focusing on specific inputs while ignoring others. -/- 2. Integration of Information -/- Consciousness functions as an integrative system. -/- Global Workspace Theory: Information from different parts of the brain (e.g., memory, perception, emotion) is integrated into a “global workspace,” where it becomes accessible to different cognitive processes. -/- Binding: Consciousness combines sensory inputs, emotions, and thoughts into a coherent experience. -/- 3. Decision-Making and Intentionality -/- Consciousness enables deliberate action. -/- Executive Functions: It allows for planning, reasoning, and decision-making. -/- Free Will: Many argue that consciousness gives the perception of free will, though decisions may be influenced by subconscious processes. -/- 4. Self-Awareness -/- Consciousness involves recognizing oneself as distinct from the environment. -/- Theory of Mind: Understanding that others have thoughts, feelings, and intentions separate from our own. -/- Introspection: Reflecting on one’s own thoughts, emotions, and actions. -/- 5. Dynamic States -/- Consciousness operates in varying levels of alertness. -/- Wakefulness: Fully alert, capable of complex thought and sensory interaction. -/- Altered States: Dreaming, hypnosis, or meditation involve different patterns of brain activity. -/- Unconscious/Subconscious Processes: Much of brain activity occurs outside conscious awareness but influences behavior. -/- 6. Neurobiological Basis -/- Consciousness arises from complex interactions in the brain. -/- Neural Correlates: Specific brain regions, such as the prefrontal cortex and thalamus, are essential for conscious thought. -/- Synchronization: Brain waves (e.g., gamma waves) synchronize neural activity to support awareness. -/- Feedback Loops: Consciousness involves ongoing feedback between the brain and the body (e.g., through the nervous system). -/- 7. Feedback Mechanism (Relating to Your Ideas) -/- Consciousness can be viewed as a feedback mechanism, continuously processing and adjusting based on internal and external inputs. -/- Decisions and behaviors create effects that, in turn, provide new inputs for further conscious processing, following natural laws of balance. -/- Let’s integrate the understanding of consciousness with your universal formula, emphasizing how it aligns with your principles, particularly the universal law of balance in nature, the law of karma (cause and effect), and the interconnectedness of systems. -/- 1. Consciousness and Perception: Awareness of Internal and External Realities -/- Consciousness processes sensory inputs and integrates them into a coherent experience, allowing individuals to interact with their surroundings. -/- Relation to the Law of Balance: Consciousness acts as a balancing system, constantly assessing internal (bodily needs, emotions) and external (environmental changes) realities to maintain equilibrium. For example: -/- Hunger (internal imbalance) leads to actions (seeking food) that restore balance. -/- Overexposure to external stress triggers adaptive behaviors (e.g., rest or problem-solving) to re-establish harmony. -/- Feedback Mechanisms: The mind processes inputs from both the organic (physical body) and inorganic (external environment) systems, which aligns with your principle that consciousness operates through feedback loops to maintain balance. -/- 2. Integration of Information: Coherence and Systems Thinking -/- Consciousness combines information from various sources—sensory data, memories, emotions—into a unified experience. This reflects the interconnectedness of systems you emphasize in the universal formula. -/- Relation to the Law of Karma (Cause and Effect): Just as systems must function without defects to produce correct outputs, consciousness must integrate accurate and balanced information for effective decision-making. -/- Example: False beliefs or distorted perceptions create internal imbalance, leading to flawed decisions, which result in external consequences. -/- Balance in Systems: Consciousness integrates diverse inputs while ensuring no single element dominates disproportionately, promoting functional harmony. -/- 3. Decision-Making: Consciousness as a Balancing Force -/- Consciousness evaluates options, predicts outcomes, and selects actions. It bridges the gap between external conditions and internal motivations. -/- Adherence to the Law of Balance: Decisions that align with natural laws of balance maintain harmony, while those that disrupt balance (e.g., overconsumption, neglecting emotional health) create systemic imbalances. -/- Example: Overexploitation of resources results in ecological imbalance, mirroring how neglecting feedback in decision-making causes disruption. -/- Law of Karma in Action: Decisions carry consequences, and the effects feedback into consciousness, influencing future decisions. This cyclic cause-and-effect process illustrates the operation of karma within the mind’s framework. -/- 4. Self-Awareness and Feedback Mechanism -/- Consciousness includes the ability to reflect on oneself, recognizing internal states and adjusting behavior accordingly. -/- Relation to Balance in Nature: Self-awareness allows individuals to evaluate whether their thoughts, emotions, and actions align with the universal law of balance. For instance: -/- Reflecting on stress levels and adapting behaviors (e.g., practicing mindfulness) helps restore mental equilibrium. -/- Feedback in Collective Systems: When conscious minds interact in social systems, they create feedback loops that shape group decisions. Leadership, for example, must remain self-aware to ensure decisions maintain societal balance. -/- 5. Dynamic States of Consciousness: Adaptability and Natural Balance -/- Consciousness operates in dynamic states, such as wakefulness, dreaming, and meditation. These states allow flexibility and adaptability to shifting conditions. -/- Law of Balance Applied to States: Dynamic shifts in consciousness maintain balance between activity and rest, or between rational thought and creative insight. Imbalance, such as chronic wakefulness or suppressed introspection, disrupts this harmony. -/- Altered States and Feedback: States like meditation enhance self-regulation, improving feedback between internal and external realities, aligning the individual with natural laws. -/- 6. Neurobiological Basis: Consciousness as a System -/- Consciousness emerges from neural interactions and feedback loops in the brain, reflecting your idea that all systems must operate free of defects to function effectively. -/- Defects and Imbalances: Defective brain processes (e.g., misinformation, trauma) disrupt the feedback mechanism, leading to imbalanced behaviors or decisions. Addressing these “defects” through education or corrective experiences restores balance. -/- Holistic Nature of Consciousness: The brain’s integration of information mirrors the universal principle of interconnectedness. Damage to one area affects the entire system, just as disrupting one part of a natural system creates widespread imbalance. -/- 7. Consciousness in Leadership and Education -/- Your universal formula aims to teach individuals how to make decisions that align with natural laws, ensuring societal balance. -/- Feedback in Collective Consciousness: Leaders’ decisions influence collective consciousness, creating societal feedback loops. Teaching leaders to align their decisions with the universal law of balance can minimize societal problems. -/- Holistic Education: Teaching students how consciousness functions—including its feedback mechanisms, its alignment with the law of balance, and the role of accurate inputs—enables critical thinking and informed decision-making. -/- 8. Consciousness as the Medium for Universal Formula Application -/- Ultimately, consciousness is the medium through which your universal formula operates. By understanding and aligning conscious processes with natural laws: -/- Individuals maintain personal balance. -/- Groups and societies achieve collective harmony. -/- Decision-making respects the interconnectedness of all systems, reducing errors and defects in outcomes. -/- . (shrink)

In the first Enquiry, Hume takes the experience of exerting force against a solid body to be a key ingredient of the vulgar idea of power, so that the vulgar take that experience to provide us with an impression of power. Hume provides two arguments against the vulgar on this point: the first concerning our other applications of the idea of power and the second concerning whether that experience yields certainty about distinct events. I argue that, even if we (...) accept Hume’s conception of the vulgar’s approach, neither of Hume’s arguments succeeds. The first argument can be resisted either by using the very arguments Hume provides concerning other causal representations or by simply rejecting Hume’s strict empiricism. The second argument can be resisted on epistemological grounds: there is no reason to think that an experience of a maximally-strong metaphysical connection would provide a maximally-strong epistemological connection. Unlike some recent neo-Anscombean responses to the second argument, my response does not require challenging Hume’s view that causal relations are strictly necessary. Though I do not attempt to translate the resilience of the vulgar view into contemporary terms, the failure of Hume’s arguments challenges one of the long-standing motivations for Humean approaches to causation. (shrink)

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are (...) answerable for our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence. (shrink)

Perception is our key to the world. It plays at least three different roles in our lives. It justifies beliefs and provides us with knowledge of our environment. It brings about conscious mental states. It converts informational input, such as light and sound waves, into representations of invariant features in our environment. Corresponding to these three roles, there are at least three fundamental questions that have motivated the study of perception. How does perception justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our (...) environment? How does perception bring about conscious mental states? How does a perceptual system accomplish the feat of converting varying informational input into mental representations of invariant features in our environment? -/- This book presents a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perception that is informed by empirical research. So it develops an account of perception that provides an answer to the first two questions, while being sensitive to scientific accounts that address the third question. The key idea is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities - for example the capacity to discriminate instances of red from instances of blue. Perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence are each analyzed in terms of this basic property of perception. Employing perceptual capacities constitutes phenomenal character as well as perceptual content. The primacy of employing perceptual capacities in perception over their derivative employment in hallucination and illusion grounds the epistemic force of perceptual experience. In this way, the book provides a unified account of perceptual content, consciousness, and evidence. (shrink)

Kant famously made a distinction between actions from duty and actions in conformity with duty claiming that only the former are morally worthy. Kant’s argument in support of this thesis is taken to rest on the claim that only the motive of duty leads non-accidentally or reliably to moral actions. However, many critics of Kant have claimed that other motives such as sympathy and benevolence can also lead to moral actions reliably, and that Kant’s thesis is false. In addition, (...) many readers of Kant find the claim that we should deny moral worth to a dutiful action performed from friendly inclination highly counterintuitive. Moreover, Kantian commentators disagree about the status of actions in conformity with duty, some claim that these can be taken as equally morally worthy as those performed from duty, while others argue that they are not even permissible. -/- It has also been claimed that Kant’s theory of moral worth should be related to the theory of the Gesinnung developed in the Religion. Thus, some authors claim that, in order for an action to possess moral worth, the agent has to be unconditionally committed to morality, that is, the agent must possess a virtuous character or good fundamental maxim (i.e. a good Gesinnung). However, according to Kant’s radical evil thesis (that is, the thesis that man is evil by nature ), the default position for man is to possess an evil Gesinnung, i.e. a Gesinnung which is only conditionally committed to morality insofar as morality does not demand a great sacrifice of our own happiness. So, an unwelcome consequence of this line of interpretation is that in Kantian ethics morally worthy actions become very rare indeed. -/- The paper is divided in two parts. The first part aims to clarify why Kant thought that only actions from duty are morally worthy, replying to some common objections against Kant’s view. I argue that Kant’s non-accidental condition should not be understood in terms of reliability because such interpretation is incompatible with Kant’s theory of motivation and rational agency. I propose an alternative interpretation which supports Kant’ s claim that only the motive of duty leads nonaccidently to dutiful actions, and thus only actions from duty possess moral worth. I end by showing that although actions in conformity with duty are worthless from the moral point of view, they are not (in many cases) impermissible. The first part concludes that the criterion for the permissibility of actions is different to the criterion for the ascription of moral worth. Thus, rightness, which pertains to actions performed on maxims that can be willed as universal laws, and moral worth, which pertains to actions performed from a sense of duty, should be understood as two different levels of moral assessment. -/- The second part of the paper examines Kant’s conception of virtue with the aim of showing that although only agents with a virtuous character (good Gesinnung) will reliably act from duty, a person with an evil character (evil Gesinnung) could on frequent occasions act from duty. I argue that we should not deny moral worth to actions performed from duty even when the agent has an evil Gesinnung. Goodness of Gesinnung is not a necessary condition of the action of an agent possessing moral worth; reliability of motivation is necessary for the ascription of virtue but not for the ascription of moral worth. It follows that virtue, which refers to the agent’s character or fundamental maxim (i.e. the agent’s Gesinnung), and moral worth are also two different levels of moral assessment. The paper concludes that three levels of moral assessment can be distinguished in Kant’s ethical system: (i) rightness, (ii) moral worth and (iii) moral virtue. Moral virtue is the highest level of moral perfection for a human being. Striving towards virtue requires constant progress and effort and ultimately a ‘revolution of the heart.’ The important point is that even when we are still striving to achieve virtue (i.e. an unconditional commitment to morality), we can ascribe moral worth to actions performed by a genuine sense of duty. It turns out that, contrary to many influential interpretations, Kantian ethics is not merely concerned with the rightness or wrongness of particular actions nor is Kantian ethics primarily an ethic of virtue. Instead, Kant’s ethical system is complex and allows for different levels of moral assessment in which both an action-centred and agent-centred perspective can be integrated. (shrink)

One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us to (...) act in opposing ways. In contrast, on an executive construal of self-control, the emphasis is not on overcoming temptation, but on overriding or inhibiting “cold” automatically triggered routines and habits that are at odds with what we intend to do. Our general aim in this chapter is to contribute to the development of an overarching theory of self-control by exploring ways in which these two apparently competing frameworks can be reconciled. We propose that self-control is best understood as a hybrid set of skills. We draw on recent work on expert motor skill to highlight important ways in which experts differ from novices in the capacities they deploy and the ways in which they deploy them. We consider analogies (and disanalogies) between the domain of sports expertise and the domain of self-control. We end by considering how such a hybrid approach can help us reconcile a motivational and an executive approach to self-control. (shrink)

Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to appreciate what (...) I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy. (shrink)

Sogo/Gakuryu Ishii is one of the pioneers of the punk/cyberpunk movement in Japanese cinema. Though his style changed throughout his career, his early films have been a great influence to filmmakers around the world. His unique filmic style presents questions, observations and interpretations regarding the role of violence as normalized in the daily lives of heavily marginalized punk youth portrayed in an amplified and stylized cyberpunk Japan. What is so captivating about Ishii's style and motivation is that he was not (...) only a filmmaker interested in making embellished political or social commentary, Ishii was also part of the emerging punk movement in Japan and several musicians of punk rock bands were also involved in his films. My main aim in my inquiry into Ishil's early films involves two parts regarding the same concept. The first is the ethical issues that arise both with portrayal of violence in films as well as the intention of such an endeavor in general. The second part is the way in which violence is made to be part of the film in terms of form and style. This may be interpreted as either glorifying and stylizing violence or showing that violence is nothing but a destructive force that the outcasts of society may not be able to escape. To the last statement Ishii seems to be silent but very active. What I mean by this is that the simplistic plot-lines of his early films are contrasted by heavy punk music, fast editing, constant moving camera and rage, fear and disappointment in the faces of the anti-heroes. (shrink)

Not the publicly asserted reasons (humanitarianism and self-defense) but cooptation of oil reserves was the objective behind the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This underlying motive utterly fails to satisfy just war jus ad bellum conditions. This prioritization of petroleum is well documented and is consistent with decades old US policy towards the Middle East, especially as codified by Anthony Cordesman in 1998 and US DoD's Strategic Assessment 1999 and then adopted by Bush II. This fraudulent use of (...) military force raises a question as to how motives for war can be accurately identified prior to falsely justified belligerence. Some positive signs are noted herein as to political philosophers' better use of Rawls's reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

The present study investigates the interaction between personal characteristics that are considered nowadays strengths used to face difficult events or transition period. A number of 200 married or living together participants completed self-reports for common goals, motivational persistence, resilience and well-being. Results show that persistence and resilience do interact with each other at an individual level but also from a family concept perspective. Moreover, maintaining apositive outlook and family spirituality do have an impact over the intensity and direction of (...) the relationship between long term purposes pursuing (LTPP) and recurrence of unattained purposes (RUP) and changes in well-being registered in time. Resiliency as a personal characteristic and family resilience show good psychometric qualities for this study. Although some of the results are descriptive, in-depth analyses of direction and intensity of the relationships lead the finalconclusions to suggestions for further research and implications for psychological practice. (shrink)

According to the character condition, a person is morally responsible for an action A only if a character trait of hers non-accidentally motivates her performing A. But that condition is untenable according to the out of character objection because people can be morally responsible for acting out of character. We reassess this common objection. Of the seven accounts of acting out of character that we outline, only one is even a prima facie counterexample to the character condition. And it is (...) not obvious that people act out of character in that sense. We argue that whether the out of character objection succeeds ultimately depends on the unnoticed methodological commitment that cases that may not resemble human life provide good data for theorizing about moral responsibility. But even if such cases provide good data, the forcefulness of the objection is at least deflated given that its persuasive power is supposed to come from clear real-life cases. (shrink)

The distinction between lying and mere misleading is commonly tied to the distinction between saying and conversationally implicating. Many definitions of lying are based on the idea that liars say something they believe to be false, while misleaders put forward a believed-false conversational implicature. The aim of this paper is to motivate, spell out, and defend an alternative approach, on which lying and misleading differ in terms of commitment: liars, but not misleaders, commit themselves to something they believe to be (...) false. This approach entails that lying and misleading involve speech-acts of different force. While lying requires the committal speech-act of asserting, misleading involves the non-committal speech-act of suggesting. The approach leads to a broader definition of lying that can account for lies that are told while speaking non-literally or with the help of presuppositions, and it allows for a parallel definition of misleading, which so far is lacking in the debate. (shrink)

What is paradoxical about the Socratic paradoxes is that they are not paradoxical at all. Socrates famously argued that knowledge is sufficient for virtue and that no one errs willingly. Both doctrines are discussed in the Protagoras between Socrates and the Abderian sophist, however the argumentative line that Socrates chooses to follow in order to refute ‘the many’ has raised a serious degree of controversy among scholars. Is Socrates upholding the hedonistic view? Or, is he only trying to show the (...) bankruptcy of the explanation of akrasia as ‘being overcome by pleasure’ which ‘the many’ advocate? Socrates intends to do the latter, showing that this hedonistic explanation of akrasia leads to absurdity. Plato’s and Socrates’ identification of goodness with pleasure would mark a sudden and unexplained departure from their moral theories, and would render the Socratic denial of akrasia an argument with limited range –only for those assuming hedonism. If we are correct to hold that Socrates does not intend to identify the good with the pleasant, then we are immediately put against a new and much more difficult challenge; that is, to suggest how the Socratic denial of akrasia could regain its catholic plausibility against the commonsensical stance to akrasia, namely that people act against their best judgment due to their impotence to resist to motivational forces such as pleasure, pain, fear, passion and love. Socrates does not offer any other explicit account –apart from the hedonistic one- of how his doctrine could be catholically defended; hence the task of decoding the Socratic line of thought is far from an easy one. The key move in order to decode the puzzling Socratic doctrine is to understand how Socrates treats the notion of ‘knowledge’. For Socrates, moral knowledge is distinguished from mere belief; in this sense, only knowledge has the commanding power which enables one to sustain his best evaluative judgment against other motivational forces and only knowledge is sufficient for the virtuous conduct. By contrast, as mere belief is susceptible to other motivational forces like pleasure, pain, fear, etc. its possessor will, in turn, be susceptible to the revision of his intentions which derive from his best value judgment. In the Protagoras, Socrates implies that intentions grounded on belief can be ‘dragged around’ by desire; and according to my view in this paper, this Socratic stance allows a non-epistemic interpretation of his thesis. According to the traditional epistemic interpretation of the Socratic denial of akrasia, one’s wrongdoing is always a miscalculation that takes place on his practical syllogism. However, my understanding of the Socratic denial of akrasia allows cases of one even going against his best judgment, when his judgment is based on belief. In that sense, a judgment grounded on belief has insufficient power to guarantee that the chosen action will follow, whereas only judgments grounded on knowledge have a commanding and lordly power. For Socrates, everyone always goes for the good but only those with knowledge can infallibly discover and act on the good. Those with mere belief can only reach an apparent good, which may be good or bad. The motivation for the good is not unshakeable for those with mere belief since the grounding of their belief is scarcely strong enough to hold on the correct intention. Socrates therefore holds that the grounding of knowledge influences the motivational state of the moral agent. Thereupon, my interpretation differs from others in suggesting that for Socrates not all the cases of akrasia are cognitive mistakes in their judgment. Rather I hold, in opposition to the received stance on akrasia, that Socrates allows that one could act against his best judgment, when the latter is grounded on mere belief. (shrink)

I defend the view that a significant ethical distinction can be made between justified killing in self-defense and police use of lethal force. I start by opposing the belief that police use of lethal force is morally justified on the basis of self-defense. Then I demonstrate that the state’s monopoly on the use of force within a given jurisdiction invests police officers with responsibilities that go beyond what morality requires of the average person. I argue that the (...) police should primarily be concerned with preserving public safety. As a consequence, police have additional moral permissions to use lethal force. But this also means that the principle of restraint is inherent to the policing function and therefore police are obliged to go to greater lengths to avoid killing. I concede that the just use of police force can be made difficult in extreme situations such as a mass riot. In such cases, police should take proportionate actions necessary to protect the lives of inhabitants by restoring order, which might include calling on military support. I conclude with a cautionary note opposing militarization of the policing role. (shrink)

The argument from inductive risk (AIR) states that scientists should consider the consequences of hypotheses and methodological choices in the course of ongoing research. It has played a central role in the widespread retreat from the ideal of value-free science. The argument is motivated, to a significant extent, by the laudable concern to use science to better society. I argue that this concern, when taken seriously, tells against the idea that individual working scientists should consider social consequences. First, I show (...) that the AIR assigns scientists a striking task: to frame social decisions and assess their full spectrum of consequences. Then, I argue that scientists should not be assigned such a task. For one thing, if both scientists and policy makers take social consequences into account, we are liable to end up with skewed and biased decisions. For another, scientists are not well-placed to carry out social decision making. I conclude by indicating a context in which the inductive risk line has more force, and by highlighting the importance, in discussing values in science, of attending to units and levels of analysis. (shrink)

In this paper, the aim is to explore how there can be a role for expression of affect in illocution, drawing upon some ideas about expression put forward by Karl Bühler. In a first part of the paper, I map some active discussions and open questions surrounding phenomena that seem to involve “expression of affect”. Second, I home in on a smaller piece of that larger puzzle; namely, a consideration of how there may be non-conventional expression of affect. I provide (...) some examples of what I take that to involve and set out some premises for approaching it. In a third section, I motivate such an interest by pointing to a question in speech act theory concerning ‘force conventionalism’. This is whether and how illocution can be performed non-conventionally—that is, whether (at least some) utterances can be communicated with illocutionary force without need of convention. I propose that where expression of affect may occur non-conventionally, it may in turn constitute one important route through which at least some kinds of illocution are achieved. In the fourth part of the paper, I sketch an account of such non-conventional expression of affect for the purposes of illocution, by exploring a broadly Bühlerian account of some affects; namely, that some affects are teleological in character, that coordinations may be involved in their satisfactional states, and that uptake of the expressed affect constitutes one subset of such satisfactional states. That exposition points to the contemporary relevance of the “action theory of expression” proposed by Bühler. (shrink)

Rational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are (...) relevant and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT. (shrink)

Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. (...) However, instead of attempting to ‘save’ CTM by constraining the account of physical implementation, I argue that the general form of the triviality argument is invalid. I provide a counterexample scenario, and show that SMA is in fact consistent with empirically rich and theoretically plausible versions of CTM. This move requires rejection of the computational sufficiency thesis, which I argue is scientifically unjustified in any case. By shifting the ‘burden of explanatory force’ away from the concept of physical implementation, and instead placing it on salient aspects of the target phenomenon to be explained, it’s possible to retain a maximally liberal and unfettered view of physical implementation, and at the same time defuse the triviality arguments that have motivated defenders of CTM to impose various theory-laden constraints on SMA. (shrink)

Nietzsche assesses values, moralities, religions, cultures, and persons in terms of health. He argues that we should reject those that are unhealthy and develop healthier alternatives. But what is Nietzsche’s conception of health, and why should it carry such normative force? In this paper I argue for reading Nietzsche’s concept of health as the overall ability to meet the demands of one’s motivational landscape. I show that, unlike other interpretations, this reading accounts for his rejection of particular features of (...) a prevailing, then as now, model of health; for his association of health with strength and with psychic unity; and for his claim that health is compatible with, and can even be enhanced by, functional impairments such as those from which he personally suffered. Throughout I draw connections to recent literature on health and disability. (shrink)

An examination of the idea of Unlimited Liability found in the Canadian Armed Forces’ (CAF) ethos as a reason for the acceptance of lethal risk tasking faced by members of the CAF. This paper argues that the idea of unlimited liability is at best unhelpful as a concept and needs to be replaced with the concept of ‘ultimate integrity.’ This new concept links directly to the CAF’s first ethical principle – respect the dignity of all persons. This new concept also (...) corresponds better with our beliefs about the nobility of military sacrifice. (shrink)

According to some, the current political fracture is best described as political polarization – where extremism and political separation infest an entire whole population. Political polarization accounts often point to the psychological phenomenon of belief polarization – where being in a like-minded groups tends to boost confidence. The political polarization story is an essentially symmetrical one, where both sides are subject to the same basic dividing forces and cognitive biases, and are approximately as blame-worthy. On a very different account, (...) what's going on is best described propaganda – where a discrete set of bad actors have manipulated some part of the media environ-ment. The propaganda story is usually told as a highly asymmetrical story, where only some media consumers are under the spell of the propagandists. Which is right? I consider two analyses of the 2016 American election: Robert Talisse's polarization-style account in Overdoing Democracy, and Benkler et. al.'s propaganda-style account in Network Propaganda. I suggest that the propaganda account has better empirical support. I also offer a diagnosis of the appeal of the polarization story. Those who accept a polarization account are often political centrists, who accuse those at the political extremes of motivated reasoning – of believing what they find comfortable. Such centrists also tend to treat political extremism as the product of the irrational belief polarization, arising from living in like-minded groups. But, I argue, these arguments are too quick. First, we can’t dismiss a group as irrational merely be-cause they are likeminded. The existence of like-minded group can be explained in terms of irrational belief polarization, but it can also be explained by rational convergence on the truth. Second, belief polarization is not always irrational, such as when its emotional effects are used to repair impaired self-confidence. Third, political centrists are also subject to similar debunking argument. When we accept a polarization account, we get to feel the comfort of being “above it all”. Political centrists are just as plausibly subject to the irrational effects of living in like-minded groups. Belief polarization isn’t just for extremists. (shrink)

Curiosity is evident in humans of all sorts from early infancy, and it has also been said to appear in a wide range of other animals, including monkeys, birds, rats, and octopuses. The classical definition of curiosity as an intrinsic desire for knowledge may seem inapplicable to animal curiosity: one might wonder how and indeed whether a rat could have such a fancy desire. Even if rats must learn many things to survive, one might expect their learning must be driven (...) by simpler incentives, such as hunger. One might also wonder what proximal signals could guide animals towards knowledge itself, or how something as abstract as knowledge could ever be a motivational target for an unreflective animal. Taking a cue from recent work in reinforcement learning, I argue that surprise functions as a reward signal for the curious animal, and then show how this amounts to a desire for knowledge gain, where knowledge is conceived of as a cognitive adaptation to reality. This adaptation results in a mental state whose existence depends essentially on the truth of its contents, a factive mental state. Curious creatures benefit from an interaction between the prediction-error correction processes of basic learning and the active surprise-seeking force of their curiosity. This internally adversarial interaction accelerates knowledge gain in ways that are very helpful for agents with the restrictions of biological creatures, in environments with the complexity of our natural world. (shrink)

A descriptive role is suggested for uracil as a temporal divide in the immediate aspects of metabolism verses long term maintained genetic transmission. In particular, details of the mechanism of excision repair of uracil from DNA based on differential parameters of spatial distortion of the planar uracil molecule within the DNA helix verses RNA, when viewed in analogy to a proposed model for space involving the substitution of the act of mirroring for the element of time in processes and a (...) descending complexity of structure with time of evolution, suggest the possibility that negative selection against decreased lifetime is the singular motive force of natural selection. The geometry of the Mobius strip, as it has a plane of mirroring symmetry, a twist able to account for torque in nature, an inversion of inside and out seen in biological structures, and an endless surface that can be accommodated to an atemporal account of physical processes is employed in a holistic model to elaborate a negative selection opposing death as zero volume or the logical existence of physical constraint to volumes that is represented as the ubiquitous inability of witnessing objects of any type to witness simultaneously both a self reflection and the reflection of self reflection. A role for uracil and its’ physical structure, in a model in which both are evolved from the mirroring of events of the witnessing of energies, is elaborated in which temporal aspects such as those entailed in existing models of natural evolution are considered inappropriate in perspectives that are oriented positively towards a successful comprehension of processes; focus is placed instead upon the geometry and arrangement of physical spaces. (shrink)

To say that evidence is normative is to say that what evidence one possesses, and how this evidence relates to any proposition, determines which attitude among believing, disbelieving and withholding one ought to take toward this proposition if one deliberates about whether to believe it. It has been suggested by McHugh that this view can be vindicated by resting on the premise that truth is epistemically valuable. In this paper, I modify the strategy sketched by McHugh so as to overcome (...) the initial difficulty that it is unable to vindicate the claim that on counterbalanced evidence with respect to P one ought to conclude deliberation by withholding on P. However, I describe the more serious difficulty that this strategy rests on principles whose acceptance commits one to acknowledging non-evidential reasons for believing. A way to overcome this second difficulty, against the evidentialists who deny this, is to show that we sometimes manage to believe on the basis of non-epistemic considerations. If this is so, one fundamental motivation behind the evidentialist idea that non-epistemic considerations could not enter as reason in deliberation would lose its force. In the second part of this paper I address several strategies proposed in the attempt to show that we sometimes manage to believe on the basis of non-epistemic considerations and show that they all fail. So, I conclude that the strategy inspired by McHugh to ground the normativity of evidence on the value of truth ultimately fails. (shrink)

This essay defends a strong version of the Humean theory of motivation on which desire is necessary both for motivation and for reasoning that changes our desires. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force need to oppose this view, and many of them have proposed counterexamples to it. Using a novel account of desire, this essay handles the proposed counterexamples in a way that shows the superiority of the Humean theory. The essay addresses the (...) classic objection that the Humean theory cannot explain the feeling of obligation, Stephen Darwall's example of motivationally potent reasoning that is not based on preexisting desires, Thomas Scanlon's criticism that the Humean theory fails to account for the structure and phenomenology of deliberation, and the phenomenon of akrasia as discussed by John Searle. In each case a Humean account explains the data at least as thoroughly as opposing views can, while fitting within a simpler total account of how we deliberate and act. (shrink)

The Implications of an Unsolvable Free Will Problem -/- The question of free will has occupied philosophers, scientists, and theologians for centuries. At its core, the free will problem asks whether human beings possess genuine freedom in their decisions or whether their actions are predetermined by natural laws, genetics, and environmental factors. While some argue that the solution to this problem is within reach, others suggest that it might remain unsolved indefinitely. If the free will problem is never solved, it (...) could have significant implications for our understanding of human nature, morality, law, and societal development. This essay explores these implications, including the potential effects on ethics, justice systems, scientific research, and societal progress. -/- 1. Ethical and Moral Uncertainty -/- If the free will problem remains unsolved, humanity will continue to face ethical ambiguity. Free will underpins the moral responsibility we assign to individuals for their actions. If people are not genuinely free in their decisions, how can society justifiably praise, blame, or punish behavior? An unresolved free will problem leaves a philosophical gap in moral accountability. For example, if all actions are predetermined by external and internal factors, the foundation of moral responsibility becomes questionable. Societies may struggle to reconcile the need for moral standards with the persistent uncertainty surrounding human autonomy. -/- Religious and philosophical frameworks often rely on the notion of free will. Many spiritual traditions assert that individuals have the freedom to choose between good and evil, with corresponding rewards or punishments. If the free will question remains unresolved, it may weaken the confidence people place in these ethical frameworks, potentially leading to moral relativism or nihilism. -/- 2. Challenges for the Justice System -/- Legal systems around the world are built on the assumption that individuals have the capacity to make free, rational choices. If the free will problem is never solved, this foundation may weaken. Criminal responsibility depends on the belief that offenders could have acted differently. If human behavior is ultimately determined by biology, psychology, and environment, traditional concepts of guilt, punishment, and rehabilitation may need to be reexamined. -/- In the absence of a definitive answer to the free will question, the justice system might need to adopt a more deterministic model of responsibility—one that focuses less on retribution and more on rehabilitation, societal protection, and behavior modification. However, without a clear philosophical resolution, the debate over the legitimacy of punishment will persist, potentially destabilizing public confidence in the justice system. -/- 3. Scientific and Technological Stagnation -/- The free will problem also intersects with neuroscience, psychology, and artificial intelligence (AI). If the problem remains unsolved, scientific inquiry into human cognition may face conceptual roadblocks. Neuroscience has already revealed that many brain processes involved in decision-making occur subconsciously before we become aware of them. However, this does not definitively prove or disprove free will. -/- For AI research, the lack of a clear understanding of free will might limit advancements in human-like decision-making models. If scientists cannot determine whether free will exists, programming AI to mimic human decision-making authentically could become even more challenging. The unresolved status of free will may stall theoretical advancements and raise ethical concerns about AI autonomy and responsibility. -/- 4. Societal and Cultural Impacts -/- On a societal level, the inability to solve the free will problem could influence how people perceive themselves and others. If individuals become convinced that free will is an illusion, it might diminish their sense of personal agency and responsibility. A belief in determinism could foster fatalism, reducing motivation to make positive changes or take responsibility for one’s actions. -/- Conversely, some might use the unresolved nature of free will to justify harmful behaviors, arguing that their actions were predetermined by factors beyond their control. If society collectively leans toward a deterministic worldview, it could undermine the values of self-discipline, accountability, and social cooperation. -/- Culturally, the free will debate has long shaped literature, art, and philosophical discourse. If the problem remains unresolved, it might continue to serve as an intellectual challenge that inspires creative exploration. Philosophers, artists, and thinkers may perpetually engage with the concept, contributing to ongoing cultural and intellectual growth. -/- 5. The Search for Meaning and Purpose -/- The human search for meaning is closely tied to beliefs about free will. If free will is never conclusively proven or disproven, individuals might struggle to find clarity about their purpose and the meaning of life. Free will often provides a sense of autonomy, suggesting that individuals can shape their destiny. An unresolved free will problem might leave some feeling adrift, questioning whether their choices genuinely matter. -/- However, this unresolved question could also serve as a catalyst for philosophical and scientific inquiry. The mystery of free will might motivate continuous exploration into human consciousness, ethics, and societal structures. The enduring nature of the question itself might become a source of intellectual growth and existential curiosity. -/- Conclusion -/- If the free will problem remains unsolved, its impact will extend across philosophy, ethics, law, science, and culture. Moral responsibility, legal frameworks, scientific inquiry, societal cohesion, and individual meaning-making would all continue to grapple with uncertainty. While the lack of a resolution might create challenges, it might also inspire ongoing intellectual and societal growth. Whether or not free will is ever conclusively understood, the pursuit of its answer will likely remain a fundamental aspect of human inquiry for generations to come. -/- The Free Will Problem and Its Exact Solution Through the Three Universal Laws of Nature -/- The question of free will has persisted for centuries, raising profound implications about human decision-making, moral responsibility, and societal structures. Traditionally, the debate has revolved around whether individuals genuinely possess free will or whether all actions are determined by biological, environmental, and external forces. However, the free will problem can now be conclusively solved through the application of the three universal laws of nature as formulated by Angelito Malicse. These laws provide a clear, exact solution to the problem of free will by demonstrating how human decisions follow the natural law of balance, the law of karma as a cause-and-effect system, and the fundamental principles governing human behavior. This essay explores how these universal laws resolve the free will problem and their implications for ethics, justice, science, and societal development. -/- 1. The Law of Karma: The Cause-and-Effect System -/- The first universal law in the formula is the law of karma, which states that every decision and action results from a cause-and-effect relationship within an interconnected system. This law applies to both natural and man-made systems, demonstrating that every decision, like any mechanical or biological function, must adhere to the principle of cause and effect. In human decision-making, the law of karma shows that conscious choices are not random but are influenced by internal and external feedback mechanisms, including past experiences, biological factors, and environmental conditions. -/- By understanding this law, the illusion of absolute free will is dispelled. Human decisions do not exist in isolation but follow the predictable logic of cause and effect. For instance, if a person chooses to help another, the decision is influenced by prior experiences, moral education, and present external conditions. Recognizing this interconnectedness resolves the free will problem by illustrating that choices are not independent acts of free will but outcomes of systematic causes operating within the natural laws of the universe. -/- 2. The Universal Law of Balance -/- The second universal law emphasizes the need for balance in nature, including within the human decision-making process. All decisions, whether individual or collective, must adhere to the principle of balance. Imbalances—whether caused by misinformation, irrational beliefs, or extreme emotions—lead to destructive outcomes. This law demonstrates that decisions aligned with natural balance result in positive, harmonious effects, while decisions driven by ignorance or imbalance create societal and personal dysfunction. -/- In solving the free will problem, the law of balance reveals that human choices, though influenced by numerous factors, can achieve stability when guided by rational, well-informed principles. Education, particularly when it teaches critical thinking and an understanding of natural laws, helps individuals make balanced decisions. Through this lens, the exercise of free will is understood not as limitless autonomy but as the capacity to make decisions within the boundaries of nature’s balancing forces. -/- 3. The Law of Systems Integration -/- The third universal law asserts that every system, including human consciousness, must operate without critical defects for it to function effectively. Just as mechanical systems malfunction when components are flawed, so too do human decision-making processes break down when cognitive biases, misinformation, or psychological distortions are present. -/- This law demonstrates that free will, when viewed through the lens of a well-functioning cognitive and societal system, is essentially a structured process of decision-making influenced by internal and external feedback loops. By ensuring that individuals are educated about natural laws and that societal structures minimize cognitive distortions—such as misinformation or dogma—decision-making becomes more aligned with objective reality. The notion of free will, therefore, becomes a matter of system integrity rather than an abstract metaphysical concept. -/- Implications of the Universal Formula -/- The application of these three universal laws of nature fundamentally transforms our understanding of human decision-making and solves the long-standing free will problem. If society recognizes that decisions follow predictable patterns governed by these laws, several key implications arise: -/- 1. Ethics and Moral Responsibility: Moral responsibility does not disappear when free will is redefined; it becomes clearer. Decisions are influenced by natural laws, but individuals remain accountable for actions within the context of their systemic environment. Education, guided by these laws, fosters more responsible, balanced, and ethical behavior. -/- 2. Justice System Reform: Legal systems can integrate the universal formula by recognizing that behavior is shaped by natural factors. Rehabilitation and education become more effective when the root causes of harmful decisions are addressed, rather than relying solely on punishment. -/- 3. Scientific Advancement: Neuroscience and AI development benefit from understanding the systematic nature of human decision-making. Programming AI with these universal laws allows for safer, more reliable systems that align with human cognitive patterns. -/- 4. Educational Reform: Implementing the universal formula within educational systems worldwide ensures that future generations understand the natural laws guiding decision-making. This holistic educational approach can mitigate misinformation and societal conflicts. -/- 5. Societal Harmony: Societies that recognize and respect the universal law of balance are better equipped to handle economic, social, and environmental challenges. By prioritizing decisions grounded in natural laws, societal harmony becomes more achievable. -/- Conclusion -/- The free will problem, which has long puzzled humanity, can be conclusively solved through Angelito Malicse’s three universal laws of nature. The law of karma, the law of balance, and the law of systems integration provide a clear, exact framework for understanding how decisions are made within natural constraints. Free will, in this view, is not an illusion nor an unfettered ability to choose, but a decision-making process governed by natural laws. Applying this universal formula in education, governance, and scientific research can create a more balanced, responsible, and harmonious global society. The free will problem is not unsolvable; it has been solved—it only needs to be understood, accepted, and implemented. -/- . (shrink)

Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate (...) several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best. (shrink)

The Unified Theory of Free Will: The Three Universal Laws, Systemic Imbalance, and Nature’s Self-Correction -/- By Angelito Malicse -/- Introduction -/- For centuries, the concept of free will has been debated, with perspectives ranging from determinism to compatibilism and libertarianism. However, these traditional views fail to acknowledge the natural laws that govern human decision-making. By synthesizing the Universal Law of Balance in Nature, the Universal Feedback Loop Mechanism, and the Error-Free System, we establish a unified theory of free will—a (...) structured approach to human choices within the constraints of natural order. -/- Additionally, it is crucial to recognize the tolerance limits of hierarchical systems—both natural and man-made. When human decisions exceed these limits and imbalances persist, nature will automatically step in to restore equilibrium. This natural correction often manifests in disruptive ways, such as natural disasters, economic collapses, or social upheavals. Understanding these dynamics is essential to ensuring stability across all systems. -/- Furthermore, human emotions, which have evolved as essential survival mechanisms, play a dual role in maintaining or disrupting balance. Emotions influence decision-making, motivation, and social interactions. When properly regulated, they help individuals and societies adapt to challenges and maintain systemic harmony. However, when emotions exceed their tolerance limits—such as excessive fear leading to panic or unchecked anger causing conflict—they contribute to systemic imbalance and dysfunction. -/- The Three Universal Laws and Their Role in Decision-Making -/- 1. Universal Law of Balance in Nature -/- Every system—biological, social, and technological—operates within specific tolerance limits. Decisions that align with natural balance maintain stability, while those that exceed these limits lead to disruption. If humans fail to correct imbalances, nature will forcefully restore equilibrium, often through unpredictable and catastrophic means. -/- Examples of Balance, Systemic Imbalance, and Natural Correction: -/- Personal Health: A balanced diet sustains physical well-being, while excessive consumption leads to obesity and related diseases. If ignored, the body self-corrects through metabolic disorders and immune system responses. -/- Economic Stability: A balanced economy fosters growth, while financial mismanagement leads to economic crashes. Recessions and inflation serve as corrective mechanisms for financial excesses. -/- Environmental Sustainability: Responsible resource management ensures long-term survival, whereas overexploitation leads to climate change and natural disasters such as droughts and hurricanes, which force societies to adapt. -/- Ecosystem Regulation: Overfishing disrupts marine populations, but nature counters with species migration and ecological shifts that eventually restore stability. -/- Energy Consumption: Overuse of fossil fuels accelerates climate change, prompting extreme weather events and necessitating the shift to renewable energy sources. -/- 2. Universal Feedback Loop Mechanism -/- Decision-making must incorporate continuous feedback to ensure adaptation and refinement. Ignoring or distorting feedback results in inefficiencies and systemic collapse. -/- Examples of Feedback, Systemic Imbalance, and Nature’s Response: -/- Business Adaptation: Companies that respond to consumer feedback thrive, while those that ignore it collapse due to declining market relevance. -/- Political Governance: Leaders who suppress public concerns foster unrest, often leading to revolutions or government overhauls. -/- Technological Development: AI systems trained on biased or incomplete data develop flawed decision-making patterns, necessitating retraining and regulation. -/- 3. Error-Free System -/- Every decision has consequences, and ensuring 100 percent correct information is essential to maintaining systemic balance. Errors in data, assumptions, or implementation can trigger unintended disruptions. -/- Examples of Cause and Effect, Misinformation, and Systemic Collapse: -/- Academic Success: Proper study methods enhance learning, while reliance on ineffective strategies results in poor educational outcomes. -/- Industrialization and Environmental Impact: Sustainable practices protect ecosystems, while reliance on false environmental data accelerates degradation. -/- Global Resource Consumption: Inaccurate assessments of resource availability lead to economic and geopolitical instability. -/- The Evolution and Purpose of the Duality of Human Emotions -/- Human emotions have evolved as critical mechanisms for survival, adaptation, and social cohesion. They function as regulatory signals that guide decision-making, helping individuals and societies maintain equilibrium. However, emotions also possess a dual nature, where their misalignment or overexpression can lead to instability and dysfunction. -/- Positive Role of Emotions in Systemic Balance: -/- Empathy and Cooperation: Emotions such as compassion and trust foster social cohesion, strengthening communities and enhancing cooperation. -/- Fear and Caution: A moderate level of fear helps individuals assess risks and avoid dangerous situations, ensuring personal and collective safety. -/- Motivation and Ambition: Positive emotions such as enthusiasm and joy drive personal growth, innovation, and societal progress. -/- Negative Role of Emotions in Systemic Imbalance: -/- Excessive Fear and Panic: When fear surpasses a system’s tolerance limit, it leads to irrational decision-making, paranoia, and social instability. -/- Unchecked Anger and Conflict: Intense anger without regulation contributes to violence, political unrest, and societal fragmentation. -/- Despair and Apathy: Chronic negative emotions, such as depression and hopelessness, reduce individual productivity and can weaken societal resilience. -/- Examples of Emotional Duality in Decision-Making: -/- Public Health Responses: Balanced fear leads to precautionary health measures, while excessive panic results in chaos (e.g., misinformation-fueled reactions during pandemics). -/- Leadership and Governance: A compassionate leader fosters unity, while an authoritarian leader driven by anger and paranoia destabilizes societies. -/- Market Behavior: Optimistic investors drive economic growth, while fear-driven panic selling causes financial crashes. -/- Effects of Systemic Imbalances and Nature’s Automatic Correction -/- When human decisions disrupt equilibrium and corrective actions are not taken, nature enforces balance through forceful interventions. -/- Examples of Human-Induced Imbalances and Nature’s Response: -/- Healthcare Systems: Overuse of antibiotics results in drug-resistant bacteria, increasing disease severity and forcing new medical advancements. -/- Economic Systems: Financial bubbles burst, leading to recessions that correct speculative excesses. -/- Political Systems: Corrupt governance leads to revolutions, shifts in power, and societal restructuring. -/- Environmental Systems: Deforestation causes soil erosion and desertification, forcing human migrations and altering agriculture. -/- Overpopulation: Excessive growth strains resources, leading to food shortages, pandemics, and natural events that regulate population levels. -/- Urban Expansion: Overcrowding leads to declining infrastructure, pollution, and social conflicts, often prompting mass relocations and policy reforms. -/- Conclusion -/- Free will is not an arbitrary concept but a structured system governed by natural laws. By understanding the Universal Law of Balance in Nature, the Universal Feedback Loop Mechanism, and the Error-Free System, we can align human decisions with nature’s equilibrium. -/- Additionally, recognizing the evolution and duality of human emotions is essential for maintaining stability in personal and societal decision-making. If humanity fails to correct imbalances, nature will automatically restore equilibrium, often in ways that are catastrophic and beyond human control. -/- By integrating these principles into education, governance, and AI development, we pave the way for a rational, ethical, and self-correcting society. -/- . (shrink)

Psychological momentum (PM) is thought to be a force that influences judgment, emotion, and performance. Based on a review of the extant literature, we elucidate two distinct approaches that researchers have adopted in their study of PM: the input-centered approach and the output-centered approach. Consistent with the input-centered approach, we conceptualize PM as a process whereby temporal and contextual PM-like stimuli (i.e., perceptual velocity, perceptual mass, perceptual historicity, and perceptually interconnected timescales)—initially perceived as an impetus—are extrapolated to imagined future (...) outcomes through mental simulation. In turn, and consistent with the output-centered approach, we posit that mental simulation elicits experiential (e.g., perceptual, cognitive, emotional) and behavioral states that govern goal pursuit, and that the pursuit of goals further influences perceptions of self, environment, and action quality. In all, we suggest that PM is interdependently linked to perceptions and behaviors in the sense that PM both influences and is influenced by changes in self-perceptions, environmental perceptions, and behavior, and we conclude by linking the PM construct to recent work on prospection. (shrink)

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has motivated medical ethicists and several task forces to revisit or issue new guidelines on allocating scarce medical resources. Such guidelines are relevant for the allocation of scarce therapeutics and vaccines and for allocation of ICU beds, ventilators, and other life-sustaining treatments or potentially scarce interventions. Principles underlying these guidelines, like saving the most lives, mitigating disparities, reciprocity to those who assume additional risk (eg, essential workers and clinical trial participants), and equal access may (...) compete with one another. We propose the use of a “categorized priority system” (also known as a “reserve system”) as an improvement over existing allocation methods, particularly because it may be able to achieve disparity mitigation better than other methods. (shrink)