Results for 'experience requirement'

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  1. The Experience Machine and the Experience Requirement.Jennifer Hawkins - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 355-365.
    In this article I explore various facets of Nozick’s famous thought experiment involving the experience machine. Nozick’s original target is hedonism—the view that the only intrinsic prudential value is pleasure. But the argument, if successful, undermines any experientialist theory, i.e. any theory that limits intrinsic prudential value to mental states. I first highlight problems arising from the way Nozick sets up the thought experiment. He asks us to imagine choosing whether or not to enter the machine and uses our (...)
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  2. Thought Experiments in Experimental Philosophy.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - In Michael T. Stuart, Yiftach Fehige & James Robert Brown (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Thought Experiments. London: Routledge. pp. 385-405.
    Much of the recent movement organized under the heading “Experimental Philosophy” has been concerned with the empirical study of responses to thought experiments drawn from the literature on philosophical analysis. I consider what bearing these studies have on the traditional projects in which thought experiments have been used in philosophy. This will help to answer the question what the relation is between Experimental Philosophy and philosophy, whether it is an “exciting new style of [philosophical] research”, “a new interdisciplinary field that (...)
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  3. Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience.Nils Franzén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):669-682.
    ABSTRACTEvaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view (...)
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  4. Experiences of Program Heads in Supervising Teachers: A Phenomenological Study.Elton John Embodo - 2024 - International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research 6 (5):1-28.
    The supervision of teachers is essential for ensuring effective teaching methods, ongoing professional growth, and student success. This study explored the experiences of program heads in supervising teachers. It was conducted in a local college in Tangub City, Misamis Occidental. The phenomenological design was used in the study. Eleven program heads served as the participants selected through the purposive sampling technique. The Interview Guide was used as the research instrument. Moustakas' transcendental phenomenology of data analysis was utilized to analyze the (...)
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  5. Phenomenal experience and the aesthetics of agency.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (3):380-391.
    In his fascinating new book Games: Agency as Art, Nguyen endorses an experiential requirement on aesthetic judgment: apt aesthetic judgment requires phenomenal experience. His own aesthetics of agency captures three phenomenally manifest and aesthetically significant harmonies (and corresponding disharmonies). But his view can be significantly extended to capture much more of the rich texture of human agency. In this discussion, I argue that emotions of agency, patterns of attention, and affordances all can be phenomenally experienced as aspects of (...)
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  6. The Experience of Free Will.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Free Will. Blackwell. pp. 417-433.
    The main question that we address in this chapter is what to say about reportedly libertarian experiences of free agency – in other words, experiences of options as being open, and up to oneself to decide among, such that, if they are accurate or veridical, then (at a minimum) indeterminism must be true. A great deal rides on this question. If normal experiences of free agency are libertarian, and if compatibilists cannot explain them away, then all of us may be (...)
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  7. Religious Experience in Science.Devinder Pal Singh - 2000 - The Sikh Review 48 (1):10-12.
    Science and religion represent two great systems of human thought. For the majority of people on our planet, religion is the predominant influence over their affairs. When science impinges on their lives, it does so, in general, through technology. The core of religion is the religious experience. True religion does not thrive on belief, it requires us to become; it is not a set of propositions to be accepted, it is a state to be experienced. The so-called religious (...) is the progeny of a free mind, a mind that does not conform unthinkingly, but questions everything and finds the truth itself. Some of the greatest scientists have succeeded in synthesizing science and religion inwardly, on a personal level. Religious experience is then seen as an extension of scientific activity. (shrink)
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  8. Temporal Experiences without the Specious Present.Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):287-302.
    Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, (...)
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  9. Agency, Experience, and Future Bias.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):237-245.
    Most of us are hedonically future-biased: other things being equal, we prefer pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future. Recently, various authors have argued that future bias is irrational, and that we should be temporally neutral instead. I argue that instead of temporal neutrality, the putative counterexamples and the rationales offered for them only motivate a more narrow principle I call Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the basis of (...)
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  10. Experience, plausibility, and evidence.Ted Poston - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
    Evidentialism is one of the most sensible claims of recent philosophy. Yet it is often joined with other theses about the structure of justification and the nature of experience that are dubious. In this paper, I argue that experience is not a basic source of evidence. I contend that for an experience to justify a belief, it must be independently plausible that the experience is reliable based on background information. The paper develops an account of plausibility (...)
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  11. Getting Gettier straight: thought experiments, deviant realizations and default interpretations.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2019 - Synthese 198 (2):1783-1806.
    It has been pointed out that Gettier case scenarios have deviant realizations and that deviant realizations raise a difficulty for the logical analysis of thought experiments. Grundmann and Horvath have shown that it is possible to rule out deviant realizations by suitably modifying the scenario of a Gettier-style thought experiment. They hypothesize further that the enriched scenario corresponds to the way expert epistemologists implicitly interpret the original one. However, no precise account of this implicit enrichment is offered, which makes the (...)
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  12. Transformative Experience and the Problem of Religious Disagreement.Joshua Blanchard & Laurie Paul - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 127-141.
    Peer disagreement presents religious believers, agnostics, and skeptics alike with an epistemological problem: how can confidence in any religious claims (including their negations) be epistemically justified? There seem to be rational, well-informed adherents among a variety of mutually incompatible religious and non-religious perspectives, and so the problem of disagreement arises acutely in the religious domain. In this paper, we show that the transformative nature of religious experience and identity poses more than just this traditional, epistemic problem of conflicting religious (...)
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  13. The epistemic superiority of experiment to simulation.Sherrilyn Roush - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4883-4906.
    This paper defends the naïve thesis that the method of experiment has per se an epistemic superiority over the method of computer simulation, a view that has been rejected by some philosophers writing about simulation, and whose grounds have been hard to pin down by its defenders. I further argue that this superiority does not come from the experiment’s object being materially similar to the target in the world that the investigator is trying to learn about, as both sides of (...)
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  14. Experience and Belief: An Inquiry Into the Doxastic Variability of Experience.T. Raja Rosenhagen - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    If what we believe can directly modify our (visual) experience, our experience is doxastically variable. If so, the following seems possible: our false and irrational background beliefs can modify our experience such that in it, things look distorted, or that it conforms with and appears to confirm the false and irrational beliefs that helped bring it about in the first place. If experience is doxastically variable, it seems, its epistemic function can be undermined. However, in this (...)
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  15. Proofs Versus Experiments: Wittgensteinian Themes Surrounding the Four-Color Theorem.G. D. Secco - 2017 - In Marcos Silva (ed.), How Colours Matter to Philosophy. Cham: Springer. pp. 289-307.
    The Four-Colour Theorem (4CT) proof, presented to the mathematical community in a pair of papers by Appel and Haken in the late 1970's, provoked a series of philosophical debates. Many conceptual points of these disputes still require some elucidation. After a brief presentation of the main ideas of Appel and Haken’s procedure for the proof and a reconstruction of Thomas Tymoczko’s argument for the novelty of 4CT’s proof, we shall formulate some questions regarding the connections between the points raised by (...)
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  16. Thought Experiments, Concepts and Conceptions.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2015 - In Eugen Fischer & John Collins (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. London: Routledge. pp. 132-150.
    The paper aims to offer an account of the cognitive capacities involved in judgements about thought experiments, without appealing to the notions of analyticity or intuition. I suggest that we employ a competence in the application of the relevant concepts. In order to address the worry that this suggestion is not explanatory, I look at some theories of concepts discussed in psychology, and I use them to illustrate how such competence might be realized. This requires, crucially, distinguishing between concepts and (...)
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  17. Can lists of requirements help consciousness navigate its epistemological quandaries?Chris Percy - manuscript
    Frustration has been growing with mainstay epistemological methods of logical deduction and experimental falsification for assessing theories of consciousness. This paper explores one among several alternatives being proposed: the listed requirements epistemology. A literature search identifies five papers that explicitly list requirements for assessing consciousness theories. These five lists are analysed as a promising starting point, but as yet insufficiently comprehensive to do the method justice. The longest list has 11 items, but 19 unique items are identified across the five (...)
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  18. Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have been made to explain (...)
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  19. Subjective Experience in Explanations of Animal PTSD Behavior.Kate Nicole Hoffman - 2020 - Philosophical Topics 48 (1):155-175.
    Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder is a mental health condition in which the experience of a traumatic event causes a series of psychiatric and behavioral symptoms such as hypervigilance, insomnia, irritability, aggression, constricted affect, and self-destructive behavior. This paper investigates two case studies to argue that the experience of PTSD is not restricted to humans alone; we have good epistemic reason to hold that some animals can experience genuine PTSD, given our current and best clinical understanding of the disorder (...)
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  20. Pandemic Experience and the Concept of World.Paul Turner - 2022 - Critical Humanities 1 (1).
    This article begins with some common or well-known sentiments about the present pandemic era and our experience of it, and moves by way of these toward discussion of the concepts of human existence and the “world” in the broadest sense of both terms. Departing from but also radicalizing the notion that “everything changed” in this pandemic time, I discuss certain logical difficulties that pertain to conceiving of or coherently talking about strict totalities which would include our own selves. This (...)
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  21. Superhero Thought Experiments: Comic Book Philosophy.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2019 - Iowa City, IA, USA: University of Iowa.
    What would happen if lightning struck a tree in a swamp and transformed it into The Swampman, or if saving billions of lives required sacrificing millions first? The first is a philosophical thought experiment devised by Donald Davidson, the second a theme from a comic written by Alan Moore. I argue that that comics can be read as containing thought experiments and that such philosophical devises should be shared with students of all ages.
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  22. Kant on Non-Veridical Experience.Andrew Stephenson - 2011 - Kant Yearbook 3 (1):1-22.
    In this paper I offer an interpretation of Kant’s theory of perceptual error based on his remarks in the Anthropology. Both hallucination and illusion, I argue, are for Kant species of experience and therefore require the standard co-operation of sensibility and understanding. I develop my account in a conceptualist framework according to which the two canonical classes of non-veridical experience involve error in the basic sense that how they represent the world as being is not how the world (...)
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  23. Suffering and Transformative Experience.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2019 - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. London: Routledge. pp. 165-179.
    In this chapter we suggest that many experiences of suffering can be further illuminated as forms of transformative experience, using the term coined by L.A. Paul. Such suffering experiences arise from the vulnerability, dependence, and affliction intrinsic to the human condition. Such features can create a variety of positively, negatively, and ambivalently valanced forms of epistemically and personally transformative experiences, as we detail here. We argue that the productive element of suffering experiences can be articulated as transformative, although suffering (...)
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  24. Experience and Life as Ever‐Present Constraints on Knowledge.Marc Champagne - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (2):235-245.
    This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind-independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, (...)
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  25. Kierkegaard's Concepts: Psychological Experiment.Martijn Boven - 2015 - In Steven M. Emmanuel, William McDonal & Jon Stewart (eds.), Kierkegaard's Concepts. Tome V: Objectivity to Sacrifice. Ashgate. pp. 159-165.
    For Kierkegaard the ‘psychological experiment’ is a literary strategy. It enables him to dramatize an existential conflict in an experimental mode. Kierkegaard’s aim is to study the source of movement that animates the existing individual (this is the psychological part). However, he is not interested in the representation of historical individuals in actual situations, but in the construction of fictional characters that are placed in hypothetical situations; this allows him to set the categories in motion “in order to observe completely (...)
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  26. The Value of Cognitive Experience.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Recent debates about consciousness and welfare have focused on whether consciousness is required for welfare subjectivity. There have been fewer attempts to explain the significance that particular kinds of consciousness have for welfare value. In this paper, I explore the relevance of cognitive experience for theories of welfare. I introduce the cognitive zombie intuition, the idea that an absence of cognitive experience can drastically change one’s welfare. I then attempt to explain the cognitive zombie intuition. I first consider (...)
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  27. Fiction and Thought Experiment - A Case Study.Daniel Dohrn - 2016 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):185-199.
    Many philosophers are very sanguine about the cognitive contributions of fiction to science and philosophy. I focus on a case study: Ichikawa and Jarvis’s account of thought experiments in terms of everyday fictional stories. As far as the contribution of fiction is not sui generis, processing fiction often will be parasitic on cognitive capacities which may replace it; as far as it is sui generis, nothing guarantees that fiction is sufficiently well-behaved to abide by the constraints of scientific and philosophical (...)
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  28.  41
    Critical Examination of John Cottingham's View on Religious Experience and its Function in the Formation of Religious Belief.Mahdi Khayatzadeh - 2023 - Hekmat Va Falsafeh 19 (74):71-95.
    John Cottingham focuses on two types of religious experience: general religious experience and specific religious experience. According to him, general experiences do not require special and complex education, scientific research or philosophical theorizing, but are a simple act of accepting a gift. Of course, unlike everyday observations, such experiences are not available to everyone and their realization requires special conditions. Regarding specific religious experiences, he also believes that when dealing with parts of the Bible that contain reports (...)
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  29. Religious Experience, Pragmatic Encroachment, and Justified Belief in God.Alex R. Gillham - 2020 - Open Theology 1 (6):296-305.
    The secondary literature on religious epistemology has focused extensively on whether religious experience can provide evidence for God’s existence. In this article, I suppose that religious experience can do this, but I consider whether it can provide adequate evidence for justified belief in God. I argue that it can. This requires a couple of moves. First, I consider the threshold problem for evidentialism and explain pragmatic encroachment (PE) as a solution to it. Second, I argue that religious (...) can justify belief in God if one adopts PE, but this poses a dilemma for the defender of the veridicality of religious experience. If PE is true, then whether S has a justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience depends on how high the stakes are for having an experience with God. This requires one to determine whether the stakes are high or low for experiencing God, which puts the experient of God in an awkward position. If the stakes are not high, then justified belief in God on the basis of religious experience will be easier to come by, but this requires conceding that experiencing God is not that important. If the stakes are high, then the experient can maintain the importance of experience with God but must concede that justified belief in God on the basis of experience with God is less likely to happen, perhaps impossible. (shrink)
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  30. The Unimaginability of Experience.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran & Christiana Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 5.
    We do not normally speak of seeing experiences. Yet it is common to say that we have imagined an experience. Why the difference here? The deep affinities between sense perception and sensory imagination might have led one to expect that the limits of what we can sensorily imagine, using visual imagery, would align with what we can, in the right circumstances, see. We face a decision: either abandon this alignment of sensory imagination with perception, or conclude that we cannot, (...)
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  31. Libertarianism and agentive experience.Justin A. Capes - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):33-44.
    Libertarianism about free will conjoins the thesis that free will requires indeterminism with the thesis that we have free will. Here the claim that we have experiential evidence for the libertarian position is assessed. It is argued that, on a straightforward reading, the claim is false, for our experiences as agents don't support the claim that free will requires indeterminism. However, our experiences as agents may still have a role to play in an overall case for libertarianism, insofar as they (...)
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  32. One self: The logic of experience.Arnold Zuboff - 1990 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):39-68.
    Imagine that you and a duplicate of yourself are lying unconscious, next to each other, about to undergo a complete step-by-step exchange of bits of your bodies. It certainly seems that at no stage in this exchange of bits will you have thereby switched places with your duplicate. Yet it also seems that the end-result, with all the bits exchanged, will be essentially that of the two of you having switched places. Where will you awaken? I claim that one and (...)
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  33. A Complexity Basis for Phenomenology: How information states at criticality offer a new approach to understanding experience of self, being and time.Alex Hankey - 2015 - Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 119:288–302.
    In the late 19th century Husserl studied our internal sense of time passing, maintaining that its deep connections into experience represent prima facie evidence for it as the basis for all investigations in the sciences: Phenomenology was born. Merleau-Ponty focused on perception pointing out that any theory of experience must in accord with established aspects of biology i.e. embodied. Recent analyses suggest that theories of experience require non-reductive, integrative information, together with a specific property connecting them to (...)
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  34. Empirical Beliefs, Perceptual Experiences and Reasons.André J. Abath - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (2):543-571.
    John McDowell and Bill Brewer famously defend the view that one can only have empirical beliefs if one’s perceptual experiences serve as reasons for such beliefs, where reasons are understood in terms of subject’s reasons. In this paper I show, first, that it is a consequence of the adoption of such a requirement for one to have empirical beliefs that children as old as 3 years of age have to considered as not having genuine empirical beliefs at all. But (...)
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  35. Understanding Subjective Experience in Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy: The Need for Phenomenology.Riccardo Miceli McMillan & Anthony Vincent Fernandez - forthcoming - Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry.
    Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy is being investigated as a treatment for a range of psychiatric illnesses. Current research suggests that the kinds of subjective experiences induced by psychedelic compounds play key roles in producing therapeutic outcomes. To date, most knowledge of therapeutic psychedelic experiences are derived from psychometric assessments with scales such as the Mystical Experience Questionnaire. While these approaches are insightful, more nuanced and detailed descriptions of psychedelic-induced changes to subjective experience are required. Drawing on recent advancements in qualitative (...)
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  36. Experience, Knowledge and Space of Reasons.Manoj Panda - 2020 - Journal of Foundational Research 28:421-450.
    Philosophers throughout the ages have struggled to explain the way or ways by which we can acquire knowledge about the external world. With an aim to meet the skeptical challenges regarding the possibility of knowledge, various accounts of knowledge have been developed across philosophical traditions. The worry to meet skeptical challenges is implicitly or explicitly present in almost every philosophical account of knowledge. Many philosophers, while explaining about the nature and the possibility of knowledge, have talked about placing it in (...)
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  37. Phenomenal knowledge without experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Leo Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
    : Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism— the view that there are phenomenal properties, or (...)
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  38.  70
    The Playful Thought Experiments of Louis CK.Chris A. Kramer - 2016 - In Mark Ralkowski (ed.), Louis CK and Philosophy. Popular Culture & Philosophy. pp. 225-236.
    It is trivially true that comedians make jokes and thus are not serious; they are “just playing.” But watching Louis CK, especially his performances in Chewed Up, Shameless, and Hilarious, it is evident that he has more in mind than simply getting his audience to frivolously guffaw. I will make the case that this is so given the content of some of his humor which centers on areas of socio-political-ethical tensions that can be uncomfortable when addressed in a direct, “bona-fide” (...)
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  39. Experience of Lung Surgery in the COVID-19 Pandemic.Kubilay İnan, İlknur Aytekin Çelik & Nurettin Karaoğlanoğlu - 2023 - European Journal of Therapeutics 29 (1):32-35.
    Objective: During the pandemic, elective cases other than those requiring emergency thoracic surgery were postponed. Depending on the magnitude of the impact the pandemic posed on hospitals and clinics, there have been changes in the number and variety of cases of thoracic surgery. The intention behind conducting this study was to share the experiences gained by a thoracic surgery clinic during the pandemic period. Methods: Altogether, 214 patients were included in the study. Patient data that were recorded included those on (...)
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  40. Mother Knows Best: Pregnancy, Applied Ethics, and Epistemically Transformative Experiences.Fiona Woollard - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (1):155-171.
    L.A. Paul argues that interesting issues for rational choice theory are raised by epistemically transformative experiences: experiences which provide access to knowledge that could not be known without the experience. Consideration of the epistemic effects of pregnancy has important implications for our understanding of epistemically transformative experiences and for debate about the ethics of abortion and applied ethics more generally. Pregnancy is epistemically transformative both in Paul’s narrow sense and in a wider sense: those who have not been pregnant (...)
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  41. Computational Theories of Conscious Experience: Between a Rock and a Hard Place.Gary Bartlett - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):195-209.
    Very plausibly, nothing can be a genuine computing system unless it meets an input-sensitivity requirement. Otherwise all sorts of objects, such as rocks or pails of water, can count as performing computations, even such as might suffice for mentality—thus threatening computationalism about the mind with panpsychism. Maudlin in J Philos 86:407–432, ( 1989 ) and Bishop ( 2002a , b ) have argued, however, that such a requirement creates difficulties for computationalism about conscious experience, putting it in (...)
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  42.  90
    Consciousness thought experiments with Non-Referential Terms.Paul Merriam & M. A. Z. Habeeb - manuscript
    This note (it is not a full-fledged academic paper) introduces a novel approach to classic thought experiments in consciousness studies through the incorporation of non-referential terms—symbols that present experiences directly rather than referring to them. By analyzing the Hard Problem, Knowledge Argument, Philosophical Zombies, and Spectrum Inversion thought experiments using both referential terms (like "blackness") and non-referential terms (like █), the paper reveals that many apparent philosophical puzzles arise from conflating referential descriptions with direct presentational experiences. The analysis shows that (...)
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  43. “The loss of experience” in digital age: Legal implications.Nataliia Satokhina & Yulia Razmetaeva - 2021 - Phenomenology and Mind 20:128-136.
    Exploring the history of our experience, Hannah Arendt reveals not only a radical transformation of its structure, but also the loss of experience as such and its replacement with technology. In order to identify the place of law in this process, we are trying to clarify the legal aspect of experience in terms of phenomenological hermeneutics and to trace its transformation in the digital age. The experience of law is thought of as one of the aspects (...)
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  44. Content externalism without thought experiments?Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):61-67.
    A recent argument against content internalism bucks tradition: it abandons Twin-Earth-style thought experiments and instead claims that internalism is inconsistent with plausible principles relating belief contents and truth values. Call this the transparency argument. Here, it is shown that there is a structurally parallel argument against content internalism’s foil: content externalism. Preserving the transparency argument while fending off the parallel argument against externalism requires that content-determination and truth-value-determination are implausibly linked together and that eternalism about belief contents is true. Given (...)
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  45. Are ‘Phase IV’ Trials Exploratory or Confirmatory Experiments?Austin Due - 2022 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 95 (C):126-133.
    Exploratory experiments are widely characterized as experiments that do not test hypotheses. Experiments that do test hypotheses are characterized as confirmatory experiments. Philosophers have pointed out that research programmes can be both confirmatory and exploratory. However, these definitions preclude single experiments being characterized as both exploratory and confirmatory; how can an experiment test and not test a hypothesis? Given the intuition that some experiments are exploratory, some are confirmatory, and some are both, a recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and (...)
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  46. The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments.Michael T. Stuart - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 83 (C):17-27.
    John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument (...)
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  47. (1 other version)The interplay of prior experience and actual situational context in intercultural first encounters.Istvan Kecskes - 2019 - Pragmatics Cognition 26 (1):112-134.
    The study aims to investigate how prior experience of interlocutors interacts with actual situational context in intercultural interactions when the latter is represented by a well-known frame: getting acquainted with others. It attempts to demonstrate how the cultural frame of the target language is broken up and substituted with an emergent frame that is co-constructed from elements from prior experience with the target language, the first language and the actual situational experience. Getting acquainted with others is a (...)
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  48. Government Policy Experiments and Informed Consent.Douglas MacKay & Averi Chakrabarti - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):188-201.
    Governments are increasingly making use of field experiments to evaluate policy interventions in the spheres of education, public health and welfare. However, the research ethics literature is largely focused on the clinical context, leaving investigators, institutional review boards and government agencies with few resources to draw on to address the ethical questions they face regarding such experiments. In this article, we aim to help address this problem, investigating the conditions under which informed consent is required for ethical policy research conducted (...)
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  49. The Sphere of Experience in Locke: The Relations Between Reflection, Consciousness, and Ideas.Vili Lähteenmäki - 2008 - Locke Studies 8:59-100.
    Locke endorses a distinction between passive reflection and voluntary attentive reflection, which he occasionally labels contemplation. Failure to recognize this distinction properly has had an effect on interpretations of Locke’s theory of reflection, and caused puzzlement about the relation between reflection and consciousness. In particular, the function of reflection as a passive internal sense that produces simple ideas of mental operations has been downplayed in favour of the view that reflection in one manner or another involves attention and/or presupposes consciousness (...)
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  50. Actions, thought-experiments and the 'principle of alternate possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
    In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such cases (...)
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