The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. Scientists have observed purely random behavior at the quantum level, which has led some physicists (...) to claim that our universe started out as a purely random quantum fluctuation. While quantum randomness makes a real appearance in our static block universe, such predetermined quantum randomness does not prove a random cause for our universe. With good scientific evidence supporting the belief that our universe was created despite the absence of cause and effect in physics, one can infer that a non-temporal non-physical cause was responsible for the creation of our universe. However, this non-temporal cause would logically have to know of and understand everything about the universe it was creating before it created our universe. Consequently, this creator would have had to already know about the appearance of quantum randomness in our universe in order to create our universe to exhibit that quantum randomness in our static block universe. The philosophy of superdeterminism supports the existence of such a Creator God, who created our static block universe outside of time without the use of any natural causal forces to exhibit predetermined quantum randomness disproving any random cause for our universe. (shrink)

In 2020, Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. This physics proof that cause and effect in physics are not real provides a new avenue of insight useful in the philosophy of religion. For example, superdeterminism provides circumstantial scientific evidence of the existence of God and our own immortality in our static block universe. The implications of (...) superdeterminism also include disproof of existentialism, nihilism. deism, pantheism, transphysical beings, pagan gods, and the Copenhagen and Many Worlds Interpretations of quantum mechanics. The philosophy of superdeterminism also conceives of the soul as an information packet appearing in spacetime rather than a transphysical being. However, the philosophy of superdeterminism also supports the truth of Christianity and the resurrection of the body and brain after death in special other universes we call Heaven and Hell. But, the philosophy of superdeterminism disproves other religions besides the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. (shrink)

What's wrong with Copenhagen, GRW, Superdeterminism, QBism, Many-worlds, Bohmianism, and Retrocausality, and how theses differ from Presentist Fragmentalism.

McQueen and Vaidman argue that the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics provides local causal explanations of the outcomes of experiments in our experience that is due to the total effect of all the worlds together. We show that although the explanation is local in one world, it requires a causal influence that travels across different worlds. We further argue that in the MWI the local nature of our experience is not derivable from (...) the Hilbert space structure, but has to be added to it as an independent postulate. This is due to what we call the factorisation-symmetry and basis-symmetry of Hilbert space. (shrink)

A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated in analogy to the continuum of time points; both “time” and “world” are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of (...) Bohmian mechanics and of Everett’s many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett’s approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains (1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, (2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, and (3) the apparently random “collapse of the wavefunction” caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory. (shrink)

This paper reviews some of the literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The publications involved tend to follow similar patterns of first identifying the mysteries, puzzles or paradoxes of the quantum world, and then discussing the existing interpretations of these matters, before the authors produce their own interpretations, or side with one of the existing views. The paper will show that all interpretations of quantum mechanics involve elements of apparent weirdness. They suggest that the quantum (...) world, and possibly our macro world, exists or behaves in a way quite contrary to the way we normally imagine they should. The paper will also show how many of the writers on quantum mechanics misunderstand idealism in the macro world as proposed by philosophers such as George Berkeley, David Hume, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill and misunderstand the concept of the observer dependent universe. The paper concludes by examining the similarities between the idealist view of the macro world and the Copenhagen Interpretation of the quantum world and suggests that as the Copenhagen Interpretation provides a view of the quantum world that is consistent with the macro world then the Copenhagen Interpretation should be the preferred view of the quantum world. (shrink)

A familiar interpretation of quantum mechanics (one of a number of views sometimes labeled the "Copenhagen interpretation'"), takes its empirical apparatus at face value, holding that the quantum wave function evolves by the Schrödinger equation except on certain occasions of measurement, when it collapses into a new state according to the Born rule. This interpretation is widely rejected, primarily because it faces the measurement problem: "measurement" is too imprecise for use in a fundamental physical theory. We argue (...) that this is a weak objection, as there may be many ways of making "measurement" precise. However, measurement-collapse interpretations face a more serious objection: a dilemma tied to the quantum Zeno effect. Is measurement itself an observable that can enter superpositions? If yes, then the standard measurement-collapse dynamics is ill-defined. If no, then (at least if measurement is an observable), measurements can never start or finish. The best way out is to deny that measurement is an observable, but this leads to strong and revisionary consequences. This reinforces the view that there is no nonrevisionary interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this text the ancient philosophical question of determinism (“Does every event have a cause ?”) will be re-examined. In the philosophy of science and physics communities the orthodox position states that the physical world is indeterministic: quantum events would have no causes but happen by irreducible chance. Arguably the clearest theorem that leads to this conclusion is Bell’s theorem. The commonly accepted ‘solution’ to the theorem is ‘indeterminism’, in agreement with the Copenhagen interpretation. Here it is (...) recalled that indeterminism is not really a physical but rather a philosophical hypothesis, and that it has counterintuitive and far-reaching implications. At the same time another solution to Bell’s theorem exists, often termed ‘superdeterminism’ or ‘total determinism’. Superdeterminism appears to be a philosophical position that is centuries and probably millennia old: it is for instance Spinoza’s determinism. If Bell’s theorem has both indeterministic and deterministic solutions, choosing between determinism and indeterminism is a philosophical question, not a matter of physical experimentation, as is widely believed. If it is impossible to use physics for deciding between both positions, it is legitimate to ask which philosophical theories are of help. Here it is argued that probability theory – more precisely the interpretation of probability – is instrumental for advancing the debate. It appears that the hypothesis of determinism allows to answer a series of precise questions from probability theory, while indeterminism remains silent for these questions. From this point of view determinism appears to be the more reasonable assumption, after all. (shrink)

Non-commuting quantities and hidden parameters – Wave-corpuscular dualism and hidden parameters – Local or nonlocal hidden parameters – Phase space in quantum mechanics – Weyl, Wigner, and Moyal – Von Neumann’s theorem about the absence of hidden parameters in quantum mechanics and Hermann – Bell’s objection – Quantum-mechanical and mathematical incommeasurability – Kochen – Specker’s idea about their equivalence – The notion of partial algebra – Embeddability of a qubit into a bit – Quantum computer is (...) not Turing machine – Is continuality universal? – Diffeomorphism and velocity – Einstein’s general principle of relativity – „Mach’s principle“ – The Skolemian relativity of the discrete and the continuous – The counterexample in § 6 of their paper – About the classical tautology which is untrue being replaced by the statements about commeasurable quantum-mechanical quantities – Logical hidden parameters – The undecidability of the hypothesis about hidden parameters – Wigner’s work and и Weyl’s previous one – Lie groups, representations, and psi-function – From a qualitative to a quantitative expression of relativity − psi-function, or the discrete by the random – Bartlett’s approach − psi-function as the characteristic function of random quantity – Discrete and/ or continual description – Quantity and its “digitalized projection“ – The idea of „velocity−probability“ – The notion of probability and the light speed postulate – Generalized probability and its physical interpretation – A quantum description of macro-world – The period of the as-sociated de Broglie wave and the length of now – Causality equivalently replaced by chance – The philosophy of quantum information and religion – Einstein’s thesis about “the consubstantiality of inertia ant weight“ – Again about the interpretation of complex velocity – The speed of time – Newton’s law of inertia and Lagrange’s formulation of mechanics – Force and effect – The theory of tachyons and general relativity – Riesz’s representation theorem – The notion of covariant world line – Encoding a world line by psi-function – Spacetime and qubit − psi-function by qubits – About the physical interpretation of both the complex axes of a qubit – The interpretation of the self-adjoint operators components – The world line of an arbitrary quantity – The invariance of the physical laws towards quantum object and apparatus – Hilbert space and that of Minkowski – The relationship between the coefficients of -function and the qubits – World line = psi-function + self-adjoint operator – Reality and description – Does a „curved“ Hilbert space exist? – The axiom of choice, or when is possible a flattening of Hilbert space? – But why not to flatten also pseudo-Riemannian space? – The commutator of conjugate quantities – Relative mass – The strokes of self-movement and its philosophical interpretation – The self-perfection of the universe – The generalization of quantity in quantum physics – An analogy of the Feynman formalism – Feynman and many-world interpretation – The psi-function of various objects – Countable and uncountable basis – Generalized continuum and arithmetization – Field and entanglement – Function as coding – The idea of „curved“ Descartes product – The environment of a function – Another view to the notion of velocity-probability – Reality and description – Hilbert space as a model both of object and description – The notion of holistic logic – Physical quantity as the information about it – Cross-temporal correlations – The forecasting of future – Description in separable and inseparable Hilbert space – „Forces“ or „miracles“ – Velocity or time – The notion of non-finite set – Dasein or Dazeit – The trajectory of the whole – Ontological and onto-theological difference – An analogy of the Feynman and many-world interpretation − psi-function as physical quantity – Things in the world and instances in time – The generation of the physi-cal by mathematical – The generalized notion of observer – Subjective or objective probability – Energy as the change of probability per the unite of time – The generalized principle of least action from a new view-point – The exception of two dimensions and Fermat’s last theorem. (shrink)

Quantum physicists have made many attempts to solve the quantum measurement problem, but no solution seems to have received widespread acceptance. The time has come for a new approach. In Sense Perception and Reality: A Theory of Perceptual Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and the Observer Dependent Universe I suggest the quantum measurement problem is caused by a failure to understand that each species has its own sensory world and that when we say the wave function collapses (...) and brings a particle into existence we mean the particle is brought into existence in the human sensory world by the combined operation of the human sensory apparatus, particle detectors and the experimental set up. This is similar to the Copenhagen Interpretation suggested by Niels Bohr and others, but the understanding that the collapse of the wave function brings a particle into existence in the human sensory world removes the need for a dividing line between the quantum world and the macro world. The same rules can apply to both worlds and the ideas stated in this paper considerably strengthen the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We argue from conceptual point of view the relationship between quantum entanglement and many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, the debate is still open, but we retain the objective Bayesian interpretation of quantum probability could be an interesting approach to solve this fundamental question.

It is proposed a critique of existing interpretations of quantum mechanics, both anti-realistic and realistic, and, in particular, the Copenhagen interpretation, the interpretations with hidden variables, the metaphysical interpretation of H. Everett’s interpretation, the many-worlds interpretation by D. Wallace, QBism by C. Fuchs, D. Mermin and R. Schack, the relational interpretation by C. Rovelli, neo-Kantian and phenomenological interpretations by M. Bitbol, the informational interpretation by A. Zeilinger, the Nobel Prize Winner in Physics 2022, and others. As (...) is known compared to classical physics, quantum mechanics is a new physical paradigm. The author argues that from a philosophical point of view quantum mechanics is an anomaly within the paradigm of (post)modern philosophy. A new approach to understanding quantum mechanics and resolving its paradoxes, rejecting the assumptions and prejudices of (post)modern philosophy, is proposed – contextual quantum realism (CQR). It is a moderately deflationary approach that combines elements of (neo-)Copenhagen, informational and realist interpretations and recognizes the possibility of knowing the things themselves. From the point of view of CQR, the measurement problem – the basic problem of philosophy of quantum mechanics – is a pseudo-problem . (shrink)

We look into the ontology of quantum theory as distinct from that of the classical theory in the sciences. Theories carry with them their own ontology while the metaphysics may remain the same in the background. We follow a broadly Kantian tradition, distinguishing between the noumenal and phenomenal realities where the former is independent of our perception while the latter is assembled from the former by means of fragmentary bits of interpretation. Theories do not tell us how the noumenal (...) world is constituted but are conceptual constructs applying to models generated in the phenomenal world within limited contexts. -/- The ontology of quantum theory principally rests on the view that entities in the world are pervasively correlated with one another not by means of probabilities as in the case of the classical theory, but by means of probability amplitudes involving finely tuned phases characterising the oscillatory behaviour of quantum mechanical states. -/- The amplitude-dependent correlations (quantum entanglement) exist over and above the classical ones expressed in terms of probabilities. While the classical correlations are essentially local in nature, quantum correlations are shared globally in the process of environment-induced decoherence. The decoherence is an effectively random process that removes local correlations in the course of global sharing of entanglement—the removal being especially manifest in the case of systems that appear as classical ones. It is this aspect of the decoherence process that makes the so-called measurement postulate (one relating to wave function collapse) cohere with the rest of the principles of quantum theory where the latter implies a Schrodinger type time evolution of quantum mechanical systems. -/- The mathematical basis of the quantum correlations consists of the description of pure states of a system in terms of vectors in a linear vector space (a mixed state appears as an admixture of pure states with some probability distribution associated with it) and, in addition, the description of (pure) states of composite systems as vectors in the product space arising from the component sub-systems. -/- The crucial aspect of the decoherence process, of significance in the context of the apparent incompatibility of the measurement postulate with the unitary Schrodinger evolution, relates to the fact that it is almost instantaneous in the case of a classical object (one that is nevertheless amenable to a quantum description). Indeed, the decoherence time is, in all likelihood, of the order of the Planck scale, being driven by field fluctuations in the Planck regime. This points to factors of an unknown nature determining the finest details of the decoherence process since Planck scale physics remains an obscure terrain. -/- In other words, quantum theory is, to all intents and purposes, in the need of a radical revision, in keeping with the fact that all theories are defeasible and need revision as our domains of experience expand and get realigned in a complex manner. The context within which quantum theory (and quantum field theory too) is defined is set precisely by the Planck scale, across which a novel theoretical framework is likely to emerge. However, as in the case of theory revisions in general, that emerging theory will stand in an asymmetric relation of incommensurability with the present-day quantum theory, where the concepts of the latter will be comprehensible in terms of those of the former, but the converse will not hold. (shrink)

Despite its enormous practical success, many physicists and philosophers alike agree that the quantum theory is full of contradictions and paradoxes which are difficult to solve consistently. Even after 90 years, the experts themselves still do not all agree what to make of it. The area of disagreement centers primarily around the problem of describing observations. Formally, the so-called quantum measurement problem can be defined as follows: the result of a measurement is a superposition of vectors, each (...) representing the quantity being observed as having one of its possible values. The question that has to be answered is: how this superposition can be reconciled with the fact that in practice we only observe one value. How is the measuring instrument prodded into making up its mind which value it has observed? Among some alternatives to resolve the above QM measurement problem, a very counterintuitive one was suggested by Hugh Everett in his 1955 Princeton dissertation, which was subsequently called the Many-Worlds Interpretation of QM (MWI). In this paper we will not discuss all possible scenarios to solve the measurement problem, but we will only shortly discuss Everett’s MWI, because it has led to heated debates on possibility of multiverses, beyond the Universe we live in. We also discuss two alternatives against MWI proposal: (a) the so-called scale symmetry theory, (b) the Maxwell-Dirac isomorphism. In last section, we also discuss shortly MWI hypothesis from philosophical perspective. (shrink)

Many researchers determine the question “Why anything rather than nothing?” as the most ancient and fundamental philosophical problem. Furthermore, it is very close to the idea of Creation shared by religion, science, and philosophy, e.g. as the “Big Bang”, the doctrine of “first cause” or “causa sui”, the Creation in six days in the Bible, etc. Thus, the solution of quantum mechanics, being scientific in fact, can be interpreted also philosophically, and even religiously. However, only the philosophical (...) interpretation is the topic of the text. The essence of the answer of quantum mechanics is: 1. The creation is necessary in a rigorous mathematical sense. Thus, it does not need any choice, free will, subject, God, etc. to appear. The world exists in virtue of mathematical necessity, e.g. as any mathematical truth such as 2+2=4. 2. The being is less than nothing rather than more than nothing. So, the creation is not an increase of nothing, but the decrease of nothing: it is a deficiency in relation of nothing. Time and its “arrow” are the way of that diminishing or incompleteness to nothing. (shrink)

We investigate the validity of the field explanation of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. It is argued that a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. This is also a consequence of protective measurement. If the wave function is a physical field, then the mass and charge density will be distributed in (...) space simultaneously for a charged quantum system, and thus there will exist a remarkable electrostatic self-interaction of its wave function, though the gravitational self-interaction is too weak to be detected presently. This not only violates the superposition principle of quantum mechanics but also contradicts experimental observations. Thus we conclude that the wave function cannot be a description of a physical field. In the second part of this paper, we further analyze the implications of these results for the main realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics, especially for de Broglie-Bohm theory. It has been argued that de Broglie-Bohm theory gives the same predictions as quantum mechanics by means of quantum equilibrium hypothesis. However, this equivalence is based on the premise that the wave function, regarded as a Ψ-field, has no mass and charge density distributions, which turns out to be wrong according to the above results. For a charged quantum system, both Ψ-field and Bohmian particle have charge density distribution. This then results in the existence of an electrostatic self-interaction of the field and an electromagnetic interaction between the field and Bohmian particle, which contradicts both the predictions of quantum mechanics and experimental observations. Therefore, de Broglie-Bohm theory as a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is probably wrong. Lastly, we suggest that the wave function is a description of some sort of ergodic motion (e.g. random discontinuous motion) of particles, and we also briefly analyze the implications of this suggestion for other realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics including many-worlds interpretation and dynamical collapse theories. (shrink)

This paper addresses a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, i.e. superdeterminism. In short, superdeterminism i) takes the world to be fundamentally deterministic, ii) postulates hidden variables, and iii) contra Bell, saves locality at the cost of violating the principle of statistical independence. Superdeterminism currently enjoys little support in the physics and philosophy communities. Many take it to posit the ubiquitous occurrence of hard-to-digest conspiratorial and coincidental events; others object that violating the principle of statistical independence implies the death (...) of the scientific methodology. In this paper, we offer a defense to these and other objections. To counter the conspiracy objection, we draw upon the philosophical literature on time travel, and conclude that the picture of the world offered by the superdeterminist does not need to be particularly surprising or conspiratorial. We then move on to other recent objections, in particular those that focus on the methodology of science and the nature of the physical laws compatible with superdeterminism. A key ingredient of our arguments is that the principle of statistical independence may be violated in theory, but valid for practical purposes. Our overarching goal is to offer a defense of superdeterminism with respect to its main objections, so that it can earn its keep as a legitimate contender among the possible interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

It is argued that the many-worlds interpretation is by far the best interpretation of quantum mechanics. The key points of this view are viewing the wave functions of worlds in three dimensions and understanding probability through self-locating uncertainty.

We provide a derivation of the Born Rule in the context of the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics. Our argument is based on the idea of self-locating uncertainty: in the period between the wave function branching via decoherence and an observer registering the outcome of the measurement, that observer can know the state of the universe precisely without knowing which branch they are on. We show that there is a uniquely rational way to apportion credence in (...) such cases, which leads directly to the Born Rule. Our analysis generalizes straightforwardly to cases of combined classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty, as in the cosmological multiverse. (shrink)

Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...) to learning where we are in the world ( Section 2 ). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect ( Section 3 ). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem ( Section 4 ) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be ( Section 5 ). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend ( Section 6 ). (shrink)

The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If (...) one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes ; there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a “forest” of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this. (shrink)

Within ordinary ---unitary--- quantum mechanics there exist global protocols that allow to verify that no definite event ---an outcome to which a probability can be associated--- occurs. Instead, states that start in a coherent superposition over possible outcomes always remain as a superposition. We show that, when taking into account fundamental errors in measuring length and time intervals, that have been put forward as a consequence of a conjunction of quantum mechanical and general relativity arguments, there are instances (...) in which such global protocols no longer allow to distinguish whether the state is in a superposition or not. All predictions become identical as if one of the outcomes occurs, with probability determined by the state. We use this as a criteria to define events, as put forward in the Montevideo Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. We analyze in detail the occurrence of events in the paradigmatic case of a particle in a superposition of two different locations. We argue that our approach provides a consistent single-world picture of the universe, thus allowing an economical way out of the limitations imposed by a recent theorem by Frauchiger and Renner showing that having a self-consistent single-world description of the universe is incompatible with quantum theory. In fact, the main observation of this paper may be stated as follows: If quantum mechanics is extended to include gravitational effects to a QG theory, then QG, S, and C are satisfied. (shrink)

One motivation for preferring the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics over realist rivals, such as collapse and hidden variables theories, is that the interpretation is able to preserve locality (in the sense of no action at a distance) in a way these other theories cannot. The primary goal of this paper is to make this argument for the many worlds interpretation precise, in a way that does not rely on controversial assumptions about the metaphysics (...) of many worlds. (shrink)

Physical systems can store information and their informational properties are governed by the laws of information. In particular, the amount of information that a physical system can convey is limited by the number of its degrees of freedom and their distinguishable states. Here we explore the properties of the physical systems with absolutely one degree of freedom. The central point in these systems is the tight limitation on their information capacity. Discussing the implications of this limitation we demonstrate that such (...) systems exhibit a number of features, such as randomness, no-cloning, and non-commutativity, which are peculiarities attributed to quantum mechanics (QM). After demonstrating many astonishing parallels to quantum behavior, we postulate an interpretation of quantum physics as the physics of systems with a single degree of freedom. We then show how a number of other quantum conundrum can be understood by considering the informational properties of the systems and also resolve the EPR paradox. In the present work, we assume that the formalism of the QM is correct and well-supported by experimental verification and concentrate on the interpretational aspects of the theory. (shrink)

The persistent interpretation problem for quantum mechanics may indicate an unwillingness to consider unpalatable assumptions that could open the way toward progress. With this in mind, I focus on the work of David Bohm, whose earlier work has been more influential than that of his later. As I’ll discuss, I believe two assumptions play a strong role in explaining the disparity: 1) that theories in physics must be grounded in mathematical structure and 2) that consciousness must supervene on material (...) processes. I’ll argue that the first assumption appears to lead us toward Everett’s many worlds interpretation, which suggests a red flag. I’ll also argue that the second assumption is suspect due to the persistent explanatory gap for consciousness. Later, I explore ways that Bohm’s later work holds some promise in providing a better fit with our world, both phenomenologically and empirically. Also, I’ll address the possible problem of realism. (shrink)

I show in this paper why the universality of quantum mechanics at all scales, which implies the possibility of Schrodinger's Cat and Wigner's Friend thought experiments, cannot be experimentally confirmed, and why macroscopic superpositions in general cannot be observed or measured, even in principle. Through the relativity of quantum superposition and the transitivity of correlation, it is shown that from the perspective of an object that is in quantum superposition relative to a macroscopic measuring device and observer, (...) the observer is already sufficiently well correlated to the measuring device that once the object correlates to the measuring device, there is no time period in which the observer can perform an appropriate interference experiment to show that the measuring device is in a superposition. (shrink)

Distinctions in fundamentality between different levels of description are central to the viability of contemporary decoherence-based Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM). This approach to quantum theory characteristically combines a determinate fundamental reality (one universal wave function) with an indeterminate emergent reality (multiple decoherent worlds). In this chapter I explore how the Everettian appeal to fundamentality and emergence can be understood within existing metaphysical frameworks, identify grounding and concept fundamentality as promising theoretical tools, and use them to characterize a (...) system of explanatory levels (with associated laws of nature) for EQM. This Everettian level structure encompasses and extends the ‘classical’ levels structure. The ‘classical’ levels of physics, chemistry, biology, etc. are recovered, but they are emergent in character and potentially variable across Everett worlds. EQM invokes an additional fundamental level, not present in the classical levels picture, and a novel potential role for self-location in interlevel metaphysics. When given a modal realist interpretation, EQM also makes trouble for supervenience-based approaches to levels. (shrink)

The paper addresses the problem, which quantum mechanics resolves in fact. Its viewpoint suggests that the crucial link of time and its course is omitted in understanding the problem. The common interpretation underlain by the history of quantum mechanics sees discreteness only on the Plank scale, which is transformed into continuity and even smoothness on the macroscopic scale. That approach is fraught with a series of seeming paradoxes. It suggests that the present mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics (...) is only partly relevant to its problem, which is ostensibly known. The paper accepts just the opposite: The mathematical solution is absolute relevant and serves as an axiomatic base, from which the real and yet hidden problem is deduced. Wave-particle duality, Hilbert space, both probabilistic and many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics, quantum information, and the Schrödinger equation are included in that base. The Schrödinger equation is understood as a generalization of the law of energy conservation to past, present, and future moments of time. The deduced real problem of quantum mechanics is: “What is the universal law describing the course of time in any physical change therefore including any mechanical motion?”. (shrink)

A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as (...) equiprobable, but we argue that the temptation should be resisted. Applying lessons from this analysis, we demonstrate (using methods similar to those of Zurek's envariance-based derivation) that the Born rule is the uniquely rational way of apportioning credence in Everettian quantum mechanics. In doing so, we rely on a single key principle: changes purely to the environment do not affect the probabilities one ought to assign to measurement outcomes in a local subsystem. We arrive at a method for assigning probabilities in cases that involve both classical and quantum self-locating uncertainty. This method provides unique answers to quantum Sleeping Beauty problems, as well as a well-defined procedure for calculating probabilities in quantum cosmological multiverses with multiple similar observers. (shrink)

Starting from the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, this work gives a holistic view of consciousness. The entirety is complete and does not possess any particular physical properties or subjective experience. It is the superposition of all possibilities. Its partition, however, gives rise to physical properties and subjective experience simultaneously. They play complementary roles to each other. The latter cannot be conveyed to a third person, and cannot be reduced to the former. It in fact fills the informational (...) gap which is impossible for the former to fill. The casual effect and the privilege of subjective experience are related to the role it plays, which is to identify the subject's self location. (shrink)

We present an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new inter- pretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. Elementary particles are considered as extended objects and nonlocal effects are included. The role of the new concepts in the problems of measurement and of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations is described. Experiments to distinguish the proposed interpretation from the (...) Copenhagen one are pointed out. (shrink)

In the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics, probabilities—and thus quantum states—represent an agent’s degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. In this paper we investigate the concept of certainty in quantum mechanics. Particularly, we show how the probability-1 predictions derived from pure quantum states highlight a fundamental difference between our Bayesian approach, on the one hand, and Copenhagen and similar interpretations on the other. We first review the main arguments for (...) the general claim that probabilities always represent degrees of belief. We then argue that a quantum state prepared by some physical device always depends on an agent’s prior beliefs, implying that the probability-1 predictions derived from that state also depend on the agent’s prior beliefs. Quantum certainty is therefore always some agent’s certainty. Conversely, if facts about an experimental setup could imply agent-independent certainty for a measurement outcome, as in many Copenhagen-like interpretations, that outcome would effectively correspond to a preexisting system property. The idea that measurement outcomes occurring with certainty correspond to preexisting system properties is, however, in conflict with locality. We emphasize this by giving a version of an argument of Stairs [(1983). Quantum logic, realism, and value-definiteness. Philosophy of Science, 50, 578], which applies the Kochen–Specker theorem to an entangled bipartite system. (shrink)

We discuss the no-go theorem of Frauchiger and Renner based on an "extended Wigner's friend" thought experiment which is supposed to show that any single-world interpretation of quantum mechanics leads to inconsistent predictions if it is applicable on all scales. We show that no such inconsistency occurs if one considers a complete description of the physical situation. We then discuss implications of the thought experiment that have not been clearly addressed in the original paper, including a tension between relativity (...) and nonlocal effects predicted by quantum mechanics. Our discussion applies in particular to Bohmian mechanics. (shrink)

The paper is concentrated on the special changes of the conception of causality from quantum mechanics to quantum information meaning as a background the revolution implemented by the former to classical physics and science after Max Born’s probabilistic reinterpretation of wave function. Those changes can be enumerated so: (1) quantum information describes the general case of the relation of two wave functions, and particularly, the causal amendment of a single one; (2) it keeps the physical description to (...) be causal by the conservation of quantum information and in accordance with Born’s interpretation; (3) it introduces inverse causality, “backwards in time”, observable “forwards in time” as the fundamentally random probability density distribution of all possible measurements of any physical quantity in quantum mechanics; (4) it involves a kind of “bidirectional causality” unifying (4.1) the classical determinism of cause and effect, (4.2) the probabilistic causality of quantum mechanics, and (4.3) the reversibility of any coherent state; (5) it identifies determinism with the function successor in Peano arithmetic, and its proper generalized causality with the information function successor in Hilbert arithmetic. (shrink)

The major point in [1] chapter 2 is the following claim: “Any formalized system for the Theory of Computation based on Classical Logic and Turing Model of Computation leads us to a contradiction.” So, in the case we wish to save Classical Logic we should change our Computational Model. As we see in chapter two, the mentioned contradiction is about and around the concept of time, as it is in the contradiction of modified version of paradox. It is natural to (...) try fabricating the paradox not by time but in some other linear ordering or the concept of space. Interestingly, the attempts to have similar contradiction by the other concepts like space and linear ordering, is failed. It is remarkable that, the paradox is considered either Epistemological or Logical traditionally, but by new considerations the new version of paradox should be considered as either Logical or Physical paradox. Hence, in order to change our Computational Model, it is natural to change the concept of time, but how? We start from some models that are different from the classical one but they are intuitively plausible. The idea of model is somewhat introduced by Brouwer and Husserl [3]. This model doesn’t refute the paradox, since the paradox and the associated contradiction would be repeated in this new model. The model is introduced in [2]. Here we give some more explanations. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function and its evolution are investigated. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of spacetime translation invariance (...) and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. Besides, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issues of unifying quantum mechanics and relativity. (shrink)

The many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics (MWI) states that the world we live in is just one among many parallel worlds. It is widely believed that because of this commitment to parallel worlds, the MWI violates common sense. Some go so far as to reject the MWI on this basis. This is despite its myriad of advantages to physics (e.g. consistency with relativity theory, mathematical simplicity, realism, determinism, etc.). Here, we make the case (...) that common sense in fact favors the MWI. We argue that causal explanations are commonsensical only when they are local causal explanations. We present several quantum mechanical experiments that seem to exhibit nonlocal “action at a distance”. Under the assumption that only one world exists, these experiments seem immune to local causal explanation. However, we show that the MWI, by taking all worlds together, can provide local causal explanations of the experiments. The MWI therefore restores common sense to physical explanation. (shrink)

The Bohr Einstein debate on the meaning of quantum physics involved Einstein inventing a series of thought experiments to challenge the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. Einstein disliked many aspects of the Copenhagen Interpretation especially its idea of an observer dependent universe. Bohr was able to answer all Einstein’s objections to the Copenhagen Interpretation and so is usually considered as winning the debate. However the debate has continued into the present time as many (...) scientists have been unable to accept the idea of an observer dependent universe and many alternatives to the Copenhagen Interpretation have been proposed. However none of the alternatives has won general acceptance because all have problems that make them implausible or impossible. (shrink)

Sense perception and Reality examines the remarkable similarities between philosophical idealism and the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum physics. The book looks at perceptual relativity involving animal senses, neurology and cognitive psychology. It concludes the universe is observer dependent and varies with the sensory apparatus used to observe it. The Copenhagen Interpretation is examined and perceptual relativity would appear to apply in the quantum world. The Copenhagen Interpretation suggests the universe is observer dependent, the same conclusion (...) as is found in philosophical idealism in the macro world. The book concludes by examining the consequences of an observer dependent universe and by showing such a universe is quite consistent with a modern objective science. (shrink)

This paper explores the physical and metaphysical implications of time travel, focusing on the possibility of changing the past, through a comparative analysis of David Lewis' modal realism and Everett's many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The existence of closed timelike curves (CTCs) in certain solutions to Einstein's field equations provides a theoretical basis for the possibility of backwards time travel, but this leads to a range of paradoxes, most notably the grandfather paradox. David Lewis argues that time (...) travel must maintain consistency and that the past cannot be changed, even if time travel were possible. His view is supported by his modal realism, which posits the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. In contrast, Everett's many-worlds interpretation, which holds that quantum mechanics describes a multiverse of branching realities, might seem to allow for the possibility of multiple, inconsistent histories. By examining these two ontological frameworks, this paper aims to shed light on the paradoxes of time travel and to explore whether the many-worlds interpretation provides a more satisfactory resolution to these paradoxes than Lewis' modal realism. It is argued that while Lewis' view provides a coherent model for maintaining consistency in time travel, Everett's interpretation may offer a more physically grounded and philosophically compelling account of the metaphysics of time travel. The paper concludes by suggesting that the many-worlds interpretation, by locating the branching of timelines within the structure of quantum mechanics itself, may provide a more promising framework for understanding the possibility and implications of time travel than Lewis' modal realism. However, significant questions remain about the nature of personal identity and free will in a branching multiverse. This comparative analysis aims to contribute to the ongoing debate about the metaphysical possibility of time travel and to highlight the value of engaging with interpretations of quantum mechanics in this context. Keywords: time travel, closed timelike curves, modal realism, many-worlds interpretation, grandfather paradox, metaphysics of time. (shrink)

This thesis develops a detailed account of the emergence of for all practical purposes continuous, quasi-classical world histories from the discontinuous, stochastic micro dynamics of Minimal Bohmian Mechanics (MBM). MBM is a non-relativistic quantum theory. It results from excising the guiding equation from standard Bohmian Mechanics (BM) and reinterpreting the quantum equilibrium hypothesis as a stochastic guidance law for the random actualization of configurations of Bohmian particles. On MBM, there are no continuous trajectories linking up individual configurations. Instead, (...) individual configurations are actualized independently of each other, carving out the decoherence-induced branching structure of the universal wave function. Yet, by contrast to the Everett interpretation, branches of the universal wave function are not actualized in parallel, i.e. all at the same time. Rather, world branches, on MBM, are actualized sequentially. -/- For an introduction to MBM, the transition from BM to MBM is described, and their empirical equivalence is established. I present the conditions under which MBM can be classified as a primitive ontology (PO) theory, regarded as crucial for the acceptance of a theory as Bohmian by many proponents of BM. While rendering MBM compatible with the PO approach, it must not fall prey to the problem of communication, arising from the two-space reading of BM. -/- The issue of temporal solipsism, identified by Bell as a serious problem for his “Everett (?) theory” – the historic predecessor of MBM – is discussed. I argue that Barbour’s time capsule approach does not provide a satisfactory solution. In particular, his adopting a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism between brain processes and experience of macroscopic change is argued to be reasonable in light of our current best neuroscience, yet problematic for theories relying solely on time capsules, understood as highly structured, individual, internally static configurations. As a solution, I introduce worlds, and world histories, as key concepts in providing a link between MBM’s micro dynamics and macroscopic phenomena. Worlds, other than time capsules, are coarse-grained regions in phase- or configuration space, defined as sets of possible micro states satisfying a relation of sufficient similarity from a macroscopic perspective, with respect to a given micro state. Hence, worlds may overlap. -/- I argue that worlds thus construed are a reasonable option for replacing the disjoint macro regions of phase space, resulting from the usual way of partitioning phase space in the standard framework of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. This move solves the issue of discontinuous change of macro variables upon the micro state crossing the boundary between different macro regions. -/- I adapt this move for MBM’s discontinuous micro dynamics in configuration space. Issues revolving around the microscopic-macroscopic distinction, particle identity, impenetrability and haecceity in light of the desideratum of particle number conservation, etc., are discussed. I provide a detailed explanation of how overlapping worlds in MBM form world histories, thereby linking up macroscopically distinct worlds. Thus, the problem of temporal solipsism is resolved in a way that is compatible with a more than minimal psychophysical parallelism. (shrink)

The modern Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics describes an emergent multiverse. The goal of this paper is to provide a perspicuous characterisation of how the multiverse emerges making use of a recent account of (weak) ontological emergence. This will be cashed out with a case study that identifies decoherence as the mechanism for emergence. The greater metaphysical clarity enables the rebuttal of critiques due to Baker (2007) and Dawid and Th\'ebault (2015) that cast the emergent multiverse ontology as incoherent; (...) responses are also offered to challenges to the Everettian approach from Maudlin (2010) and Monton (2013). (shrink)

The Born’s rule to interpret the square of wave function as the probability to get a specific value in measurement has been accepted as a postulate in foundations of quantum mechanics. Although there have been so many attempts at deriving this rule theoretically using different approaches such as frequency operator approach, many-world theory, Bayesian probability and envariance, literature shows that arguments in each of these methods are circular. In view of absence of a convincing theoretical proof, recently (...) some researchers have carried out experiments to validate the rule up-to maximum possible accuracy using multi-order interference (Sinha et al, Science, 329, 418 [2010]). But, a convincing analytical proof of Born’s rule will make us understand the basic process responsible for exact square dependency of probability on wave function. In this paper, by generalizing the method of calculating probability in common experience into quantum mechanics, we prove the Born’s rule for statistical interpretation of wave function. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics, like any physical theory, comes equipped with many metaphysical assumptions and implications. The line between metaphysics and physics is often blurry, but as a rough guide, one can think of a theory’s metaphysics as those foundational assumptions made in its interpretation that are not usually directly tested in experiment. In classical mechanics some examples of possible metaphysical assumptions are the claims that forces are real, that inertial mass is primitive, and that space is substantival. The distinctive (...) feature of these claims is that they are all rather far removed from ordinary tests of the theory. Newton defended all three of the above claims at one time or other, whereas Mach attacked each one; however, both scientists agreed on enough of the formalism and its connection to experiment to predict (e.g.) the same periods for given pendulums. What they disagreed about were the ingredients necessary to use classical mechanics to explain and understand the world. (shrink)

This paper explores personal identity and persistence through time in the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (QM). First, I will motivate the MWI’s relevance in the domain of metaphysics. Second, I will define endurantism. Third, I will explain the foundational physics underlying the MWI which entails branching worlds. Finally, I will argue that the privileged branch view best captures endurantist judgments about personal identity and persistence through time in the many-worlds framework. (Note (...) that this work is in its early draft stages - later versions will be updated and revised). (shrink)

This is an extension of my earlier work, How in the World Are There Many Worlds and it's a lot more interesting! This paper explores personal identity and persistence through time in the many-worlds framework, governed by the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics (QM). First, I will motivate our consideration of the MWI in this context. Second, I will introduce endurantism, which is one answer to the puzzle concerning persistence through time. (...) Third, I will explain the foundational physics underlying the MWI that lends itself to branching worlds. In turn, I will explain what exactly a world amounts to in this picture. Then, I will present three views on personal identity and persistence through time: the bye-bye Betty view, the every-branch view, and the privileged branch view. I will argue that the privileged branch view is the most attractive of the bunch for determining the best candidate among close continuers. Finally, I will discuss knowledge, attitudes, and moral responsibility within the privileged branch view. (shrink)

This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including the holographic principle and multiverse theory in quantum physics, and eternalism and mind-body dualism in philosophy – jointly imply an audacious new theory of free will. This new theory, "Libertarian Compatibilism", holds that the physical world is an eternally existing array of two-dimensional information – a vast number of possible pasts, presents, and futures – and the mind a nonphysical entity or set of properties that "read" that (...) physical information off to subjective conscious awareness (in much the same way that a song written on an ordinary compact-disc is only played when read by an outside medium, i.e. a CD-player). According to this theory, every possible physical “timeline” in the multiverse may be fully physically deterministic or physically-causally closed but each person’s consciousness still entirely free to choose, ex nihilo, outside of the physical order, which physically-closed timeline is experienced by conscious observers. Although Libertarian Compatibilism is admittedly fantastic, I show that it not only follows from several live scientific and philosophical hypotheses, I also show that it (A) is a far more explanatorily powerful model of quantum mechanics than more traditional interpretations (e.g. the Copenhagen, Everett, and Bohmian interpretations), (B) makes determinate, testable empirical predictions in quantum theory, and finally, (C) predicts and explains the very existence of a number of philosophical debates and positions in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will. First, I show that whereas traditional interpretations of quantum mechanics are all philosophically problematic and roughly as ontologically “extravagant” as Libertarian Compatibilism – in that they all posit “unseen” processes – Libertarian Compatibilism is nearly identical in structure to the only working simulation that human beings have ever constructed capable of reproducing (and so explaining) every general feature of quantum mechanics we perceive: namely, massive-multiplayer-online-roleplaying videogames (or MMORPGs). Although I am not the first to suggest that our world is akin to a computer simulation, I show that existing MMORPGs (online simulations we have already created) actually reproduce every general feature of quantum mechanics within their simulated-world reference-frames. Second, I show that existing MMORPGs also replicate (and so explain) many philosophical problems we face in the philosophy of mind, time, personal identity, and free will – all while conforming to the Libertarian Compatibilist model of reality. -/- I conclude, as such, that as fantastic and metaphysically extravagant as Libertarian Compatibilism may initially seem, it may well be true. It explains a number of features of our reality that no other physical or metaphysical theory does. (shrink)

Recently we proposed “quantum language" (or,“the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics"), which was not only characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic turn of quantum mechanics but also the linguistic turn of Descartes=Kant epistemology. Namely, quantum language is the scientific final goal of dualistic idealism. It has a great power to describe classical systems as well as quantum systems. Thus, we believe that quantum language is the language in which science is written. The (...) purpose of this preprint is to examine and assert our belief (i.e.,“proposition in quantum language" ⇔“scientific proposition). We believe that it's one of main themes of scientific philosophy to make such language. (shrink)

Based on de Broglie’s wave hypothesis and the covariant ether, the Three Wave Hypothesis (TWH) has been proposed and developed in the last century. In 2007, the author found that the TWH may be attributed to a kinematical classical system of two perpendicular rolling circles. In 2012, the author showed that the position vector of a point in a model of two rolling circles in plane can be transformed to a complex vector under a proposed effect of partial observation. (...) In the present project, this concept of transformation is developed to be a lab observation concept. Under this transformation of the lab observer, it is found that velocity equation of the motion of the point is transformed to an equation analogising the relativistic quantum mechanics equation (Dirac equation). Many other analogies has been found, and are listed in a comparison table. The analogy tries to explain the entanglement within the scope of the transformation. These analogies may suggest that both quantum mechanics and special relativity are emergent, both of them are unified, and of the same origin. The similarities suggest analogies and propose questions of interpretation for the standard quantum theory, without any possible causal claims. (shrink)

The paper takes up Bell's “Everett theory” and develops it further. The resulting theory is about the system of all particles in the universe, each located in ordinary, 3-dimensional space. This many-particle system as a whole performs random jumps through 3N-dimensional configuration space – hence “Tychistic Bohmian Mechanics”. The distribution of its spontaneous localisations in configuration space is given by the Born Rule probability measure for the universal wavefunction. Contra Bell, the theory is argued to satisfy the minimal desiderata (...) for a Bohmian theory within the Primitive Ontology framework. TBM's formalism is that of ordinary Bohmian Mechanics, without the postulate of continuous particle trajectories and their deterministic dynamics. This “rump formalism” receives, however, a different interpretation. We defend TBM as an empirically adequate and coherent quantum theory. Objections voiced by Bell and Maudlin are rebutted. The “for all practical purposes”-classical, Everettian worlds exist sequentially in TBM. In a temporally coarse-grained sense, they quasi-persist. By contrast, the individual particles themselves cease to persist. (shrink)