Abstract: Law professors offer to teach students something called “thinking like a lawyer.” They suggest thereby that legal thought is in some way unique. If it is, through what means is it acquired? By reading the law. And so reading the law must be a different experience than reading other things, as is implied by the admonition that thinking like a lawyer is somehow different than other thinking. In most law school education, reading is practiced as a means to an (...) end—to produce a description of the substance or procedure of a particular area of the law. Too often, it is only in legal research and writing courses that reading is explicitly addressed. Even there, it is most often analyzed only in its role as a counterpart to the goal of writing; of producing tangible text. But although reading is not studied on its own terms, it makes up most of the practice of learning the law and much of the practice of law. When we read in the utilitarian senses of describing substance or procedure or in order to learn to write, we omit the powerful, tacit learning that occurs with this reading—the learning of the legal worldview. This remains true in the practice of law as well, where reading maintains the acquired worldview. This article explores how that worldview seeps silently into the lives of lawyers while they are busy learning to describe and inscribe the law. While social science has much to tell us about the process of reading, we need to turn to the arts to see the worldview that is learned and perpetuated when one learns to read the law. (shrink)

The idea of permit trading in the United States can be traced as far back as the 1970s, but emissions trading has really only became a popular and exportable idea with the more recent demands that environmental protection acknowledge economic pressures through such ideas as sustainable development. Now the idea of emissions trading has caught on in South America, China and Europe as well. Yet in the eagerness of governments and industry to work out the technical details and legal mechanics (...) of the emissions trading tool, insufficient attention has been paid to its underlying legal and ethical assumptions. In this article, it is emphasized that emissions trading is a part of compliance with environmental law, not a market alternative to compliance. The difference between the two greatly effects and is affected by theories of rights. As part of the scheme of rights and accompanying duties, the author questions whether an implicit right to pollute has been created through emissions trading, as exemplified by the comparison of the systems in the U.S., China and Europe. (shrink)

Two problems of wildlife law will be addressed in this article - one is spatial and the other is temporal. The first problem is the lack of identity with, and therefore support for, international wildlife law that local populations have. That leads to the second problem, which is the failure to apply the lessons learned from biodiversity law of fauna to the biodiversity problems of flora. As to the spatial problem, if we make a simple comparison between a map of (...) biodiversity hotspots and a world geopolitical map, we can see that the hotspots worldwide fall largely in developing countries. (shrink)

The legal, political, and social meaning of the work of Charles Darwin has been claimed as resident to conservative and liberal homes alike. Peter Singer’s unique admixture of personal liberal politics and what may look to be an extremely conservative philosophy of nature expose some over-simplicity in traditional ‘right’ and ‘left’ categories. In ‘‘Recovering the Left from Darwin in the 21st Century’’, Steve Fuller provides us with insightful historical and sociological contexts for Singer’s challenges. In this article, Kirk (...) class='Hi'>Junker takes one aspect of the trajectory ‘the notion of natural rights’ and examines their social construction, linguistic maintenance, and legal ramifications. (shrink)

Although we were again reminded in 2008 of the unreliability of markets, pollution mitigation and environmental improvement become increasingly intertwined with market economics. We seem irrationally to continue and in fact, increase the role of the market in maintaining and improving human health and the environment. In this article, the author reviews four popular schemes for market particiption in human health and the environment: emissions trading, the top runner program, corporate average fuel economy (CAFE), and technology forcing. This review demonstrates (...) that when each of these programs has been deemed "effective", it generally means "economically profitable", not effective in improving human health or the environment. The review further shows that as these four methods are compared one to the other, when they do work to improve human health or the environement, their relative ability to do so is directly proportional to the degree of legal control, and indirectly proportional to the role of the market. (shrink)

Contrary to the notion that the human mind has some sort of tendency toward the abstract processes of classifying, analysing and synthesising, this paper suggests that these processes are historically and socially constructed. Because these processes (in particular, synthesising) are brought about to serve specific purposes and agendas, we need to pre-examine them periodically to see if they still serve our needs. In the past, synthesis had an important function as a symbol, among alchemists, for example. We have all but (...) forgotten that symbolic functioning and treat it now only in its material manifestations. Having done so, we use the material sense to explain the symbolic sense. In that way, synthesis may no longer be a helpful way to look at our abstract processes. Insofar as the needs of the future may be different than the needs of the past or present, it may indeed be time to abandon ideas of abstract synthesis. The author suggests that in its place, we consider the notion of ‘shuttling’. Shuttling allows us to adopt different positions, and even contradictory positions within our individual thinking, without feeling the need to immediately characterise the contradiction as ‘wrong’. And insofar as we may have multiple present positions, shuttling opens up the possibility for multiple future positions as well. (shrink)

In reading Barbara Koslowski's "Theory and Evidence: The Development of Scientific Reasoning", one may be convinced that the ancient debate between classical rationalists and empiricists is alive. And like most people who carefully investigate the ability of either rationalism or empiricism truly to account for all of our ability to know, Koslowski arrives at the position of saying that knowledge (in this case scientific knowledge) is a product of both: "neither theory nor data alone is sufficient to achieve scientific success; (...) each must be evaluated in the context of, and constrained by, the other". The problem, according to Koslowski, for those who insist upon empiricism as being the only type of understanding which counts as science, is that we then exclude much of the productive thought in children empiricism champions itself as being theory-independent. The theory-independent notion of science uses covariation as its exclusive criterion for scientific reasoning. "In short, the empiricist aim of rationally reconstructing scientific inquiry in terms of theory-independent principles went along with an (all but exclusive) emphasis on the role of Humean indices. And this, in turn, brought with it a corresponding emphasis on hypothesis testing rather than hypothesis discovery and revision". Consequently, according to Koslowski, if we are willing to expand our notion of scientific reasoning to go beyond testing for covariation, then we will find that many more children and adults can be seen to reason in a manner which would be called "scientific". (shrink)

On September 7, 2008 the executive administration of American President George W. Bush announced that his government would take over the giant mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, costing the citizens $200 billion. One week later, the 160 year-old American investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. What would soon be known worldwide as “the financial crisis” had begun. In response to that crisis, less than a month later, on October 3, 2008, the (...) United States Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which established the Troubled Asset Relief Program and authorized the use of $700 billion in taxpayer funds to bail out the banking and finance industry. As a result, the U.S. Treasury reports that the total bailout gave Bank of America $45 billion, Citigroup Bank $45 billion, AIG Bank $40 billion, J. P Morgan $25 billion, Wells Fargo $25 billion, General Motors $10.4 billion, Goldman Sachs $10 billion, Morgan Stanley $10 billion, GMAC $5 billion, and Chrysler corporation, a mere $4 billion. This response to a perceived crisis was not limited to the United States. On October 12, 2008—in one day alone—the United Kingdom coughed up the equivalent of €679 billion in bank relief. And in Germany, Der Spiegel reported on December 23, 2008 “The German government whipped its €480 billion bank bailout package through parliament in record time.". (shrink)

The future is evitable. That is to say if, as many of the contributors to Futures over the years have claimed, there is more than one future possible, and that more than one will be experienced, then talking about ‘inevitability’ is simply wrong. And what a task it is to attempt to say anything warranted, but nevertheless fresh concerning the futures of Europe—especially in such a context as considering the plural conception of futures in the title of this publication! Immediately (...) after the member states of the Union failed to agree the draft treaty on European Constitution at the Intergovernmental Conference ending on December 13, 2003, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung provided two full pages of political coverage under the rubric “After the Failure [or ‘running aground’] of Brussels— The EU in Crisis”, and on the front page reported “The EU at an Uncertain Future” [2]. Six months later, on the day after those same states agreed a Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, The Irish Times reported that Sweden still supported the EU, but not the Euro, and that EU Council President Bertie Ahearn, the Irish Prime Minister, thanked all those who helped with ‘a ship that has been safely docked today’ [5]. Ships are useful not when they remain in port, but rather when they move, so six months later, after nearly four decades of failed attempts, on December 17, 2004, Turkey was given the possibility of opening talks for accession to the European Union. From the European docks of Ireland, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, there are contributions in this special edition of Futures on “The Futures of Europe”. Even within the geographic limits of Europe, the ships come at different speeds, as represented by two authors from outside the Eurozone and four within. There are also contributions from a ship between ports in Italy and the USA and from a ship between Germany and Turkey. And there is something from that port across the ocean—the USA. What may be perhaps the most telling contribution to this volume, however, is the one that is not here. I had invited a colleague from Beijing to provide a prospective from China on the futures of Europe, and he had enthusiastically accepted. (shrink)

Broadly stated, programs implementing the notion of sustainable development seek to balance economic interests with environmental interests. One would assume from the focus that one finds in sustainable development literature on how economics needs to account for the environment that sustainable development adherents are satisfied with the ways in which environmental studies account for economics. Specifically, it appears that sustainable development adherents are satisfied with the content of science as it is currently practiced and wish only to apply that content (...) of science practice more democratically to special problems. This essay questions that assumption by taking a concrete look at the environmental policy document known as Agenda 21. Can the extant practices of science, which to varying degrees created the need for the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, remain untouched while economics are restructured, if we are to obtain sustainable development? Simply put, what is a sustainable science? (shrink)

Elsewhere I have argued that the future is made of words and images that we create and use in the present, and that the nature of these words is such that we project our future(s)1 from them[1]. Ultimately, we then treat those projected worlds, made of our own words and images, as being something real, or at least real enough to be considered unavoidable, and thus we read back meaning on the present based upon the unavoidable future that we have (...) created. If one accepts this schema, then it begins to make sense not only to examine this process of future creation, but to examine the particular words and images that we have chosen to create the future. Here, I want to examine a particular word—the word “millennium”. A recent edition of the television programme Equinox began with the question “Why has the millennium— a date of our own making—become the focus for the hopes and fears of mankind?”2 The answer lies in the question—it is our own making. We are not only the ones who have done the mathematical calculation to make it 2000, we have created the meaning and significance that it has. And then strangely, dumb-founded and amazed, we stand back as though we are looking upon something as otherpowered as the sun. How do we do this? (shrink)

On the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, the Berlin Declaration declared the period of reflection on the failed Treaty to Establish a Constitution for Europe to be at an end. To replace it, a reform treaty was signed in Lisbon in December of 2007, and newspapers from Dublin to Beijing reported on the communique issued by EU leaders in Brussels that stated ,,The Lisbon Treaty provides the Union with a stable and lasting institutional framework. We expect no change (...) in the foreseeable future, so that the Union will be able to fully concentrate on addressing the concrete challenges ahead, including globalisation and climate change ..."2 In choosing the problems to highlight in the press release for what still might constitute the legal framework for Europe in the foreseeable future, why did these leaders state, and why did these journalists repeat these two issues together - globalisation and climate change? ,,Globalisation" and the various processes it describes as such have already been thoroughly discussed in legal literature many times over. (shrink)

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and our language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. -/- Can an image create a future? Can a word create a future? Most emphatically,‘yes’, I would say. Moreover, not only can words and images create a future, they are the only means of future creation. They are that important because they are that close to our creation of meaning. Thus, it makes (...) perfect sense to look to word and image in its most voluminous form—film—to see suggestions of what some of the future(s) might be. -/- This is not an analysis in the standard sense of a film review. My only comments lie with the creation of future(s) in language and for present purposes, perhaps even more so, in image. There is one important point to be made about one particular word right here at the outset, though. One of the most important criticisms in future studies is that we treat the future as an inevitable manifesting of itself—something that happens ‘out there’, beyond our control or influence. Consequently, there is only one future, as though it is already written in the script of a God, and we are playing it out on stage. This attitude is reflected in language insofar as we consider it standard to use definite, rather than indefinite articles; that is, to say the future, just as we say the present and the past. In fact, we do have some say in the future(s). It is not some sort of intentionally-guided say that we have, however. And it is certainly not some sort of happy control of destiny. It is more of a structural influence. That influence is an influence whereby we create an atmosphere of possibilities. (shrink)

Of course it is not a word, this “dediction”; at least, not yet. But why not? As the story goes, James Joyce was once asked whether his habit of inventing words was because there were not enough words in the English language. He answered that there were enough words, just not the right words. To see whether “dediction” might be a “right word”, I begin by considering related terms, and then consider what they do for us—why do they exist and (...) my new term, “dediction”, does not? For example, if we construct for ourselves a simple list of Latinate roots related to writing and seeing, and then add time-related prefixes, we could quickly come up with “post-script”, “describe”, “description,” “prescribe”, and “prescription”, among others. (“Depict” and “depiction” come to mind as well, but their treatment is beyond my scope here.) If we then do the same for speaking, we have no trouble recognising “predict” and “prediction”, but what about “postdict” and “postdiction” or “dedict” and “dediction”? (shrink)

Previously in Futures, I discussed a word that we use to form an abstract futures concept: “millennium” [1]. In its most common current usage, “millennium” is an example of a word that provides, and one might even say controls, a future orientation for us. In the present essay, I am taking a different approach to the role of the word that I will be discussing. This word is not an example of a future-orientation; rather it is more of an example (...) of language about future-orientation. The word is “expectation”. To make this distinction clearer, it may help to borrow some of the terminological distinctions made by the American logician, C.S. Peirce. First of all, for Peirce, and indeed for my present purposes, signs include words. More specifically, in a paper dated 1867, May 14th, and published in the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Science (Boston), VII (1868) [2] Peirce divided signs into three categories based upon their relationship to their object—Icons, Indices, and Symbols. (Peirce himself used the convention of capitalising the words.) He defined “Icon” as a sign determined by its object “by virtue of its own internal nature”. In comparison, he defined “Index” as a sign determined by its object “by virtue of being in real relation to it”, such as when smoke is a sign of fire. A Symbol, according to Peirce, is a sign determined by its object “only in the sense that it will be so interpreted”. A Symbol thus depends upon conventions or habits. (shrink)

This article considers the role of law as an active force in educating citizens on norms of the society. The norms are created and enforced in the law in general, but of particular importance are those in environmental law. In environmental law the environment is not protected only for the sake of serving human beings. To learn this lesson, however, one must look at the specifics of the law and its application. Some laws purport to be concerned with the environment (...) for its own sake, but a review of the language of that law shows it to be indirectly benefitting humans. (shrink)

There are two different ways in which one can connect the declarations of a worldwide financial crisis and a worldwide climate crisis. The first way has relatively clear legal aspects and requires just a bit of extra thought to see the connection. Insofar as institutions and sources of law have attempted to address climate change to date, states have come to regard the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Protocol thereto, signed during a regular annual Conference of (...) the Parties in 1997 at Kyoto, as the organizing force of all serious legal actions. There are two foci of the UNFCCC and Protocol - mitigation of the causes of climate change and adaption to the effects of climate change. In the first ten years of life with the UNFCCC, much of the focus was upon mitigation. During that period, adaptation was regarded as only a regrettable fallback position to be considered if we were unable (or as it turns out, unwilling) to mitigate. (shrink)

In his essay "Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community," Edward W. Said throws down a gage to literary theorists and challenges them to break out of disciplinary ghettos, "to reopen the blocked social processes ceding objective representations (hence power) of the world to a small coterie of experts and their clients, to consider that the audience for literacy is not a closed circle of three thousand professional critics but the community of human beings living in society . . . ."' To (...) the literary critic he admonishes: "When you discuss Keats or Shakespeare or Dickens, you may touch on political subjects, of course, but it is assumed that the skills traditionally associated with modern literary criticism . . . are there to be applied to literary texts, not, for instance, to a government document . . . . The intellectual toll this has taken in the work of the most explicitly political of recent critics . . . is very high." Should lawyers not match Said's gage by throwing down one of their own? If literary criticism should be socially engaged, should the social practice of law not be literate? If so, to what end? (shrink)

When introducing the respective roles of the philosopher and the mathematician in Being and Event, Alain Badiou notes that when representing mathematics: "placing being in the general position of an object, would immediately corrupt the necessity, for any ontological operation, of de-objedification. Hence, of course, the attitude of those the Americans call working mathematicians: they always find general considerations about their discipline vain and obsolete. They only trust whomever works hand in hand with them grinding away at the latest mathematical (...) problem. . . .Empirically, the mathematician always suspects the philosopher of not knowing enough about mathematics to have earned the right to speak." While the discipline of law does not have the ontological purchase of the discipline of mathematics, the working lawyer, like the working mathematician, would feel disconnected from "the rigorous description of the generic essence of [his] operations" that the philosopher might offer. Badiou further reports that "justice" is a philosophical word if we do not include juridical significations in it. It is precisely here, when the juridical significations are left aside, that the lawyer (not the legislator) is excluded from the benefits of a "rigorous description" that a philosopher might offer. What can be done to extend the ontological understanding of justice to include the subjectivity of the lawyer and to determine whether the juridical is capable of Badiou's sense of "event?". (shrink)

What powers do to several states of the United States have individually to enter into environmental agreements with other sovereign nations? In this article, the author reviews the power that states may have generally and then specifically regarding environmental agreements. Several traditional tools of analysis have historically been used including the constitutional doctrine of pre-emption, cooperative federalism and the foreign affairs doctrine. Some newer tools of analysis are also offered including the revival of the treaty-compact and the author's own concept (...) of "de-emption". The United States Senate's explicit refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, coupled with the consequent state initiatives to control greenhouse gasses - especially the documents concluded between New Jersey and the Netherlands, provide rich examples of these tools in contemporary action. (shrink)

“Human relations and the relations to other beings in our age.” There are three components to this theme: human-to-human relationships, human-to-other being relationships, and the temporal focus of our age. In the following, I will both discuss theoretical concerns among these components as well as present case studies to illustrate my points. In asking why a duck cannot sign a contract, I hope to demonstrate inherent insufficiencies in relations between humans and other beings in our age when they are characterized (...) as legal property relations. Among the possible forms that could relate humans to other humans and other beings, global society often resorts to law. Relationships in other, more culturally-dependent arenas, are more difficult to navigate when the cultures speak different languages, follow different religions, and build different family structures. Indeed we are not globalized in these cultural areas. We are globalized economically. And insofar as law facilitates globalization, the economic norms it uses become the common denominator among the cultures and even the relationship between humans and other beings. (shrink)

In the human and natural sciences there are many ways of examining nature. While archaeologists, anthropologists and other scientists prefer to examine nature empirically, philosophers and other humanists are more likely to examine texts in order to arrive at an idea of, for example, the Greek world's understanding of nature. Among the scholarly treatises that we typically consider to be sources for research into Greek philosophy of nature and the environment, I selected, for the purposes of this paper, Plato's The (...) Laws and Aristotle's Constitutions of Athens. In this paper I will argue that if we want to understand ecology or environment as cultural concepts, and we look to the law of Classical Greece, or at least Athens, we find that knowing the law is not the direct process of the present day - that is to say, we cannot simply look to written codes to understand the legal practices. Plato in The Laws, points to a comportment toward nature, through the law, which can be based upon objectively-obtained values, without resulting in material scientism. With this in mind, we citizens can determine environmental policy and law, without pretending that it is dictated by earth, air and water. (shrink)

Much too often, we are guilty of monumentalizing historical persons. As monuments, these people stop being persons, and instead function as placeholders. Monuments can be placeholders for that which is good, or that which is bad. Depending upon one's predictions for such phenomena as "The Enlightenment" and "The Scientific Revolution", one is likely to place either wreaths or garbage at the foot of the monument that is René Descartes. To his credit, Keith Devlin does neither in "Goodbye,Descartes". In the post-war (...) era, trendy circles often find Descartes to be the convenient whipping-boy for all that is wrong with our relationship to the natural world: the subject-object divide, a dispassionate attitude, hyper-rationality, and a context-free world of practices. This use of Descartes ultimately means that no longer does anyone seriously examine his work or closely trace its ramifications. Instead one just evokes his name as the locus of rationality, the side of the Enlightenment, or the turning point from enchantment. (shrink)

In current legal and political atmospheres, when governments are embracing notions such as pollution prevention and the three ”R’s” – reduce, reuse and recycle, while discarding command and control types of regulatory enforcement, some may be surprised to learn that since 1971 Pennsylvania law has permitted the exemption of corporate assets from capital stock valuation for the purpose of paying capital stock taxes, if the assets are devoted to pollution control or abatement. Straightforward though the idea of tax exemption for (...) pollution control assets may seem, the execution of the statutory exemption, together with the regulation which was promulgated thereunder, yields a wide variety of hermeneutic fruit under the scrutiny of the judiciary and the advocacy of lawyers. (shrink)

"[A]n orderly transfer of responsibility back to Britain, which has exclusively governed Northern Ireland for most of the past three violent decades" is a phrase that ended a recent world news brief in a Pittsburgh newspaper. To the uninitiated, this may look like the same old Ireland; in fact, it may not even look like news. Certainly, it is not quick change [...]. But if we unpack this simple statement, we find that there is much that is new here, and (...) much that is of interest to those who might want to approach things Irish from a legal perspective. Indeed, approaching Ireland from a legal perspective may be precisely what is new. While our research has found much discussion of the social, political and historical aspects of Irish culture, there is not much that would both qualify as legal scholarship and is up-to-date in a situation that experiences significant changes daily. (shrink)

In looking toward the futures of Europe, the focal point of the legal and governmental aspects of European life has recently become the Treaty Establishing a Constitution of Europe - or just the "Constitution" as it has become colloquially known. That socio-linguistic act of referring to a document as a constitution is a mammoth move. First, it ignores all of the concerns and handwringing around the idea of producing a legal document called a constitution that might immediately be thought of (...) as a sovereign-building document, such as the German constitution of the Irish constitution. Second, it suggests that the people of Europe are in some way similarly situated as together to constitute something. In this article, the author continues a series of reflections on words regarding futures, and takes an extensive look at the use, misuse and power of the word "constitution". (shrink)

This chapter argues that in cases in which a (non-institutional) group is collectively causally responsible and collectively morally responsible for some harm which is either (i) brought about intentionally or (ii) foreseen as the side effect of something brought about intentionally or (iii) unforeseen but a nonaggregative harm, each member of the group is equally and as fully responsible for the harm as if he or she had done it alone.

Ludwig deals with the relations between language, thought, and rationality, and, especially, the role and status of assumptions about rationality in interpreting another’s speech and assigning contents to her psychological attitudes—her beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on. The chapter is organized around three questions: What is the relation between rationality and thought? What is the relation between rationality and language? What is the relation between thought and language? Ludwig argues that some large degree of rationality is required for thought and (...) consequently that same degree of rationality at least is required for language since language requires thought. Thought, however, does not require language. In answering questions and, Ludwig gives particular attention to Davidson’s arguments for the Principle of Charity, according to which it is constitutive of speakers that they are largely rational and largely right about the world, and to Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that without the power of speech we lack the power of thought. (shrink)

Let the label binary category terms refer to natural language expressions like ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘female’, and ‘male’. Focusing on ‘woman’ and ‘female’, I develop a novel, empirically supported theory of the meanings of English binary category terms. Given plausible assumptions about the metaphysics of sex and gender, this gender-first theory predicts that the sentence ‘Trans women are women’ expresses a truth in all contexts and the sentence ‘Women are adult human females’ expresses a truth in most ordinary contexts — thus (...) that these two sentences can and usually do express logically consistent contents. The key feature of the proposed theory is that it treats both ‘woman’ and ‘female’ as sensitive to an individual’s gender when that individual belongs to a gendered category and to an individual’s sex otherwise. The existence and plausibility of a gender-first theory of this kind opens up conceptual room for trans-inclusive positions in the philosophy of sex and gender which endorse the claim that women are adult human females, thereby both accounting for trans women’s experiences of their bodies as female and helping to disarm the sentence ‘Women are adult human females’ as a trans-exclusionary slogan. (shrink)

This article begins by distinguishing force and mood. Then it lays out desiderata on a successful account. It sketches as background the program of truth-theoretic semantics. Next, it surveys assimilation approaches and argues that they are inadequate. Then it shows how the fulfillment-conditional approach can be applied to imperatives, interrogatives, molecular sentences containing them, and quantification into mood markers. Next, it considers briefly the recent set of propositions approach to the semantics of interrogatives and exclamatives. Finally, it shows how to (...) integrate exclamatives and optatives into a framework similar to the fulfillment approach. (shrink)

A sorites argument is a symptom of the vagueness of the predicate with which it is constructed. A vague predicate admits of at least one dimension of variation (and typically more than one) in its intended range along which we are at a loss when to say the predicate ceases to apply, though we start out confident that it does. It is this feature of them that the sorites arguments exploit. Exactly how is part of the subject of this paper. (...) The majority of philosophers writing on vagueness take it to be a kind of semantic phenomenon. If we are right, they are correct in this assumption, which is surely the default position, but they have not so far provided a satisfactory account of the implications of this or a satisfactory diagnosis of the sorites arguments. Other philosophers have urged more exotic responses, which range from the view that the fault lies not in our language, but in the world, which they propose to be populated with vague objects which our semantics precisely reflects, to the view that the world and language are both perfectly in order, but that the fault lies with our knowledge of the properties of the words we use (epistemicism). In contrast to the exotica to which some philosophers have found themselves driven in an attempt to respond to the sorites puzzles, we undertake a defense of the commonsense view that vague terms are semantically vague. Our strategy is to take fresh look at the phenomenon of vagueness. Rather than attempting to adjudicate between different extant theories, we begin with certain pre-theoretic intuitions about vague terms, and a default position on classical logic. The aim is to see whether (i) a natural story can be told which will explain the vagueness phenomenon and the puzzling nature of soritical arguments, and, in the course of this, to see whether (ii) there arises any compelling pressure to give up the natural stance. We conclude that there is a simple and natural story to be told, and we tell it, and that there is no good reason to abandon our intuitively compelling starting point. The importance of the strategy lies in its dialectical structure. Not all positions on vagueness are on a par. Some are so incredible that even their defenders think of them as positions of last resort, positions to which we must be driven by the power of philosophical argument. We aim to show that there is no pressure to adopt these incredible positions, obviating the need to respond to them directly. If we are right, semantic vagueness is neither surprising, nor threatening. It provides no reason to suppose that the logic of natural languages is not classical or to give up any independently plausible principle of bivalence. Properly understood, it provides us with a satisfying diagnosis of the sorites argumentation. It would be rash to claim to have any completely novel view about a topic so well worked as vagueness. But we believe that the subject, though ancient, still retains its power to inform and challenge us. In particular, we will argue that taking seriously the central phenomenon of predicate vagueness—the “boundarylessness” of vague predicates—on the commonsense assumption that vagueness is semantic, leads ineluctably to the view that no sentences containing vague expressions (henceforth ‘vague sentences’) are truth-evaluable. This runs counter to much of the literature on vagueness, which commonly assumes that, though some applications of vague predicates to objects fail to be truth-evaluable, in clear positive and negative cases vague sentences are unproblematically true or false. It is clarity on this, and related points, that removes the puzzles associated with vagueness, and helps us to a satisfying diagnosis of why the sorites arguments both seem compelling and yet so obviously a bit of trickery. We give a proof that semantically vague predicates neither apply nor fail-to-apply to anything, and that consequently it is a mistake to diagnose sorites arguments, as is commonly done, by attempting to locate in them a false premise. Sorites arguments are not sound, but not unsound either. We offer an explanation of their appeal, and defend our position against a variety of worries that might arise about it. The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce an important distinction in terms of which we characterize what has gone wrong with vague predicates. We characterize what we believe to be our natural starting point in thinking about the phenomenon of vagueness, from which only a powerful argument should move us, and then trace out the consequences of accepting this starting point. We consider the charge that among the consequences of semantic vagueness are that we must give up classical logic and the principle of bivalence, which has figured prominently in arguments for epistemicism. We argue there are no such consequences of our view: neither the view that the logic of natural languages is classical, nor any plausible principle of bivalence, need be given up. Next, we offer a diagnosis of what has gone wrong in sorites arguments on the basis of our account. We then present an argument to show that our account must be accepted on pain of embracing (in one way or another) the epistemic view of “vagueness”, i.e., of denying that there are any semantically vague terms at all. Next, we discuss some worries that may arise about the intelligibility of our linguistic practices if our account is correct. We argue none of these worries should force us from our intuitive starting point. Finally, we cast a quick glance at other forms of semantic incompleteness. (shrink)

How are we able to perceive the world veridically? If we ask this question as a part of the scientific investigation of perception, then we are not asking for a transcendental guarantee that our perceptions are by and large veridical; we presuppose that they are. Unless we assumed that we perceived the world for the most part veridically, we would not be in a position to investigate our perceptual abilities empirically. We are interested, then, not in how it is possible (...) in general for us to perceive the world veridically, but instead in what the relation is between our environment and its properties, of which we have knowledge, on the one hand, and our perceptual mechanisms, on the other, that results in very many, even most of our perceptions being veridical in everyday life. (shrink)

Our aim in the present paper is to investigate, from the standpoint of truth-theoretic semantics, English tense, temporal designators and quantifiers, and other expressions we use to relate ourselves and other things to the temporal order. Truth-theoretic semantics provides a particularly illuminating standpoint from which to discuss issues about the semantics of tense, and their relation to thoughts at, and about, times. Tense, and temporal modifiers, contribute systematically to conditions under which sentences we utter are true or false. A Tarski-style (...) truth-theoretic semantics, by requiring explicitly represented truth conditions, helps to sharpen questions about the function of tense, and to deepen our insight into the contribution the tenses and temporal modifiers make to what we say by using them. (shrink)

The Abrahamic faiths of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam are typically recognized as the world’s major monotheistic religions. However, African Traditional Religion is, despite often including lesser spirits and gods, a monotheistic religion with numerous adherents in sub-Saharan Africa; it includes the idea of a single most powerful God responsible for the creation and sustenance of everything else. This Element focuses on drawing attention to this major world religion that has been much neglected by scholars around the globe, particularly those working (...) in the West or Northern Hemisphere. It accomplishes this primarily by bringing it into conversation with topics in the Anglo-American philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this introduction we explore a number of puzzles that arise concerning epistemic autonomy, and introduce the sections and chapters of the book. There are four broad types of puzzles to be explored, corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first set of puzzles concerns the nature of epistemic autonomy. Here, questions arise such as what is epistemic autonomy? Is epistemic autonomy valuable? What are we epistemically autonomous about? The second set of puzzles concern epistemic paternalism. Paternalistic acts (...) interfere with an agent’s autonomy. Here, questions arise concerning the permissibility of epistemic paternalism as well the extension of epistemically paternalistic acts. The third set of puzzles concerns the relation of epistemic autonomy to epistemic value and to intellectual virtues and vices. Is there epistemic value to being epistemically autonomous? How does epistemic autonomy relate to different intellectual virtues and vices? Finally, the fourth set of puzzles concerns the role of epistemic autonomy within a social epistemology. How does epistemic autonomy square with a reliance on expertise? Does thinking about epistemic autonomy add to the debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement or epistemic injustice? (shrink)

Recent third person approaches to thought experiments and conceptual analysis through the method of surveys are motivated by and motivate skepticism about the traditional first person method. I argue that such surveys give no good ground for skepticism, that they have some utility, but that they do not represent a fundamentally new way of doing philosophy, that they are liable to considerable methodological difficulties, and that they cannot be substituted for the first person method, since the a priori knowledge which (...) is our object in conceptual analysis can be acquired only from the first person standpoint. (shrink)

This paper articulates and defends a conception of logical form as semantic form revealed by a compositional meaning theory. On this conception, the logical form of a sentence is determined by the semantic types of its primitive terms and their mode of combination as it relates to determining under what conditions it is true. We develop this idea in the framework of truth-theoretic semantics. We argue that the semantic form of a declarative sentence in a language L is revealed by (...) a (canonical) proof of its T- sentence in an interpretive truth theory for L. We give a precise characterization of sameness of logical form between any two declarative sentences in any two languages in terms of the notion of corresponding proofs in interpretive truth theories for the languages. We illustrate the utility of this approach with a number of examples. We then extend the characterization to non-declaratives in a generalization of truth-theoretic semantics that appeals to fulfillment conditions, of which truth conditions are one variety. On this approach, logical forms are not reified, and the notion of sameness of logical form is treated as conceptually basic. We discuss the relation of this conception of logical form to the project of identifying logical constants, reviewing two approaches, one of which takes topic neutrality as central, the other recursion. We argue that the project of identifying logical constants for the purposes of classifying together valid arguments is largely independent of that identifying logical form of sentences, and urge an ecumenical approach to extending talk of logical constants beyond where it is currently well-grounded. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell, in the second of his 1914 Lowell lectures, Our Knowledge of the External World, asserted famously that ‘every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical’ (Russell 1993, p. 42). He went on to characterize that portion of logic that concerned the study of forms of propositions, or, as he (...) called them, ‘logical forms’. This portion of logic he called ‘philosophical logic’. Russell asserted that ... some kind of knowledge of logical forms, though with most people it is not explicit, is involved in all understanding of discourse. It is the business of philosophical logic to extract this knowledge from its concrete integuments, and to render it explicit and pure. (p. 53) Perhaps no one still endorses quite this grand a view of the role of logic and the investigation of logical form in philosophy. But talk of logical form retains a central role in analytic philosophy. Given its widespread use in philosophy and linguistics, it is rather surprising that the concept of logical form has not received more attention by philosophers than it has. The concern of this paper is to say something about what talk of logical form comes to, in a tradition that stretches back to (and arguably beyond) Russell’s use of that expression. This will not be exactly Russell’s conception. For we do not endorse Russell’s view that propositions are the bearers of logical form, or that appeal to propositions adds anything to our understanding of what talk of logical form comes to. But we will be concerned to provide an account responsive to the interests expressed by Russell in the above quotations, though one clarified of extraneous elements, and expressed precisely. For this purpose, it is important to note that the concern expressed by Russell in the above passages, as the surrounding text makes clear, is a concern not just with logic conceived narrowly as the study of logical terms, but with propositional form more generally, which includes, e.g., such features as those that correspond to the number of argument places in a propositional function, and the categories of objects which propositional.... (shrink)

Recent advances in natural language processing have given rise to a new kind of AI architecture: the language agent. By repeatedly calling an LLM to perform a variety of cognitive tasks, language agents are able to function autonomously to pursue goals specified in natural language and stored in a human-readable format. Because of their architecture, language agents exhibit behavior that is predictable according to the laws of folk psychology: they function as though they have desires and beliefs, and then make (...) and update plans to pursue their desires given their beliefs. We argue that the rise of language agents significantly reduces the probability of an existential catastrophe due to loss of control over an AGI. This is because the probability of such an existential catastrophe is proportional to the difficulty of aligning AGI systems, and language agents significantly reduce that difficulty. In particular, language agents help to resolve three important issues related to aligning AIs: reward misspecification, goal misgeneralization, and uninterpretability. (shrink)

Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its obvious bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual’s welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial (...) systems have wellbeing. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that our metaphysical and moral uncertainty about AI wellbeing requires us dramatically to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create. (shrink)

Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.

Nudging works through dispositions to decide with specific heuristics, and has three component parts. A nudge is a feature of an environment that enables such a disposition; a person is nudged when such a disposition is triggered; and a person performs a nudged action when such a disposition manifests in action. This analysis clarifies an autonomy-based worry about nudging as used in public policy or for private profit: that a person’s ability to reason well is undermined when she is nudged. (...) Reasoning well is a component of self-guidance, which is an aspect of autonomy and so something there is reason to promote, preserve, or respect. However, a person can reason well when she is nudged: Many of these heuristics are good rules to reason with, and she can be flexible with respect to them when she takes there to be a better way to reason. Along the way, this paper uncovers several design specifications for responsible nudging, and discusses open empirical questions. However, nudging’s being compatible with reasoning well crystallizes a distinct worry about manipulation: that nudge designers can rely on nudged people guiding themselves toward the designers’ own ends. Manipulation of this sort exploits one aspect of autonomy (namely, self-guidance) to undermine autonomy in other respects. (shrink)

This chapter explains the mechanism of proxy agency whereby a group (or individual) acts through another authorized to represent it.

This paper gives an account of proxy agency in the context of collective action. It takes the case of a group announcing something by way of a spokesperson as an illustration. In proxy agency, it seems that one person or subgroup's doing something counts as or constitutes or is recognized as (tantamount to) another person or group's doing something. Proxy agency is pervasive in institutional action. It has been taken to be a straightforward counterexample to an appealing deflationary view of (...) collective action as a matter of all members of a group making a contribution to bringing about some event. I show that this is a mistake. I give a deflationary account of constitutive rules in terms of essentially collective action types. I then give an account of one form of constitutive agency in terms of constitutive rules. I next give an account of status functions—of which being a spokesperson is one—that also draws on the concept of a constitutive rule. I then show how these materials help us to see how proxy agency is an expression of the agency of all members of the group credited with doing something when the proxy acts. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.

I address a criticism of the use of thought experiments in conceptual analysis advanced on the basis of the survey method of so-called experimental philosophy. The criticism holds that surveys show that intuitions are relative to cultures in a way that undermines the claim that intuition-based investigation yields any objective answer to philosophical questions. The crucial question is what intuitions are as philosophers have been interested in them. To answer this question we look at the role of intuitions in philosophical (...) inquiry. When we have done this, we can see that it is impossible for intuitions properly understood to be relative in the way that has been suggested as they are conceived of as expressions of competence in the concepts deployed in their contents. The remaining methodological issues, though not to be dismissed, present no in principle objection to the method of thought experiments. (shrink)

Corporations have often been taken to be the paradigm of an organization whose agency is autonomous from that of the successive waves of people who occupy the pattern of roles that define its structure, which licenses saying that the corporation has attitudes, interests, goals, and beliefs which are not those of the role occupants. In this essay, I sketch a deflationary account of agency-discourse about corporations. I identify institutional roles with a special type of status function, a status role, in (...) which the collectively accepted function is expressed in part through its occupier’s intentional expression of her agency in that role. I identify institutions as systems of status roles and show how this is compatible with seeing the agency of institutions generally, even over time periods in which there is complete change in role occupiers, as a matter of the contributions only of individual agents. I explain how the reduction of the institution to its members is compatible with its potentially having had a completely different membership. I show in the case of the corporation in particular that, once we see its origins and function, the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading and are compatible with a deflationary account of corporate agency. I show in connection with this that the corporation is to be identified with its shareholders, and that where a corporation separates ownership and control, its managers and employees are proxy agents of the shareholders doing business under the corporate form. Finally, I canvass the legitimate ways of construing ordinary talk about corporate intention, belief, and so on, in light of this, none of which support the attribution of genuine agency or intentionality to any group per se associated with the corporation. (shrink)

Recent studies on mind‐wandering reveal its potential role in goal exploration and planning future actions. How to understand these explorative functions and their impact on planning remains unclear. Given certain conceptions of intentions and beliefs, the explorative functions of mind‐wandering could lead to regular reconsideration of one's intentions. However, this would be in tension with the stability of intentions central to rational planning agency. We analyze the potential issue of excessive reconsideration caused by mind‐wandering. Our response resolves this tension, presenting (...) a model that aligns the roles of mind‐wandering in planning with empirical evidence and the sustained stability of intentions. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan of action, a conditional intention is a commitment to a contingency plan, a commitment about what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency relevant to one’s interests obtaining. In unconditional intending, our commitment to acting is not contingent on finding out that some condition obtains. In conditional intending, we intend to undertake an action on some condition, impinging on our interests, which (...) is as yet unsettled for us, but about which we can find out without undue cost. (shrink)

Much of the recent movement organized under the heading “Experimental Philosophy” has been concerned with the empirical study of responses to thought experiments drawn from the literature on philosophical analysis. I consider what bearing these studies have on the traditional projects in which thought experiments have been used in philosophy. This will help to answer the question what the relation is between Experimental Philosophy and philosophy, whether it is an “exciting new style of [philosophical] research”, “a new interdisciplinary field that (...) uses methods normally associated with psychology to investigate questions normally associated with philosophy” (Knobe et al. 2012), or whether its relation to philosophy consists, as some have suggested, in no more than the word ‘philosophy’ appearing in its title, or whether the truth lies somewhere in between these two views. I first distinguishes different strands in Experimental Philosophy, negative and positive x-phi, and x-phi pursuing philosophy as opposed to x-phi as cognitive science. Next I review some ways in which Experimental Philosophy has been criticized. Finally, I consider what would have to be true for Experimental Philosophy to have one or another sort of relevance to philosophy, whether the assumptions required are true, how we could know it, and the ideal limits of the usefulness Experimental Philosophy to philosophy. I conclude x-phi cannot in principle be a replacement for traditional first person approaches because it yields the wrong kind of knowledge and that it can nonetheless be a practical aid in conducting philosophical thought experiments. n. (shrink)