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  1. Le langage. Lectures d’Aristote.Gazziero Leone (ed.) - 2021 - Leuven: Peeters.
    Even though Aristotle speaks often about language, his remarks do not fall within the province of any given discipline, let alone belong to the same subject matter or amount to a πραγματεία of their own. Rather, they are somewhat scattered across the Aristotelian corpus and are to be gleaned from a vast array of texts, including ethical and political writings (where language plays a remarkable role in shaping human sociability), treatises on natural history (where Aristotle outlines the physiology of phonation (...)
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  2. Aristotle on the Unity of the Nutritive and Reproductive Functions.Cameron F. Coates & James G. Lennox - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (4):414-466.
    In De Anima 2.4, Aristotle claims that nutritive soul encompasses two distinct biological functions: nutrition and reproduction. We challenge a pervasive interpretation which posits ‘nutrients’ as the correlative object of the nutritive capacity. Instead, the shared object of nutrition and reproduction is that which is nourished and reproduced: the ensouled body, qua ensouled. Both functions aim at preserving this object, and thus at preserving the form, life, and being of the individual organism. In each case, we show how Aristotle’s detailed (...)
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  3. Aristotle on the Matter for Birth, Life, and the Elements.David Ebrey - 2020 - In Liba Taub (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Science. Cambridge, UK: pp. 79-101.
    This essay considers three case studies of Aristotle’s use of matter, drawn from three different scientific contexts: menstrual fluid as the matter of animal generation in the Generation of Animals, the living body as matter of an organism in Aristotle’s On the Soul (De Anima), and the matter of elemental transformation in Generation and Corruption. I argue that Aristotle conceives of matter differently in these treatises (1) because of the different sorts of changes under consideration, and (2) because sometimes he (...)
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  4. Why De Anima Needs III.12-13.Robert Howton - 2020 - In Gweltaz Guyomarc'H., Claire Louguet & Charlotte Murgier (eds.), Aristote et l'âme humaine. Lectures de 'De anima' III offertes à Michel Crubellier. Leuven: pp. 329-350.
    The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex activity” of its (...)
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  5. A Theory of Evolution as a Process of Unfolding.Agustin Ostachuk - 2020 - Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy 16 (1):347-379.
    In this work I propose a theory of evolution as a process of unfolding. This theory is based on four logically concatenated principles. The principle of evolutionary order establishes that the more complex cannot be generated from the simpler. The principle of origin establishes that there must be a maximum complexity that originates the others by logical deduction. Finally, the principle of unfolding and the principle of actualization guarantee the development of the evolutionary process from the simplest to the most (...)
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  6. Aristotle, Heidegger, and the Megarians.Hikmet Unlu - 2020 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 64 (1):125-140.
    This paper examines Aristotle’s analysis of unenacted capacities to show the role they play in his discovery of the concept of actuality. I first argue that Aristotle begins Metaphysics IX by focusing on active and passive capacities, after which I discuss Aristotle’s confrontation with the Megarians, the philosophers who maintain that a capacity is present only insofar as it is being enacted. Using Heidegger’s interpretation as a guide, I show that Aristotle’s rejection of the Megarian position leads him to propose (...)
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  7. How Aristotle Changes Anaxagoras’s Mind.Jason W. Carter - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):1-28.
    I argue that a common interpretation of DA 3.4, which sees Aristotle as there rejecting Anaxagoras’s account of mind, is mistaken. Instead, I claim that, in providing his solution to the main puzzles of this chapter, Aristotle takes special care to preserve the essential features that he thinks Anaxagoras ascribes to mind, namely, its ability to know all things, its being unmixed, and its inability to be affected by mixed objects.
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  8. Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Christopher Shields. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):192-193.
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. By Shields Christopher.
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  9. Can there be a science of psychology? Aristotle’s de Anima and the structure and construction of science.Robert J. Hankinson - 2019 - Manuscrito 42 (4):469-515.
    This article considers whether and how there can be for Aristotle a genuine science of ‘pure’ psychology, of the soul as such, which amounts to considering whether Aristotle’s model of science in the Posterior Analytics is applicable to the de Anima.
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  10. O Problema do Pensamento no De Anima de Aristóteles.Fernanda Pereira Augusto da Silva - 2016 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal da Paraíba, Brazil
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  11. The Principle of Life: from Aristotelian Psyche to Drieschian Entelechy.Agustin Ostachuk - 2016 - Ludus Vitalis 24 (45):37-59.
    Is life a simple result of a conjunction of physico-chemical processes? Can be reduced to a mere juxtaposition of spatially determined events? What epistemology or world-view allows us to comprehend it? Aristotle built a novel philosophical system in which nature is a dynamical totality which is in constant movement. Life is a manifestation of it, and is formed and governed by the psyche. Psyche is the organizational principle of the different biological levels: nutritive, perceptive and intelective. Driesch's crucial experiment provided (...)
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  12. Merely Living Animals in Aristotle.Refik Güremen - 2015 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):115.
    : In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded that some of (...)
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  13. Touching, thinking, being: The sense of touch in Aristotle's De Anima and its implications.Pascal Massie - 2013 - Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):74-101.
    Aristotle’s treatment of tactility is at odds with the hierarchical order of psyche’s faculties. Touching is the commonest and lowest power; it is possessed by all sentient beings; thinking is, on the contrary, the highest faculty that distinguishes human beings. Yet, while Aristotle maintains against some of his predecessors that to think is not to sense, he nevertheless posits a causal link between practical intelligence and tactility and even describes noetic activity as a certain kind of touch. This essay elucidates (...)
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  14. SENSO-PERCEPÇÃO NO DE ANIMA B DE ARISTÓTELES.Fernanda Pereira Augusto da Silva - 2011 - Dissertation, Ufpb, Brazil
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  15. Imaginação e intelecção no De Anima III 3-5 de Aristóteles.Pedro Vinicius Brito Eroles - 2011 - Dissertation, Puc-São Paulo
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  16. A noesis como intelecção dos indivisíveis em Aristóteles.Juliana Peixoto - 2010 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
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  17. O conceito aristotélico de phantasia deliberativa no livro III do De Anima.Viviane Dutra Gramigna - 2006 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
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  18. Aristóteles: De Anima.Maria Cecília Gomes dos Reis - 2006 - São Paulo, Brazil: Editora 34.
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  19. O nous no "Tratado da alma" de Aristóteles.Juliana Peixoto - 2005 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
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  20. Aristóteles: De Anima Livros I-III (trechos).Lucas Angioni - 1999 - Campinas, Brazil: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de Campinas.
    Translation of passages of Aristotle's De Anima into Portuguese. The passages are these: I.1, I.4 (the 'Rylean passage'); II.1-6; III.1-8. The translation is preliminary.
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