View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

13 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-07-31
    The Axiology of Abortion: Should We Hope Pro-Choicers or Pro-Lifers Are Right?Perry Hendricks - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    The ethics of abortion considers whether abortion is immoral. Pro-choice philosophers think that it is not immoral, while pro-life philosophers think that it is. The axiology of abortion considers whether world would be better if the pro-choice or pro-life position is right. While much attention has been given to the ethics of abortion, there has been no attention given to the axiology of abortion. In this article, I seek to change that. I consider various arguments for thinking our world would (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-03-20
    Una popolazione sana, virtuosa e felice. Malthus dalla morale sessuale all’etica della procreazione.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2012 - In M. Loi & Roberto Mordacci (eds.), Etica e genetica. Storia, concetti e pratiche. Milano: Bruno Mondadori. pp. 3-22.
    I argue that Malthus’s Essay on Population is more a treatise in applied ethics than the first treatise in demography. I argue also that, as an ethical work, it is a highly innovative one. The substitution of procreation for sex as the focus makes for a drastic change in the agenda. what had been basically lacking in the discussion up to Malthus’s time was a consideration of human beings’ own responsibility in the decision of procreating. This makes for a remarkable (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. added 2018-09-07
    Even If the Fetus is Not a Person, Abortion is Immoral: The Impairment Argument.Perry Hendricks - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (2):245-253.
    Much of the discussion surrounding the ethics of abortion has centered around the notion of personhood. This is because many philosophers hold that the morality of abortion is contingent on whether the fetus is a person - though, of course, some famous philosophers have rejected this thesis (e.g. Judith Thomson and Don Marquis). In this article, I construct a novel argument for the immorality of abortion based on the notion of impairment. This argument does not assume that the fetus is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  4. added 2016-12-08
    Harm or Mere Inconvenience? Denying Women Emergency Contraception.Carolyn McLeod - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (1):11-30.
    This paper addresses the likely impact on women of being denied emergency contraception (EC) by pharmacists who conscientiously refuse to provide it. A common view—defended by Elizabeth Fenton and Loren Lomasky, among others—is that these refusals inconvenience rather than harm women so long as the women can easily get EC somewhere else nearby. I argue from a feminist perspective that the refusals harm women even when they can easily get EC somewhere else nearby.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  5. added 2016-05-27
    Moralna niepewność w argumentacji bioetycznej.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - Filozofia W Praktyce 2 (14).
    Niektórzy twierdzą, że nawet jeśli ktoś nie wierzy, że embriony lub płody ludzkie mają jakiś szczególnie wyróżniony status moralny, to z ostrożności powinien traktować je tak, jak gdyby miały pełny status moralny. Pokażę, dlaczego takie rozumowanie jest niepoprawne.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2016-05-27
    Klauzula sumienia: lekarze jak poborowi.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2015 - Filozofia W Praktyce 1 (1).
    „Skoro powszechnie przyjmuje się, że sumienie jest suwerenne, to nie wiadomo, po co lekarz miałby uzasadniać pisemnie swój światopogląd” – napisała Naczelna Izba Lekarska w skardze do Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Trybunał tę część skargi oddalił w wyroku z 7 października 2015 r., ale stwierdził, że „Celem prowadzenia dokumentacji medycznej nie jest (…) utrwalanie na piśmie poglądów filozoficzno-prawnych lekarza”. Uznał też, że uzasadnienie „powinno mieć charakter medyczny, a nie służyć wyjaśnieniu światopoglądu lekarza, czy też wskazaniu zasady moralnej leżącej u podstaw jego zachowania”. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2016-04-08
    Contraception and Abortion: A Utilitarian View.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    Conservative and liberal approaches to the problem of abortion are oversimplified and deeply flawed. Accepting that the moral status of the conceptus changes during gestation, the author advances a more nuanced perspective. Through applying a form of rules in practice utilitarianism within the context of overall population policy, he provides a compelling ethical and legal framework for regulating contraception and abortion practices.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2016-03-30
    Uzasadnienie Sprzeciwu Sumienia: Lekarze, Poborowi I Żołnierze.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2016 - Diametros 47:98-128.
    I will argue that physicians have an ethical obligation to justify their conscientious objection and the most reliable interpretation of the Polish legal framework claims that conscientious objection is permissible only when the justification shows the genuineness of the judgment of conscience that is not based on false beliefs and arises from a moral norm that has a high rank. I will demonstrate that the dogma accepted in the Polish doctrine that the reasons that lie behind conscientious objection in medicine (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. added 2014-10-08
    Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving.Jason Marsh - 2014 - Bioethics 28 (6):313-319.
    Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason-giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  10. added 2014-04-24
    Contraception and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (7):42-43.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. added 2014-03-07
    Emergency Contraception and Conscientious Objection.J. Paul Kelleher - 2010 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):290-304.
    Emergency contraception — also known as the morning after pill — is marketed and sold, under various brand names, in over one hundred countries around the world. In some countries, customers can purchase the drug without a prescription. In others, a prescription must be presented to a licensed pharmacist. In virtually all of these countries, pharmacists are the last link in the chain of delivery. This article examines and ultimately rejects several standard moves in the bioethics literature on the right (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. added 2014-01-14
    Public Goods and Procreation.Jonny Anomaly - 2014 - Monash Bioethics Review 32 (3-4):172-188.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. added 2012-04-17
    Antinatalism, Asymmetry, and an Ethic of Prima Facie Duties.Gerald Harrison - 2012 - South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):94-103.
    Benatar’s central argument for antinatalism develops an asymmetry between the pain and pleasure in a potential life. I am going to present an alternative route to the antinatalist conclusion. I argue that duties require victims and that as a result there is no duty to create the pleasures contained within a prospective life but a duty not to create any of its sufferings. My argument can supplement Benatar’s, but it also enjoys some advantages: it achieves a better fit with our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations