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  1. The Fate of the Act of Synthesis: Kant, Frege, and Husserl on the Role of Subjectivity in Presentation and Judgment.Jacob Rump - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (11).
    I investigate the role of the subject in judgment in Kant, Frege, and Husserl, situating it in the broader and less-often-considered context of their accounts of presentation as well as judgment. Contemporary philosophical usage of “representation” tends to elide the question of what Kant called the constitution of content, because of a reluctance, traced to Frege’s anti-psychologism, to attend to subjectivity. But for Kant and Husserl, anti-psychologism allows for synthesis as the subjective act necessary for both “mere presentation” and judgment. (...)
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  2. Gesetze des Denkens? Von Husserls und Freges Psychologismus-Kritik zu einem transzendentalen Kern der Logik.David Löwenstein - 2020 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 74 (4):514-531.
    Husserl and Frege reject logical psychologism, the view that logical laws are psychological 'laws of thought'. This paper offers an account of these famous objections and argues that their crucial premise, the necessity of logical laws, is justified with reference to a problematic metaphysics. However, this premise can be established in a more plausible way, namely via a transcendental argument which starts from the practice of rational criticism. This argument is developed through a discussion of Quine's holism, which at first (...)
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  3. Platonism in Lotze and Frege Between Psyschologism and Hypostasis.Nicholas Stang - 2018 - In Sandra Lapointe (ed.), Logic from Kant to Russell. New York: Routledge. pp. 138–159.
    In the section “Validity and Existence in Logik, Book III,” I explain Lotze’s famous distinction between existence and validity in Book III of Logik. In the following section, “Lotze’s Platonism,” I put this famous distinction in the context of Lotze’s attempt to distinguish his own position from hypostatic Platonism and consider one way of drawing the distinction: the hypostatic Platonist accepts that there are propositions, whereas Lotze rejects this. In the section “Two Perspectives on Frege’s Platonism,” I argue that this (...)
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  4. (1 other version)La evolución de la crítica fregueana al psicologismo.Mario Ariel González Porta - 2012 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 57 (2):99-122.
    There is an evolution in the Fregean critique of psycho-logism, and the differences between the 1884 and the 1893 stances, when the revision of a psychologistic theory of subjectivity starts to be founded, are particularly relevant.
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  5. Psychologism And Its History Revalued.Kevin Mulligan - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    A hundred years ago Frege had published most of his arguments against psychologism and Husserl was busy writing his Logical Investigations, which was to appear at the turn of the century and open with a long onslaught on psychologism. The arguments of these two logicians against the psychologistic view - of Mill, Erdmann and many others - that the discipline of logic, its sentences, or its "laws", deal with psychological phenomena met with widespread approval from those best qualified to judge (...)
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  6. Frege on the Relations between Logic and Thought.Simon Evnine - manuscript
    Frege's diatribes against psychologism have often been taken to imply that he thought that logic and thought have nothing to do with each other. I argue against this interpretation and attribute to Frege a view on which the two are tightly connected. The connection, however, derives not from logic's being founded on the empirical laws of thought but rather from thought's depending constitutively on the application to it of logic. I call this view 'psycho-logicism.'.
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