Life Support

Edited by Craig Paterson (Complutense University of Madrid)
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  1. added 2019-10-21
    Should Aggregate Patient Preference Data Be Used to Make Decisions on Behalf of Unrepresented Patients?Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - AMA Journal of Ethics 21 (7):566-574.
    Patient preference predictors aim to solve the moral problem of making treatment decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients. This commentary on a case of an unrepresented patient at the end of life considers 3 related problems of such predictors: the problem of restricting the scope of inputs to the models (the “scope” problem), the problem of weighing inputs against one another (the “weight” problem), and the problem of multiple reasonable solutions to the scope and weight problems (the “multiple reasonable models” (...)
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  2. added 2019-09-09
    What It Is To Die.Cody Gilmore - forthcoming - In Michael Cholbi & Travis Timmerman (eds.), Exploring the Philosophy of Death and Dying. New York: Routledge.
    A defense of the view that (i) to be alive is to be actively undergoing (not merely capable of undergoing) certain vital processes, that (ii) to die is cease to be capable of undergoing those processes (not to cease undergoing them), and that (iii) organisms in cryptobiosis (suspended animation) are not undergoing those processes but are capable of doing so, and are neither alive nor dead.
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  3. added 2019-06-20
    Review of Daniel Callahan, The Troubled Dream of Life. [REVIEW]Donna Dickenson - 1995 - Journal of Medical Ethics 21:188-191.
    Review of Daniel Callahan's book The Troubled Dream of Life.
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  4. added 2019-06-19
    Are Medical Ethicists Out of Touch? Practitioner Attitudes in the US and UK Towards Decisions at the End of Life.Donna Dickenson - 2000 - Journal of Medical Ethics 26 (4):254-260.
    To assess whether UK and US health care professionals share the views of medical ethicists about medical futility, withdrawing/withholding treatment, ordinary/extraordinary interventions, and the doctrine of double effect. A 138-item attitudinal questionnaire completed by 469 UK nurses studying the Open University course on "Death and Dying" was compared with a similar questionnaire administered to 759 US nurses and 687 US doctors taking the Hastings Center course on "Decisions near the End of Life". Practitioners accept the relevance of concepts widely disparaged (...)
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  5. added 2019-04-11
    Epistemic Burdens and the Incentives of Surrogate Decision-Makers.Parker Crutchfield & Scott Scheall - 2019 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 22 (4):613-621.
    We aim to establish the following claim: other factors held constant, the relative weights of the epistemic burdens of competing treatment options serve to determine the options that patient surrogates pursue. Simply put, surrogates confront an incentive, ceteris paribus, to pursue treatment options with respect to which their knowledge is most adequate to the requirements of the case. Regardless of what the patient would choose, options that require more knowledge than the surrogate possesses (or is likely to learn) will either (...)
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  6. added 2019-04-09
    Withdrawal Aversion as a Useful Heuristic for Critical Care Decisions.Piotr Grzegorz Nowak & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (3):36-38.
    While agreeing with the main conclusion of Dominic Wilkinson and colleagues (Wilkinson, Butcherine, and Savulescu 2019), namely, that there is no moral difference between treatment withholding and withdrawal as such, we wish to criticize their approach on the basis that it treats the widespread acceptance of withdrawal aversion (WA) as a cognitive bias. Wilkinson and colleagues understand WA as “a nonrational preference for withholding (WH) treatment over withdrawal (WD) of treatment” (22). They treat WA as a manifestation of loss aversion (...)
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  7. added 2018-01-15
    Two Ways to Kill a Patient.Ben Bronner - 2018 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 43 (1):44-63.
    According to the Standard View, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but rather allows the patient to die—an important distinction, according to some. I argue that killing can be understood in either of two ways, and given the relevant understanding, the Standard View is insulated from typical criticisms. I conclude by noting several problems for the Standard View that remain to be fully addressed.
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  8. added 2017-01-27
    The Total Artificial Heart and the Dilemma of Deactivation.Ben Bronner - 2016 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26 (4):347-367.
    It is widely believed to be permissible for a physician to discontinue any treatment upon the request of a competent patient. Many also believe it is never permissible for a physician to intentionally kill a patient. I argue that the prospect of deactivating a patient’s artificial heart presents us with a dilemma: either the first belief just mentioned is false or the second one is. Whichever horn of the dilemma we choose has significant implications for contemporary medical ethics.
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  9. added 2015-04-30
    A. Scola, Quale vita? La bioetica in questione. [REVIEW]R. Barcaro - 2000 - Epistemologia 23 (1):179-180.
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  10. added 2013-06-01
    Rola świadomości w decyzjach dotyczących zaprzestania podtrzymywania funkcji życiowych.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2011 - Rocznik Kognitywistyczny 5:191-198.
    Badania przy użyciu rezonansu magnetycznego sugerują, że przynajmniej niektórzy pacjenci w tzw. stanie wegetatywnym mogą być bardziej „świadomi”, niż to się do tej pory wydawało. W artykule zamierzam omówić te badania; następnie rozważę, o jakie rozumienie pojęcia świadomości może w nich chodzić; a wreszcie zastanowię się nad etycznymi implikacjami tych odkryć. Zamierzam też rozważyć, czy posiadanie wyższych form świadomości zawsze ma być dodatkową racją przemawiającą przeciwko zaprzestaniu podtrzymywaniu funkcji życiowych. Tym samym, w artykule chciałbym wskazać istotność badań z zakresu kognitywistyki (...)
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  11. added 2012-09-01
    Withdrawing Artificial Nutrition and Patients' Interests.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (9):555-556.
    I argue that the arguments brought by Counsel for M to the English Court of Protection are morally problematic in prioritising subjective interests that are the result of ‘consistent autonomous thought’ over subjective interests that are the result of a more limited cognitive perspective.
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