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  1. added 2020-06-15
    Теоремата на Мартин Льоб във философска интерпретация.Vasil Penchev - 2011 - Philosophical Alternatives 20 (4):142-152.
    А necessary and sllmcient condilion that а given proposition (о Ье provable in such а theory that allows (о Ье assigned to the proposition а Gödеl пunbег fог containing Реanо arithmetic is that Gödеl number itself. This is tlle sense о[ Martin LöЬ's theorem (1955). Now wе сan рut several philosophpllical questions. Is the Gödеl numbег of а propositional formula necessarily finite or onthe contrary? What would the Gödel number of а theorem be containing Реanо arithmetic itself? That is the (...)
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  2. added 2020-06-14
    Неразрешимост на първата теорема за непълнотата. Гьоделова и Хилбертова математика.Vasil Penchev - 2010 - Philosophical Alternatives 19 (5):104-119.
    Can the so-ca\led first incompleteness theorem refer to itself? Many or maybe even all the paradoxes in mathematics are connected with some kind of self-reference. Gбdel built his proof on the ground of self-reference: а statement which claims its unprovabllity. So, he demonstrated that undecidaЬle propositions exist in any enough rich axiomatics (i.e. such one which contains Peano arithmetic in some sense). What about the decidabllity of the very first incompleteness theorem? We can display that it fulfills its conditions. That's (...)
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  3. added 2020-05-28
    A New Reading and Comparative Interpretation of Gödel’s Completeness (1930) and Incompleteness (1931) Theorems.Vasil Penchev - 2016 - Логико-Философские Штудии 13 (2):187-188.
    Peano arithmetic cannot serve as the ground of mathematics for it is inconsistent to infinity, and infinity is necessary for its foundation. Though Peano arithmetic cannot be complemented by any axiom of infinity, there exists at least one (logical) axiomatics consistent to infinity. That is nothing else than a new reading at issue and comparative interpretation of Gödel’s papers (1930; 1931) meant here. Peano arithmetic admits anyway generalizations consistent to infinity and thus to some addable axiom(s) of infinity. The most (...)
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  4. added 2015-09-09
    Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic.Jonathan Payne - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):243-261.
    Neo-Fregean approaches to set theory, following Frege, have it that sets are the extensions of concepts, where concepts are the values of second-order variables. The idea is that, given a second-order entity $X$, there may be an object $\varepsilon X$, which is the extension of X. Other writers have also claimed a similar relationship between second-order logic and set theory, where sets arise from pluralities. This paper considers two interpretations of second-order logic—as being either extensional or intensional—and whether either is (...)
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  5. added 2012-10-18
    To Be or to Be Not, That is the Dilemma.Juan José Luetich - 2012 - Identification Transactions of The Luventicus Academy (ISSN 1666-7581) 1 (1):4.
    A set is precisely defined. A given element either belongs or not to a set. However, since all of the elements being considered belong to the universe, if the element does not belong to the set, it belongs to its complement, that is, what remains after all of the elements from the set are removed from the universe.
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