Switch to: References

Citations of:

Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (2007)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. (1 other version)Cognitive Science.Thagard Paul - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Do Apes Read Minds?: Toward a New Folk Psychology.Kristin Andrews - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   94 citations  
  • (1 other version)Vital materialism and the problem of ethics in the Radical Enlightenment.Charles T. Wolfe - 2013 - Philosophica 88 (1):31-70.
    From Hegel to Engels, Sartre and Ruyer (Ruyer, 1933), to name only a few, materialism is viewed as a necropolis, or the metaphysics befitting such an abode; many speak of matter’s crudeness, bruteness, coldness or stupidity. Science or scientism, on this view, reduces the living world to ‘dead matter’, ‘brutish’, ‘mechanical, lifeless matter’, thereby also stripping it of its freedom (Crocker, 1959). Materialism is often wrongly presented as ‘mechanistic materialism’ – with ‘Death of Nature’ echoes of de-humanization and hostility to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Don't Ask, Look! Linguistic Corpora as a Tool for Conceptual Analysis.Roland Bluhm - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 7-15.
    Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour, and with it the belief in the primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their various endeavours, philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds refer to the use and meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions. Often, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint ownership thesis.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Continental Philosophy Review 46 (4):509-531.
    In “The Child’s Relations with Others,” Merleau-Ponty argues that certain early experiences are jointly owned in that they are numerically single experiences that are nevertheless given to more than one subject (e.g., the infant and caregiver). Call this the “joint ownership thesis” (JT). Drawing upon both Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analysis, as well as studies of exogenous attention and mutual affect regulation in developmental psychology, I motivate the plausibility of JT. I argue that the phenomenological structure of some early infant–caregiver dyadic exchanges (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Natural Agents: A Transcendental Argument for Pragmatic Naturalism.Carl Sachs - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (1):15-37.
    I distinguish between two phases of Rorty’s naturalism: “nonreductive physicalism” (NRP) and “pragmatic naturalism” (PN). NRP holds that the vocabulary of mental states is irreducible to that of physical states, but this irreducibility does not distinguish the mental from other irreducible vocabularies. PN differs by explicitly accepting a naturalistic argument for the transcendental status of the vocabulary of agency. Though I present some reasons for preferring PN over NRP, PN depends on whether ‘normativity’ can be ‘naturalized’.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The phenomenology of depression and the nature of empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2):269-280.
    This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Meaning in Nature: Organic Manufacture? [REVIEW]Stephen J. Cowley - 2008 - Biosemiotics 1 (1):85-98.
    The paper examines Marcello Barbieri’s (2007) Introduction to Biosemiotics. Highlighting debate within the biosemiotic community, it focuses on what the volume offers to those who explain human intellect in relation to what Turing called our ‘physical powers.’ In scrutinising the basis of world-modelling, parallels and contrasts are drawn with other work on embodied-embedded cognition. Models dominate biology. Is this a qualitative fact or does it point to biomechanisms? In evaluating the 18 contributions, it is suggested that the answers will shape (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The sleeping brain and the neural basis of emotions.Roumen Kirov, Serge Brand, Vasil Kolev & Juliana Yordanova - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):155-156.
    In addition to active wake, emotions are generated and experienced in a variety of functionally different states such as those of sleep, during which external stimulation and cognitive control are lacking. The neural basis of emotions can be specified by regarding the multitude of emotion-related brain states, as well as the distinct neuro- and psychodynamic stages (generation and regulation) of emotional experience.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are we predictive engines? Perils, prospects, and the puzzle of the porous perceiver.Andy Clark - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):233-253.
    The target article sketched and explored a mechanism (action-oriented predictive processing) most plausibly associated with core forms of cortical processing. In assessing the attractions and pitfalls of the proposal we should keep that element distinct from larger, though interlocking, issues concerning the nature of adaptive organization in general.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Perceptual Modalities: Modes of Presentation or Modes of Interaction?Marek McGann - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):1-2.
    Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Artificial Consciousness and Artificial Ethics: Between Realism and Social Relationism.Steve Torrance - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):9-29.
    I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social–relational’ perspective on our judgments of the moral status of artificial agents (AAs). I develop a realist position according to which the moral status of a being—particularly in relation to moral patiency attribution—is closely bound up with that being’s ability to experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS). For a realist, both moral status and experiential capacity are objective properties of agents. A social relationist denies the existence of any such objective properties in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Enactivism, from a Wittgensteinian Point of View.Daniel D. Hutto - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (3):281-302.
    Enactivists seek to revolutionize the new sciences of the mind. In doing so, they promote adopting a thoroughly anti-intellectualist starting point, one that sees mentality as rooted in engaged, embodied activity as opposed to detached forms of thought. In advocating the so-called embodied turn, enactivists touch on recurrent themes of central importance in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. More than this, today's enactivists characterize the nature of minds and how they fundamentally relate to the world in ways that not only echo but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Embodied cognition and religion.Fraser Watts - 2013 - Zygon 48 (3):745-758.
    It is argued that there are good scientific grounds for accepting that cognition functions in a way that reflects embodiment. This represents a more holistic, systemic way of thinking about human beings, and contributes to the coordination of scientific assumptions about mind and body with those of the faith traditions, moving us beyond sterile debates about reductionism. It has been claimed by Francisco Varela and others that there is an affinity between Buddhism and embodied cognition, though it is argued here (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • La actualidad de la fenomenología husserliana: superación de viejos tópicos y apertura de nuevos campos de exploración.Jesús Adrián Escudero - 2013 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 18:12-45.
    En el marco de un nuevo descubrimiento de la fenomenología, este trabajo ofrece diferentes argumentos para superar la clásica interpretación de Husserl considerándolo un representante prototípico del solipsismo. En primer lugar, se refuta la interpretación mentalista de Dreyfus de la fenomenología husserliana, mostrando que su programa filosófico va más allá de la tradicional dicotomía entre internalismo y externalismo; en segundo lugar, se señalan algunas de las principales contribuciones realizadas por la fenomenología de Husserl al campo de las ciencias cognitivas y (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Proper embodiment: the role of the body in affect and cognition.Mog Stapleton - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of grossmorphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking Their Body? [REVIEW]Yochai Ataria & Yuval Neria - 2013 - Human Studies 36 (2):159-178.
    War captivity is an extreme traumatic experience typically involving exposure to repeated stressors, including torture, isolation, and humiliation. Captives are flung from their previous known world into an unfamiliar reality in which their state of consciousness may undergo significant change. In the present study extensive interviews were conducted with fifteen Israeli former prisoners of war who fell captive during the 1973 Yom Kippur war with the goal of examining the architecture of human thought in subjects lacking a sense of body (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Enjoying the Spread: Conscious Externalism Reconsidered.D. Ward - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):731-751.
    According to a variety of recent ‘enactivist’ proposals, the material basis of conscious experience might extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and nervous system and into the environment. Clark (2009) surveys several such arguments and finds them wanting. Here I respond on behalf of the enactivist. Clarifying the commitments of enactivism at the personal and subpersonal levels and considering how those levels relate lets us see where Clark’s analysis of enactivism goes wrong. Clark understands the enactivists as attempting to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought.John Spackman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):741-751.
    Recent years have seen a growing interest in Buddhist thought as a potential source of alternative conceptions of the nature of the mind and the relation between the mental and the physical. This article considers and assesses three different models of what contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from Buddhist thought. One model, advocated by Alan Wallace, holds that we can learn from Buddhist meditation that both individual consciousness and the physical world itself emerge from a deeper, “primordial” consciousness. A (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Explanatory Role of Computation in Cognitive Science.Nir Fresco - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):353-380.
    Which notion of computation (if any) is essential for explaining cognition? Five answers to this question are discussed in the paper. (1) The classicist answer: symbolic (digital) computation is required for explaining cognition; (2) The broad digital computationalist answer: digital computation broadly construed is required for explaining cognition; (3) The connectionist answer: sub-symbolic computation is required for explaining cognition; (4) The computational neuroscientist answer: neural computation (that, strictly, is neither digital nor analogue) is required for explaining cognition; (5) The extreme (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science.Mog Stapleton - 2013 - Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
    Cognitive systems research has predominantly been guided by the historical distinction between emotion and cognition, and has focused its efforts on modelling the “cognitive” aspects of behaviour. While this initially meant modelling only the control system of cognitive creatures, with the advent of “embodied” cognitive science this expanded to also modelling the interactions between the control system and the external environment. What did not seem to change with this embodiment revolution, however, was the attitude towards affect and emotion in cognitive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Cellular automata.Francesco Berto & Jacopo Tagliabue - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Cellular automata (henceforth: CA) are discrete, abstract computational systems that have proved useful both as general models of complexity and as more specific representations of non-linear dynamics in a variety of scientific fields. Firstly, CA are (typically) spatially and temporally discrete: they are composed of a finite or denumerable set of homogeneous, simple units, the atoms or cells. At each time unit, the cells instantiate one of a finite set of states. They evolve in parallel at discrete time steps, following (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Autonomy in evolution: from minimal to complex life.Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo & Alvaro Moreno - 2012 - Synthese 185 (1):21-52.
    Our aim in the present paper is to approach the nature of life from the perspective of autonomy, showing that this perspective can be helpful for overcoming the traditional Cartesian gap between the physical and cognitive domains. We first argue that, although the phenomenon of life manifests itself as highly complex and multidimensional, requiring various levels of description, individual organisms constitute the core of this multifarious phenomenology. Thereafter, our discussion focuses on the nature of the organization of individual living entities, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Kinds of Life. On the Phenomenological Basis of the Distinction Between Higher and Lower Animals.Christiane Bailey - 2011 - Journal of Environmental Philosophy 8 (2):47-68.
    Drawing upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological constitution of the Other through Einfülhung, I argue that the hierarchical distinction between higher and lower animals – which has been dismissed by Heidegger for being anthropocentric – must not be conceived as an objective distinction between “primitive” animals and “more evolved” ones, but rather corresponds to a phenomenological distinction between familiar and unfamiliar animals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The no-self alternative.Thomas Metzinger - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This article explores the ‘no-self alternative’ in the debate on the metaphysical and phenomenological concept of the self. It suggests that the no-self alternative may not be an alternative at all and it could simply be the default assumption for all rational approaches to self-consciousness and subjectivity. It outlines several different anti-realist arguments about the self and explains why the idea that there are no selves is counter-intuitive. It shows why the intuitions of phenomenology are traceable to the contingent fact (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Non-Conceptual Content and the Subjectivity of Consciousness.Tobias Schlicht - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):491 - 520.
    Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern.J. Ganeri - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):671-703.
    Jaegwon Kim has argued (Kim 2006a) that the two key issues for emergentism are to give a positive characterization of the emergence relation and to explain the possibility of downward causation. This paper proposes an account of emergence which provides new answers to these two key issues. It is argued that an appropriate emergence relation is characterized by a notion of ‘transformation’, and that the real key issue for emergentism is located elsewhere than the places Kim identifies. The paper builds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Interactionism and Mindreading.John Michael - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.
    In recent years, a number of theorists have developed approaches to social cognition that highlight the centrality of social interaction as opposed to mindreading (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ; Gallagher 2001 , 2007 , 2008 ; Hobson 2002 ; Reddy 2008 ; Hutto 2004 ; De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007 ; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher et al. 2010 ). There are important differences among these approaches, as I will discuss, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • The dorsal stream and the visual horizon.Michael Madary - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):423-438.
    Today many philosophers of mind accept that the two cortical streams of visual processing in humans can be distinguished in terms of conscious experience. The ventral stream is thought to produce representations that may become conscious, and the dorsal stream is thought to handle unconscious vision for action. Despite a vast literature on the topic of the two streams, there is currently no account of the way in which the relevant empirical evidence could fit with basic Husserlian phenomenology of vision. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Neo-pragmatic intentionality and enactive perception: a compromise between extended and enactive minds.Katsunori Miyahara - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.
    The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the mind, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • From movement to dance.Maxine Sheets-Johnstone - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):39-57.
    This article begins with a summary phenomenological analysis of movement in conjunction with the question of “quality” in movement. It then specifies the particular kind of memory involved in a dancer’s memorization of a dance. On the basis of the phenomenological analysis and specification of memory, it proceeds to a clarification of meaning in dance. Taking its clue from the preceding sections, the concluding section of the article sets forth reasons why present-day cognitive science is unable to provide insights into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Metaphor and Meaning in Early China.Edward Slingerland - 2011 - Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10 (1):1-30.
    Western scholarship on early Chinese thought has tended to either dismiss the foundational role of metaphor or to see it as a uniquely Chinese mode of apprehending the world. This article argues that, while human cognition is in fact profoundly dependent on imagistic conceptual structures, such dependence is by no means a unique feature of Chinese thought. The article reviews empirical evidence supporting the claims that human thought is fundamentally imagistic; that sensorimotor schemas are often used to structure our understanding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art. A variety of theorists have appropriated it for their purposes ever since George Henry Lewes gave it a philosophical sense in his 1875 Problems of Life and Mind. We might roughly characterize the shared meaning thus: emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.) Each (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • (1 other version)Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition.Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
    I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Enacting Musical Experience.Joel Krueger - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):98-123.
    I argue for an enactive account of musical experience — that is, the experience of listening ‘deeply’(i.e., sensitively and understandingly) to a piece of music. The guiding question is: what do we do when we listen ‘deeply’to music? I argue that these music listening episodes are, in fact, doings. They are instances of active perceiving, robust sensorimotor engagements with and manipulations of sonic structures within musical pieces. Music is thus experiential art, and in Nietzsche’s words, ‘we listen to music with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Embodied cognitive neuroscience and its consequences for psychiatry.Thomas Fuchs - 2009 - Poiesis and Praxis 6 (3-4):219-233.
    Recent years have seen the emergence of a new interdisciplinary field called embodied or enactive cognitive science. Whereas traditional representationalism rests on a fixed inside–outside distinction, the embodied cognition perspective views mind and brain as a biological system that is rooted in body experience and interaction with other individuals. Embodiment refers to both the embedding of cognitive processes in brain circuitry and to the origin of these processes in an organism’s sensory–motor experience. Thus, action and perception are no longer interpreted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Context-switching and responsiveness to real relevance.Erik Rietveld - 2012 - In Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.), Heidegger and Cognitive Science. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • On the relation between the enactive and the sensorimotor approach to perception.Dario Taraborelli & Matteo Mossio - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1343-1344.
    In Mossio & Taraborelli (2008) we challenged the assumption according to which the ecological and sensorimotor approaches are mere conceptual variations on the same enactive theme. We showed, on the contrary, that they endorse substantially different notions of an 'action-dependent perceptual invariant' and we submitted that this distinction has interesting theoretical and empirical implications. This dissimilarity between ecological and sensorimotor theories stems, in our view, from a more fundamental divergence on the nature of perceptual information. Since Gibson's work, the ecological (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Cognitive Ecology.Edwin Hutchins - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):705-715.
    Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context. In particular, it points to the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem. At least three fields were taking a deeply ecological approach to cognition 30 years ago: Gibson’s ecological psychology, Bateson’s ecology of mind, and Soviet cultural-historical activity theory. The ideas developed in those projects have now found a place in modern views of embodied, situated, distributed cognition. As cognitive theory continues to shift from units (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic - 2012 - In Shackelford Todd & Vonk Jennifer (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology. Oxford University Press. pp. 39-60.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Introduction Part I.Claire Colebrook - 2008 - Deleuze and Guatarri Studies 2 (Suppl):1-19.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embodied cognitive science: Gibbs in search of synthesis.Paweł Gładziejewski, Anna Karczmarczyk & Przemysław Nowakowski - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):215 – 225.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.
    How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Embodied Cognitive Science and its Implications for Psychopathology.Zoe Drayson - 2009 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (4):329-340.
    The past twenty years have seen an increase in the importance of the body in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind. This 'embodied' trend challenges the orthodox view in cognitive science in several ways: it downplays the traditional 'mind-as-computer' approach and emphasizes the role of interactions between the brain, body, and environment. In this article, I review recent work in the area of embodied cognitive science and explore the approaches each takes to the ideas of consciousness, computation and representation. Finally, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Self–other contingencies: Enacting social perception.Marek McGann & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):417-437.
    Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot because intentions and emotions for them are hidden away inside and we do not have direct access to them. Enactive theories still have no idea because they have so far mainly focused on perception of our physical world. We surmise, however, that the latter hold promise since, in trying to understand (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation.Thomas Fuchs & Hanne De Jaegher - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
    Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  • (1 other version)Enacting the self: Buddhist and enactivist approaches to the emergence of the self.Matthew MacKenzie - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):75-99.
    In this paper, I take up the problem of the self through bringing together the insights, while correcting some of the shortcomings, of Indo–Tibetan Buddhist and enactivist accounts of the self. I begin with an examination of the Buddhist theory of non-self ( anātman ) and the rigorously reductionist interpretation of this doctrine developed by the Abhidharma school of Buddhism. After discussing some of the fundamental problems for Buddhist reductionism, I turn to the enactive approach to philosophy of mind and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Intentionality, cognitive integration and the continuity thesis.Richard Menary - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):31-43.
    Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Facing Life: The messy bodies of enactive cognitive science.Marek McGann - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    Descriptions of bodies within the literature of the enactive approach to cognitive science exhibit an interesting dialectical tension. On the one hand, a body is considered to be a unity which instantiates an identity, forming an intrinsic basis for value. On the other, a living body is in a reciprocally defining relationship with the environment, and is therefore immersed and entangled with, rather than distinct from, its environment. In this paper I examine this tension, and its implications for the enactive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation