Glimpses into Byzantium. Its Philosophy and Arts -/- This volume contains peer-reviewed articles published by the author either in hard-copy or in electronic format between 2019 and 2021. These focus on various aspects of Byzantine and Medieval culture. -/- It is not possible to upload an entire book here, but there are copies of it in libraries and it can also be bought from Amazon.

This article seeks to provide an answer as to why Metaphysics, Lam ends not with the justly famous account of the divine nous with which this book of the treatise is always associated, but with an aporetic account of the living and dying of everything mortal. This surprising moment, I argue, is a manifestation of Aristotle's conviction—quite alien to the mainstream understanding of philosophy as a discipline today—that even the purest moments of theoretical speculation are the work of a human (...) soul always in touch with its materiality and its subsistence in the world. A soul that only is at all when it is at work in living well, which is to say when the soul enacts itself in praxis. This means: the best understanding of the aporetic conclusion to Metaphysics, Lam is the one that asks us to recall that Aristotle's project of first philosophy—however much its most proper subject matter is the unchanging and immaterial—proceeds as part of a human life lived a certain way, and not as part of an academic discipline. (shrink)

RésuméEn expliquant la relation entre hypothèses et images dans l'analogie de la ligne du livre Vl de laRépubliquede Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur l'élucidation platonicienne de la nature des mathématiques telle que la conçoit le mathématicien lui-même. Je poursuis avec une critique des interprétations traditionnelles de cette relation, qui partent de l'assomption douteuse que les mathématiques s'occupent des Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite la notion de «structure». Je montre comment les «hypothèses» comme principes de (...) preuve peuvent déterminer les structures des «images» par lesquelles les structures intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathématiques en viennent à être connues. (shrink)

RésuméEn expliquant la relation entre hypothèses et images dans l'analogie de la ligne du livre Vl de laRépubliquede Platon, je m'attarde d'abordsur l'élucidation platonicienne de la nature des mathématiques telle que la conçoit le mathématicien lui-même. Je poursuis avec une critique des interprétations traditionnelles de cette relation, qui partent de l'assomption douteuse que les mathématiques s'occupent des Formes platoniciennes. Pour formuler mon point de vue sur cette relation, j'exploite la notion de «structure». Je montre comment les «hypothèses» comme principes de (...) preuve peuvent déterminer les structures des «images» par lesquelles les structures intelligibles correspondantes des objets mathématiques en viennent à être connues. (shrink)

This chapter is a work in applied metaphysics. Recent discussions of monism and metaphysical dependence are deployed to develop a view—the doctrine of divine priority (DDP)—that is a viable alternative to the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS). DDS and the traditional motivation for it are discussed, then DDP is introduced by way of an analogy involving Jonathan Schaffer’s distinction between two forms of monism. It is argued that DDP is an alternative to DDS by showing that it is consistent with (...) the traditional motivation for the latter view, and argued that DDP is a viable alternative by showing that objections to its peculiar implications rest on assumptions that can reasonably be rejected. In the concluding section, the findings of the main discussion are summarized and DDP’s potential theological import is illustrated with a brief discussion of a possible solution to the Problem of the Trinity it affords. (shrink)

ArgumentThe aim of this paper is two-fold: to offer an interpretation that preserves the natural reading ofPhysicsII 1 – that Aristotle is drawing a stark distinction between what is natural and what is artificial; and to show how there is logical room for atertium quid– a category for things that are products of both nature and art. This aim is attained by highlighting two important qualifications Aristotle makes about the products of art in relation to an innate internal principle of (...) change and pointing out that the proper understanding of the significance of the essential-accidental distinction that Aristotle draws must be viewed in the context where he identifies two kinds of nature – form and matter. Based on these analyses, the following three logical categories are shown to be consistent with the passage: 1) purely natural things; 2) essentially artificial objects; and 3) essentially natural things with artificial aspects. (shrink)

The position on the question of divine providence of the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. A.D. 200) is of particular interest. It marks an attempt to find avia mediabetween the Epicurean denial of any divine concern for the world, on the one hand, and the Stoic view that divine providence governs it in every detail, on the other.2As an expression of such a middle course it finds a place in later classifications of views concerning providence.3It is also of (...) topical interest: Alexander's fullest discussion, in his treatiseDe providentia (On Providence)(surviving only in two Arabic versions), has only recently been edited and translated,4although some aspects of his position had long been known from other texts preserved in Greek.5. (shrink)

There is a certain conventional interpretation of Aristotle's argument, inMetaphysicsΛ.7, for the identification of the first unmoved mover as God, according to which that argument has the following outline.

In the largely historical and aporetic first book of theDe Anima (DA), Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states:Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say that the (...) soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul. (DA408bll–15). (shrink)

Aristotle gave seven arguments for the law of non-contradiction. The first one is against a special case of dialetheism, the view that only some contradictions are true, and other six arguments are...

InMetaphysicsΘ.6, 1048b14-17, Aristotle treats the problem of what it is for the infinite to exist potentially, i.e. to be potentially actual. According to my interpretation, Aristotle argues that to exist potentially is for the infinite to have a potentiality which cannot be actualized in reality but only in thought, because it is a potentiality the process of whose actualization cannot be brought to an end.

In "Metaphysics" Gamma 3 Aristotle declares that the philosopher investigates things that are qua things that are and that he therefore should be able to state the firmest principles of everything. The firmest principle of all is identified as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC). The main focus of Gamma 3 is Aristotle's proof for this identification. This paper begins with remarks about Aristotle's notion of the firmness of a principle and then offers an analysis of the firmness proof for PNC. (...) It focuses on some key assumptions of the proof and on the range and force of the proof. Aristotle closes Gamma 3 with the claim that PNC is ultimate in the sense that all other principles somehow rest on it. This, rather controversial, claim is given a defensible reading and shown to be central to the chapter's effort to establish PNC as the firmest principle of all. As such it completes the firmness proof and is not simply an appended remark. (shrink)

The notion of homonymy has been of perennial philosophical interest to scholars of Aristotle from ancient Greek commentators to modern thinkers. Across historical periods, certain issues have remained central, such as the nature of Aristotelian homonymy, its relation to synonymy and analogy, and whether the concept undergoes change throughout the corpus. In addition, fundamental questions concerning the use of homonymy in regard to dialectical practice and scientific inquiry are raised and discussed. It is argued that there are two aspects to (...) Aristotelian homonymy, negative and positive in function, which provide complementary roles in regard to dialectic and science. (shrink)

G. H. von Wright proposed that a temporal interval exemplifies a real contradiction if at least one part of any division of this interval involves the presence of contradictorily related (though non-simultaneous) states. In connection with intervals, two negations must be discerned: 'does not hold at an interval' and 'fails throughout an interval'. Von Wright did not distinguish the two. As a consequence, he made a mistake in indicating how to use his logical symbolism to express the notion of real (...) contradiction. The present paper aims to reconstruct and philosophically motivate von Wright's argument for the possibility of real contradictions. (shrink)

The present paper deals with eight charges that are frequently leveled against any research that focuses on the agrapha dogmata. The charges are demonstrated to be completely unfounded and, therefore, duly dismissed. In particular, it is argued here that the phrase ta legomena is by no means to be understood as ironic. Consequently, the article rejects the very common picture of Plato as some sort of dogmatist and author of a fixed philosophical system. However, Plato’s philosophy is presented as rather (...) ‘overt’ and ‘straightforward’ in its nature. With the situation being as it is, thorough knowledge of the agrapha dogmata is shown to be an absolute prerequisite for understanding Plato’s dialogues. The paper concludes with an observation that while investigating the issue is completely warranted and does not in any way entail any devaluation of the dialogues, Aristotle’s testimony must also be taken into account. (shrink)

In this paper I ask whether in Aristotle's metaphysical system the form of a non-living sensible substance, such as the form of this house, is or is not universal. I argue that his position as it stands is self-contradictory, and then try to give some account of the pressures that led to this central contradiction in Aristotle's metaphysical thought.

Like many realists about causation and causal powers, Aristotle uses the language of necessity when discussing causation, and he appears to think that by invoking necessity, he is clarifying the manner in which causes bring about or determine their effects. In so doing, he would appear to run afoul of Humean criticisms of the notion of a necessary connection between cause and effect. The claim that causes necessitate their effects may be understood—or attacked—in several ways, however, and so whether the (...) view or its criticism is tenable depends on how we understand the necessitation claim. In fact, Aristotelian efficient causation may be said to involve two distinct necessary connections: one is a relation between causes considered as potential, while the other relates them considered as active. That is, the claims that (1) what has the power to heat necessarily heats what has the power to be heated, and that (2) a particular flame which is actually under a pot necessarily heats it, both of which appear to be true for Aristotle, involve distinct notions of necessity. The latter kind of necessity is based on the facts, as Aristotle sees them, about change, whereas the former is based in the nature of properties. Though different, both kinds of necessity are instances of what contemporary philosophers would call metaphysical necessity, and together they also amount to a theory of causal determination. (shrink)

Aristotle thinks that we understand something when we know its causes. According to Aristotle but contrary to most recent approaches, causation and explanation cannot be understood separately. Aristotle complicates matters by claiming that there are four causes, which have come to be known as the formal, material, final, and efficient causes. To understand Aristotelian causation and its relationship to explanation, then, we must come to a precise understanding of the four causes, and how they are supposed to be explanatory. Aristotle’s (...) discussion of the causes, however, is compact, and he typically presents them without arguing for them. He thus leaves us with a number of questions, ranging from the highly specific to the highly general. One question in particular has captured the attention of scholars and philosophers over the last century, and it has had a strong influence on recent treatments of the four causes – namely, whether we are right to understand Aristotle as committed to a plurality of kinds of causation, or rather a plurality of kinds of explanation. Sometimes the question is raised as one of whether it would be more accurate to speak of the four ‘becauses’ rather than the four ‘causes’. This worry is highly general, and there are in fact several ways in which it might be formulated; nonetheless, it is important to clarify the precise nature of the problem, and the possible ways of responding to it. At issue is not just whether Aristotle’s notions are sufficiently like the modern notion of causation to be relevant to our concerns, but, more importantly, whether the distinctions he draws are ultimately metaphysical or epistemological in character. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to explain the differences between neo-Aristotelian virtue and positive organizational virtuousness from the virtue ethics perspective. Most studies use virtues and virtuousness interchangeably. A few others try to explain their differences from the positive organizational science perspective. Although closely related, we believe that these two notions are not identical. If we understand neo-Aristotelian virtue correctly, then it cannot be judged exclusively on what is externally verifiable, as is the case with virtuousness. For these reasons, (...) we attempt our own differentiation, highlighting the gains and losses realized in the migration from neo-Aristotelian virtue to positive organizational virtuousness, and establishing guideposts to meaningfully combine the strengths of both concepts. (shrink)

In the largely historical and aporetic first book of the De Anima , Aristotle makes what appear to be some rather disturbing remarks about the soul's status as a subject of mental states. Most notably, in a curious passage which has aroused the interest of commentators, he seems to suggest that there is something wrong with regarding the soul as a subject of mental states: Thus, saying that the soul is angry is the same as if one were to say (...) that the soul builds houses and weaves: for it is perhaps better to say not that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does [these things] with his soul. (shrink)

In this paper I deal with a puzzling passage, which occurs in Metaphysics Z 13.1038b2 – 3 and where Aristotle mentions four possible meanings of substance: the substratum, the essence, the compound of these (τὸ ἐκ τούτων) and the universal. This list accords only partially with the previous one in Z 3.1028b33–36, where Aristotle mentions the substratum, the essence, the universal and the genus. Thus, Z 13’s list omits Z 3’s genus, but includes τὸ ἐκ τούτων, which is standardly used (...) by Aristotle to refer to the compound of matter and form. This is puzzling, for at least two reasons: (1) it is not clear what has happened to Z 3’s genus; (2) it is not clear what exactly is the reference of τὸ ἐκ τούτων, for the context suggests, at first glance awkwardly, that the compound in question is that of substratum and essence, and not of matter and form. These problems have led some scholars to delete τὸ ἐκ τούτων from the list. In this paper I provide two sets of arguments in order to resist the deletion. In the first set I show how, at least in principle, it would not be inaccurate to define the compound of matter and form as a “compound of substratum and essence”. In the second set, I show how, in fact, through the reference to the compound of substratum and essence, Aristotle does not want to designate, in Z 13, the hylomorphic composite. Rather, he aims to designate the notion of form regarded as universal, namely as ‘species’, which seems to reveal a peculiar sort of composition between a substratum (its genus) and an essence (its specific difference). (shrink)

In NE III.10, 1118b1–3, Aristotle says that the “most shared of the senses is that according to which intemperance [comes about], and it would seem justifiably to be shameful, because it inheres [in us] not insofar as we are human beings, but insofar as we are animals”. This statement appears to describe the sense of touch as shameful. This may seem like a strange position for Aristotle to hold, since elsewhere he describes human touch as the most accurate among animal (...) species, which corresponds to our superior intelligence, and as necessary for animal life. In this paper, I argue that Maimonides nevertheless succeeds in showing that Aristotle has a strong theoretical reason for maintaining that the sense of touch is shameful. Maimonides shows that, based on principles of Aristotelian psychology, human touch is indeed shameful because it obstructs intellectual activity. (shrink)

In one of the unpublished parts of his manuscript titled the Spicilegia, Arthur Schopenhauer presents an uncharacteristically sympathetic reading of an Aristotelian text. The text in question, De anima III. 5, happens to include the only occurrence of arguably the most controversial idea in Aristotle, namely the distinction between active and passive nous. Schopenhauer interprets these two notions as corresponding to his own notions of the ?will? and the ?intellect? or ?subject of knowledge?, respectively. The result is a unique interpretation, (...) according to which Aristotle's active nous is in fact non-intellectual: it is devoid of any interaction with intelligible objects, and hence lacks any intellectual activity. I show that this interpretation, though counterintuitive, is tenable, and that it may contribute to our understanding of Aristotle even if we do not adopt Schopenhauer's metaphysics. (shrink)

In the second century of our era the Athenian Platonist, Atticus, claimed that it was clear not only to philosophers but perhaps even to ordinary people that the heritage left by Plato was the immortality of the soul. Plato had expounded the doctrine in various and manifold ways and this was about the only thing holding together the Platonic school. Atticus is but one witness to the prominence accorded the soul in discussions and debates among later Platonists. But while questions (...) concerning the origin, constitution, and destiny of the human soul are relatively well attested for Middle Platonism, not to mention Neoplatonism, we know much less about these topics among Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus of Athens and Xenocrates of Chalcedon . Both wrote treatises on the soul , but these have been lost along with their other, numerous writings. Because the least that can be said is that Speusippus and Xenocrates upheld the immortality of the soul , any snippet of information that might tell us more deserves close consideration. (shrink)

In the second century of our era the Athenian Platonist, Atticus, claimed that it was clear not only to philosophers but perhaps even to ordinary people that the heritage left by Plato was the immortality of the soul. Plato had expounded the doctrine in various and manifold ways (ποικίλως καì παντοίως) and this was about (σχεδόν) the only thing holding together the Platonic school. Atticus is but one witness to the prominence accorded the soul in discussions and debates among later (...) Platonists. But while questions concerning the origin, constitution, and destiny of the human soul are relatively well attested for Middle Platonism, not to mention Neoplatonism, we know much less about these topics among Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus of Athens (c. 408–339) and Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396–314). Both wrote treatises on the soul (περì ψυχ⋯ς), but these have been lost along with their other, numerous writings. Because the least that can be said is that Speusippus and Xenocrates upheld the immortality of the soul (as would be expected), any snippet of information that might tell us more deserves close consideration. (shrink)

Presocratic philosophy, for all its diverse features, is united by the quest to understand the origin and nature of the world. The approach of the Pythagoreans to this quest is governed by their belief, probably based on studies of the numerical relations in musical harmony, that number or numerical structure plays a key role for explaining the world-order, the cosmos. It remains questionable to what extent the Pythagoreans, by positing number as an all-powerful explanatory concept, broke free from Presocratic ideas (...) that certain stuffs or material elements sufficed to account for the source and constitution of the world, but apparently number found such a universal application with them that Aristotle could summarize the Pythagorean position as ‘numbers…are the whole universe’ . Historians of Greek philosophy have generally accepted Aristotle's assessment. Of late, however, certain scholars have argued that the Pythagorean number doctrine is Aristotelian interpretation, unjustly foisted upon the Pythagoreans. Enlisted in support of their arguments are the fragments of Philolaus of Croton. Here we have the foremost representative of fifth-century Pythagoreanism, who states as his basic principles, not numbers exactly, but ‘limiters’ and ‘unlimiteds’, and who, it is argued, regards number solely as an epistemological aid for understanding the structure of reality. So Philolaus is called upon as a witness against Aristotle. The rationale goes something like this: Aristotle most likely had written sources for his knowledge of Pythagorean teachings; the only texts we know of with any certainty are Philolaus' book and the writings of Archytas; since Aristotle treats Archytas separately, he is mainly relying on Philolaus; because Philolaus does not expressly state that things are numbers, Aristotle's interpretation is wrong. (shrink)

Presocratic philosophy, for all its diverse features, is united by the quest to understand the origin and nature of the world. The approach of the Pythagoreans to this quest is governed by their belief, probably based on studies of the numerical relations in musical harmony, that number or numerical structure plays a key role for explaining the world-order, the cosmos. It remains questionable to what extent the Pythagoreans, by positing number as an all-powerful explanatory concept, broke free from Presocratic ideas (...) that certain stuffs or material elements sufficed to account for the source and constitution of the world, but apparently number found such a universal application with them that Aristotle could summarize the Pythagorean position as ‘numbers…are the whole universe’. Historians of Greek philosophy have generally accepted Aristotle's assessment. Of late, however, certain scholars have argued that the Pythagorean number doctrine is Aristotelian interpretation, unjustly foisted upon the Pythagoreans. Enlisted in support of their arguments are the fragments of Philolaus of Croton. Here we have the foremost representative of fifth-century Pythagoreanism, who states as his basic principles, not numbers exactly, but ‘limiters’ and ‘unlimiteds’, and who, it is argued, regards number solely as an epistemological aid for understanding the structure of reality. So Philolaus is called upon as a witness against Aristotle. The rationale goes something like this: Aristotle most likely had written sources for his knowledge of Pythagorean teachings; the only texts we know of with any certainty are Philolaus' book and the writings of Archytas; since Aristotle treats Archytas separately, he is mainly relying on Philolaus; because Philolaus does not expressly state that things are numbers, Aristotle's interpretation is wrong. (shrink)

I IntroductionAt Metaphysics Γ 3, Aristotle argues that it belongs to a single discipline, which he calls first philosophy, to investigate both substance and a special class of claims which includes among its members the principle of non-contradiction. At Γ 4, after insisting that the PNC is, strictly speaking, indemonstrable, he sets forth a series of sketches of refutative arguments intended to show how it can, nonetheless, be substantiated. Traditionally, his main refutative argument has been taken to be embedded in (...) the passage which runs from 1006a31 to b34. In that passage, he tries to show that anyone who denies the PNC and who can then be led, by means of an artfully arranged series of questions, to agree to a few seemingly modest theses about the signification of expressions of a certain type — which Aristotle illustrates with the general term ‘man’ — is thereby logically committed to the following modal claim: ‘It is necessary, then, if it is true to say that something is a man, that it be a bipedal animal'. (shrink)

I IntroductionAtMetaphysicsΓ 3, Aristotle argues that it belongs to a single discipline, which he callsfirst philosophy,to investigate both substance and a special class of claims which includes among its members the principle of non-contradiction. At Γ 4, after insisting that the PNC is, strictly speaking, indemonstrable, he sets forth a series of sketches of refutative arguments intended to show how it can, nonetheless, be substantiated. Traditionally, his main refutative argument has been taken to be embedded in the passage which runs (...) from 1006a31 tob34. In that passage, he tries to show that anyone who denies the PNC and who can then be led, by means of an artfully arranged series of questions, to agree to a few seemingly modest theses about the signification of expressions of a certain type — which Aristotle illustrates with the general term ‘man’ — is thereby logically committed to the following modal claim: ‘It is necessary, then, if it is true to say that something is a man, that it be a bipedal animal'. (shrink)

In two of his dialogues especially, the Sophist and the Parmenides, Plato concerns himself at length with problems presented by the Eleatics. Despite difficulties in the interpretation of individual passages, the Sophist has in general proved the less difficult to understand, and since some of the problems at issue in the two works indicate the same or similar preoccupations in Plato's mind, it is worth considering how far an interpretation of the ‘easier’ dialogue can be used to forward an interpretation (...) of the more difficult. First, therefore, we must identify problems common to the two works; then we must see whether we can understand what Plato understood Parmenides to have done—this may help towards an understanding of what he did in fact do; finally we can apply our findings to the Parmenides itself, particularly to the problem of the unity of the dialogue, in the hope that Plato's intentions may become clearer. (shrink)

The notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters. Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and (...) the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a “weak individuator.” A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent, separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 257 - 292 It is commonly assumed that Aristotle defines a sense by reference to its ability to perceive the items that are proper to that sense, and that he explains perceptions of unities of these items, and discriminations between them, by reference to what is called the ‘common sense’. This paper argues in contrast that Aristotle defines a sense by reference, not only to its ability to perceive the proper items, but also (...) to its ability to discriminate between them, and thus aims to show that Aristotle’s theory of sense perception is basically a theory of perceptual discrimination. (shrink)

As is well enough known, the term physis in Empedocles Fr. 8 is cited by Aristotle in the Metaphysics as meaning the ousia of natural things, in the sense of the stable substance or form that is the terminus of generation. This interpretation is rejected almost unanimously by commentators. The three or four attempts to defend it have not proved convincing. The case now seems officially closed. Yet there remain some loose ends. These are of the kind that would keep (...) bothering television detectives and would cause enough loss of sleep to prompt a fresh investigation of a whole case. Is that procedure called for here? (shrink)

Este artículo intenta comparar dos interpretaciones diferentes de la relación entre una capacidad y su correspondiente actualidad en Física III. El autor se concentra en la legitimidad de una distinción entre “capacidad de ser” y “capacidades de devenir”. Esta distinción se aplica a la interpretación de la definición de movimiento de Aristóteles. Mittelmann discute la circularidad que parece resultar de un recurso a “capacidades dinámicas”; luego se propone mostrar que el modo alternativo de construir la posición de Aristóteles por referencia (...) a la actualización incompleta de “capacidades de ser” produce algunas consecuencias contra-intuitivas. El trabajo termina por señalar que ambas estrategias llevan a una alternativa: o la definición aristotélica de movimiento debe aceptarse sin objeciones o debe ser rectificada en el sentido sugerido por W. D. Ross, pero a riesgo de hacer la definición circular. (shrink)

Aristotle’s broad characterization of the soul has been challenged on account of its reliance on the notion of a “potentially alive body”. J. L. Ackrill famously claimed that no body can meet this description without being already actually alive. By a close inspection of both metaphysical and embryological texts, this paper argues that (1) it is embryos (and not fully-formed organic bodies) who provide the right kind of potentially alive subjects and that (2) the schematic character of the soul’s common (...) formula accounts for its seemingly intractable features. It also holds that (3) once the homonymous nature of life is brought into the picture, the κοινότατος λόγος appears unproblematic – at least for some of its most troublesome instances. (shrink)

This paper presents a reading of Metaphysics Z.10–11 according to which both chapters outline two main definienda: forms and material substances or compounds, each of which is governed by its own peculiar constraints. Forms include formal parts alone; furthermore, they are the main definable items and enjoy the strictest possible unity. However, this does not preclude Aristotle from upgrading material compounds to the status of definable items in their own right. Z.10 explains this contention by making the compound’s sensible functional (...) matter dependent on its form. This dependence affords the resulting compound an unusually tight form-matter relationship, strong enough to ensure its definability, despite falling short of the highest kind of unity that only forms display. (shrink)

Discussions of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z tend to treat it either as an independent treatise on substance and essence or as preliminary to the main conclusions of the Metaphysics. I argue instead that Z is central to Aristotle’s project of first philosophy in the Metaphysics: the first philosopher seeks the first causes of being qua being, especially substances, and in Z, Aristotle establishes that essences or forms are the first causes of being of perceptible substances. I also argue that the centrality (...) of Z to first philosophy is compatible with its status as theology. (shrink)

I introduce a methodology for doing the history of philosophy called philosophical modeling. I then employ this methodology to give a theory of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and appearances. This theory models Kant's distinction on the distinction between a constituting object and the object it constitutes.

In this paper I argue that Proclus’ criticism of the causality of Aristotle’s intellect is part of a general attack on Aristotle’s metaphysics. I show how Proclus criticises Aristotle for rejecting the One as a metaphysical principle and the metaphysical confusion that arises from this. Additionally, I claim that for Proclus Aristotle’s understanding of efficient causality differs from Plato’s and I discuss two of his arguments that Aristotle should have accepted the intellect as an efficient cause. As I show throughout, (...) Proclus differs in his approach to Aristotle from the harmonising agenda of Ammonius and Simplicius. (shrink)

Building on previous scholarly work on the mathematical roots of assertoric syllogistic we submit that for Aristotle, the semantic value of the copula in universal affirmative propositions is the relation of divisibility on positive integers. The adequacy of this interpretation, labeled here ‘arithmetical dictum’, is assessed both theoretically and textually with respect to the existing interpretations, especially the so-called ‘mereological dictum’.