Transhumanists and their fellow travelers urge humanity to prioritize the development of biotechnologies that would eliminate aging, delivering ‘an endless summer of literally perpetual youth.’ Aspiring not to age instantiates what philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls the yearning for ‘external transcendence,’ or the fundamental surpassing of human bounds due to confidence that life without them would be better. Based on Immanuel Kant’s account of the parameters of human understanding, I argue that engineering agelessness could not be a rational priority for humanity (...) on the level of public policy. This stance is complemented by an argument focused on individual decision-making in liberal-democratic milieus, where no governing conception of the good is presumed and the first-personal level matters greatly. Here, drawing on philosopher and cognitive scientist Laurie Ann Paul’s concept of ‘transformative experience,’ I maintain that individuals could not ‘rationally,’ meaning, here, ‘prudentially,’ say ‘yes’ to agelessness. Absorbing the irrationality of human zeal to eliminate aging, based on assurance that an ageless existence would be better, should spur a redoubled dedication to human flourishing. (shrink)

For many, striving to attain first place in an athletic competition is explicable. Less explicable is striving to attain first place in a virtue (aretē) competition. Yet this latter dynamic appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. There is 4.3’s magnanimity, the crown of the virtues, which seemingly manifests itself in outdoing one’s peers in virtue. Such one-upmanship also seems operant with 9.8’s praiseworthy self-lover, who seeks to get as much of the fine (to kalon) as possible for herself. Contrary to many (...) interpreters, this paper argues that praiseworthy self-love and magnanimity involve one-upmanship. The relevant exemplars are not simply striving to be the best that they can be in respect to virtue (in virtuous activity), but to be better than others. The paper argues that Aristotle’s axiology, which sets activity (energeia) above state (hexis) and potentiality (dunamis), engenders one-upmanship. For only the level of activity substantially differentiates individuals, settling for inferiority is obviously objectionable, and equal achievement for Aristotle is not static but involves matching and surpassing the achievements of others. The paper concludes that modern discomfort with these dynamics is due to an axiology Nietzsche attributes to Christianity, one that bases human value fundamentally on non-differentiating potentiality. (shrink)

What is a problem? What is problematic about any problem whatsoever, philosophical or otherwise? As the origin of assertion and apodeiction, the problematic suspends the categories of necessity and contingency, possibility and impossibility. And it is this suspension that is the essence of the problem, which is why it is so suspenseful. But then, how is the problem problematic? Only if what is suspended neither comes to presence, nor simply goes out into absence, that is, if the suspension continues, which (...) continues the problem. But what is problematic about suspension? As a consideration of language shows, the problem of suspension is the problem of implication. If being, for example, is merely implied, neither present nor absent, then it is the suspension of both, at least insofar as it is problematic. And this not only says something about language; rather, it has ontological implications as well — it speaks of being, and the being of anything whatsoever. For if being is implied, if that is the problem of being, it is because being is an implication. Then the being of things like problems is implied as well; or being is in things by implication. But what does it mean for being to be neither presence nor absence, but an implication? It means that being is implied in a way that is problematic — before it is necessary, or even possible. For being’s way of being is characterized by suspension — which has implications for thinking and speaking about being, and about things like problems, even about anything whatsoever. And this has implications for what being implies, namely, unity and time and aspect. (shrink)

In this article, I elucidate the significance of Heidegger’s ‘question of being’ from a topological point of view by explaining the relationship between his thought of place and language. After exploring various hermeneutic strategies of reading Heidegger’s oeuvre, I turn to Richard Capobianco’s interpretation of Heidegger and critically engage with his idea of the experience of being itself as the ‘luminous selfshowing of logos’. In doing so, I explain the later turn from ‘truth’ to ‘place’ and articulate why logos needs (...) to be conceived as the gathering site of the presencing of being. In arguing against the primacy of passive receptivity and active projection, I put forward the primacy of language as the topos and logos of being. In returning to the Capobianco-Sheehan debate, I conclude by explaining why Heidegger’s placerelated notions cannot be thought metaphorically. (shrink)

Статтю присвячено аналізу та визначенню топосу як філософського поняття. В античній логіці і риториці топос був артикульований як метафора для характеристики «місць», де дослідник міг знайти аргументи відповідно до теми. Показано, що формування думки з певної проблеми відбувається за допомогою топосів, які організовують мисленнєвий простір, підтверджуються соціальним досвідом і беруть участь у конструюванні соціального світу. Топос є елементом мисленнєвої схеми, яка організована в логіці просторового сприйняття світу. Топологічна стратегія дослідження соціальних явищ враховує не лише характеристики самих об’єктів аналізу, а й (...) контексти і соціокультурне середовище, в яке вони вписані. У соціальній топології поняття «топос» постає конвенціональним і залежить від зміни умов, які формують і приймають діючі соціальні суб’єкти. Топос розглядається як межа, рамка об’єкта аналізу. Межі не є самодостатніми, а визначаються через відношення до іншого простору, як перехід з одного простору в інший. (shrink)

This article concerns the problem of time pressures in higher education from the perspective of Newtonian (clock)time and pedagogical action. While most recent critiques of contemporary time pressures turn to alternative time theories in place of Newtonian temporality, the current paper outlines a way to conceive education from a Newtonian time perspective while also retaining theorizations of education as a form of cyclical and uncertain interaction. Time is theorized as changes in the immediate present which transform an uncertain and potential (...) future to an evident and permanent past in a Newtonian-linear temporal framework. Education, on the other hand, is defined as pedagogical influence to foster student’s human growth, demonstrated in a teaching–studying–learning relationship. Slow education theories and strategies are proposed as a way to reclaim time for education from the accelerative time policies of HE from within a linear time perspective instead of having to propose alternative time theories to ‘free’ education from its rootedness in the temporality of past, present, and future. (shrink)

I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary beliefs, whereas a proper understanding of reasoning excludes that our awareness of reasons consists in beliefs. In the first three sections, I set forth five claims that realists standardly make, explain some assumptions I make concerning reasoning, and show why realism, so understood, cannot accommodate the truism that we (...) reason with reasons. I then consider two proposals for how to avoid the problem. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Almost all philosophers recognize the fundamental importance of the Phenomenology of Spirit. But Hegel's way of thinking and speaking—which he names, “speculative”—needs explaining. The example of “the speculative sentence” is helpful—for here, speculating means implying, that is, neither bringing meaning to presence nor keeping it in absence; but rather, speaking and thinking by implication. If the history of philosophy, however, overlooks what is implied, then it cannot grasp what is, and what is thought and said in the speculative sentence. (...) Luckily, there is another way: implying that which can neither be said nor left unsaid, neither thought nor unthought. Reinterpreting Hegel's speculative sentence, therefore, for implication, for what is implied—and neither present nor absent—Haas demonstrates how to think and speak speculatively about thinking and speaking, substance and subject, being and becoming, whether in philosophy or not, even if we implicate ourselves thereby. (shrink)

According to L.E.J. Brouwer, there is room for non-definable real numbers within the intuitionistic ontology of mental constructions. That room is allegedly provided by freely proceeding choice sequences, i.e., sequences created by repeated free choices of elements by a creating subject in a potentially infinite process. Through an analysis of the constitution of choice sequences, this paper argues against Brouwer’s claim.

The mantra that "the best way to predict the future is to invent it" (attributed to the computer scientist Alan Kay) exemplifies some of the expectations from the technical and innovative sides of biomedical research at present. However, for technical advancements to make real impacts both on patient health and genuine scientific understanding, quite a number of lingering challenges facing the entire spectrum from protein biology all the way to randomized controlled trials should start to be overcome. The proposal in (...) this chapter is that philosophy is essential in this process. By reviewing select examples from the history of science and philosophy, disciplines which were indistinguishable until the mid-nineteenth century, I argue that progress toward the many impasses in biomedicine can be achieved by emphasizing theoretical work (in the true sense of the word 'theory') as a vital foundation for experimental biology. Furthermore, a philosophical biology program that could provide a framework for theoretical investigations is outlined. (shrink)

Was Aristotle the ‘father’ and founder of the epigenesis doctrine? Historically, I will argue, this question must be answered with ‘no’. Aristotle did not initiate and had no access to a debate that described itself in terms of ‘epigenesis’ and ‘preformation’, and thus cannot be considered the ‘father’ or founder of the epigenesis-preformation controversy in a literal sense. But many ancient accounts of reproduction and embryological development contain analogies to what early modern scientist called ‘epigenesis’ and ‘preformation’, and, in this (...) analogous sense, Aristotle can be considered a precursor of the epigenesis-preformation controversy. But is Aristotle’s position actually epigenetic, as most of the traditional interpreters hold, or preformationist, as some of the recent scholars believe? I will argue against the one-sidedness of both readings that Aristotle’s account of reproduction and heredity contains mainly epigenetic, but also a few preformationist characteristics. Whereas, for instance, Aristotle’s idea of a successive development of the embryo’s parts is doubtlessly epigenetic, Aristotle’s idea that the development of the embryo is an actualization and enlargement of potential parts, which are simultaneously present in the semen, can be considered a preformationist feature. (shrink)

Associate Professor | Director and President Department of Philosophy | Molinari Institute 6080 Haley Center, Auburn University Auburn AL 36849 USA email: [email protected] URL: praxeology.net..

Later medieval theories of free choice differ fundamentally as to the importance they assign to deliberation. Some thinkers hold that the will's choices necessarily agree with the intellect's judgment, obtained by deliberation, of what is most worth choosing in a particular circumstance. They thus think that deliberation provides the object of choice. In addition, they take the control that is essential to free choice to be rooted in deliberation. Others object that deliberation cannot ground free choice since it is itself (...) not originally in our control. They think that one can choose differently from what appears most choiceworthy upon deliberation, and so they deny that the object of choice is exclusively given by deliberation. This paper considers theories of the role of deliberation in free choice held by prominent thirteenth and early fourteenth-century thinkers. It will be shown that there are significant theoretical difficulties on both sides. (shrink)

Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have (...) different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an ontological elucidation of change. In the first part, I examine two conceptions of change that can be found in Aristotle'sPhysicsand I hold that one of them is more basic than the other. In the second part, I offer an ontological model of change according to which a change is a kind of conjunction of states and times.According to Aristotle a change,metabolé,isfromsomethingtosomething else. He distinguishes three kinds of changes. One of them is what he calls (...) motion-kinesis-i.e., the transition from a positive termAto a negative termB.Motion in respect to quality is called alteration, in respect to quantity it is known either as increase or as decrease, and in respect to place it is designated by the name of locomotion. (shrink)

One of the remarkable features of recent interest in the work of Louis Althusser has been the prominence granted to Althusser’s cultural criticism. However, aside from one notable exception, Althusser’s cultural criticism has not figured prominently in discussions of his late work, and the absence of Althusser’s cultural criticism from those discussions has perhaps unwittingly obscured both the genealogy of Althusser’s late aesthetic ontology and the logic of his last texts, of ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’ (...) and related writings on aleatory materialism. By tracing the genealogy of the aleatory impulse in Althusser’s cultural criticism, it is possible to show how that work resonates in Althusser’s late texts including the larger unpublished manuscript from which ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’ has been drawn. This reading of the philosophy of the encounter also allows us to understand the importance of Nicolas Malebranche for Althusser’s aleatory materialism. (shrink)

According to L.E.J. Brouwer, there is room for non-definable real numbers within the intuitionistic ontology of mental constructions. That room is allegedly provided by freely proceeding choice sequences, i.e., sequences created by repeated free choices of elements by a creating subject in a potentially infinite process. Through an analysis of the constitution of choice sequences, this paper argues against Brouwer’s claim.

I argue that realism about reasons is incompatible with the possibility of reasoning with reasons, because realists are committed to the claim that we are aware of reasons by way of ordinary belief...

Theologians often reflect on the ethical uses and impacts of artificial intelligence, but when it comes to artificial intelligence techniques themselves, some have questioned whether much exists to discuss in the first place. If the significance of computational operations is attributed rather than intrinsic, what are we to say about them? Ancient thinkers—namely Augustine of Hippo (lived 354–430)—break the impasse, enabling us to draw forth the moral and metaphysical significance of current developments like the “deep neural networks” that are responsible (...) for some of the most remarkable achievements of the past few years. First, Augustine’s theology of the natural world’s rationes seminales makes sense of neural networks’ success by explaining the world as a kaleidoscopic refraction of divine Wisdom rather than as a collection of discrete objects standing in crisp relations. Second, his account of interpretive judgment as a moral act bound up with love reveals how our training and use of AI relates to the Christian’s assimilation to Wisdom. The contingent meaning of the neural network reveals AI’s potential either for standing between us and the world or in some sense facilitating a Christian’s regathering of the created echoes of divine Wisdom throughout his or her journey into the Trinity. (shrink)

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas states that the “aspect of pastness” involved in memory is a certain kind of cognitive object — i.e., an intention — apprehended by the “estimative power.” All told, however, Aquinas mentions this idea precisely once. In this article, I construct an account of the idea that pastness is an estimative intention by drawing upon texts in which I argue that Aquinas develops this idea, albeit without invoking the terminology of the estimative intention. I conclude (...) that, by identifying the aspect of pastness as an estimative intention, Aquinas neatly synthesizes the Aristotelian and Arabic traditions on memory. (shrink)

In this essay, I respond to a problem raised by Sarah Broadie in her 1987 article “Nature, Craft and Phronesis in Aristotle.” Broadie analyzes Aristotle’s famous craft analogy for natural causation in order to determine whether or not it requires importing a psychological dimension to natural teleology. She argues that it is possible to make sense of the analogy without psychology, but that the tradeoff is a conception of craft so thoroughly de-psychologized that it is rendered unrecognizable, perhaps even incoherent (...) as a referent. I dispute this suggestion and argue, rather, that Aristotle’s insistence on removing psychology from the craft side of the analogy points to his prioritization of techne itself, rather than any particular craftsman, as primary efficient agent. The lack of psychology that characterizes a techne ensures stability and reliability in the causal process that could not be guaranteed by the idiosyncratic psychologies of various craftspeople. The same kind of stability and reliability belong to nature as an efficient cause, forming the basis of the comparison between craft and natural teleology. It is therefore the craft, not the craftsman, that must stand as analog to nature. I demonstrate the value of this revision by applying the analogy to the case of natural teleology: reproduction as depicted in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals. The result is a reading of Aristotle’s analogies that can assuage Broadie’s concerns and allow for a natural thing’s own nature to more fully inhabit its intended role as an inner source of change. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problem of divine causation in relation to created agents in general and human rational agents in particular. Beyond creation and conservation, Aquinas specifies divine contribution to created agents’ operation as application in the role of the first cause and the operation of the principal cause employing an instrumental cause. It is especially the latter which is open to varying interpretation and which might be potentially threatening to human freedom. There are different readings of what it (...) is for the secondary agent to “act through the power of the principal cause”. Either the divine cause causes only the existence of the effect of the secondary cause, or it also causes the cause to operate in the sense that it determines its outcome. The latter seems to contradict human freedom. Both readings of Aquinas were developed in the latter half of the sixteenth century within scholastic philosophy and theology. (shrink)

This paper shows how key aspects of Aristotle’s core concepts of matter and motion, some of which have recently been shown to help make sense of quantum mechanical indeterminacy, align with some important results of the energy-momentum relationship of special relativity. In this conception, mobility and indeterminacy are inherently linked to each other and to materiality. Applying these ideas to massless particles, which relativity tells us move at the maximal cosmic speed, allows us to draw the conclusion that they must (...) be the most basic physical bodies, that is, mobile substances. The most familiar massless particle, the photon, constitutes light. Furthermore, because the photon composes luminous matter but cannot be decomposed into anything else more basic, it fulfills the definition of element. (shrink)

One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of (...) several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

I discuss two questions: (1) would Duhem have accepted the thesis of the continuity of scientific methodology? and (2) to what extent is the Oxford tradition of classification/subalternation of sciences continuous with early modern science? I argue that Duhem would have been surprised by the claim that scientific methodology is continuous; he expected at best only a continuity of physical theories, which he was trying to isolate from the perpetual fluctuations of methods and metaphysics. I also argue that the evidence (...) does not support the conclusion that early modern doctrines about mathematics and physics are continuous with the subalternation of sciences from Grosseteste, Bacon, and the theologians of fourteenth-century Oxford. The official and dominant context for early modern scientific methodology seems to have been progressive Thomism, and early modern thinkers seem to have pitted themselves against it. (shrink)

The article examines the debate between, on the one hand, the proponents of the position that European reason and logic are universal and therefore the dialogue between West and East will always be unequal and, on the other hand, the advocates of a pluralistic approach, who defend the equality of parties in the dialogue as well as the independence of cultures and ways of thinking in different regions of the world. The author expands the agenda of the debate, appealing to (...) the authors of the book Dialogue of Cultures in a Globalizing World. In addition, the author clarifies the concept of globalization, used by many participants in the discussion, and also formulates his own understanding of philosophy. The author considers philosophy, firstly, as a way of deconstructing reality that has ceased to respond to the challenges of time, secondly, as a process of the creation of schemes defining new reality and objects and, thirdly, as personal and professional methods for solving these problems. The article also discusses the condition of the comprehension of procedural phenomena. Thus, there is a methodological approach that makes possible, according to Kant, to grasp the essence of complex systemic phenomena. Therefore, the author examines a case in which C.G. Jung talks about one of his own child experiences. The author argues that the conditions of the comprehension of processuality are, on the one hand, the formation of a special integrity that is personality and, on the other hand, its actions, which make it possible to assemble the discrete states identified by the researcher into a single process. The personality is considered as the subject who, starting from ancient culture, aims for independent behavior, partially overcomes social and cultural dependence, begins to build his own world and himself in this world. (shrink)

We present a temporal logic of branching time with four primitive operators: |$\exists {\mathcal {C}}$| – it may change whether; |$\forall {\mathcal {C}} $| – it must change whether; |$\exists \Box $| – it may be endlessly unchangeable that; and |$\forall \Box $| – it must be endlessly unchangeable that. Semantically, operator |$\forall {\mathcal {C}}$| expresses a change in the logical value of the given formula in every state that may be an immediate successor of the one considered, while |$\exists (...) {\mathcal {C}}$| expresses a change in the logical value of the given formula in some state that is a possible immediate successor. |$\forall {\mathcal {C}} $| and |$\exists {\mathcal {C}}$| are not normal operators, they are not mutually definable and have unusual properties: |$\forall {\mathcal {C}} A\leftrightarrow \forall {\mathcal {C}} \neg A$| and |$\exists {\mathcal {C}} A \leftrightarrow \exists {\mathcal {C}} \neg A$| are axioms. Operators |$\exists \Box $| and |$\forall \Box $| express endless unchangeability in some and all paths, respectively. Our axiomatization contains two infinitary rules that allow one to obtain |$\exists \Box A$| from infinitely many combinations of formulas with |$A, \neg, \forall {\mathcal {C}}, \land $|⁠, and to get |$\forall \Box A$| from infinitely many combinations of formulas with |$A, \neg, \exists {\mathcal {C}}, \land $|⁠. We show that our formalism is complete by presenting a bridge between our logic and logic |$\textsf {UB}$|⁠, which is a fragment of |$\textsf {CTL}$| in which until operators does not occur. (shrink)

Infinity and negation are in various relations and interdependencies one to another. The analysis of negation and infinity aims to better understanding them. Semantical, syntactical, and pragmatic issues will be considered.

This thesis is an analysis of the use and definition of the concepts health, well-being and welfare within the field called “the science of animal health and welfare”. The materials used are a literature survey of the field, qualitative interviews with Swedish veterinary surgeons and a study of the concepts in legislation concerning animals in England, Germany and Sweden. The main emphasis has been on theoretical definitions explicitly stated in the different texts or in the interviews. Two ways of distinguishing (...) between animals are used: according to species and according to the role that animals have for humans. As a result it becomes salient whether the definitions have limits with regard to species or role. In the thesis a great number of definitions of the three concepts are interpreted, compared and criticised. As a result a limited number of definitions have been categorised and collected into clusters which fulfil minimal requirements of consistency and practicability. The analysis supports the use of all three concepts – health, well-being and welfare – since they are all needed for making crucial distinctions in the science of animal health and welfare. (shrink)

This article aims to contribute to the understanding of Roy Bhaskar's philosophical evolution from critical realism to the philosophy of meta-Reality. Following Bhaskar's own terminology, I define his intellectual journey as the ‘identification of dualism and duality within non-duality’ by proposing that anti-anthropism plays a key role in the developmental consistency of his system from critical realism via dialectical critical realism to meta-Reality. For this purpose, I compare Bhaskar's philosophy with Andrew Collier's theory of human rationality and spiritual emancipation based (...) on Christianity and Tu Wei-Ming's anthropocosmic understanding of human beings and nature based on Confucianism. (shrink)

This essay will discuss the combined seminars presented in the book “The Greek Imaginary: from Homer to Heraclitus” by Cornelius Castoriadis. In these seminars he dissects Ancient Greek culture, politics, and religion in an investigative and analytic way. Through ancient Greek mythology and the Homeric texts a lot of information can be derived regarding the everyday lives, ideology, and philosophy of the time; all of the aforementioned will be explicated as well as the way Castoriadis specifically interprets certain aspects of (...) ancient Greek life in his own unique way. Additionally, we will look into the language of the texts, the meaning of the French vocabulary that was used at the seminars and the ways in which it can be accurately translated in English. (shrink)

Making a history of the principle of inertia, as of any other principle or concept, is a complex but still possible operation. In this work it has been chosen to make a back story which seemed the most natural way for a reconstruction. On the way back, it has been decided to stop at the 6th century CE with the contribution of Ioannes Philoponus. The principle he stated, although very different from the modern one, is certainly associated with it. Going (...) back in time it is still possible and of course one could proceed to the origins of the homo sapiens who perhaps posed the problem of why a club thrown with his hand could go so far from him. But the similarities that one can find with the modern principle are very vague, too perhaps. Without going so far one could see an embryonic idea of the principle of inertia in the atomistic theory of Democritus in the 5th century BCE. The motion of atoms whirling with no apparent reason can suggest the idea that a body can also move with no reason. But the transition from the atom, a metaphysical being, to the body, an empirical being, is far from immediate. (shrink)

U ovom ću članku razmotriti Aristotelov protreptički argument za nužnost filozofije kako ga je postavio Al-Kindi. Pokazat ću kako muslimanski kritičar filozofije, prvenstveno onaj koji je usklađen s teološkim stajalištima Ibn Hanbala, može s razlogom odbaciti protreptički argument kako ga predstavlja Al-Kindi. Međutim, argument se može preraditi na način da se zaobiđu uobičajene kritike koje iznose protivnici filozofije u stilu Hanbalīja. Dapače, tvrdit ću da je njegova ispravnost neupitna jednom kad se argument pravilno razjasni s obzirom na to kako se (...) treba shvatiti 'filozofiju'. Na kraju ću ukratko raspravljati o tome zašto muslimanski kritičari filozofije ne moraju smatrati protreptički argument problematičnim, budući da neizbježnost filozofije ne zahtijeva privrženost svim vrstama filozofskih pozicija, koliko god one bile problematične za islamsku doktrinu. (shrink)

The question, what measures to address the shortage of transplantable organs are ethically permissible? requires careful attention because, apart from its impact on medical practice, the stance we espouse here reflects our interpretations of human freedom and mortality. To raise the number of available organs, on utilitarian grounds, bioethicists and medical professionals increasingly support mandatory procurement. This view is at odds with the Catechism of the Catholic Church, according to which ‘[o]rgan donation after death is a noble and meritorious act’ (...) but ethically impermissible absent consent. Those who concur with this position, but would oppose conscription on independent philosophical grounds, have not yet found a voice in the Western tradition comparable in strength to the utilitarian basis of the policy’s support, for Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, too, lend themselves to a requirement that we make our organs available to others when they can no longer serve ourselves. One finds an ethical wedge against conscription in an unexpected philosophical locale: the ‘fundamental ontology’ of Heidegger’s Being and Time, where pertinent individual choices arc protectively over what happens post mortem. Heidegger’s perspective on this issue thus meshes, not with other philosophical voices, but with Catholic doctrine—a surprising convergence of atheistic and theistic approaches to our flourishing whose ground I address in the article’s conclusion. (shrink)

In cognitive science, the dynamical systems theory (DST) has recently been advocated as an approach to cognitive modeling that is better suited to the dynamics of cognitive processes than the symbolic/computational approaches are. Often, the differences between DST and the symbolic/computational approach are emphasized. However, alternatively their commonalities can be analyzed and a unifying framework can be sought. In this paper, the possibility of such a unifying perspective on dynamics is analyzed. The analysis covers dynamics in cognitive disciplines, as well (...) as in physics, mathematics and computer science. The unifying perspective warrants the development of integrated approaches covering both DST aspects and symbolic/computational aspects. The concept of a state-determined system, which is based on the assumption that properties of a given state fully determine the properties of future states, lies at the heart of DST. Taking this assumption as a premise, the explanatory problem of dynamics is analyzed in more detail. The analysis of four cases within different disciplines (cognitive science, physics, mathematics, computer science) shows how in history this perspective led to numerous often used concepts within them. In cognitive science, the concepts desire and intention were introduced, and in classical mechanics the concepts momentum, energy and force. Similarly, in mathematics a number of concepts have been developed to formalize the state-determined system assumption [e.g. derivatives (of different orders) of a function, Taylor approximations]. Furthermore, transition systems - a currently popular format for specification of dynamical systems within computer science - can also be interpreted from this perspective. One of the main contributions of the paper is that the case studies provide a unified view on the explanation of dynamics across the chosen disciplines. All approaches to dynamics analyzed in this paper share the state-determined system assumption and the (explicit or implicit) use of anticipatory state properties. Within cognitive science, realism is one of the problems identified for the symbolic/computational approach - i.e. how do internal states described by symbols relate to the real world in a natural manner. As DST is proposed as an alternative to the symbolic/computational approach, a natural question is whether, for DST, realism of the states can be better guaranteed. As a second main contribution, the paper provides an evaluation of DST compared to the symbolic/computational approach, which shows that, in this respect (i.e. for the realism problem), DST does not provide a better solution than the other approaches. This shows that DST and the symbolic/computational approach not only have the state-determined system assumption and the use of anticipatory state properties in common, but also the realism problem. (shrink)

Recent developments in music as well as in the debate on present-day transformations of religion, call for a renewal of the question of ‘sacred music.’ This article poses the question, and suggests a direction in which theory could move in order to understand the ways in which the ancient idea of sacred music remains important for present-day music and for religious reflection. Starting from the observation that theological thinkers tend to have a preference for the music of Mozart, the question (...) is raised how they theoretically substantiate the theological privilege of a music like Mozart’s. As it turns out, the key figure relating music to the sacred is the figure of form, often exemplified by musical melody. The music theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, who has had a significant influence on Jean-Luc Marion, is a case in point. However, as is shown with reference to the musical aesthetics of the early 19th century, this figure is also central to the diametrical opposites of sacred music, being the musically sublime and the ‘religion of music.’ This observation leads to the question how, on a theoretical level, one could distinguish between sacred music and its obverse. As is shown, Marion suggests a new way of understanding the possibility of sacred music, starting from the ideas of the gift and the ‘saturated phenomenon.’ Analysing a key passage from Etant donné, it is argued that the implied shift the from form to the gift does not entirely annul the undecidability of sacred music. But also, it is argues that is does indeed show the importance and challenge that the notion of sacred music implies for both theological-philosophical and musical reflection. (shrink)

‘The mathematisation of time has limits,’ writes Derrida in ‘Ousia and Gramme.’ Taking this quote in all possible senses, this paper considers Derrida’s definition of limit as gramme, trace, and ap...

The article is devoted to the theme of the moral condition during the Black Death epidemic in Florence within Boccaccio’s group of young people in his Decameron. The disease in the region of Florence caused many existential and moral tragedies. A group of young people transferred the joy of life and moral principles to the gardens outside the city of the disease. They describe different moral and philosophical thoughts in their songs at the end of each day.2 These songs represent (...) ten parts of nature and form the basis on which the allegorical character of the works is further developed. They are also carriers of the laws of nature and natural wisdom. (shrink)