Citations of:
Higherorder free logic and the PriorKaplan paradox
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (45):493541 (2016)
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Generalizing on some arguments due to Arthur Prior and Dmitry Mirimanoff, we provide some further limitative results on what can be thought. 



I present a paradoxical combination of desires. I show why it's paradoxical, and consider ways of responding. The paradox saddles us with an unappealing trilemma: either we reject the possibility of the case by placing surprising restrictions on what we can desire, or we deny plausibly constitutive principles linking desires to the conditions under which they are satisfied, or we revise some bit of classical logic. I argue that denying the possibility of the case is unmotivated on any reasonable way (...) 

This paper is an investigation of the general logic of "identifications", claims such as 'To be a vixen is to be a female fox', 'To be human is to be a rational animal', and 'To be just is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies', many of which are of great importance to philosophers. I advocate understanding such claims as expressing higherorder identity, and discuss a variety of different general laws which they might be thought to obey. [New version: (...) 

The thesis examines A.N. Whitehead and B. Russell’s Ramified Theory of Types. It consists of three parts. The first part is devoted to understanding the source of impredicativity implicit in the induction principle. The question I raise here is whether secondorder explicit definitions are responsible for cases when impredicativity turns pathological. The second part considers the interplay between the viciouscircle principle and the noclass theory. The main goal is to give an explanation for the predicative restrictions entailed by the viciouscircle (...) 

This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. / In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truthcharacterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...) 

In truth theory one aims at general formal laws governing the attribution of truth to statements. Gupta’s and Belnap’s revisiontheoretic approach provides various wellmotivated theories of truth, in particular T* and T#, which tame the Liar and related paradoxes without a Tarskian hierarchy of languages. In property theory, one similarly aims at general formal laws governing the predication of properties. To avoid Russell’s paradox in this area a recourse to type theory is still popular, as testified by recent work in (...) 

Propositions are central to at least most theorizing about the connection between our mental lives and the world: we use them in our theories of an array of attitudes including belief, desire, hope, fear, knowledge, and understanding. Unfortunately, when we press on these theories, we encounter a relatively neglected family of paradoxes first studied by Arthur Prior. I argue that these paradoxes present a fatal problem for most familiar resolutions of paradoxes. In particular, I argue that truthvalue gap, contextualist, situation (...) 

