- Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?Kate Nolfi - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):97-121.details
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Reasoning, rationality, and representation.Wade Munroe - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8323-8345.details
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Rationality, Reasoning Well, and Extramental Props.Wade Munroe - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):175-198.details
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Blind rule-following and the ‘antinomy of pure reason’.Alexander Miller - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):396-416.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
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Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):263-327.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Philosophie der Wissenschaftskunst. Philosophiehistorische Beobachtungen zur Bedeutung von Regeln des wissenschaftlichen Sprechens.Thomas Kupka - 2013 - Berichte Zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 36 (1):57-82.details
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Inference and the taking condition.Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):294-302.details
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Does the ‘Missing Fundamental’ Require an Inferentialist Explanation?J. A. Judge - 2017 - Topoi 36 (2):319-329.details
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Regulative Rules: A Distinctive Normative Kind.Reiland Indrek - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
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Rule-following, ideal conditions, and finkish dispositions.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):195-209.details
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Foundational Semantics II: Normative Accounts.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (6):410-421.details
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Against normativism about mental attitudes.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):295-311.details
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Limiting logical pluralism.Suki Finn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4905-4923.details
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The practical rationality of trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
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Why Is a Valid Inference a Good Inference?Sinan Dogramaci - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):61-96.details
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The Construction of Epistemic Normativity.Michael Hannon & Elise Woodard - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Naturalism Meets the Personal Level: How Mixed Modelling Flattens the Mind.Robert D. Rupert - manuscriptdetails
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Metacognitive feelings, self-ascriptions and metal actions.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):145-162.details
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The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - 2020 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.details
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Modality in Brandom's Incompatibility Semantics.Giacomo Turbanti - 2011 - In María Inés Crespo, Dimitris Gakis & Galit Weidman-Sassoon (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Conference - Truth, Meaning, and Normativity. ILLC Publications.details
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And So On. Two Theories of Regress Arguments in Philosophy.Jan Willem Wieland - 2012 - Dissertation, details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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