- What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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Modest Sociality, Minimal Cooperation and Natural Intersubjectivity.Michael Wilby - 2020 - In Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Switzerland: pp. 127-148.details
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Thinking, Acting, Considering.Daniel Muñoz - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):255-270.details
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The Beliefs and Intentions of Buridan's Ass.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2):209-226.details
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A Defence of Intentionalism about Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 775-791.details
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A First-Order Logic Formalization of the Industrial Ontology Foundry Signature Using Basic Formal Ontology.Barry Smith, Farhad Ameri, Hyunmin Cheong, Dimitris Kiritsis, Dusan Sormaz, Chris Will & J. Neil Otte - 2019 - In Barry Smith, Farhad Ameri, Hyunmin Cheong, Dimitris Kiritsis, Dusan Sormaz, Chris Will & J. Neil Otte (eds.), ”, Proceedings of the Joint Ontology Workshops (JOWO), Graz.details
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These confabulations are guaranteed to improve your marriage! Toward a teleological theory of confabulation.Samuel Murray & Peter Finocchiaro - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10313-10339.details
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Indispensability, the Discursive Dilemma, and Groups with Minds of Their Own.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2014 - In Sara Rachel Chant, Frank Hindriks & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), From Individual to Collective Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 137-162.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.details
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Entitlement to Reasons for Action.Abraham Roth - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 75-92.details
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Lucky joint action.Julius Schönherr - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (1):123-142.details
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Discourse and method.Ethan Nowak & Eliot Michaelson - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (2):119-138.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.details
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Pathologies of Agency.Lubomira V. Radoilska - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency.details
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Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Binding and its consequences.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):49-71.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Agential Knowledge, Action and Process.Ben Wolfson - 2012 - Theoria 78 (4):326-357.details
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Folk conceptions of intentional action.Alfred R. Mele - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):281-297.details
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The norms of acceptance.Joëlle Proust - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):316-333.details
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Value Capture.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.details
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Hope: A Solution to the Puzzle of Difficult Action.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-19.details
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How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self‐Control and the Divided Mind.Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2012 - Noûs 48 (1):41-74.details
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Separating Action and Knowledge.Mikayla Kelley - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology.Michael Wilby - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 32 (1).details
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Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Distinct Wrong of Deepfakes.Adrienne de Ruiter - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1311-1332.details
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Two Cheers for “Closeness”: Terror, Targeting and Double Effect.Neil Francis Delaney - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335-367.details
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Planning and the stability of intention: A comment.Laura DeHelian & Edward F. McClennen - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (3):319-333.details
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Speaker meaning.Wayne Davis - 1992 - Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (3):223 - 253.details
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On Margaret Gilbert's Rights and Demands.Stephen Darwall - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):499-504.details
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The ethical obligation of the dead donor rule.Anne L. Dalle Ave, Daniel P. Sulmasy & James L. Bernat - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (1):43-50.details
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Episodic memory for human-like agents and human-like agents for episodic memory.Cyril Brom, Jiří Lukavský & Rudolf Kadlec - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2):227-244.details
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Creatures of Darkness.Sam Cumming - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):379-400.details
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Are bygones bygones?Robin Cubitt, Maria Ruiz-Martos & Chris Starmer - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (2):185-202.details
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Symposium on ''Cognition and Rationality: Part I'' Relationships between rational decisions, human motives, and emotions. [REVIEW]Cristiano Castelfranchi, Francesca Giardini & Francesca Marzo - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (2):173-197.details
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Global Individualism and Group Agency.Aluizio Couto - 2021 - Philosophia 51 (1):1-20.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.details
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Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.details
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Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions.Randolph Clarke - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391-409.details
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Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
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Instrumentally Rational Myopic Planning.Chrisoula Andreou - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (2):133-145.details
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Failed-Art and Failed Art-Theory.Christy Mag Uidhir - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):381-400.details
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Cognitive control, intentions, and problem solving in skill learning.Wayne Christensen & Kath Bicknell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-36.details
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The Normative Requirement of Means-End Rationality and Modest Bootstrapping.Luis Cheng-Guajardo - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (3):487-503.details
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