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Thick Evaluation.T. Kirchin Simon - 2014 - Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.details
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Exclusion in Morality.Lei Zhong - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):275-290.details
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Sensibility and moral values in Mengzi’s metaethics.Meng Zhang - 2022 - Asian Philosophy 32 (3):312-330.details
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The indifference argument.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):91 - 124.details
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Science and ethics: Demarcation, holism and logical consequences.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (1):126-138.details
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Normativity and the Metaphysics of Mind.Nick Zangwill - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1–19.details
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Kant on Pleasure in the Good.Nick Zangwill - 2021 - Disputatio 13 (62):181-188.details
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Sturgeon and Brink on Moral Explanations.Ken Yasenchuk - 1994 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (4):483-502.details
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Self-Consciousness in Animals: Advantages and Problems of a Multipronged Approach.Florian Leonhard Wüstholz - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):1-18.details
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Should morality be abolished? An empirical challenge to the argument from intolerance.Jennifer Cole Wright & Thomas Pölzler - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):350-385.details
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‘Ought’-contextualism beyond the parochial.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):3099-3119.details
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Prospects for non-cognitivism.Catherine Wilson - 2001 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):291 – 314.details
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Euthyphro and Moral Realism: A Reply to Harrison.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2016 - Sophia 55 (3):437-449.details
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Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism.Christopher Gregory Weaver - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (1):3-24.details
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Moral inferentialism and the Frege-Geach problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.details
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I Ought, Therefore I Can.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):167-216.details
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Consequentialism and the causal efficacy of the moral.Andrea Viggiano - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2927-2944.details
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Moore’s Open Question Maneuvering: A Qualified Defense.Jean-Paul Vessel - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):91-117.details
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Re-evaluating the hiddenness argument from above.Kevin Vandergriff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2):193-211.details
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“Response-dependence, rigidification, and objectivity”, erkenntnis 44 (1995): 101-112.Peter Vallentyne - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (1):101 - 112.details
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Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement?Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1437-1454.details
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Moral Theory and Theorizing in Health Care Ethics.Hugh Upton - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (4):431-443.details
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Can the Canberrans’ Supervenience Argument Refute Shapeless Moral Particularism?Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):545-560.details
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Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Theoria 80 (2):184-190.details
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Formulating Moral Objectivity.Elizabeth Tropman - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):1023-1040.details
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Evolutionary debunking arguments: moral realism, constructivism, and explaining moral knowledge.Elizabeth Tropman - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):126-140.details
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Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?Elizabeth Tropman - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):26-46.details
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De dicto internalist cognitivism.Jon Tresan - 2006 - Noûs 40 (1):143–165.details
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Jurisprudential Theories and First‐Order Legal Judgments.Kevin Toh - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):457-471.details
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An argument against the social fact thesis (and some additional preliminary steps towards a new conception of legal positivism).Kevin Toh - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (5):445 - 504.details
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On the epistemic status of considered moral judgments.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):97-129.details
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On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgments.Mark Timmons - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):97-129.details
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Irrealism and error in ethics.Mark Timmons - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (3-4):373-406.details
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Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”.John J. Tilley - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.details
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Motivation and practical reasons.John J. Tilley - 1997 - Erkenntnis 47 (1):105-127.details
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Butler's Stone.John J. Tilley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4): 891–909.details
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The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscience.Folke Tersman - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):389 – 405.details
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Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):55-72.details
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À la rescousse du platonisme moral.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (3):531-556.details
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Introduction.Christine Tappolet & Daniel Weinstock - 2001 - Philosophiques 28 (1):3-8.details
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La nature des normes.Christine Tappolet & Daniel Weinstock - 2001 - Philosophiques 28 (1):3.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2016 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.details
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Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.details
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The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.details
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Realist Ethical Naturalism for Ethical Non-Naturalists.Ryan Stringer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):339-362.details
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Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.details
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Are normative properties descriptive properties?Bart Streumer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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