- The Normativity of Rationality, by Benjamin Kiesewetter.Conor McHugh - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1245-1253.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.details
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Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism.Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.details
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Acting for the right reasons.Julia Markovits - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):201-242.details
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Norms for emotions: biological functions and representational contents.Matteo Mameli - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):101-121.details
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Norms for emotions: Biological functions and representational contents.Matteo Mameli - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):101-121.details
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On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Free will and the necessity of the present.Roberto Loss - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):63-69.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality.Errol Lord - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.details
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The real symmetry problem for wide-scope accounts of rationality.Errol Lord - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):443-464.details
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Précis of The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):452-456.details
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On Treating Something as a Reason for Action.Clayton Littlejohn - 2008 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-5.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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Evidence and armchair access.Clayton Mitchell Littlejohn - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):479-500.details
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Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38.details
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Normativity and self-relations.Yair Levy - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):359-374.details
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Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake?Yair Levy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):2021-2038.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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Political Realism as Methods not Metaethics.Jonathan Leader Maynard - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (3):449-463.details
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Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning.Sven Lauer & Cleo Condoravdi - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):584-621.details
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Making „Reasons " Explicit. How Normative is Brandom's Inferentialism?Daniel Laurier - 2008 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 13 (1):127-145.details
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Intentional Normativism Meets Normative Supervenience and the Because Constraint.Daniel Laurier - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):315-331.details
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Aesthetic obligations.Robbie Kubala - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (12):e12712.details
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The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief.Thomas Kroedel - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):741–751.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
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Reply to Bridges.Niko Kolodny - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):369-376.details
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Promises and Practices Revisited.Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):119-154.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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Literal force : a defence of conventional assertion.Max Kölbel - 2009 - In Sarah Sawyer (ed.), New Waves in Philosophy of Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.details
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What’s the matter with Huck Finn?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):70-87.details
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Reasoning as a source of justification.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.details
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Perceptual Fundamentalism and a priori bootstrapping.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2087-2103.details
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How you know you are not a brain in a vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.details
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Appearances, Rationality, and Justified Belief.Alexander Jackson - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):564-593.details
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Discussion??The guise of a reason?Nadeem Jz Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.details
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Requirements, Oughts, Intentions.John Horty - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):220-229.details
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Rational Requirements and 'Rational' Akrasia.Edward S. Hinchman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):529-552.details
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Reasons and impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.details
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Why be yourself? Kantian respect and Frankfurtian identification.Tim Henning - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):725-745.details
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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.details
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Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.details
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Norms of Inquiry.Eliran Haziza - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (12):e12952.details
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Some more thoughts on semantic oughts: A reply to Daniel Whiting.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):54-63.details
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Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.details
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