- Moderatism and Truth.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):271-287.details
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Motivating (Underdetermination) Scepticism.Guido Tana - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):243-272.details
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The insignificance of philosophical skepticism.Jonathan Dixon - 2022 - Synthese 200 (485):1-22.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Skepticism and the Digital Information Environment.Matthew Carlson - 2021 - SATS 22 (2):149-167.details
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Underdetermination and closure: Thoughts on two sceptical arguments.Martin Smith - 2022 - In Duncan Pritchard & Matthew Jope (ed.), New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure. Routledge.details
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Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.details
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(2 other versions)The sources of scepticism.Duncan Pritchard & Vicente Raga Rosaleny - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60.details
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The Self-Hollowing Problem of the Radical Sceptical Paradox.Changsheng Lai - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1269-1288.details
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Does Skepticism Presuppose Explanationism?James R. Beebe - 2017 - In Kevin McCain & Ted Poston (eds.), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 173-187.details
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(1 other version)Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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(1 other version)The Power of Appearances.Nenad Popovic - forthcoming - Brill.details
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(1 other version)Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Radical Scepticism, How-Possible Questions and Modest Transcendental Arguments.Ju Wang - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (2):210-226.details
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Ignorance and Epistemic Contextualism.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2016 - In Blome-Tillmann Michael (ed.), The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press. pp. 96-113.details
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Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology.James R. Beebe & Jake Monaghan - 2018 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-70.details
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Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard & Chris Ranalli - 2017 - In Derek Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Agency.Jill Claudia Rusin - 2002 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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Closure and Underdetermination Again.Ju Wang - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1129-1140.details
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Petitio Principii: A Bad Form of Reasoning.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):fzt086.details
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Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.Joshua May - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):341-359.details
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Sceptical Scenarios Are Not Error-Possibilities.Tim Kraft - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):59-72.details
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Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility.Luca Moretti - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.details
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Introduction.Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi & Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):221-234.details
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Two skeptical arguments or only one?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.details
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The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.details
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Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism.Jochen Briesen - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.details
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Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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We Can't Know.Markus Lammenranta - 2020 - In Steven B. Cowan (ed.), Problems in Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates. Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 38-51.details
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Scepticism, closure and rationally grounded knowledge: a new solution.Ju Wang - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2357-2374.details
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Occam’s Razor, Dogmatism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):1-29.details
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Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism.Kevin McCain - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2):120-139.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2020 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 18 (3).details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.details
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Semantic self-knowledge and the vat argument.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2289-2306.details
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How I Know I'm Not a Brain in a Vat.José L. Zalabardo - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:65-88.details
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The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.details
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Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Principles and Sceptical Arguments: Closure and Underdetermination.Cameron Boult - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1125-1133.details
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Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility.Claudio Almeida - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):197-215.details
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(1 other version)Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Semantic Externalism, and Justified Belief about the External World.Hamid Alaeinejad - 2020 - Philosophical Readings 12 (3).details
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Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments.Mikael Janvid - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):63-77.details
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