- Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Value taxonomy.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2015 - In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), Handbook of Value: Perspectives From Economics, Neuroscience, Philosophy, Psychology and Sociolog. Oxford University Press. pp. 23-42.details
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The Authority Account of Prudential Options.Keith Horton - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):17-35.details
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Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences.Mauro Rossi - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):82-98.details
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Summary.L. S. Temkin - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):265-291.details
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(1 other version)Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.details
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A Moorean View of the Value of Lives.Kris McDaniel - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.details
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Value Relations Revisited.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2012 - Economics and Philosophy 28 (2):133-164.details
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Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Intentional Endorsement.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):155-172.details
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(2 other versions)An Extended Framework for Preference Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):360-367.details
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On Normativity.Michael Smith - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):715-731.details
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Anti-perfectionisms and autonomy.Ben Colburn - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):247-256.details
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Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice.Martijn Boot - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):75 - 92.details
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(1 other version)Breaking ties: The significance of choice in symmetrical moral dilemmas.Carla Bagnoli - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):157–170.details
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How to be indifferent.Sebastian Liu - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Moral Uncertainty, Pure Justifiers, and Agent-Centred Options.Patrick Kaczmarek & Harry R. Lloyd - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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How to Read a Representor.Edward Elliott - forthcoming - Ergo.details
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Perfect Freedom and God's Hard Choices.Luke Wilson - 2022 - Faith and Philosophy 39 (2):291-312.details
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Conflicts of Rights and Action‐Guidingness.Cristián Rettig & Giulio Fornaroli - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (2):136-152.details
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Social Choice, Nondeterminacy, and Public Reasoning.Anders Herlitz & Karim Sadek - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (3):377-401.details
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An Ignorance Account of Hard Choices.Daniel Https://Orcidorg624X Villiger - 2022 - Res Philosophica 99 (3):321-337.details
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Parity and the Resolution of Value Conflicts in Design.Atay Https://Orcidorg Kozlovski - 2022 - Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (2):1-18.details
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Can Parfit’s Appeal to Incommensurabilities Block the Continuum Argument for the Repugnant Conclusion?Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2019 - In Paul Bowman & Katharina Berndt Rasmussen (eds.), Studies on Climate Ethics and Future Generations, Vol. 1. Institute for Futures Studies.details
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How to (Consistently) Reject the Options Argument.Stephen M. Campbell, Joseph A. Stramondo & David Wasserman - 2021 - Utilitas 33 (2):237-245.details
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Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
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Hard Environmental Choices: Comparability, Justification and the Argument from Moral Identity.Espen Dyrnes Stabell - 2021 - Environmental Values 30 (1):111-130.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
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Betterness of permissibility.Benjamin Ferguson & Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2451-2469.details
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Vagueness and Indeterminacy in Metaethics.Tom Dougherty - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 185-193.details
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Indeterminate Oughts.J. Robert G. Williams - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):645-673.details
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Incommensurability and vagueness.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.details
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(1 other version)Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):731-753.details
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How to Be an Ethical Expressivist.Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):47-81.details
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Comparing Suffering Across Species.John Nolt - 2013 - Between the Species 16 (1):8.details
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Practically Equal: An Analysis of the Practical Nature of Equality and Incomparability. [REVIEW]David Pinkowski - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):457-470.details
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Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle.Erik Carlson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.details
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In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):317-327.details
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Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument.Johan E. Gustafsson & Nicolas Espinoza - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763.details
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Value relations.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2008 - Theoria 74 (1):18-49.details
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(2 other versions)An extended framework for preference relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):101-108.details
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No Outcome Is Good, Bad, or Evaluatively Neutral for Anyone.Michael Rabenberg - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-17.details
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Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity.Michael Klenk - 2021 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 13 (2).details
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Axiological Retributivism and the Desert Neutrality Paradox.Tim Campbell - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (4):80.details
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On the Ranking of Teams.Stephen Kershnar & James Delaney - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):567-579.details
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Putting costs and benefits of ordeals together.Anders Herlitz - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (1):37-49.details
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Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.details
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Spectrum Arguments, Parity and Persistency.Anders Herlitz - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):463-481.details
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Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.details
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Can Every Option Be Rationally Impermissible?Chrisoula Andreou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1309-1317.details
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Superhard Choices.Miguel F. Dos Santos - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):248-265.details
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