- Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Is scientific theory change similar to early cognitive development? Gopnik on science and childhood.Tim Fuller - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):109 - 128.details
|
|
Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action.Thomas Müller (ed.) - 2014 - Wien, Austria: Springer.details
|
|
Computational Complexity Theory and the Philosophy of Mathematics†.Walter Dean - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):381-439.details
|
|
Minimal Rationality and the Web of Questions.Daniel Hoek - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Dynamic Solution to the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Mattias Skipper & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):501-521.details
|
|
Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.details
|
|
Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
|
|
The assumptions on knowledge and resources in models of rationality.Pei Wang - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (01):193-218.details
|
|
On the computational complexity of ethics: moral tractability for minds and machines.Jakob Stenseke - 2024 - Artificial Intelligence Review 57 (105):90.details
|
|
Simple heuristics meet massive modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Inquiry, reasoning and the normativity of logic.van Remmen Maximilian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-28.details
|
|
Preface Writers are Consistent.Roger Clarke - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (3):362-381.details
|
|
How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
|
|
Self-deception, intentions and the folk-psychological explanation of action (in Croatian).Marko Jurjako - 2020 - Prolegomena: Časopis Za Filozofiju 19 (1):91-117.details
|
|
Rationalising belief.Mark Leon - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):299-314.details
|
|
Epistemic competence.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.details
|
|
Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.details
|
|
Taking the intentional stance seriously.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379-390.details
|
|
Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378-379.details
|
|
A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-378.details
|
|
Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-377.details
|
|
Content and consciousness versus the International stance.Alexander Rosenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-376.details
|
|
Intentions and adaptations.H. L. Roitblat - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-375.details
|
|
International plovers or just dump brids?Carolyn A. Ristau - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-375.details
|
|
The International stance faces backward.Howard Rachlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-373.details
|
|
Dennett's rational animals: And how behavorism overlooked them.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372-373.details
|
|
Parlez-vous baboon, Bwana Sherlock?E. W. Menzel - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):371-372.details
|
|
Adaptation and satisficing.John Maynard Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):370-371.details
|
|
Intentions as goads.David McFarland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):369-370.details
|
|
The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368-369.details
|
|
Elementary errors about evolution.Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):367-368.details
|
|
Dennett' “Panglossian paradigm”.Alison Jolly - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-367.details
|
|
The adaptiveness_ of _mentalism?.Nicholas Humphrey - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-366.details
|
|
Belief accripton, parsimony, and rationality.John Hell - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-366.details
|
|
Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-365.details
|
|
Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.details
|
|
Denoting and demoting international systems.George Graham - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):363-364.details
|
|
Lloyd Morgan's canon in evolutionary context.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):362-363.details
|
|
A la recherche du docteur Pangloss.Niles Eldredge - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):361-362.details
|
|
Adaptationism was always predictive and needed no defense.Richard Dawkins - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):360-361.details
|
|
Science as an international system.Arthur C. Danto - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):359-360.details
|
|
Dennett' instrumentalism: A frog at the bottom of the mug.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):358-359.details
|
|
Cognitive ethology: Theory or poetry?Jonathan Bennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):356-358.details
|
|
Rationality: putting the issue to the scientific community.John Beatty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):355-356.details
|
|
Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.details
|
|
The case for massively modular models of mind.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
|
|
Ingeniería inversa y cognición: ¿algunas remembranzas panglossianas?Jonathan Echeverri & Liliana Chaves - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (155):145-170.details
|
|
Reverse engineering and cognition panglossian memories?Jonathan Echeverri Álvarez & Liliana Chaves Castaño - 2014 - Ideas Y Valores 63 (155):145-170.details
|
|