- Foundational Grounding and Creaturely Freedom.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1108-1130.details
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Substance Causation.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (1):287-308.details
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Free will and control: a noncausal approach.David Palmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10043-10062.details
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The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):161-178.details
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Is it all just a matter of luck?Timothy O'connor - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):157 – 161.details
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How Do We Know That We Are Free?Timothy O’Connor - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):79-98.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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Degrees of freedom.Timothy O'Connor - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):119 – 125.details
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Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Can Self-Forming Actions Dispel Worries about Luck?Brendan Murday - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1313-1330.details
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Emergent Agent Causation.Juan Morales - 2023 - Synthese 201:138.details
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Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1459-1477.details
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Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
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Free will and paranormal beliefs.Ken Mogi - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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“Let’s build an Anscombe box”: assessing Anscombe’s rebuttal of the statistics objection against indeterminism-based free agency.Thomas Müller - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-22.details
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Is Agent-Causal Libertarianism Unintelligible?Stephen D. Mizell - 2020 - Philosophia Reformata 85 (1):1-19.details
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The sweet mystery of compatibilism.Eugene Mills - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):50 - 61.details
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The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?Kristin M. Mickelson - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):705-722.details
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
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On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
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Moral responsibility and the continuation problem.Alfred R. Mele - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):237-255.details
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Luck and Free Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):543-557.details
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Libertarianism and Human Agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):72-92.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
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Deciding: how special is it?Alfred R. Mele - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):359-375.details
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Decisions, intentions, and free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.details
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Can one decide to do something without forming an intention to do it?John McGuire - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):269-278.details
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Causal pluralism: agent causation without the panicky metaphysics.Joseph Martinez - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-21.details
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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.details
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Zimmerman’s The Immorality of Punishment: A Critical Essay. [REVIEW]Neil Levy - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (1):103-112.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Luck and Agent-Causation: A Response to Franklin.Neil Levy - 2015 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 9 (4):779-784.details
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Hodgson, David., Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will.Neil Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):183-192.details
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Determinist deliberations.Neil Levy - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):453-459.details
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Bad Luck Once Again.Neil Levy - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):749-754.details
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Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.details
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Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.details
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Kane, Pereboom, and Event-Causal Libertarianism.John Lemos - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):607-623.details
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The Metaphysical Requirement for Models of Prediction and Explanationist Approaches to the Problem of Induction.Jaeho Lee - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):225-242.details
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What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
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Agent Causation, Realist Metaphysics of Powers, and the Reducibility Objection.Davis Kuykendall - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1563-1581.details
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Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.details
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Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.details
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The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.details
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A Challenge for Soft Line Replies to Manipulation Cases.Gerald K. Harrison - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):555-568.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.details
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