- The Quality of Life: Aristotle Revised, by Richard Kraut.Daniel M. Haybron - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):947-956.details
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Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing.Euan Hans Metz - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Readingdetails
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Two Visions of Welfare.Fred Feldman - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (2):99-118.details
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The Experience Machine and the Experience Requirement.Jennifer Hawkins - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 355-365.details
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Why Trolley Problems Matter for the Ethics of Automated Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):293-307.details
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Welfarism.Ben Bramble - 2021 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd print edition. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1043-1063.details
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Reflective blindness, depression and unpleasant experiences.Elizabeth Ventham - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):684-693.details
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Is Rawls Really a Kantian Contractarian?Baldwin Wong - 2016 - Public Reason 8 (1-2).details
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Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure.Eden Lin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):510-524.details
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Moral Considerability and the Argument from Relevance.Oscar Horta - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (3):369-388.details
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Eliminating Prudential Reasons.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257.details
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Demandingness Objections in Ethics.Brian McElwee - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (266):84-105.details
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Children and Well-Being.Anthony Skelton - 2018 - In Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder & Jurgen de Wispelaere (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children. New York: Routledge. pp. 90-100.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Lopsided Lives.Theron Pummer - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 275-296.details
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Happiness in prison.Sabrina Intelisano - unknowndetails
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The Misfortunes of Moral Enhancement.Marco Antonio Azevedo - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (5):461-479.details
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Debunking Arguments: Mathematics, Logic, and Modal Security.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Michael Ruse & Robert J. Richards (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Do evolutionary debunking arguments rest on a mistake about evolutionary explanations?Andreas L. Mogensen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1799-1817.details
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A Contemporary Account of Sensory Pleasure.Murat Aydede - 2018 - In Lisa Shapiro (ed.), Pleasure: A History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 239-266.details
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Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect.Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson - 2018 - In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), Philosophy of Pain. London: Routledge. pp. 27-59.details
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Pleasure and Its Contraries.Olivier Massin - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):15-40.details
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How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal.Murat Aydede - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (1):119-133.details
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The Proper Pursuit of Happiness.Daniel M. Haybron - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (3):387-411.details
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Is it Better to Love Better Things?Aaron Smuts - 2014 - In Christian Maurer, Tony Milligan & Kamila Pacovská (eds.), Love and Its Objects: What Can We Care For? Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Normative Reasons for Love, Part I.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):507-517.details
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(1 other version)Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Frustrating Problem For Four-Dimensionalism.A. P. Taylor - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1097-1115.details
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Classifying theories of welfare.Christopher Woodard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):787-803.details
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Pleasurably Regarding the Pain of Fictional Others.Aaron Smuts - manuscriptdetails
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Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?Glen Pettigrove - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (3):191-207.details
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The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.details
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In Defense of the No-Reasons View of Love.Aaron Smuts - details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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(1 other version)Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.details
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What do our intuitions about the experience machine really tell us about hedonism?Sharon Hewitt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.details
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Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2010 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.details
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The feels good theory of pleasure.Aaron Smuts - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):241-265.details
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Intuitions and Values: Re-assessing the classical arguments against quantitative hedonism.David Lanius - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):53-84.details
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No Theory-Free Lunches in Well-Being Policy.Gil Hersch - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):43-64.details
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You Oughta Know: A Defence of Obligations to Learn.Teresa Bruno-Niño & Preston J. Werner - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):690-700.details
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Action always involves attention.Wayne Wu - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):693-703.details
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Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule.Katharina Berndt Rasmussen - 2013 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Introduction.Daniel Star - 2018 - In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Taking Pleasure in the Good and Well-Being: the Harmless Pleasures Objection.James J. Delaney - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):281-294.details
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Higher and Lower Pleasures Revisited: Evidence from Neuroscience.Roger Crisp & Morten Kringelbach - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (2):211-215.details
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Objectivism about animal and alien well-being.Moore Andrew - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):328-336.details
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